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ABSTRACT
The necessity of considering the scope of martial law impressed 
me forcibly when President Iskander Mirza published his Proclamation 
of 7 October, 1958 j abrogating the Constitution of Pakistan and 
declaring "martial law" throughout the country. Before considering 
the nature of the present regime in Pakistan, I thought it proper to 
inquire what had previously been regarded as the justification and 
scope of martial law, for without a clear conception of the foundations 
upon which this rests, any comments on the aspects of the present 
"martial rulef-- in Pakistan would be superficial and might be dismissed 
as inaccurate.
I was thus prompted to consider the origin of martial law in the 
Commonwealth and the United States of America, and the various 
meanings which have been assigned to it in these countries. To find 
the true limits of powers exercised by the Armed Forces when martial 
law is declared, it was considered necessary to discuss the extent of 
the executive discretionary powers exercised on less dangerous occasions, 
such as riot and other ordinary breaches of peace, as well as during 
war which demands the sacrifice of life and property of the citizen.
A consideration of the decisions of the Commonwealth and American 
courts and the opinions of jurists and lawyers makes it evident &hat 
the executive or military claim to assume unlimited powers has not been 
conceded. To allow complete freedom of action for the purpose of 
restoring peace and order does not necessarily confer liberty to 
commit any excesses. For as soon as martial law is withdrawn, every
officer is liable to criminal and civil proceedings for his acts 
which may be alleged to have been unnecessary or not done in good 
faith.
Chapter I is introductory and discusses the origin of martial 
law in England and the circumstances which led to the declaration in 
the Petition of Right, 1628, forbidding the application of martial 
law in England in time of peace. Chapter II relates the controversies 
among the judges and lawyers as to the true scope and meaning of 
martial law and considers whether it may be proclaimed in England 
today. The question whether martial law is derived from the common 
law power to repel force by force or from the Crown's prerogative is 
discussed. Chapter III deals with the application of martial law in 
the Commonwealth, especially in India during British rule. A few 
pages have been devoted to the consideration of the declaration of a 
"state of siege" under French constitutional law. Martial law has so 
frequently been applied in America by the State authorities that the 
whole of Chapter IV was necessary to consider the state of law in 
that country.
Chapter V deals h general problems which normally arise in 
connection with the maintenance of law and order in cases of ordinary 
breaches of peace. The precise limits of executive powers and the 
scope of judicial control have been considered in Chapters VI and VII. 
The exercise of war powers and the claim to uphold the Constitution 
under the stress of 'total war', such as the two preceding World wars 
required, have been considered in detail in Chapters VIII and IX.
Chapters X and XI deal exclusively with the recent application 
of "martial law" in Pakistan. The nature of "martial law" as now 
applied in Pakistan is so different from the ordinary conception of 
martial law that its discussion had to he postponed till the end.
The Conclusion finds its place in Chapter XII.
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CHAPTER I
THE MEANING OF "MARTIAL LAW"
1. Some Early Definitions
As an expression though not as a phenomenon "martial law” is 
familiar to all. But the term has been used in an off-hand manner, so 
that to discover its true and proper meaning one has to take particular 
care. As martial law is a concept of British Constitutional Law, 
before examining its scope and content elsewhere it will be necessary 
first to note the definitions assigned to it in English sources, for 
when considering the use of the expression in other countries, 
differences in meaning wall be apparent.
(a) Martial Law is no law. In England, martial lax/ has had an 
eventful history and as has been rightly remarked, "to unravel the 
knotted threads of the subject one must start a long way backn.(l) 
Martial law, originally spelt "marshal lax/", the law administered in 
the Court of the Constable and the Marshal of England, x/as recognised 
by statute as early as the reign of Richard II, nearly the end of the 
fourteenth century. From the early applications of the law it is hard 
to reach any definite conclusions about its nature and substance.
Perhaps due to its historical origin no serious attempt x/as made to 
authoritatively define it, though early efforts to describe what is
(l) Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and Insurrection, 23 Illinois Lax/ 
Review 766,
martial law ill, no doubt, be discernible. Another reason for the 
paucit5r of definitions is provided by the unwillingness of the common 
law lawyers to characterise it as lax*. According to their views martial 
law was not properly law but something which was a negation of law. It 
would seem strange that no less an authority than Sir Ms/thew Hale described 
martial law as not in, in truth and reality, a law, but something 
indulged rather than allowed as a law; the necessity of government, 
order and discipline in an army only gave these laws a countenance.(2)
If we accept the proposition that martial law is no law, but Something 
indulged rather than allowed as law1, it will be difficult to find 
positive principles governing its exercise. It will, in fact, be 
difficult to maintain that martial law is a legal concept at all. 
Traditionally, however, martial lax* has been recognised as a power 
vested in the Administrator by the common lax* or as a prerogative of the 
King and no student of constitutional law or history could deny its 
existence as a legal and factual phenomenon, since the simple fact that 
martial lax* exists has been recognised by the courts. While refeiring 
to such asseverations made by numerous English authorities which reach far
(2) Hale, History of the Common Law, p*54* Similarly, Blackstone 
said: “Martial lax* is built on no settled principles, but is
entirely arbitrary in its decisions, and is in truth no law, but 
something indulged rather than allowed as lax*, a temporary 
excrescence bred out of the distemper of the State and not any part 
of the permanent and perpetual lax*s of the kingdom. The necessity 
of order and discipline is the only thing which can give it 
countenance and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of 
peace when the King1 s courts are open for all persons to receive 
justice according to the lax* of the land11. Book I. p.414*
3.
down into the nineteenth century as “martial law has no place whatsoever 
in this realm”, ”it can never be resorted to without parliamentary 
authorisation”, “since the Stuarts it has been a totally exploded thing”, 
“it is the most unconstitutional procedure conceivable” and similar others, 
Professor Corwin said that these merely befogged the issue, “for that 
there is such a thing as “martial law” in some sense of the term is to-day 
recognised by the most conservative authorities”.(3)
Etymologically, martial law means the law of war, though, as has 
been said, originally it had nothing to do with the god of war.(4) It 
is, however, still recognised as one of the possible meanings of the 
phrase, but it is not the same in which it is generally understood by 
Commonwealth lawyers to-day.
To a lawyer, however, martial law means either one or all of the
(3) Edward S. Corwin, The President, p.172.
(4) Some of the Dictionary meanings approximate to this etymological
sense: “Martial law - The law of war, that depends upon the just
but arbitrary power and pleasure of the King, or his lieutenant; 
for though the King doth not make any laws but by common consent in
Parliament, yet in time of war, by reason of the necessity of it,
to guard against dangers that often arise, he useth absolute power, 
so that his word is a law”. Blount* s Law Dictionary (1670). So 
also in Burr ell fs Law Dictionary. New York edition, 1851, martial 
law has been defined as “a system of rules for the government of an 
array or adopted in times of actual war. An arbitrary kind of law 
or rule sometimes established in a place ox* district occupied or 
controlled by an armed force, by which the civil authority and the 
ordinary administration of the law are either wholly suspended or 
subjected to military power”. Now as a matter of etynology, 
marshal has nothing whatever to do with martial - the marshal is 
the master of the horse - he is mar esc alius. mares chalk, a stable 
servant - while of course martial has to do with Mars, the god of 
war”. - Maitland, Constitutional!- History of England. 266 (1926)
4.
following - "suspension of ordinary law and the temporary government of 
a country or parts of it by military tribunals",(5)> common law right of 
the Grown and its servants to repel force by force in the case of invasion, 
insurrection, riot or generally of any violent resistance to the law" (6), 
"the government of a country or a district by military tribunals, which 
more or less supersede the jurisdiction of the courts"(7), "justification 
by the common law of acts done by necessity far the defence of the 
commonwealth when there is war within the realm"(8), "a suspension of the 
civil rights and the ordinary forms of trial are in abeyance"(9),
"suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus"(10), or "not 
law in the sense of code rules, but a condition of affairs"(ll).
According to Chancellor Kent, "martial law is quite a distinct 
thing (from ordinary military law), and is founded on paramount necessity, 
and is proclaimed by a military chief"*(12) There is also the 
mischievous saying of the Duke of Wellington that martial law was neither 
more nor less than the will of the General who commanded the army. (13)
T5) A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution. Tenth edition, p7287”"(l959)
(6) Ibid. p. 288.
(7) Ibid* p. 291.
(8) Sir Frederick Pollock, What is Martial Law? 18 Law Q.R. at p.156.
(9) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Lavj, (l869)p.207.
(10 ) Halleck, International Law. Volume V. p. 501.
(Id.) Wright y. Fitzgerald 7Tl799 ) 27 State Trials 759.
(12) Kent, Commentaries. Volume I. p. 377.
(13) The Duke of Wellington^ Speech in the House of Lords on April 1,1851,
quoted in Clodefs Military Forces of The Crown. Vol.II. 502 * "As to 
the remark which had been made about him, he would say word in 
explanation. He contended that Martial Law was neither more nor less
than the will of the General who commands the army. In fact, Martial
Law meant no law at all* Therefore the General xiio declared Martial 
Law, and commanded that it should be carried into execution was bound 
to lay down distinctly the rules and regulations and limits according 
to which his will was to be carried out. Now he had, in another 
country, carried on Martial Law; that was to say, he had governed
a large proportion of the population of a country by his own will.
But then, what did he do? He declared that the country should be
5.
It must be observed that martial law as understood in the latter sense 
and exercised by the commander of an army occupying foreign territory, 
is an element of the .ius belli.(14)
(b) Martial Law ~ an ancient institution, A word of caution before 
we enter any further discussion on the nature aiid meahihg’ of martial law 
will perhaps be necessary. Martial law is an ancient institution 
recognised, as already seen, quite early by English judges and legislators. 
The idea represented by the expression is older still, perhaps almost 
coeval with the emergence of the idea of the State, though for the purpose 
of the history and development of martial law, travelling back to such a
distant point of time is not practicable, nor would it be useful. We
shall, therefore, endeavour to find what martial law actually means in 
relatively modern times. Cur concern here will be more with the doctrine 
of martial law than the consideration of its history and application. For,
it must be appreciated that the two things are quite distinct.
governed according to its own National laws, and he carried into 
execution that will. He governed the country strictly by the laws 
of the country, and he governed it with such moderation, he must 
say, that political servants and Judges who at first had fled or 
had been expelled, afterwards consented to* act under his direction. 
The Judges sat in the courts of law conducting their judicial 
business, and administering the law under his directi on”.
(14) "Martial law, as exercised in any country by the commander of a
foreign army, is an element of the jus belli. It is incidental to 
the state of solemn war, and appertains to the law of nations. The 
commander of the invading, occupying or conquering army rules the 
invaded, occupied or conquered foreign country with supreme power, 
limited only by international law and orders of the Sovereign or 
Government he serves or represents. For by the law of nations the 
occupatio bellica in a just war transfers the sovereign power of the 
enemy1 s country to the Conqueror. Such occupation by right of war 
so long as it is military only - that is, flagrante bello - will be 
the case put forward by the Duke of Wellington, of all the powers 
of government resumed in the hands of the c ommander-in-chiefu • - 
Cushing, vlii Opinions, p. 369 (1837)
6.
Accepting what has been said by an eminent jurist, (15) the 
difficulty in discerning what in substance martial law is one which faces 
us when considering most English institutions. It has been, we feel, 
rightly remarked that "the English terminology is confusing and inexact11. 
(16) As some of the confusion is historical, the analysis will, 
undoubtedly, involve consideration of its application and exercise at 
different periods of history both in England and elsewhere. From the 
beginning of its known origin until it ceased to be applied in England, 
the term ,rmartial law" has been used, as will be seen, in several senses. 
The incomplete notions of the common law jurists in England about matters 
comprehended in martial law and the fact that "even at a later day in
England, the nature of martial law remained without accurate
appreciation in Westminster Hall", (17) led to a lack of unanimity in 
regard to the contents of martial law. "On this subject there is no 
universal consensus of opinion, and the authorities are few and 
inconclusive". (18) Inevitably, where our efforts will fail to fix upon 
an invariable content so far as English law is concerned, we shall turn 
to other sources for a solution of the controversy as to the true scope 
and extent of the operation of martial law*
It must not be supposed, because martial law is an English
expression, that the power to declare it is an exclusive feature of the
(15) "• a body of law so ancient and developed in such an atmosphere,
is not easy either to state or to understand". - William Holdsworth, 
Martial Law Historically Considered. (1902) 18 Law Q. R. 117.
(16) Keir and Lawson, Cases in Constitutianal Law, 4-th edition, at
p. 384 (1954)*
(17) Cushing, yiii Opinions. p. 367 (1857)
(18) Keir and Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law, 4th edition, p. 431.
7.
governmental powers in England and the other members of the Commonwealth*
It is one of the incidents of the sovereign power of every State* 1 It 
has been usual for all governments, during an actual, rebellion to 
proclaim martial law or the suspension of civil jurisdiction".(19)
Under various legal systems and at different times martial law has been 
resorted to in circumstances less dire than a state of actual war between 
the two different countries. The palpable difference between its 
application in England and some other countries has been, as was observed, 
the "disposition towards which most governments are prone, to introduce 
too soon, to extend too far, to retain too long, so perilous a remedy". (20) 
(o) Differences in application. Though laws of different countries 
differ as to the application and exercise of martial law, on comparing 
English lax-? on the subject with the laws of other countries, some primary 
differences emerge* Thus, while the English jurists recognised that
(19) Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England. Volume I,
ch*v, p. 24-0* The same points of viex; find egression in the
following words; "Martial lax-/ exists only in time of war and 
originates in military necessity. It derives no authority from 
the civil law (using the term in its more general s ense), nor 
assistance from the civil tribunals, for it overrules, suspends 
and replaces both. It is from its very nature an arbitrary power. 
It has been used in all countries and by all governments, and is 
as necessary to the sovereignty of a State as the poxrer to declare 
and raalce war. The right to declare, apply, and enforce martial 
lax-; is one , of the sovereign pox^ ers and resides in the governing
authority of the State whether restrictive and rules are to be 
adopted for its application, or whether it is to be exercised 
according to the exigencies which call it into existence". - 
Halleck, International Law, Volume I* p. 499 (1878)
(20) Ibid. p. 240.
e.
“there may indeed, "be times of pressing danger, when the conservation of 
all demands the sacrifice of the legal rights of a few; there may be 
circumstances that not only justify, but compel the temporary abandonment 
of constitutional!. power“,(2l) they at the same time extolled the 
personal liberty of the subject vhose preservation is of great importance 
to the public and stressed the danger that lies in its arbitrary 
curtailment by the executive* “To bereave a man of life, or by violence 
to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial would be so gross 
and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of 
tyranny through the whole kingdom; but confinement of the person, by 
secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or 
forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more 
dangerous engine of arbitrary government(22) Yet, as Stephen felt, 
when the State was in a real danger this might be a necessary measure.
Immediately after pronouncing in favour of depriving subjects of 
their liberty in cases of extreme necessity, he describes some’ relieving 
features in the British Constitution: “But the happiness of our
Constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine 
when the danger of the State is so great, as to render this measure 
expedient: for it is the Parliament only (or legislative power) that,
whenever it sees proper, by suspending the Habeas Corpus Act for a short 
and limited time, can enable the Crown to imprison suspected persons 
without the possibility of their obtaining their discharge, during that
(21) Henry Hallara, The Constitutional History of England. Volume I, 
Ch.V, p. 240.
(22) Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of Englaayj. 8th edition, p* 143.
9period, by any interference of the courts'1. (23)
Though there are other differences on this subject between English 
law and the laws of other countries, the differences stressed by Stephen 
were, no doubt, most important*(24) It may be mentioned that no Act of 
Parliament precedes a declaration of martial law although it is usually 
followed by an Act of Indemnity, when the normal administration is 
restored "in order to give constitutional existence to the fact of martial 
law"*(25) But there are instances when Parliament passed statutes 
enabling authorities in Ireland and elsewhere to proclaim martial law* 
Special statutory powers were obtained conferring express powers on the 
military to try private citizens by the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, 
as amended by the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915* It is true 
the authorities did not have to use it; still powers to set up special 
courts were obtained by the Emergency Powers (Defence) (No.2) Act, 1940.
Inevitable as may be the circumstances under which martial law need 
be proclaimed, restraint and moderation in its exercise are still 
preferable. Any exercise of despotic or arbitrary power must be kept
(23) Ibid. Stephen found a parallel in the practice in ancient Rome*
"As the Senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a 
magistrate of absolute authority, when they judged the republic in 
any imminent danger* The decree' of the Senate, which usually 
preceded the nomination of the magistrate, dent oneram consulos, 
ne quid respublica detriment! capiat was called the Senatus
consul.turn necessitus. and in like manner this experiment ought only 
to be tried in cases of extreme emergency: in these the nation
parts with its liberty for a while, in order to preserve it for 
ever". Ibid*
(24) "Martial law cannot be used in England without authority of 
Parliament". - Baron Comyn, Dig. Pari*. H*23, quoted by Forsyth, 
Gases and Opinions on Gonstitutional Law, p* 207.
(25) Halleck, International Law. Volume I, 499 (1878)
10.
within proper limits; otherwise its abuse may tend to produce different 
and unexpected results. "But even when left um'estricted by constitutional 
or statutory law, like the power of a civil court to punish contempts, it 
must be exercised with due moderation and justice; and as ‘paramount 
necessity* alcne can call it into existence, so must its exercise be 
limited to such times and places as this necessity may require; and moreover, 
it must be governed by the rules of general public law, as applied to a 
state of war".(26) But as such restraint advocated on idealistic 
considerations may not be possible for those who are acting arbitrarily 
in great emergencies, Coelcburn, C.J., suggested that proper restrictions 
should be put tip on the exercise of power under martial law. (27)
2* Martial Law As Applied in England
Reference has already been made to the Court of the Constable and 
the Marshal from which both military and martial law originated* Though 
the detailed history of its workings is beyond the scope of our discussion, 
some critical!, examination of its organisation and powers will surely lead
(26) Ibid.
(27) Rex v* Nelson and Brand. Special Report, p. 75* "Let us hope 
that the exercise of martial law will be placed under due 
limitations, and its administration fenced round by the safeguards 
which were wiseley provided by the legislature in the Act of 1833. 
Without these it may well be doubted whether martial law is not, 
under any circumstances, a greater evil than that which it is 
intended to prevent".
ru
to the better understanding of the subject. (28)
(a) The Constable and Marshal1s Court. The Court of the Constable 
and the M&pshal was a part of the Curia Regis, or the Supreme Court 
established in England by William the Conqueror. The Constable or Comes 
Stabuli. or to use the modern designation, the Master of the Horse, was 
the commander-in-chief of the King’s army and as such governed all persons 
and exercised jurisdiction over all offences committed in the army 
especially when it was on service overseas* The Court constituted by the 
Constable and the Marshal exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
(29) Marshal or as at present spelled 1 martial’ law invariably meant the
law administered by the King’s Marshal. To it Coke referred as the 
’’fountain of marshal law”*(30) The Constable and Marshal’s Court is also
known in the records by its other name, the Curia Militaris. or the
Court of Chivalry. The proceedings of the Constable and Marshal’s Court 
were ’’not according to the course of the common law". (31)
(28) "In the Middle Ages martial law meant the law administered by the 
Court of the Constable and the Marshal. To that Court we must look 
for the origin both of the military and the martial law of the 
present day. Both these laws are the result of a development which 
dates from an early period in our constitutional history".
- William Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered.
18 Law Quarterly Review, 117.
(29) British Manual of Military Law, Section I, at p.4. (1938)
(30) Coke, 4 Inst. c.17.
(31) Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England. Volume I, p.24-0
(188l) "Towards the end of the Wars of the Roses we find very 
terrible powers of summary justice granted to the Constable. In 
1462 Edward IV empowers him to proceed in all eases of treason, 
’summarily and plainly, without noise and show of judgment on 
simple inspection of fact*. A similar patent was granted to Lord 
Rivers in 14&7. They show something very like a contempt for law - 
the Constable is to exercise powers of almost unlimited extent, all 
statutes, ordinances, acts and restrictions to the contrary 
notwithstanding". Maitland, Constitutional History of England.
266 (1926) ~
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The civil jurisdiction of the Constable and Marshall Court was 
exercised by the Court of Chivalry which was "a court of honour, and 
consisted in redressing injuries of honour, and correcting encroachments 
on coat armour, precedency, and other distinctions of families11, (32)
It had also jurisdiction over disputes arising out of contracts connected 
with war outside the realm* Thus, in 1389 a statute whose 1 vagueness 
is characteristic1 (33) defines the jurisdiction of the court as followss 
"To the Constable it pertaineth to have cognisance of contracts touching 
deeds of arms and of war out of the realm, and also of things that touch 
war within the realm, which cannot be determined nor discussed by the 
common law, with other ways and customs to the same matters pertaining, 
which other Constables heretofore have duly and reasonably used in their 
time". (34)
In the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction the Constable and 
Marshals Court was empowered to punish murder and other civil crimes 
committed by Englishmen abroad, (35) In time of war it took cognisance of 
"the offences and miscarriages of soldiers contrary to the law and rules 
of the army", (36) Whenever war was impending the King, on the advice of 
the Constable, used to issue orders and regulations governing the conduct 
of the soldiers and in course of time these rules and orders came to be
known as martial lai/,(37) but, it may be mentioned, they would mean
"(32) British Manual of Military Law, p.4> Section I ~(l958j
(33) IS Law Quarterly Review 117,
(34) 13 Richard II, st,l, c,2.
(35) British Manual of Military Law, Section I, p. 4* (195S)
(36) Hale, History of the Common Law, p, 42,
(37) Ibid. "&Lways preparatory to an actual war, the kings of this 
realm, by the advice of the Constable and Marshal, were used to
compose a bode of rules and orders far the due order and discipline
of their officers and soldiers, together with certain penalties
on the offenders; and this was called martial law".
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military law in the modern sense.(3&) Cockburn C.J. in referring to the
rules and constitutions of Richard II, said:
“They from an elaborate code minute in its details to a degree that 
might serve as a model to anybody drawing up a code of criminal law. They 
follow the soldier into every department of military life and service.
They point out his duties to his officers, his duties to the service, his 
duties to his comrades, his duties with regard to the unarmed population 
with whom he may come in contact. They show what would be infractions of 
these duties and attach specific penalties to ;every violation of the law so 
set forth”.(39)
These rules were entitled as ‘’Statutes, Ordinances and Customs to
'
be observed in the Army”. Similar ordinances and statutes were 
promulgated during the reigns of Henry V, Henry VII, Henry VIII and 
Charles I. In the reign of James II these ordinances for the due order 
and discipline of the array appeared under the name of “Articles of War”.
With the efflux: of time and along with the expansion of English 
dominions overseas it became necessary to undertake simultaneous military 
operations In different countries and, therefore, to Institute at 
different places and times several courts on the model of the Constable and 
Marshal1s Court. It is not definitely known, however, whether these courts 
exercising judicial functions and administering military law as embodied 
in the Articles of War acted by virtue of their office or by virtue of 
commissions from the Grown. As has been said, “probably the power to
(38) 1^ Law Quarterly Review 122.
(39) Rex v. Nelson and Branc^ Special Report, p.89.
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administer such law was chiefly conferred by Commission11. (40)
In 1521 the office of the High Constable as a permanent office was 
at an end, since from that year High Constables are never permanently 
appointed but for such ceremonies as the coronations and the like* The 
office of the Earl Marshal has, however, continued till to-day* Since 
1533 the Duke of Norfolk and his male lineal descendants have been its 
incumbents.
(b) Royal Commissions and Proclamations. With the extinction of the 
office of the High Constable the administration of the military la\* was 
carried on by Commissions from the Crown authorising the commander-in-chief 
to issue regulations for the governance of the army and appoint himself 
or deputies to act as a court. (41) The courts-martial in the present 
form can be traced from this practice, (42) There is, however, this 
difference between the earlier courts and the courts-martial of the present 
day, that in the former the commander himself sat as the president and 
the courts1 power was plenary and their sentences were executed without 
confirmation as required at present. (43)
To sum up what we have so far discussed about the Constable and 
Marshall Court, it is seen to have exercised jurisdiction over three 
classes of persons.(44) Thus, the Court had jurisdiction overs
(a) the soldiers of the Crown; the military law of the present day;
(b) all citizens in time of riot or rebellion; the martial law 
of the present day;
(40) British Manual of Military Law, Section I, p. 5 (1958)
(41) Ibid. ~
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) 18 Law Quarterly Review 117.
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(c) alien enemies.
When the Duke of Wellington referred to martial law as "neither more 
ntbr less than the will of the General- who commands the army", he referred 
to the jurisdiction over alien enemies and had in his mind his personal 
experience of exercising such jurisdiction in the Peninsular War* To~day, 
however, the exercise of martial law in a foreign territory by the 
commander of the occupying forces would come under the scope of International 
Law# Martial, law proper in Municipal law would mean the jurisdiction 
in times of riot or rebellion.
With the disappearance of the Constable's Court martial law in the 
sense it was then understood began to be administered by the Generals 
acting under the King's Commissions. The close association of martial 
law with these Commissions and their final prohibitions by the Petition of 
Right in 1628 renders an inquiry into their nature necessary.
These Commissions issued by the Crown expressly authorised the 
execution of martial law and we have already seen that the administration 
of military law was not much affected due to the issuing of these 
Commissions when the Constable's Court ceased to exist.
The Commissions were directed against two classes of offenders, 
namely, (l) the mutineers in the army, and (2) the rebels or enemies 
who were captured in war. They were usually issued to the Generals 
and lords*«lieutenants but sometimes also to the municipal authorities who 
executed them also in time of peace. (45)
(45) Cl ode, Military Forces of the Crown. Volume I, p. 76. (1869)
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An early instance of such Commissions is provided by one which in 
1569 Queen Elizabeth I granted to the Earl of Sussex for suppressing the 
rebellion led by the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland* Sir 
George Bower, who was appointed his Provost-Marshal, toured Durham and 
Yorkshire and \*ithin less than three weeks executed at different places 
nearly 600 persons. The severity he displayed in the execution of 
martial law can only be favourably compared to that indulged in more 
recently by the court-martial set up by Governor Eyre in suppressing the 
Jamaica Insurrection in 1865»(46)
As the Commission themselves are self-explanatory of the system 
they introduced, it would seem proper to examine their terms. We shall 
refer to three of them. The first was issued to certain persons in 1617 
and was directed for the government of Wales and the counties of Worcester, 
Hereford and Shropshire. It authorised the calling out the array of the 
county -
HAs well against all and singular our enemies, as also against all 
and singular rebells, traytors, and other offenders and their adherents, 
against us our Crowne and dignite, within the said principalitie and 
dominions of North Wa3.es and South Wales, the marches of the same, and 
counties and places aforesaid, and with the said traytors and rebells 
from tyme to tyme to fight and then to invade, resist, suppresse, 
subdue, slay, kill, and put to execution of death, by all ways and
(46) On two other occasions Queen Elizabeth I issued Proclamations.
In 15B8 she issued a proclamation which declared that those who 
circulated traitorous libels or papal bulls against the Queen were 
to be punished by martial law. Again, during the riots in 
London in 1595, she granted a Commission to try and execute the 
rioters according to the Justice of martial law.
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and means, from tyme to tyme by your discretion*
"And further to doe, execute, and use against the said enemies, 
traytors, rebells, and such other like offenders and their adherents 
afore-mentioned, from tyme to tyme as necessitie shall require, by your 
discretion, the law called the martiall lawe according to the law 
martiall, and of such offenders apprehended or being brought in subjection, 
to save whom you shall think good to be saved, and to slay, destroie, 
and put to execution of death, such and as ma^of them as you shall think 
meete, by your good discretion, to be put to death"*
The second Commission issued to Sir Robert Maunsel in 1620 empowered 
him to suppress piracy and gave him full power's "to execute and take away 
their life, or any member, in form and order of martial law"*
The third example of such a Commission is provided by one issued to 
the Mayor of Dover and others in 1624-* It recited as follows:-
"To proceed according to the Justice of Martial Law against such 
soldiers with any of our lists aforesaid, and other dissolute persons 
joining with them, or any of them, as during such time as any of our 
said troops or companies of soldiers shall remain or abide there, and 
not be transported thence, shall, within any of the places or precincts 
aforesaid, at any time after the publication of this our Commission, 
commit any robberies, felonies, mutinies, or other outrages or 
misdemeanours, which by the martial law should or ought to be punished 
with death, and by such summary course and order as is agreeable to 
martial law, and as is used in armies in time of war, to proceed to the 
trial and condemnation of such delinquents and offenders, and them cause 
to be executed and put to death according to the law martial, for an
IB.
example of terror to others, and to keep the rest In due awe and 
obedience"*(47)
What was precisely meant by the "Justice of Martial Law" is not, 
however, easy to discern from the passage mentioned above. According 
to Clode, the omission was perhaps intended to be supplied by Articles 
of War issued by the Crown for the government of the army. There may be 
some truth in his contention, inasmuch as the Articles issued by the 
King in 1625 contained reference to the methods by which martial law was 
to be executed. The offences dealt with under these Articles were partly 
civil and partly military but they were alike punishable by the commanding 
officer or the marshals court. They conferred authority "to any three 
or more of the Commissioners to call a Marshal Court, and sit in 
commission to hear, judge, and determine, any fact done by soldiers; 
but to have no power to put to death till they have advertised the General 
that shall have authority of life and death for such troops as he shall 
command". (4B)
It will be important to mention that the Commissions were both 
issued and executed not in time of war but of peace. They were aimed 
more at the speedy punishment of any crimes committed either by soldiers 
or civilians associated with them than at maintaining discipline and ‘ 
order in the army.(49) Another distinctive feature noticed by Stephen
(47) Rymerfs Food., xviii, 254, 763, quoted by Stephen in his Opinion
on the Jamaica Insurrection. Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on
Constitutional Law, at p.554*
(48) Clode, Military Forces of the Crown. Volume I,p. 18 (1869)
(49) Ibid.
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is that 11 they authorise not merely the suppression of revolts by military 
force, which is undoubtedly legal, but the subsequent punishment of 
offenders by illegal tribunals1'* (50) It has to be noticed that these
Commissions authorised trial by martial law of men who were merely guilty 
of ordinary felonies* (51)
It is needless to say that such Coramissionsjwere illegal and were 
so held, as will be seen, by contemporary legal opinion* It has been 
quite often asserted that the "government may put down force by force - 
but when there is no rebellion, or when the rebellion is suppressed, it 
has no authority to direct the trial of prisoners, except in the ordinary 
courts and according to the known law of the land"*(52)
If the legality of the Commissions and the tribunals set up under 
their authority were doubtful in the eyes of the lawyers of the period, 
it may be legitimately asked why it was not so declared by any common law 
court? The reasons for such discreet silence on the part of the judges 
might be explained by saying that as king*s servant*s they were reluctant 
to incur royal displeasure* But, as has been observed by Maitland,
"past history made their position difficult  and to break with It
was impossible", (5.3) According to the old theory, the king was the 
fountain of all justice and the judges were his servants or deputies*
When such was thought to be the constitutional position of the judges, 
it must have been extremely difficult for them to assert their independence 
and to declare royal acts to be illegal* "To hold, not that some
(50) Ibid,
(51) Maitland, Constitutional History, p.267 (1926)
(52) Ibid.
(53) Maitland, Constitutional History, p,267 (1926)
isolated act of royal authority was illegal, but that the government of 
the country was being regularly conducted in illegal ways - this would 
have been a hard feat for the king*s servants and deputies"* (54^ 
admitting the frequent use of such proclamations and commissions, Cockbum, 
C.J* said that, as in those times the "constitutional Boundaries were not 
as firmly fixed and ascertained as happily they now are, the prerogative 
of the Crown was often attempted to be stretched beyond its proper limits 
by these declarations of the royal will"* (55)
(c) The Petition of Right* 1628* What the court did not do the House 
of Commons proceeded to effect* Having been exasperated by the frequent 
and free use of the authority conferred by such commissions, the House 
of Commons first resolutely challenged the legality of these proceedings 
and finally declared their illegality by the celebrated Petition of Right
(54) Ibid* p. 268.
(55) Rex v* Nelson and Brand, Special Report, p*37* Coke, who was
ultimately dismissed by the king, discusses these proclamations 
in page 74 of his Reports:*- "Besides such as are issued in 
furtherance of the executive powers of the Crown, proclamations 
which either call upon the subject to fulfil some duty which he is 
by law bound to perform, or to abstain from any acts or conduct 
already prohibited by law are perfectly lawful and rights and it
is said that if, after such a proclamation, the law is nevertheless 
broken, the disobedience of the royal command, if not of itself a 
misdemeanour, is at all events an aggravation of the offence* On the 
other hand, whenever a proclamation purports to be made in the 
exercise of legislative power - or if the sovereign grants a monopoly 
or privilege against the rights of the rest of the community, or 
imposes a duty to which the subject is not by law liable, or
prohibits under penalties any act which is not an offence at law,
or adds fresh penalties to any offence beyond those to which it is 
already liable, the proclamation is of no effect; for the Crown 
has no legislative power except such as it exercises in common with 
the other two branches of the legislature". Coke, then, quoted 
Comyns as saying:- "The king cannot by proclamation alter any part 
of the common law, statutes or customs of the realm". - Digest* 
title Prerogative D 3*
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in 162$,(56) Some consideration of its scope, aims and purposes would, 
therefore, seem appropriate*
(56) The following is an extract from the Petition of Right containing j
references to Martial Law:
"Whereas also by authority of Parliament, in the 2f5th year of 
the reign of King Edward III, it is declared and enacted, That no 
man shall stand forejudged of life or limb against the form of the 
Great Charter and the laws and statutes of this realm; And by the 
said Great Charter and other laws and statutes of this your realm, 
no man ought to be adjudged to death, but by the laws established 
in this your realm, either by the customs of the same realm or by 
Acts of Parliament:
"Whereas no offender of what kind soever is exempted from the 
proceedings to be used, and punishments to be inflicted by the 
laws and statutes of this your realm; nevertheless of late, divers 
Commissions, under your Majesty*s Great Seal, have issued forth, 
by which certain persons have been assigned and appointed Commissioners, 
with power and authority to proceed, within the land, according to 
the justice of Martial Law, against such soldiers and marine, or 
should commit any murder, robberies, felony, mutiny, or other 
outrage or misdemeanour whatsoever; and by such summary course and 
order as is agreeable to Martial Law, and is used in armies in time 
of war, to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, 
and them to cause to be executed and put to death according to the 
Law Martial:
"By pretext whereof some of your Majesty*s subjects have been, 
by some of the said Commissioners, put to death, when and where, 
if by laws and statutes of the land they had deserved death, by the 
same laws and statutes also they might, and by no other ought to 
have been judged and executed:
And also sundry grievous offenders, by colour thereof claiming 
and exemption, have escaped the punishment due to them by the laws 
and statutes of this your realm, by reason that divers of your 
officers and ministers of justice have unjustly refused or forborne 
to proceed against such offenders according to the same laws and 
statutes, upon pretence that the said offenders were punishable only 
by Martial Law, and by authority of such Commissions as aforesaid; 
which Commissions and all others of like nature are wholly and 
directly contrary to the said lav/s and statutes of this your realm;
"They do therefore humbly pray your most excellent Majesty 
that the aforesaid Commissions for proceeding by Martial Law may be 
revoked and annulled; and that hereafter no Commissions of like 
nature may issue forth to any person or persons whatsoever to be 
executed as aforesaid, lest by colour of them any of your Majesty*s 
subjects be destroyed or put to death contrary to the laws and 
franchise of the land"*
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The Petition of Right, enrolled on the statute book-;as 3 Car l,c 1, was 
assented to by Charles I after he held some consultation with the Judges* (57)
(57) "Before the bill was passed he (Charles I) sent for the two chief 
Justices, Hyde and Richardson, to Whitehall, and propounded 
certain questions, directing that the other Judges should be 
assembled in order tp answer them. The first question was,
"whether in no case whatsoever the Icing may not commit a subject 
without, showing cause". To which the Judges gave an answer the 
same day under their hands which was the next day presented to his 
majesty by the two chief Justices, in these words: "We are of
opinion, that , by the general rule of law, the commitment by his 
majesty ought to be shown; yet some cases may require such secrecy, 
that the Icing may commit a subject without showing the cause for a 
convenient time.!. The. Icing then delivered them a second question 
and required them to keep it very secret, as the former: "Whether,
in case a habeas corpus be bi*ought and a warrant from the king, 
without any. general or special cause returned, the Judges ought 
to deliver him before they understand the cayise from the king?"
Their answer was as follows: "Upon a habeas corpus brought for
one commited; by the king, if the cause be not specially or generally 
returned, so as the court may take knowledge thereof, the party 
ought by the general, rule of law to be delivered. But if the case 
be such that , the same require^fth secrecy, and may not presently 
be disclosed, the court in descretion may forbear to deliver the 
prisoner for a convenient time, to the end the court may be 
advertised of the truth thereof". On receiving this answer the, , 
king proposed a third question: "Whether, if the king grant the
Commons1 petition, he doth not thereby exclude himself from 
committing or restraining a subject for any time.or cause whatsoever 
without showing cause?", The judges returned for answer to this 
; . important query: "Every law, after it is made, hath its
exposition,, and so this petition and answer must have an 
exposition as the case in the nature thereof shall require to stand 
with justice; which is to be left to the courts of justice to 
determine, which cannot particularly be discovered until such case 
shall happen. And, although the petition be granted, there is 
.- V  nb fear of conclusion as is intimated in the question", Henry
. Hallam, Constitutional History, Volume I at pp. 390-91. '
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The statute is so called because it was not drawn in the common form of an 
Act of Parliament, though it has "always been regarded as having 
statutory force". (58) It may be mentioned that the Bill of Rights has 
largely superseded it.($9)
The immediate cause for the insistent demand by the House of Commons 
to pass the enactment was the decision in Darnel* s Case (1627), well-known
' X
as The Five Knights1 Case, where Hyde C.J., in deciding for the King, 
accepted the contention of the Attorney-General Heath that the King was 
.iusticiarius regni. all justice was derived from him and he had an 
absolute power to commit. The defendants were imprisoned for their 
refusal to pay contributions to a forced loan. (60)
The Petition of Right vigorously protested against all kinds of 
taxes and such-like charges "without common consent by Act of Parliament", 
and forbade arbitrary imprisonment, the use of commissions of martial 
law, the law of the Constable and Marshal in time of peace and the 
billeting of soldiers upon private persons.(6l) The obvious reasons 
that inspired Parliament to enact the Petition of Right was its abhorrence 
of the arbitrary exercise of the royal prerogative and in declaring the 
commissions illegal they gave recognition to the principle that during 
peace time the civil magistrate had ample authority to punish any
(58) 0. Hood Phillips, The Constitutional Law of Great Britain and the
Commonwealth. p. 41, Second Edition, (1957*7" ""
(59) Ibid.
(60) 3 St. Tr. 1.
(61) "These four grievances or abuses form the foundation of the 
Petition of Right, presented by the Commons in the shape of a 
declaratory statute". Henry Hall am, Constitutional History. 
Volume I, p. 389. (1881)
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offenders, whether they were soldiers or ordinary citizens.(62)
That these commissions were illegal and thought to he so by the 
highest council in the kingdom will be evident from a little incident 
recorded in the reign of Queen Elizabeth 1.(63) According to the views 
of authorities on English Constitutional Laws such commissions of martial 
law "were probably illegal apart from this declaration" in the Petition 
of Right. (64) Moreover, the Petition did not say something new. It 
merely re-stated the old law. (65)
(62) "The argument against the legality of these commissions rested upon 
the principle, - that in time of peace the civil magistrate had 
cognizance of all offences committed against the public peace, and 
that the civil population ought not - whatever rule should be 
applied to the soldiers - to be subjected to Martial Law. The 
status of an offender was at that time a doubtful security upon 
which to rest his life or liberty, and therefore the Petition of 
Right made no distinction between the Civil and Military population, 
but declared these Commissions of Martial law against any person 
whatsoever to be wholly and directly contrary to the laws and 
statutes of the realm". Clode, Military Forces of the Crown. 
Volume I, p. 19#
(63) "Elizabeth, always hasty in passion and quick to punish, would 
have resorted to this summary course on a slighter occasion. One 
Peter Burchell, a fanatical puritan, and perhaps insane, 
conceiving that Sir Christopher Hatton was an enemy to true 
religion, determined to assassinate him. But by mistake he 
wounded instead a fatuous seaman, Captain Hawkins, For this 
ordinary crime the Queen could hardly be prevented from directing 
him to be tried instantly by martial law. Her Council, however, 
(and this it is important to observe), resisted this illegal 
proposition with spirit and success". (Hallam, Constjtutional 
History, Volume I, p. 24-0) The Queen, it is well to remember, had 
a few bad precedents set up in the previous reigns and the truth 
is that "bad precedents always beget lorogeniem vitiosiorem".
(64) Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Laws, p.403, 5th edition (1955)
(65) "The Petition of Right was in a form of a re-enactment of old law. 
After stating the old law which wan to be re-enacted, and the 
manner in which it had been infringed, it prays that there may be 
no such infringements in future". Holdsworth, Martial Law 
Historically Considered . 18 Law Quarterly Review 119.
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It is true, however, that since 162& ’’martial law has never been 
attempted to be exercised in the realm of England by virtue of the 
prerogative”(66), but there have beem a few instances when it has been 
applied under Parliamentary authority till it finally disappeared. We 
shall return later to consider whether the Petition of Right abolished 
martial law altogether or only made Its application during peace illegal. 
For the present, however, we shall proceed to look into the circumstances 
in which martial law was enforced at least partially under the authority 
of Parliament,
During the Civil War in England the Long Parliament passed an 
Ordinance in 1644- under which ”a Commission was granted to the Earl of 
Essex, Captain-General of the Parliamentary Forces, together with 
twenty-nine others of the nobility, gentry, and principal officers,
”or any twelve of them”, with full power to hear and determine all such 
causes as belong to military cognisance, according to certain articles 
therein set forth”.(67) Quite a number of military officers were tried
(66) K.v.Helson and Brand (1867) Special Report at p.45
(67) Article I - ”No person whatever shall go from London and Westminster, 
or any part of the kingdom under the power of the Parliament, to 
hold any communication whatever, either personally, by letters,
or messages, with the King, Queen, or Lords of the Council 
abiding with them, without consent of both Houses, or their 
committee for managing the war, or the Lord General or officer 
commanding in chief, on pain of death, or other corporal punishment 
at discretion.
Article 3 - ”No person whatsoever, not under the power of the enemy, 
shall voluntarily relieve gny person being in arms against the 
Parliament, knowing him to be so, with money, victuals, or 
ammunition, on pain of death, or other corporal punishment at 
discretion^ nor shall voluntarily harbour any such, on pain of 
such discretionary punishment.
Article 5 - ”No guardian or officer of any prison shall wilfully 
suffer any prisoner of war to escape, on pain of death; or 
negligently, on pain of imprisonment, and further punishment 
at discretion”.
Rex v. Nelson and Brand. Special Report, p.45.
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■under the commission but, excepting the solitary instance of one Roger 
l!Bstrange, no civilian was brought to trial under it. He was tried for 
espionage and sentenced to death, but he managed to escape. It may, 
however, be mentioned that espionage always comes under military 
cognisance.
During the Commonwealth period one Penruddock, a Wiltshire 
gentleman, led a revolt against Cromwell, by entering Salisbury with 
a small force and declaring his intention to restore the authority of 
the exiled King. His open act of defiance, culminating in seizing the 
Judge and the Sheriff, was acquiesced in by the people. The rebellion 
was, however, quite easily suppressed. But this little incident gave 
Cromwell the pretext to resort to an unprecedented exercise of 
arbitrary power.
Though Cromwell had perhaps every regard for government bjr law, 
becoming aware of his growing unpopularity, he utilised this opportunitjr 
in introducing measures throughout the country which might be described 
as the clearest violation of law and contrary to all for which Parliament 
had so recently fought and beheaded the King. He established what may be 
described as a sort of a military rule which even th© autocratic Stuarts 
dared not do. He divided England into eleven military districts and 
put each under a maj or-general who was made responsible for the 
subjection of the entire people of his district. These men were 
violently anti-royalist and showed scant respect for any form of civil
27.
rule.(6S) The resulting repression gave the British people a lasting 
distaste for rule by the military. (69) To find the reasons for such 
strange behaviour one has to agree to what has been asserted of men who 
assume powers under such circumstances as Cromwell did, "To govern 
according to law may sometimes be an usurper's wish, but can seldom 
be in his power".(?0)
(6£) "They (the major-generals) were employed to secure the payment 
of a tax of ten per cent, imposed by Cromwell's arbitrary will 
on those who had ever sided with the King during the late wars, 
where their estates exceeded £100 per annum* The major-generals, 
in their correspondence printed among Thurloe's papers, display 
a rapacity and oppression beyond their master's. They complain 
that the number of those exempted is too great; they press for 
harsher measures; they incline to the unfavourable construction 
in every doubtful case; they dwell on the growth of malignancy 
and the general disaffection. It was not indeed likely to be 
mitigated by this unparalleled tyranny* .All illusion was now 
gone as to the pretended benefits of the civil war. ! It had 
ended in a despotism, compared to xdiieh all the illegal practices 
of former kings, all that had cost Charles his life and crown, 
appeared as dust in the balance. For what was ship-money,
a general burthen, by the side of the present decimation of a
single class, whose offence had long been eclated by a 
composition and effaced by an act of indemnity? Or were the 
excessive punishments of the Star-chamber so odious as the 
capital executions inflicted without trial by peers, whenever 
It suited the usurper to erect his high court of justice?
Henry Hallam, C onstitutional History. Volume II, p.251. •
(69) Ibid. "A sense of present evils not only excited a burning desire
to live again under the ancient monarchy, but obliterated,
especially in the new generation, that had no distinct remembrance 
of them, the apprehension of its former abuses".
(70) Ibid.
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00 The Array Regulations. It may be convenient here to make some 
mention, necessarily brief, of the position held by the army In England. 
That Parliament was much impressed by Cromwell*s undisputed authority 
over the army is evident from the fact of his going unchallenged in his 
repressive measures so long as he lived, but that at the same time they 
cherished profound hatred against him will be shown by the exhumation 
and hanging of his corpse on the restoration of monarchy. Be that as 
it may, Parliament did not authorise a standing army since It was ever 
looked upon as a permanent threat against all liberty and freedom.
During the reigns of Charles II and James II the army was tolerated 
rather than authorised by Parliament. Its refusal to authorise a 
standing army explains the absence of any rules for the guidance of 
their conduct and discipline which was, it will be recalled, enforced 
by means of the so-called martial law*
A word or two will be necessary to explain why Parliament reconciled 
itself to the idea of a standing army* James II enlisted a large 
standing army, the rank and file being largely Irish, and many Catholics 
received commissions. He lost his nerve when William III landed in the 
west, and went into exile, so the army never went into action, but it 
was put about and largely believed that James* intention was to use it 
to restore the Catholic faith by force. Hence the Bill of Rights, 1688, 
forbids the existence of a standing army, and to give legality to its 
existence the Array Act has to be passed annually*
Yet, at the same time Parliament felt the necessity for the 
installation of a body of paid soldiers to ensure the safety of the nation.
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Dicey summarised the position in which the statesmen of the time found 
themselves and how did they get out of the difficulty which baffled 
solution in so many countries:
nA permanent army of paid soldiers* whose main duty is one of 
absolute obedience to commands, appears at first sight to be an institution 
inconsistent with that i*ule of law or submission to the civil authorities, 
and especially to the judges, which is essential to popular or 
Parliamentary Government; and in truth the existence of permanent army 
has often in most countries and at times in England ~ notably under the 
Commonwealth - been found inconsistent with the existence of what, by a 
lax though intelligible mode of speech, is called a free government*
The belief, indeed, of our statesmen down to a time considerably later 
than the Revolution of 1689 was that a standing army must be fatal to 
English freedom, yet very soon after the Revolution it became apparent 
that the existence of a body of paid soldiers was necessary to the safety 
of the nation* Englishmen, therefore, at the end of the 17th and the 
beginning of the 18th centuries, found themselves placed in this dilemma. 
With a standing army the country could not, they feared, escape from 
despotism; without a standing army the country could not, they were 
sure, avert invasion; the maintenance of national liberty appeared to 
involve the sacrifice of national independence’1. (71)
With the recognition of the necessity to maintain a standing army, 
Parliament began to realise that the solution lay in providing for the 
government and discipline of the army and the opportunity was
(71) A. Y. Dicey, The Da# of the Constitution. Tenth edition, p*297. 
(1959)
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accidentally offered by the following incident. The problem that seemed 
so long apparently insolvable found at last an easy solution.
With the accession to the English throne by William III and Mary it 
was thoughtadvisable that such of the English soldiers as were found still 
loyal to James II must be sent away to Holland under a Treaty of Alliance 
with the United Provinces* Accordingly, an order i*as issued to BOO 
men to proceed to Ipswich and from there to embarlc for Holland* On 
reaching Ipswich they mutinied and declared Janies II their King* There 
was no time for delay and leave was given in the Commons to bring in a 
Bill to punish mutiny and desertion for a limited time. In a little 
over three weeks the Bill was rushed through both Houses of Parliament 
and on the 3rd of April, 1689, received the Royal Assent.
Thus, under the stress of a very critical situation facing the King
and Parliament an Act was passed nfor punishing officers or soldiers who
shall I'kitiny or Desert their Majestyes Service11, consisting of ten sections
and prefaced by a preamble. (72) This is the first Mutiny Act whose terms
X72) The Preamble recites as follows: *  ~ ™ ~
"Whereas, the raising or keeping a standing Army within this 
kingdoms In time of peace unlesse It be with consent of Parlyament 
is against law* And whereas it is judged necessary by their Maj estyes, 
and this present Parlyament that dureing this time of Danger 
severall of the Forces which are now on foote should be continued 
and others raised for the safety of the kingdom© for the common 
defence of the Protestant Religion and for the reduceing of Ireland:
"And whereas now man may be forejudged of Life or Lirabe, or 
subjected to any lcinde of punishment by Martiall Law, or in any 
other manlier than by the judgement of his Peeres, and according to 
the knowne and Established Laws of this Realme. Yet nevertheless 
it being requisite for retaineing such Forces as are or shall be 
raised dureing this exigence of Affaires in their Duty an exact 
Discipline be observed. And that Soldiers who shall Mutiny or Stir 
up Sedition, or shall desert Their Majestyes Service be brought to 
a more exemplary and sppedy Punishment than the usuall Forms will 
allow".
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have reappeared without substantial alteration in every subsequent Mutiny 
Act till 1878.(73) It will be noticed that even during such an emergency 
as brooked no delay the members of Parliament did not forget to consider 
and deal with the question of the Crown1 s prerogative as to martial law* 
Thus, as will be seen from the terms of the Act, ”if it conceded 
exceptional powers td the Crown for the punishment of soldiers on the 
one hand, it restrained the Crown in the exercise of the undefined 
prerogative of declaring Martial Law against the civil community in the 
other”* (74) We shall return, later, to consider the effect of the 
Petition of Right so far as the application of martial law in England is 
concerned and resume for the present our discussion of the various 
instances when under Parliamentary authority martial law was ab least 
partially applied; it wiH be seen that this was done on three different
(73) ""Without tracing the history of these Acts which will be beyond the
scope of our work, we may shortly refer to the present position of 
the laws governing the soldiers* In 1879 Parliament consolidated 
in one statute, the Army Discipline and Regulation Act, 1879, the 
Mutiny Act and the Articles of War made under and deriving authority 
from that Act* Two years later this Act was repealed and 
re-enacted with necessary amendments in the Army Act of 1881. 
Subsequently the Army (Annual) Act was passed every year and since 
1917 is called the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act, Its preamble 
recites the famous clause of the Bill of Rights (which enacted that 
"the raising or the Keeping of a standing army within the kingdom 
in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is 
against law”), and then proceeds to suspend it for another year.
In 1955 two new Acts - the Army Act, 1955, and the Air Force Act, 
1955, - came into force. These Acts may be operative for further 
periods of one year but not for a total period of more than five 
years, unless Parliament otherwise determines. As, however, 
Parliament has never feeen jealous of the Crown1s power in relation 
to the Navy and Naval Discipline, the regular .Naval Forces are 
governed by the permanent Naval Discipline Acts, 1866-19. To-day- 
one, therefore, finds no difficulty about the laws governing the 
soldiers as such,
(74) Clode, Military Forces of the Grom, Volume 1, p,142. (I869)
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occasions, during the rebellions of 1715, 1745 and 1780,
(e) Instances of Martial Law under Parliamentary Authority. In 1715 
the government issued a Proclamation which authorised all civil and 
military officers to suppress the rebellion, if necessary, by force of 
arms. The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended and authority was granted to 
seize the horses of suspected persons and try the rebels in any district 
though the offences were not committed in such a district. There was, 
however, no attempt to try any persons by court-martial excepting a few 
half-pay officers,(75) All these extraordinary measures resorted to for 
the purpose of suppressing the rebellion were sanctioned by Parliament,
Almost similar measures were introduced during the rebellion in 
1745* The King, on the advice of the Privy Council (Parliament being 
in recess), issued a Proclamation against Papists and empowered the 
civil magistrates to do all that necessary to prevent any riot or 
disorder. Soon after when Parliament reassembled, it supported the 
Crown in the steps taken on its own initiative.
When troubles broke out in 1780 and on the civil magistrates refusal 
to attend with troops, the military was authorised to put down the riot 
without the help of the civil power. This, undoubtedly, was an extreme 
step but Lord Chancellor Thurloe sought justification for it in the 
following words:
nLn all cases of high treason, insurrection, and rebellion within 
the Realm, it was the peculiar office of the Crown to use the most 
effectual means of resisting and quashing such insurrection and rebellion,
(75) Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, Volume II, p,l63. (1869)
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and punishing the instruments of it* But the King, any more than the 
private person, could not supersede the law, nor any act contrary to it, 
and therefore he was bound to take care that the means he used for putting 
an end to the Rebellion and Insurrection were legal and constitutional, 
and the Military employed for that purpose were every one of them amenable 
to the law, because no word of command from-their particular officer, 
no direction from the War Office, or Order of Council, could warrant or 
sanction their acting illegally. In the Rebellions on 1715 and 1745 it
was in their Lordships1 recollection what were the measures then pursued, 
not but he saw he was verging towards the discussion of a situation very 
different from that in which the late disturbances put the metropolis, 
but yet their cases were alike in their respective degrees, and the late 
insurrection was similar to the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745, as far as 
it went11. (76)
Though martial law on these oocasions met with parliamentary 
approval, it was applied in a very restricted and qualified sense. The 
above statement of the law by the Lord Chancellor is a clear reflection 
of the judicial attitude and sets a limit to the exercise of arbitrary 
powers. Moreover, its duration was short though its necessity was great. 
Apart from these instances of martial law in the distant past, there has 
been no other occasion, excepting the two World Wars, when ^ Parliament 
has armed the Executive with all necessary powers to deal with emergencies 
created by war.
It must be mentioned that the position as to the application and 
enforcement of martial law in the British colonies and possessions was
176) Ibld7at"pri65l '
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different. Doubts were expressed whether in spite of the Petition of 
Right 1628, martial law could be declared in those territories* Nowhere 
has the administration of martial law, as will be seen, led to the 
suspension of the constitution or the civil power, saving so far as it 
was required to cope with the abnormal situation.
3 • Distinctions between Military and Martial Law. Military Government 
and Court-Martial.
To avoid further confusions, it is necessary to distinguish martial 
law from other similar concepts which are often associated with it, such 
as military law and government, and court-martial.
Military law is a body of special laws and regulations governing 
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. It is applicable to the members 
of the aforesaid armed forces, in peace as well as in war. Citizens 
who enter these organisations subject themselves to its jurisdiction.(77) 
They are triable by military tribunals if they violate any of its 
provisions and cannot claim to be tried under the criminal procedure 
ordinarily available to civilians. nThe tribunals by which this law is 
enforced are not a part of the judicial system, and their judgments are 
not subject to review under certiorari or habeas corpus by the Supreme
(77) "This Military law is a special code of rules administered by 
courts-martial to which the persons defined by the Army Act are 
subjected0. W. S. Holdsworth, 18 Law Quarterly Review at 122(1902) 
According to Cockbum C.J., '‘military law as applicable to the 
soldier is a precise, ascertained, and well-defined law".
Rex v. Nelson and Brand. Special Report, at p.86 (1867).
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Court. It is not arbitrary in character but is as definite and precise 
as the body of law governing civilians. It does not supersede the civil
laws in the sense of exempting the soldier from liability to trial and 
punishment in the ordinary courts". (73)
A military government is the dominion or control imposed by the 
conquering army on the occupied territory and its inhabitants. In Ex 
parte Milligan (79) Chase C.J. of the American Supreme Court described 
it as "military jurisdiction to be exercised by the military commander 
under the direction of the President, in time of foreign war without the 
boundaries of the United States, or In time of rebel].ion and civil war 
within states and districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents". 
In distinguishing between military and martial law Mr. Magoon said: 
"A military government takes the place of a suspended or destroyed 
sovereignty, while martial law, or more properly martial rule, takes 
the place of certain governmental agencies which for the time being are 
unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains
(73) Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and the War Power, (1917-13)
2 Minnesota Law Review 110 at 117. Willoughby defined military 
law as "the body of administrative laws created by Congress for the
government of the army and navy as an organised force". The Const-
itutional Laws of the United States, at p.1228.
(79) (1866) 4 Wall 2. "In the exercise of military government, the
commander may adopt, for the purposes of temporary civil 
administration, the existing system of the country, including 
its laws and courts, but the jurisdiction of such laws and courts 
e is not ex proprio vigore. but solely by virtus of the authority
conferred by him. It is therefore the arbitrary will, of the
commander; it may be suspended, modified, or superseded at his 
discretion. Military government is a species of civil government 
existing under the sanction of the war power in the enemy* s
country". (1917-13) 2 Minnesota Law Review at p.119*
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subject to the sovereignty. The occasion of military government is the
expulsion of the sovereignty theretofore existing, which is usually
accomplished by a successful military invasion. The occasion of martial
rule is simply public exigency which may rise in time of war or peace.
A military government since it takes the place of a deposed sovereignty,
of necessity continues until a permanent sovereignty is again established
in the territory. Martial rule ceases when the district is sufficiently
tranquil to permit the ordinary agencies of government to cope with
existing conditions".(80)
Again, martial law is different from proceedings by courts-martial.
1 Courts-martial are part of the recognised judicatures of the realm,
whose jurisdiction is confined to the military and naval forces of the
Crown".(8l) Willoughby defined courts-martial as "the tribunals in
which those who violate the military lav are commonly tried (except where
urgency demands a more summary method) ....."(82)
Courts which are set up to administer martial law (when it means
the assumption of absolute power by the officers of the State for the
suppression of insurrection and the restoration of order and lawful
authority)"are not^, properly speaking, courts-martial or courts at
all",(83) Such courts were described by Sir James Stephen as "mere
(80J "Magoon, Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Teiritories 
subject to Military Occupation. quoted by Willoughby in his 
Constitutional Laws of the United States, p.l236$1910)
(81) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Cons ti tuti onal Law, p. 207
(1869)* In Wolton v. Gavin. 16 Q.B.61, Lord Campbell~C.J. said:
"None are bound by the Mutiny Acts or the Articles of War, except
His Majesty*s forces".
(83) Willoughby, The Constitutional Laws of the United States, at p. 1197. 
(1910)
(83) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, (1869)
Joint Opinion of Mr. Edward James and Mr. Fitz-James Stephen on 
Martial Law with reference to th£ Jamaica Insurrection, at 559.
committees formed for the purpose of carrying into execution the 
discretionary power assumed by the Government". (84) The members of the 
so-called military courts "are not obliged to proceed" according to 
military law, but "if they do . so proceed, they are not protected by 
them as the members, of a real court-martial might be, except in so far 
as such proceedings are evidence of good faith". As to the legal 
position of the members of such courts "they are justified in doing, with 
any forms and in any manner, whatever is necessary to suppress 
insurrection, and to restore peace and the authority of the law. ' They 
are personally liable for any acts which they may commit In excess of 
that power, even if they act in strict accordance with tbsjMutiny Act 
and Ar tides of War", (85) .
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CHAPTER II
COMOVERSIES AS TO TEE MEANING OF MARTIAL LAW
1. Gan the Grom declare Martial Law on apprehended danger?
Both the origin and development of martial, law in England, as 
already seen, are so shrouded in obscurity that the difficulty of giving 
an unconfused account of it will be easily understood. So far we have 
briefly traced its growth from a common source, the Constable and 
Marshals Court, which also gave birth to the military law of to-day.
We may now, therefore, proceed to examine the views of some eminent 
persons concerning martial law and see how far they conform to the true 
definition of it. While considering the contents of martial law we will 
also discuss the claims made on behalf of the Gvowi to exercise it on 
occasions which did not, in the opinion of the constitutional lawyers, 
justify its application.
Bound up with their pretended claim to rule by divine right, the 
Tudor and Stuart kings tried to establish their absolute authority by 
any means available and in any direction which offered an opening for 
such aggrandisement. Views were early expressed that martial law could 
only be exercised during a time of war and resentment was apparent against 
subjection of ordinary citizens to the jurisdiction of the Constable*s 
Court. In their earnest desire to be real kings and not shadows, both 
the Tudors and the Stuarts found many occasions to spurn such opinions
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and sentiments. (1)
Their attempt to extend the powers of declaring martial law to 
cases of apprehended danger got judicial support in two cases; Bate1 s 
Case(2) and Hex v* Hampden(3), popularly known as The Case of Ship-money.
In Bate!s Case the judgment dealt with the power of the Crown over 
trade5 treaties, foreign affairs and indirect taxation, indicating 
how the Grown could turn its powers over foreign trade to fiscal uses*
"All customes, be they old or new, are no other than the effects and 
issues of trades and commerce with forrain nations; but all' commerce 
and affairs with forraxners, all wars and peace, all acceptance and 
admitting for current forrain coyn,' all parties and treaties whatsoever, 
are made by the absolute power of the King”* The decision made it clear 
that the King could impose duties on imported goods for regulation of 
trade, but not for raising revenues and his statement that the duty was 
imposed for such purposes was conclusive. In matters affecting the 
State and common benefits of the people the King!s power was absolute and 
he could not be controlled by Parliament. Customs were an important 
matter of State*
(1) "They did not consider themselves bound by the legal definition of 
1 a time of war*. They considered that they might submit ordinary 
citizens to the jurisdiction of the Marshal or his deputies whenever 
in their opinion such a measure was necessary to the preservation 
of order. They may be said therefore to have extended this 
jurisdiction in two ways: (l) They extended to persons, not
members of the array, powers which existed only over soldiers duly 
enrolled in the army; (2) they made a time of war mean a time of 
apprehended disturbance*u William Holdsworth, Martial Law
Historically Considered, 18 Law Quarterly Review 123.
(1606) 2 State Trial 371.
(1637) 3 State Trial 823.‘3I
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The facts in the Case of Ship-money are well-known to every 
student of English Constitutional Law and history. In 1634 Charles I 
issued writs to all seaport towns to provide fully manned and equipped 
ships required for protecting English shipping. As no other tom 
excepting London was in a position to supply those ships, "the demand 
was equivalent to a demand for money". In 1635, writs for ship-money 
were again issued, and this time to inland counties also. On getting 
a favourable answer from the judges who were asked to give their opinion 
on the legality of the writs, similar writs were issued the next year. (4) 
The defendant, a Buckinghamshire gentleman, refused to pay tax of £1 
imposed on him. Hence proceedings were taken against him.
It was conceded on behalf of the defendant that the King had 
supreme power in matters relating to the defence of the country, he was 
the sole judge to determine whether danger existed, and he could raise 
money for providing him with the means to protect the country, But it 
was contended that before doing so the King was bound to summon
U) In fairness to the xinfortunate King it must be mentioned that the 
following opinion of the judges on the legality of the writs was 
obtained previous to their issue:
"We are of opinion, that when the good and safety of the kingdom 
in general is concerned, and the whole kingdom in danger, .your 
majesty may, by writ, under the Great Seal of England, command 
all the subjects of this your kingdom, at their charge, to 
provide and furnish such number of ships, with men, munition, 
and victuals, and for such time as your majesty shall, think fit, 
for the defence and safeguard of the kingdom from such danger and 
peril: and that by law your majesty may compel the doing thereof,
in case of refusal or refractoriness. And we are also of opinion, 
That in such case, your majesty is the sole judge, both of the 
danger, and when and how the same is to be prevented and avoided". 
Quoted by Keir and Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law, Fourth 
edition, at p.51« (1954) ~
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Parliament, for it could best judge the state of the country and as such 
■was best qualified to burden the country.
On behalf of the Crown the argument was advanced that though it
was clear law that the King could in peace time tax only with the consent 
of Parliament, it was otherwise in an emergency. The proposition sought
to be laid down by the Court was that the King could take away property
not only when war was actually raging but also on mere apprehension of war* 
The majority of judges including Finch C.J, stuck to the views that 
the Crown had the power to proclaim martial law whenever he felt the 
country1s defence required it and he was the sole judge of the 
circumstances which constituted such danger. (5)
Mr. Holborne, Hampdenfs counsel, represented the other view which
(5) Finch C.J. said: HIn time of imminent danger, tempore belli.
anything, and by any man, may be done5 murder cannot be punished$ 
yet, says my brother Crooke, the King cannot charge his subjects 
in any case without Parliament! no., not when the kingdom is
actually invaded by the enemy. But truly I think, as he was the
first, so he will be the last of that opinion   There hath
been and may be as great danger when the enemy is not discerned as 
when in arms and on the land. In the time of iirar when the course 
of law Is stopped, when judges have no power or place, when the 
courts of justice can send out no process, in this case the King 
may charge his subjects, you grant. Mark what you grant; when 
there is such a confusion as no law, then the King may do it.
Dato uno absurdo infinita sequunter. Then there may be a time of
war in one part of the kingdom, and the courts of justice may sit. 
How whether a danger be to all the kingdom or a part, they are
alike perilous, and all ought to be charged   E^qpectancy of
danger, I hold, is a sufficient ground for the King to charge 
his subjects for If we. stay till the danger comes, it will be then 
too late. And his averment of the danger is not traversable, it 
must be binding when he perceives and says there is a danger! as 
in 1588 the enemy had been upon us, if it has not been foreseen 
and provided for before it came'1. (1637) St. Tr. at p.1234.
insisted on the presence of actual pressing danger before the Crown could 
proceed by means of martial law:
“Put the case an enemy was landed, to show what the powers are by
our laws in that case for defence! when there is particular appearance 
of instant and apparent danger, in that case particular property must 
yield much to necessity. These cases our books warrant, as building of 
bulwarks on another manfs ground, and burning corn. In 1538 there was 
an actual danger, and then it was just to take corn or grass or anything 
to raise supplies* But where do any of our books say that upon fear of 
danger, though in the King*s case, a man can without leave make a
bulwark in another man1 s land? •••••• "(6)
It was the law of necessity, he said, that would Impel not only 
the King but any subject to do any act upon any man*s land and invade any 
property for the purposes of defence, if there was an instant danger or 
actual invasion. He went so far as to suggest that in such a case "the 
subject may prejudice the King himself in point of property ...... Levis
timor will not serve ...... but such a fear as ariseth from an actual
and apparent danger"• (7)
The claim of the Crown to extend martial law to cover cases of 
apprehended disturbance was perhaps motivated by the principle that 
prevention is better than-cure, but in spite of the views held by the 
majority so well propounded by Finch C.J. it may be submitted that mere 
expectancy of danger could not invest the Gvo\m with additional
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powers.(8) Judging from this standpoint the views put forward by 
Mr. Holborne and adopted by Grooke J. would seem to be correct.(9) It 
must be mentioned, however, that the Crown laxvryers* attempt in the Case 
of Ship-money to prop up the Crown* s exorbitant claim to exercise optional 
power of government was largely negatived by subsequent developments.
Their effort also to circumvent the Petition of Right by putting a 
strained construction upon it would appear to be fruitless.
Even before the lax* was laid doxjn in 1628 the statement of the 
principle that nearly approximates to it will be found embodied in the 
following assertion of Sir Thomas Smith, Queen Elizabeth I*s Ambassador 
and Secretary of State. "In war time and in the field the Prince hath 
also absolute power, so that his word is a law. Pie may put to death, 
or to other bodily punishment, xtfhom he shall think so to deserve, 
without process of laxtf or form of judgment. This hath been sometime 
used xtfithin the realm before any open war, in sudden insurrections and 
rebellions, but that not alloxjed of xdLse and grave men, who in that 
their judgment had consideration of the consequence and example, as much 
as of the present necessity, especially when by any means the punishment 
might have been done by order of law. This absolute pox^ er is called
(8) "It is only the actual presence of pressing danger which gives to 
the Crown and to the subject alike the right to do what is necessary 
to ward off the danger". William Holdsx^orth, 18 Law Quarterly 
Reviex*, p. 125#
(9) Per Crock© Js ,lRoyal power, I account, is to be used in cases 
of necessity and imminent danger, x-ahen ordinary courses xd.ll not 
avail •••«•« as in cases of rebellion, sudden invasion, and some 
other cases, where martial law may be used, and may not stay for 
legal proceedings". Ibid. p.1162.
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Martial Law* and ever was, and necessarily must be, used in all camps 
and hosts of men, where the time nor place, do suffer the tarriance of 
pleading and process, be it never so short, and the important (quaere* 
importunate) necessity requireth speedy execution, that with more awe 
the soldier might be kept in more strait obedience, without which never 
captain can do anything vailable in the wars11* (10) It will be seen that
though Sir Thomas referred to the limitations under which the Grown could 
exercise such absolute power, he was mistaken as to the true nature of 
martial law* Like all others he included in the concept of martial -law 
what would be known as military law to-day* The gist of his assertion 
that martial law could be applied to soldiers and only during war time was, 
however, in accordance with the prevailing notions and the spirit of the 
Petition of Right.
2. Was Military and Martial Law the same?
We should, however, remember that here and in subsequent
reference to martial law jurisdiction over soldiers in war time also
meant jurisdiction over citizens who were liable to serve as soldiers,
the reason being the absence of a standing army diiring this period. (11)
So, whenever the Constable and Marshal*s Court or the Officers who
received commissions to execute martial law tried to administer such law,
they did not confine their jurisdiction to the soldiers only but extended
it to include ordinary citizens. The same confusion has, therefore,
Tl07 Sir Thomas Smith, The Commonwealth"ofEngland. Book^Y^oIiv. (156^7
quoted by Sir Frederick Pollock, IS L.Q.R. at pp,152-3 (1902)
(11) w. s. Holdsworth, History of English Law. Volume I, p. 575.
_
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persisted in the minds of the lawyers, legislators and judges. Whatever 
protest m s  thus directed against the illegality of martial law mainly 
concerned itself with the time or circumstances when its applications 
would be legal, rather than with the persons to whom it could be applied. 
Further confusion arose from its common historical origin, as already 
seen, with military law. Gradually however, such confusion was cleared, 
but the process involved minute scrutiny and repeated examination over a 
long period.
Such legal luminaries as Hale, Coke and Blackstone were, it wall 
not be surprising to see, unable for these reasons correctly to define 
martial law. According to Hale, martial law was in truth and reality 
not law; it was something indulged rather than allowed by law; the 
necessity of government, order and discipline in an army alone gave these 
laws countenance - quod enim necessitas. cogit defendit* Secondly, this 
indulged law was only to extend to members of the army or to those of the 
opposed army and was not intended to be executed or exercised upon those 
who were not enlisted in the army, for they were not bound by military 
constitutions applicable only to the army, governed by and subject to 
a different law (i.e. the common law), which remains valid even during 
a time of war. Finally, the exercise of martial law whereby any person 
should lose his life, or member, or liberty should not be permitted in 
time of peace when the King!s courts were open for all persons to receive 
justice according to the laws of the land. This was, in substance, 
declared by the Petition of Right by which such commissions and martial 
law were repealed and made illegal.(12)
(12) Hale, History of the Common Law, p.54.
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Evidently, what Hale has here referred to is military law, i.e., 
the body of rules for the internal government of- land forces which at the 
present day is exercised by courts-martial. (13) Though at the same time 
his statement on martial law contains references which would indicate his 
familiarity with certain aspects of it. From the latter portion of his
opinion it would appear that he was of opinion that, not only civilians,
but also soldiers could not be tried by martial law in time of peace.
Coke and Blackstone (14) used this expression in the same sense. 
Probably the confusion could have been avoided if the distinction between 
courts-martial proper and the military courts set up under martial law 
were well kept in mind. When the former became established, they used 
to administer the Articles of War and Ordinances special^ enacted to 
govern the conduct of soldiers in war time (15), and were *part of the 
recognised judicatures of the realm, whose jurisdiction is confined to 
the military and naval forces of the Grown*.(l6) Except soldiers no one
(13) Mr. Cushing, the Attorney-General of United States of America,
criticised Hale*s opinion in sayings nThis proposition is a mere 
composite blunder, a total misapprehension of the matter. It
confounds martial law and law military; it ascribes to the former
the uses of the latter, it erroneously assumes that the government 
of a body of troops is a necessity more than that of a body of 
civilians or citizens. It confounds and confuses all the 
relations of the subject, and is an apt illustration of the 
incompleteness of the notions of the common law jurists of England 
in regard to matters not comprehended in that limited branch of the 
legal science**. viii Opinions. p.367. It must be mentioned that 
in criticising Hale in the light of views developed after Hale*s 
time, things having a common origin must be regarded as the same 
until their ambits become sufficiently distinct to make the 
difference clear.
(14.) Supra,; footnote 2, chapter I.
(15) Supra, p.9, chapter I.
(16) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions, p.208. (I869)
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bound by the Articles of War or the Ordinances. (17) According to Forsyth, 
a want of attention to this fact produced confusion as to the true nature 
of martial law *even in the minds of judges* * (18) Presumably, he was 
referring to the opinion expressed by Lord Loughborough C.J. in the case 
°£ Grant v. Could. (19) It wall be apparent from the views there expressed 
by Lord Loughborough C.J. that the meaning he ascribed to martial law 
contained the elements of military law as well« He said:-
,lThis leads me to an observation that martial law such as it is 
described by Hale, such also as it is marked by IVh*. Justice Blackstone, 
does not exist in England at all. Where martial law is established, and 
prevails in any country, it is of a totally different nature from that 
which is inaccurately called martial law, merely because the decision is 
by a court-martial, but which bears no affinity to that which m s  formerly 
attempted to be exercised In this kingdom, which was contrary to the 
constitution and which has been for a century totally exploded. Where 
martial law prevails, the authority under which it is exercised, claims 
a jurisdiction over aj.1 military persons, in all circumstances. Even 
their debts are subject to enquiry by military authority”.
The learned Chief Justice in trying to define martial law has, 
it may be submitted, worked under the same difficulty as others before 
him and similarly bungled. It is true that he has shown awareness of 
the non-existence of martial law * which was formerly attempted to be 
exercised in this kingdom*. Obviously enough, he is here referring to
(17) Per Lord Campbell C.J. in Wo3.ton v. Gavin. 16 Q.b7"§L "
(18) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions, p. 208. (1869)
(19) (1792) 2 H.B1.69: 126 English Reports 434*
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the issue of commissions to try men in time of peace for ordinary felonies 
by martial law 1 which was contrary to the constitution1 and was* of 
course* forbidden by statute a century and'a half earlier*(i.e., by the 
Petition of Right* 1628) But, towards the end of the passage, xjhere
he seems to have attempted to define martial lax*?* he, in fact, merely
refers to military law as administered by courts-martial to-day.
That the exact limit or content of martial law x*/as not clearly 
knoxjn to these eminent authorities and the resulting discrepancy between 
their statement of the law and its exercise will, it is hoped, be 
apparent from our foregoing discussions. The reason of such confusion,
Li as already observed, as perhaps due to the common historical origin of 
both military and martial lax-/, but that persons like Hale, Coke.,
Blackstone and even Lord Loughborough failed to distinguish between 
military and martial law, though surprising, can only be best e:xplained 
in the x-zords of Coclcburn G.J. that "they knew of no such difference, and 
that the distinction now supposed to exist is a thing that has come into 
the minds of men certainly much later than when these eminent lumLneries 
of the law of England xwote their celebrated treatises".(20)
3* In what sense x/as Martial Law under stood in recent times?
We have been hitherto concerned with viex-js expressed by past 
authorities, but some comparatively recent opinions on martial lax*/ are,
(20) Rex v. Weis on and Brand* Special Report, pp. 99-100 (1867)
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it is submitted , not also wholly accurate. The statement of no less 
an authority than Dicey offers an example of incorrect notions regarding 
the true nature of martial law, (2l)
Dicey refers to two senses in which the term "martial law" is 
generally understood, and tries to show in which sense its existence as 
part of English law is acceptable and in which sense it is not. If martial 
law means the suspension of ordinary law and the temporary government of 
a country or parts of it by military tribunals and which is, according 
to him, its proper sense, it is non-existent in England, The 
proclamation of martial law in this sense would be merely equivalent to 
ushering a state of affairs obtainable under a declaration of a "state of 
siege" in France and other continental countries. Under such a regime 
the ordinary lav; is suspended, the courts1 jurisdiction is superseded 
and any man becomes liable to arrest, imprisonment or even execution at 
the will of the military commander. The English constitution does not
recognise this kind of martial law. If there is an insurrection or
rebellion, soldiers may do anything to suppress It, kill, execute or 
slaughter as in battle, but, as soon as the disturbance is over, they 
have no right under the lav; to inflict punishment for such riot or 
rebellion. If any execution takes place under the sentence of a court- 
martial, once such rebellion has been ended, It will be illegal and 
technically murder, (22) It would appear that so far Dicey truly
(21) A, V, Dicey, The Law of t]a§ Constitution, Tenth edition, at pp,2&7-
293 (1959)
(22} Here, Dicey follows the opinion expressed by Coke, Hale and Rolle. 
Thus, Coke said: "If a lieutenant, or other that hath commission
of martial authority, In time of peace hang or otherwise execute 
any man by colour of martial law, this is murder; for this is 
against Magna Carta", 3 Inst. 32.
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represented the state of the law In England. His assertion that the 
absence of martial law in this sense shows unmistakably the supremacy of 
the law under the English constitution is also justifiable.
From this point of view one could find much substance in the 
assertion that there is no such thing as martial law in the English system 
of government, but, as this kind of statement might be misleading,
Dicey proceeds to propoxmd his theory of martial law.
Dicey asserts that martial law is the common law right of the Grown 
and its servants to repel force by force in the case of invasion, 
insurrection, riot, or any violent resistance to "the law. Though 
controversies exist as to whether martial law is used in exercise of the 
common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by force 
or in virtue of the prerogative of the Crown, we shall postpone its 
discussion for the present and proceed to consider his further views on 
the subject.
There may be some historical reasons which prompted Dicey to say 
that martial law uis a power which has in itself no special connection 
with the existence of an armed force”(23), but it will be difficult 
to-day for any one to suppose that martial law could be enforced x-athout 
the employment of the armed forces or at least the readiness to employ 
them should the occasion require it. His attempt to elaborate and 
illustrate this point would, it appears, meet further objections.
No-one xjould contradict Dicey xdien he says that the Crown has the
(23) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, Tenth edition, at 
p.238 (1959;
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right to put down breaches of the peace, but when, after discussing 
the respective rights and duties of the soldiers and the subjects, he
says: nif then by martial law be meant the power of the government or
of loyal citiaens to maintain public order, at whatever cost of blood 
or property may be necessary, martial law is assuredly part of the law 
of England**(24), his views become subject to criticism. With all respect 
due to such a high authority, it seems a matter for regret that Dicey 
included in the definition of martial la\^  not only the Crown* s right to 
suppress breaches of the peace, but also the duty of every subject, 
whether a civilian or a soldier, whether a servant of the government,
such as a policeman, or a person in no way connected with the
administration, to assist in putting down breaches of the peace. The 
inclusion within the scope of martial law of the duty of the subject to 
assist in suppressing a breach of the peace, it is submitted, is not 
warranted by the existing state of the law.
Though Dicey*s analysis cannot thus be offered as an authoritative 
definition of martial law, it has to be admitted that it is not a wholly 
wrong conception. It will be seen that his reference to the assumption 
of powers by the Crown*s servants to restore peace and order in case of 
disturbance, especially when grave and abnormal, points to the modern 
sense in which martial law is understood. We do not, however, dispute 
the duty of the citiaens to render all conceivable assistance to the 
police or the armed forces, when required to do so in such dire
(24.) Ibid. at p.290.
circumstances o
A few other opinions, the occasions for which did not arise in 
England but in the British possessions overseas, may now be considered, 
though we shall.postpone the discussion of the concept of martial law 
among Commonwealth lawyers to a separate chapter.
In 1&4& martial law was proclaimed In Ceylon and a Committee of 
the House of Commons was set up in the following year to inquire into 
the causes of the disturbances and the legality and extent of the 
proceedings umder the aforesaid proclamation. The following opinion 
delivered by Sir David Dundas, the Judge Advocate-General, is, It 
would appear, a substantially correct approach to the problem;
115475*“ Does not martial lav; siipersede both military and civil
law? - I think it over-rides, in respect of the persons upon whom it is 
to operate, all other law. For instance, if five or six regiments 
were to mutiny in the field, would any one tell me you must apply to 
Parliament before you could reduce those persons to subjection? There 
must be somewhere, for public safety, a right to exercise such power 
in time of need......
M5476.« (Sir Robert Peel) - A wise and courageous man, responsible 
for the safety of a colony, would take the law into his own hands, and 
make a law for the occasion, rather than submit to anarchy? - I think 
that a wise and courageous man could, If It were necessary, make a law 
to his own hands, but he would much rather take a law which is already
made; and I believe the law of England is that a Governor, like the
Crown, has inherent in him the right, when the necessity arises, of
judging of it, and, being responsible for his work afterwards, so to
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deal with the laws as to supersede them all and to proclaim martial law 
for safety of the colony. I think a good man will do it with very great 
care; and a prudent man too, but a wise and courageous man;, I think 
ought not to be shy of doing it,
u54-77*~ (Mr. Gladstone) - You spoke of his being responsible for 
that which he has done; if he is responsible for that which he has done, 
does not it seem to follow that what he has done has not been done under 
the law so to be called, but under a necessity which is above the law? - 
I say he is responsible for what he has done, just as I am responsible 
for shooting a man on the King* s highway who comes to rob me. If I
mistake my man, and have not, in the opinion of the judge and jury who
try me, an. answer to give, I am responsible,
,r547#*- (Mr, Adderley) ■» Under martial law, would there be any 
difference in the treatment of a soldier and a civilianJ - I should 
say none; but that is a matter upon which, of course, I can have no
knowledge; ray notion is, that an offender ought to be subjected to the
punishment of death if it be necessai^ y, so other punishments which are 
fit, and that there is not any difference between a soldier offending 
a common man; he is an offender against the peace,(25)
About the views thus expressed by Sir David as to what is meant 
by the expression ,rmartial law11 Sir James Stephen said that they were 
substantially correct, The following cause celebre which arose in 
Jamaica in 1$65 was the occasion for Sir James* opinions which he later
(25) Quoted in Cl ode* s Military Forces of the Crown, Volume II, at
pp. 160-61. (1869)
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on included in his famous History of the Criminal Law of England. There 
was a revolt of the negroes against the British planters * to suppress 
which Governor Eyre proclaimed martial law in accordance with the 
provisions of a local Act. Quite unfortunately most severe measures 
were adopted to suppress the insurrection.(26) During this extraordinary 
regime a civilian, Gordon, was arrested in a district where martial 
law was not proclaimed, and removed to a place where it was in force.
He was tried by a court-martial, found guilty of treason for inciting 
the negroes to rise, and was shot.
A great uproar took place in England over the incidents in Jamaica 
and the legality of the regime was vehemently assailed. A Parliamentary 
Commission which was set up to investigate the circumstances leading to the 
enforcement of martial law and its justifiability, sought the legal 
opinion of Sir James Stephen. The terms of reference were - nThe 
Committee desires to be advised what steps are open to them to assist 
their fellow-subjects in Jamaica to obtain the protection of the law; 
and, if the law has been broken, to bring the guilty parties to justice, 
and also what steps are open to them, as Englishmen, to vindicate 
constitutional law and order, if constitutional order and law have been 
illegally set aside by the local Government in Jamaica11.
After considering the state of law in England Sir James summed up 
his views on martial law in the following propositions %
”1. Martial law is the assumption by officers of the Crown of
(26) Rex v. Bel son and Brand. (1B67) Special Report.
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absolute power, exercised by military force, for the suppression of an 
insurrection, and the restoration of order and lawful authority*
”2. The officers of the Crown are justified in any exertion of 
physical force, extending to the destruction of life and property to 
any extent, and in any manner that may be required for the purpose*
They are not justified in the use of cruel and excessive means, but are 
liable civilly and criminally for such excess. They are not justified 
in inflicting punishment after resistance is suppressed, and after the 
ordinary courts of justice can be reopened1*. (27)
Earlier, he mentioned that the expression ’martial law** was used 
at different times in four diffent senses. Eirst, it meant 11 the law 
martial, exercised by the Constable and Marshal over troops in actual 
service and especially on foreign service”. Secondly, the same system 
was attempted by several sovereigns to be introduced in time of peace to 
punish breaches of peace. This was declared illegal by the Petition of 
Right, 1628. Thirdly, the Mutiny Acts and the Army Discipline Acts, 
to-day called the military law, were mistakenly known as martial law.
In the first sense martial law Is obsolete and in the second sense it 
can no longer be declared in England. But the egression, as pointed 
out by him, ”has survived and has been applied to a very different 
thing, namely to the common law right of the Crown and its representatives 
to repel force by force in the case of invasion or insurrection, and to 
act against rebels as it might against invaders”.(28)
TTtF  Sir James Pitz-James Stephen, History of the Criminal Law in 
England, at p.215 (1883)
(28) Ibid. at pp.207-8.
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It is quite apparent that what Dicey understood by martial law is not 
essentially different from the meaning attributed to it by Sir David and Sir 
James. A3.1 of them rested the legality of martial law on necessity 
and also favoured assumption of absolute powers by the executive if 
circumstances demanded it. Though these viewd approach nearer to the 
modern meaning in which martial law is commonly understood to-day, they 
did not go altogether without challenge. Thus, Cockburn C.J. had, 
apart from his criticism of the exercise of unlimited powers, ' objections 
to call the right of private defence, whether on the part of ordinary 
citizens or the officers of the Crown by the expression "martial law".(29) 
To resist anu illegal application of force whether directed against any 
individual or lawfully constituted authority is perfectly legal and such 
common law right to repel force by force is undoubtedly part and parcel 
of the law of England. But this, he said, is not its proper sense 
and, therefore, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that such 
common law right was any part of martial law;
"It is simply the application of a universally acknowledged 
principle^ namely, that where illegal force is resorted to for the 
purpose of crime, you may meet that illegal force by force, and may 
repress and prevent it by any amount of force that may be necessary for 
the purpose, even if that necessity should involve the death of the 
offender. If a man attacks you with intention to murder you, or to 
do you bodily harm$ if a man stops you on the highway to rob you; if
(29) Rex v. Nelson and Brand. (IB67) Special Report, at p«,£4o
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he invades the sanctity of your dwelling by night, under circumstances 
calculated to inspire you with apprehension and fear, you are not bound 
to submit to the injury that may presently be done you, and to leave it 
to the law afterwards to avenge the wrong s you may at once take the law 
into your own hands, and in self-protaction, or for the prevention of
crime, kill the offender by any means in your p o w e r (30)
Similarly, if there is a mutiny on board ship or in an army, 
immediate force may be applied to the extent of even killing those engaged 
in it, ,fBut this is not what can properly be called martial law. It
is part and parcel of the law of England - or perhaps I should say it is
a right paramount to all law, and which the law of every civilised 
country recognises"*(31)
Cockburn C,J, was, in his charge to the Grand Jury, considering 
the limit and extent of the authority administering martial law in Jamaica 
during the insurrection in 1865, He considered several opinions(32)
(30) Ibid, at
(31) Ibid, at pc85*
(32)o "Martial 1 aw is arbitrary and uncertain in its nature, so much so
that the term law cannot be properly applied1'. Or, "when martial
law Is proclaimed, the law is the will of the ruler, or rather 
the will of the ruler is law". Or, "when martial law is
proclaimed, there is no rule or law by which the officers 
executing martial law are bound to carry on their proceedings^ it 
is far more extensive than ordinary military law, it overrides all 
other law, it is entirely arbitrary"* Or, "martial law is, in 
short, the suspension of all law but the will of the military 
commanders entrusted with its execution, to be exercised 
according to their judgment, the exigencies of the moment, and 
the usages of the service, with no fixed and settled rules or 
laws, no definite practice, and not bound even by the rules of 
military law"* m Ibid* pe22«
current In his time about the powers of the executive during any such 
extraordinary regime but found himself unable to accept them as sound.
The immediate reason for his refusal to extend recognition to these 
opinions was that, excepting the authority pf the persons making them, 
they had no real basis. In short, he, considered these viex/s not only 
untenable and mischievous, but even detestable. Those who were 
responsible for these opinions should have known that men acting on them 
might have to answer "civilly or criminally, for a violation of law". (33) 
He could not for a moment imagine that the existing state of the lav/ 
empowered the armed forces with "purely arbitrary, despotic, and 
capricious powers" as v/ere set out in these opinions on the extent and 
limits of martial law. He did not deny that Parliament could enact 
that martial law should be enforced but, before doing so, it should 
certainly put "such restrictions and conditions «•*..« on the exercise 
of this anomalous jurisdiction as may ensure the observance of those 
things which are essential to justice", and which would restrain those 
who in time of public commotion are "called on to administer this rude 
and hasty justice".(34)
Cockburn C.J. quite emphatically repudiated such extreme views 
about martial law which, as necessity was the only justifying factor, 
favoured "the exhibition of martial law in its most summary and terrible 
form" and setting up examples of Immediate punishment. If this meant 
that only to inspire terror men could be sacrificed without ascertaining
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whether they were guilty or innocent, it would then be very natural to , 
expect that no court of justice would ever cotmtenance such odious ideas. 
With philosophical detachment he proceeded to formulate the guiding 
principle in the following words i-
’’There are considerations more important even than shortening the
temporary duration of an insurrection* Among them are.the eternal mid
immutable principles of justice, principles which can never be violated 
without lasting detriment to the true interest and well-being of a 
civilised ccmmunity’*.(35)
In another case(36) arising out of the same disturbances in Jamaica 
in 1365 where proceedings were started in England against Governor Eyre 
for acts done under his orders, Lord Blackburn had to consider the extent 
of executive power during such an extraordinary regime. Enunciating the 
rule applicable in such circumstances, he said that the power of the 
officer varied according to the state of the law he would find himself in. 
He might have to act under the general law or particular statutes. 
Referring to the instant case, he pointed out that the Governor derived
his powers, not only from the common law, as an Act of the local
legislature also empowered him "in the event of disturbance, or emergency 
of any kind, to declare any particular parish, district or county of 
the island under martial law". What this enactment Implied will be 
evident from the following words s-
111 think that the Legislature of Jamaica meant to enact that the
(35) Ibid. at p. ios
(36) Rex v. Eyre, (1363) Special Report 67.
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commander-in~chief at the time should have very extensive power  .... to
do that which the Petition of Right had declared the Crown could not do 
in time of peace, and which it is doubtful whether the Crown could ever 
legally do in time of war^ I mean, to supersede the common law altogether, 
and to punish all manner of offences that were there done, by summary 
process, not of course to give arbitrary power like that which it is 
said an Oriental Sovereign has, to kill men with cause or without cause, 
but to enable the authorities to supersede the ordinary process of law, 
the ordinary common law, and try all manner of things by this summary
process, in order that offenders might be summarily tried and punished^
the great object being to stop the invasion or insurrection". (37)
On these views on martial law it may be fairly assumed that, in 
its modern sense, it denotes the exercise of exceptional powers during 
an emergency caused either by foreign invasion or domestic rebellion*
Such an extraordinary regime may lead to the total or partial substitution 
of military for judicial process and also to a new relationship between 
the civilian population and the armed forces* We may agree that martial 
law is "a peculiar system of legal relations which arise between the 
military and civilian subjects of the King in time of insurrection or 
civil war. It has been used to cover the assumption by military 
commanders of powers for the restoration of order in the event of civil 
,war or insurrection which are not ...... equally exercisable by the
ordinary citizen"*(33)
(37) Ibid. oJt 77
(38) Iteir'and Lawson, Cases on Constitutional Law, at p.431.
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We shall now pass on to a consideration of the question whether 
martial law exists at all in England, for the dogma that ,!the common law 
knows nothing of martial law1 was persistently believed even during the 
first half of the nineteenth century*. Such remarks as "martial law has 
no place whatsoever in this realm", since the time of the Stuarts it has 
been na totally exploded thing”, it is the "most unconstitutional 
procedure conceivable” and others similar were the natural outcome of 
the popular but uncritical belief* It will be our endeavour to find 
how much truth or falsehood lies behind these asseverations, "for that 
there is such a thing as martial law in some sense of the term is to-day 
recognised by the most conservative authorities”*(39)
We have, of course, already discussed in which sense martial law 
is at present understood by English jurists and lawyers* Our purpose 
will be to discuss the opposing views as to the existence of martial 
law in England and discover the true position relating to it*
4* Does Martial Law Exist in England?
While considering Dicey*s views we have seen how much strongly 
and emphatically he asserted that martial law was, as defined by him, 
assuredly part of the law of England* We also ventured to explain why 
the views expressed by him as to the scope of martial law were, in our 
respectful opinion, erroneous and suggested that a:more correct:approach
(39) Ed\vrard S* Corwin, The President, at p. 172 (1948)
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is found in the exposition of the law by Sir David Dundas and Sir James 
Stephen. We are now, therefore, confronted with the problem whether 
martial law still exists in England. We could perhaps accept Dicey*s 
affirmative statement as to the existence of the law in the country of 
its origin, had we been able to adopt his definition as correct. But 
if martial law is what later jurists regard it as being, we should 
encounter some difficulty in explaining the effect of the Petition of 
Eight, 1623,
We shall not go into the question whether martial law can be 
legally declared in England in time of peace for the simple reason that 
there is no use in denying something which nobody asserts to be true. 
Such eminent persons as Cockburn C.J., Holdsworth and others have been 
unanimous in holding that martial law would be illegal, if there was no 
war or conditions of war existing within the realm.(40)
It therefore remains to be seen whether martial lav/ could be
declared in England during a time of war. For two reasons it becomes
difficult to reach a definite conclusion. First, ' the terms of the 
clause relating to martial, law in the Petition of Eight are obscure* (4l) 
Secondly, since 1623 there has not been any. case in which it was 
necessary to consider judicially uthe limits of the powers of the 
prerogative in time of war",(42). The result has been that the judges,
(4-0) Blackburn, J„, in Rex v. Eyre. Special Report, p.73, saiid:-
"This much, I think, I may safely say, that in time of peace 
the Crown has no such power1*. Holdsworth, History of English
Law, Volume VI, p. 226 (1924) ”
(41) "The words of the Petition of Eight are obscure, and can be made 
to-bear a wider interpretation”. Halsbury*s Law of England. 
Volume III, p.260, Third edition. ™
(42) Rex_y._Eyre, Special Report, p,73*
when incidentally referring to the clause in the Petition of Right, have 
held widely differing views, though in doing so, they have merely 
given recognition to already existing differences of opinion as to the 
effect of the Petition of Right.(43)
Thus, in Rex v. Byre(44) Lord Blackburn said that uit would be 
an exceedingly wrong presumption to say that the Petition of Right, In 
not condemning martial law in time of war, sanctioned it; still it 
did not in terms condemn it". According to him, therefore, Parliament 
did not expressly say that the Crown shall not have the power to declare 
martial law, but from this It does not necessarily follow that they
(43) Per Cockburn C.J. in Rex v. Nelson and Brand, p.66, (1367)
"Two views have been propounded of this celebrated statute.
The one that its effect is limited to commissions such as 
those of which the Commons had more immediate cause to complain, 
and especially to commissions issued in time of peace; the other
that it was intended to prevent the exercise of martial law
against the subject, under any circumstances, and even as
against the soldier, except in the case of "armies in time of
war”. The latter would appear to have been the view of Lord 
Hale, and the words of the statute are certainly large enough
to embrace the more general position; nor is it at all probable 
that the Commons many of whom must have foreseen that, as things
were then going, armed resistance to the encroachments of the
prerogative might become inevitable, Intended to leave the 
subject, in’the event of popular commotion, at the mercy of 
martial law".
(44) Special Report, p.73. (1868)
"sanctioned and recognised that doing so in time of war was legal".(45)
The judicial doubt as to whether martial law can be legally resorted to 
within the realm Is quite apparent from the above statement*
On the other hand the observations made by Lord Halsbury as to the 
possible effect of the Petition of Right are, as it will be seen, 
opposed to the views expressed by Lord Blackburn. In Ex Parte Marais(46) 
Lord Halsbury, the Lord Chancellor, positively asserted that the 
"framers of the Petition of Right well knew that what they were doing when 
they made a condition of peace the ground of the illegality of 
unconstitutional procedure". This view goes to establish that the 
application of martial law would be legal within the realm, if a state 
of war existed.
(45) Ibid. In his opinion if they did so, it would not have been 
a reasonable inference at all. For, he further said, "the 
great statesmen as well as great lawyers at that time in 
Parliament were sensible enough to be aware that in fighting 
with the Crown at such a time they should take care that they 
were distinctly in the right; that there should be no doubt 
about the point on which they took their stand. They did not, 
therefore, say that Queen Elizabeth did such things at the 
time of the rising in the North as were illegal; it would have 
been very foolish of them to do that, because by attacking the 
Crown on such a point, they would have given the Crown a 
debateable ground which would have been of immense advantage to 
it. It may be very much doubted too, whether the Puritans, 
who were the great party who struggled against Charles, would
have altogether sympathised with the implied attack on the 
Protestant Queen Elizabeth if it had been made, for the mode 
in which she put down the two Popish earls for the rising in 
the North; and they, therefore, as wise statesmen, did not 
take that point".
(46) 1902 A.C. 109.
Opinions among jurists are available in support of these two 
opposite views. Thus, an eminent writer, while referring to the 
proposition laid down by Lord Halsbury in the Marals case, found himself 
unable to accept its obvious meaning and said that it could not be "taken 
to mean that the framers of the Petition of Right expressly made the 
Petition of Right applicable only to Commissions for the execution of 
martial law issued by the Crown in time of peace, becavise no such 
limitation is expressed in that document"* (47) According to him the 
Petition of Right prohibited the issue of all Commissions which had long 
been issued by the Crown for trying soldiers and civilians, by military 
or martial law* Further, he said, the whole object of the Petition 
was to prevent the Crown from having the power by proclamation to deal 
with subjects at any time by other means than by the ordinary courts, 
and to prevent disturbances or hostilities being made at the will of the 
king a reason for the issue of Commissions such as had been issued. It 
would seem that his approach came nearer to Lord Blackburn1 s.
Without expressly stating his support for Lord Halsbury*s assertion, 
Holdsworth considered the matter fron another aspect and came to the 
same conclusion as his. What the Petition of Right did was to declare 
the recent extensions of the jurisdiction of the Constable* s court 
illegal* As a result, therefore, it "condemned the view that the 
court (Constable*s) had under any circumstances jurisdiction over anyone 
within the realm in time of peace".(43) He was of opinion that the
(47) Sir Cyril Dodd, The Case of Marais. 18 Law Quarterly Review at 149*
(48) W. S. Holdsworth, History of English Law, Volume I, at p. 576.
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Petition of Right did not deny that the Constable’s court had jurisdiction 
over soldiers in time of war* The fact that it was a declaratory Act 
and as such did not intend to abolish the legitimate jurisdiction of the 
Constable’s court went to confirm his opinion, Further, this was also 
the views of the contemporary lawyers. Therefore, ”the reasonable 
construction of the Petition was that it was exactly these extensions 
which it did condemn; but that it did not intend to condemn the 
jurisdiction admitted to belong to it by the mediaeval statutesf*. (49)
Hargrave, in stating his opinion as to the legality of the trial 
of a citizen in Ireland under martial law previous to the enactment 
which allowed such trial, doubted whether the extension of the 
jurisdiction of the Constable’s Court to try ordinary citizens on the 
charge of rebellion would be illegal:
!,Before the passing of the Act it had been open to doubt whether 
the prerogative of claiming and exercising martial law in time of actual 
rebellion, or In time of actual invasion by a foreign enemy was not 
merely referable to the law for governing the royal army and all connected 
with it (i,e#, for governing those employed In defending the country 
against invasion and suppressing rebellion) and whether under martial 
law to try persons seized in rebellion or upon suspicion of being rebels 
before a court-martial constituted by the King’s authority and punish 
them by death, or otherwise at the discretion of such a court, was not 
an extension of martial law beyond its real object, and an infringement
(49) Ibid.
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of the lax* of En&Land, in a point of most serious character”, (50)
According to him, therefore, the Aet(5l) sanctioning the exercise 
of martial lav powers to suppress the Irish rebellion should not have 
been passed, or if it was deemed essential to enact such lai<js, at least 
the extraordinarily harsh latitude allowed by the Act should have been 
avoided* He could not but wholeheartedly regret that the provisions of 
the Irish statute, enacted in "the heated atmosphere of civil commotions 
in Ireland", were, after the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 
incorporated in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament,(52) Judging 
from "previously settled notions" these statutes merely amounted "to a 
melancholy change".
Leaving aside these speculations about the intended effect of the 
Petition of -Right which would seem to be academic and therefore, devoid 
of any great practical interest (for it may be recalled that martial law 
has not been proclaimed in the United Kingdom during the last three 
centuries), we may proceed to consider the present law which would 
govern a situation both grave and abnormal and thus requiring the 
intervention by the military arm of the State, To assert that, in view 
of the Petition of Right, the executive government in the United Kingdom 
has no effective power in its hands to d eal with any emergency caused
either by rebellion within the realm (which to«day nobody supposes to be
probable) or invasion would be surely against common sense* As a matter
(50) William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law. 189, 
(1869)
(51) 39 George III, c*3.
(52) 41 George III, c,15*
of fact it will be seen that at the beginning of this century as well as 
quite recently, during the two World Wars, the United Kingdom Parliament 
passed enactments giving the executive necessary powers to meet the 
emergency. There may be some controversies as to whether the enforcement 
for example, of the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914-1915 and Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939-1940, virtually amounted to an application 
of martial law, but it is established beyond any doubt that the Armed 
Forces may be legally empowered under any grave emergency by an Act of 
Parliament to render such assistance as may be deemed essential to ensure 
the restoration of order. As the aforesaid Acts quite amply illustrate 
the method and manner by which the United Kingdom Parliament intended to 
cope with such emergencies, it is thought fit to consider them in some 
details. But before doing so it may be necessary, since we have been 
referring so long to the various senses in which martial law has been 
used and understood by different people, to indicate in which sense it 
exists in the English system of government. In the sense that, during 
an invasion or rebellion or riot or in expectation thereof, the executive 
government in England may assume exceptional powers, one can say that 
martial law exists in this country.(53) "Martial law" in this sense 
only means the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel 
force by force and to take any such measures as may be necessary and 
expedient for restoring peace and order.
(53) A, V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution. Tenth edition, at 
p.290, (1959)
During the First World War, the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, 
was passed to meet the national,emergency caused by the declaration of 
war against Germany. Parliament conferred on the Government both 
legislative and executive powers *for securing the public safety and 
the defence of the realm1. Some twenty days later, on August 28, an 
amending Act was passed which empowered to provide for the suspension 
of any restrictions on the acquisition or user of land, or the exercise 
of the power of making by e-laws, or any other power under the Defence 
Acts, 1842-1875, or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903*. On 
November, 1914, the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act was passed 
which gave His Majesty in Council the power to make regulations, and 
provided inter alia that offenders should be tried and punished by
courts-martial for breaches of such regulations. Objections were raised
against conferment of such powers which would treat ordinary citizens 
as if they were subject to military law. As a result, the Defence of 
the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915, was passed which authorised civil 
courts to try breaches of the aforesaid regulations. It further provided 
that in the event of actual invasion or any special military emergency,
His Majesty in Council might, by Proclamation, suspend, generally or 
in specified areas, the Jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Though the public realised the gravity of the war crisis and was 
willing to submit to the necessities arising out of war, they could 
hardly imagine the extent of government control. "In the succeeding
years the country was to learn, as never before, the unsuspected lengths
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to which unccntroiled executive legislation and action could be carried"(54) 
In the cases involving the interpretation of these Acts "some 
great constitutional battles were fought and some great constitutional 
principles asserted", which we shall discuss while considering the 
scope of judicial review of war power.(55)
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 , the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act, 1939, was enacted which empowered His Majesty in Council 
to make such Defence Regulations "as appear to him to be necessary or 
expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, 
the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war 
in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community".
The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, allowed Defence 
Regulations issued under the Act of 1939, to make provision "for 
requiring persons to place themselves, .their services, and their 
property at the disposal of His Majesty".
The Emergency Powers (Defence) (No.2) Act, 1940, passed a few 
months later, provided that "for securing, that , where by reason 
of recent or immediately apprehended enemy action the military situation 
is such as to require that criminal justice should be administered more 
speedily than would be practicable by the ordinary Courts, persons, 
whether or not subject to the Naval Discipline Act, to military law, or 
to the Air Force Act, m a y    be tried by such Special courts, not
(54) Sir C. K. Allen, Law and Orders. (1956) at p. 41.
(55) Chapters - VIII and IX, ~
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being courts-martial* as may be so providedu. But it must be mentioned 
that "these Special Courts* which never in fact operated* were 
essentially civilian courts and were in no sense military courts or 
courts-martial. Even the Treachery Act* 194*0? Section 2, which did 
confer on courts-martial jurisdiction to try enemy aliens for offences 
against that Act* provided that this jurisdiction should be exercised 
only by the direction and with the consent of the Attorney-General". (56)
5. Is a declaration of martial law within the prerogative powers of 
the Crown, or is it a common law -power?
Some controversy arises as to whether* in cases of extreme 
necessity and imminent danger* the right to declare martial law is 
part of the Crown1s prerogative or based on the right of rulers and 
subjects alike to use necessary force in protection of life or property* 
nSince* however* the separation of military law from martial law took 
place, the latter term* has been applied to something quite different - 
namely* the law of necessity promulgated by the Crown in case of domestic 
danger arising from foreign invasion or native insurrection to which both 
civilians and soldiers are equally subject* and which is enforced by 
military authority. The possible existence of such a state of things 
in British dominions has been repeatedly recognised by statute; but it 
has been strongly contested between writers on constitutional law and
(56) British Manual of Military Law. Part I* Section I* at p.6. (1956)
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military law whether it is a part of ordinary law or n o t *(57)
Facts and arguments can be set out in support of both views, and 
it is difficult to choose between them.
The jurisdiction once exercised by the Court of the Constable and 
Marshal was part of the Croi^s prerogative to govern both soldiers and 
subjects in time of war and Holdsworth says that "that prerogative had 
never been taken away; it still existed"*(58) The preambles and 
recitals in some Irish statutes regulating the statutory exercise of 
martial law in Ireland contain references to resort-bo martial law for 
the sake of public safety,(59)
Writers on military law such as Mac Arthur, Clode, Hough and 
Simmons consistently took the view that the Crown had a prerogative 
right to declare martial law and execute it in British dominions in the 
event of invasion or domestic rebellion* Sir David Dundas, Judge 
Advocate«General, also stated that the Irish Act (39 George III, 3) 
vras a "plain recognition of the prerogative of the Crown to declare 
martial law*" The Act is only a confirmation of the authority the 
Crown already possessed and shows that it would, whenever there was 
the opportunity, come to Parliament for conferment of such powers in
(57) G. G. Phillimore, Martial Law in Rebellion. The Journal of the
Comparative Legislation. April 1900, p.50. ”
(58) Martial Law Historically Considered. 18 Law Quarterly Review, p*126.
(59) 39 George III, c*ll, mentions in the preamble "the wise and 
salutary exercise of His Majesty*s undoubted prerogative in 
executing martial law", and the same Act provides that "nothing 
in the Act contained shall be construed to take away, abridge, 
or diminish the acknowledged prerogative of His Majesty for the 
public safety to resort to the exercise of martial law".
Similarly 43 George III, c.117, has references to his "undoubted 
prerogative".
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order to proceed according to law. But an emergency might suddenly 
arise in which there would be no tin© for asking such powers from the 
legislature and the executive would have to act instantly if the 
constitutional government was to be maintained. What should the 
executive do in such circumstances? Sir David said, "it is the duty 
of the executive, and there is royal authority to do so at home and 
abroad" to decide for itself and effectively deal with the situation.(60) 
We have already discussed the views of such eminent authorities 
as Dicey, Lord Loughborough and Stephen and others which hold that 
martial law is merely part of the common law right of rulers and subjects 
to repel force by force for the safety of the kingdom* Cockburn, C„J. 
who, as we have seen, characterised martial law as a "shado'wy, 
uncertain, precarious something, depending entirely on the conscience 
or rather on the despotic and arbitrary will of those who administer it" 
definitely held that it was nothing more nor less than the application 
of the common law principle by which "life may be protected and crime 
prevented by the immediate application of any amount of force which, 
under the circumstances, may be necessary". (61)
Whichever of these two views as to the source from which the 
jurisdiction to proclaim and enforce martial law has been derived, be 
correct, the law, it has been asserted, "acts on the same principles 
in judging the conduct of those who have acted under a proclamation of
(60) Clode, i^litary Forces of the Crown, Volume II, at p. (bo (1869)
(61) Rex v. Nelson and Brand. (1868) Special Report, p.85.
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martial law*1 *(62) Both views would, however, require as condition 
precedent of a proclamation of martial law a state of affairs which 
would absolutely demand the immediate use of force.(63)
(62) Martial Law Historically Considered. IS Law Quarterly Review, at 
129.
(63) Ibid. at p.128.
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CHAPTER 5
MARTIAL LAW IN THE Q O m Q W m i f m
1. Preliminary Observations
(Cur problem till now has been to determine the meaning of the 
expression “martial law" as understood in English constitutional law.
It would seem proper to examine the experience of other peoples, 
particularly in the British colonies and dominions, Prance and the 
United States of America, in order to get a clearer view of the basic 
nature of martial law.
* The sense in which martial law has been applied in the Commonwealth 
is not widely different from its English sense, though doubts have been 
expressed whether the British Crown had, in view of the provisions of 
the Petition of Right, the power to declare martial law outside England. 
"Whatever power the Crown possesses in this respect in the United 
Kingdom, it possesses equally in the colonies, whether settled or 
conquered; for it seems that the Petition of Right applies to both as 
being merely declaratory of the common law of England regarding the
(i)
limits of the sovereign’s prerogative and the subject rights." So far 
as the assumption of necessary powers for the safety of the country is 
concerned, the other systems of law resemble the common law of England,
(l) G. G. Phillimore, Martial Law in Rebellion, J.S.C.L., April 1900, 
at p.52.
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lout important differences will be noticeable. As to the similarity
between them, it has been observed! "The common law of England is the
common lav/- of most of the self-governing Colonies, and in any case the
Roman-Dutch law and the French law of Quebec admit as clearly as the
(2)
English law the doctrine salus republioae supreina lex." From a con­
sideration of the opinions of the distinguished lawyers, judges and 
legislators, it would seem that elsewhere, as in England, the con­
stitutional practice has been far from uniform.
To make a labyrinthine analysis of the various applications of 
martial law is not our purpose. It is the want of preciseness in 
defining the limits of martial law which invites our attention. Though, 
since the days of the Stuart Kings, martial law has never been formally 
declared in England, whether in peace or war, it has been frequently 
resorted to in the colonies and dominions.
2. Governor!s Power to Proclaim Martial Law
In the previous two chapters we have considered the Crown's 
prerogative to declare martial law in England and other questions 
relating to its origin, history and development. In discussing its 
applications in the Commonwealth, it is necessary to consider whether 
a Governor can proclaim martial law in the colony or the dominion when 
there is actually no war or rebellion. It may be mentioned that the 
powers of the Governor to proclaim martial law are somewhat different 
in a self-governing dominion from those in a colony. As Professor 
Keith has said:
(2) A. B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. I 
(1912), at p.270.
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"In no self-governing Colony is there any provision for martial 
law as part of the law of the land, and there is therefore no statutory 
basis on which the proclamation of such law can rest. For again can it 
be held that there is any common law right to proclaim martial law: it
is no part of the prerogative to upset the established lav/ of the land."
He found no reason why there should be any illegality in issuing 
a proclamation of martial law. It is difficult to imagine what crime 
would be committed by its mere issue, and even if it were regarded as a 
crime to issue a proclamation which might provoke serious resistance 
from aggrieved citizens, the risk of any Court so holding does not seem
great. Siibsequent action might be illegal, but hardly the proclamation. 
Stripped of its phraseology it merely means that, "in the opinion of the 
Executive, there exists a state of matters in which the suspension of 
the ordinary legal forms is necessary, and it operates as a warning to 
citizens that this is the case, and that they should therefore be on 
their guard to maintain order: it may even be that such a proclamation 
may have effect in terrifying evil-doers and mitigating the evil
results of their machinations against the State."
In construing the language of the statutes in force in Lower 
Canada in 1838 which referred to "the undoubted prerogative of Her 
Majesty for the public safety to resort to the exercise of martial lav/ 
against open enemies and traitors," opinions were expressed that "the
(?)
(4)
(5)
Ibid, at p.269. 
Ibid.
Ibid.(5)
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Governor of Lower Canada has the power of proclaiming in any district
in which large "bodies of the inhabitants are in open rebellion, that
(6)
the Executive Government will proceed to enforce martial law."
Even without such a proclamation when due to insurrection or rebellion 
the ordinary course of law coiild not be maintained, the Governor could 
proceed to put down the rebellion by force of arms, as in the case of 
invasion, and for that purpose may lawfully put to death all persons
(7)
engaged in the work of resistance.” Such proclamation conferred no
power on the Governor which he would not have possessed without it.
Its object was only to give notice to the inhabitants of the course
(8)
that would be adopted for restoring tranquillity.
In connection with the proclamation of martial law by a Governor 
the question sometimes arises whether such proclamation is conclusive.
If the occasion does not justify its proclamation or further continuance, 
can the judges openly so declare, or must they accept the judgment of 
the Executive? In an inquiry before the House of Commons Committee 
into the disturbances in Ceylon in 1848, Sir Robert Peel asked vdiether, 
in "the case of a profligate or tyrannical government, having a plausible 
pretext for it, proclaiming martial law, and that a man was apprehended 
by military authority and subjected to detention" » the Court would
(9)
grant habeas corpus? Sir David Dundas, the Judge Advocate-General,
(6) Joint Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals Sir John 
Campbell and Sir R. Ivl. Rolfe, quoted in Keir and Lawson’s Cases 
in Constitutional Law at p.445 (1954)*
(7) Ibid,
(8) Ibid.
(9) Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, Yol. II, at p.506.
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replied that "if there was a mere tyrannical pretext for martial law,
made upon no justifiable occasion and with no necessity whatsoever, I
doubt very much if there would not be found bold-hearted men in
(10)
Westminster Hall to pay no obedience to this martial law*"
Incidentally, it might seem relevant to inquire whether or not 
the Governor is required to act on ministerial advice in proclaiming 
martial law. Legally the Governor is, of course, not bound to act on 
ministerial advice. In refusing to act on such advice, he may run the 
risk of being in a difficult position. Ho Governor would wish for a 
moment to be in the position in which Governor Eyre found himself.
It is therefore only natural that in such cases the Governor should 
agree with his ministers, "If a ministry, which is presumably at 
least honest, assures the Governor that he should proclaim martial 
law, he would rest under a grave responsibility if he refused to do 
so and in the face of a crisis left the Government in hopeless con­
fusion, v/hile the Governor was running about trying to find a minister 
to accept responsibility for carrying on the Government. It is cer­
tainly within the bounds of possibility that a crisis might arise in 
which it was clearly the unhappy Governor's duty to dismiss ministers 
or to refuse their advice and accept their resignations, but it is 
not probable, and it may fairly be said that this is one of the cases
(n)
whehe the Governor can hardly be expected to differ from ministers."
(10) Ibid.
(11) A. !B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Hominmens, Yol. I, 
(1912), at p.275.
Can the Governor, without being empowered in this behalf, declare
martial law and take appropriate measures to suppress the rebellion?
(12)
In the opinion of Willes J. he certainly has such powers. The duty 
of adopting all reasonable steps to suppress the rebellion "is in an 
especial degree incumbent upon him as being entrusted with the powers 
of government for preserving the lives and property of the people and
(15)
the authority of the Crown.'*
3. The Rational Basis for a Proclamation of Martial haw
Since 1628 martial lav/ has never been formally declared in 
England and therefore "courts founded on Proclamations of Martial
(14)
Lav/ had been wholly unknown." This is not equlvalent to saying that 
in emergencies government in England was powerless. We have already
(15)
briefly considered, and shall more fully discuss the extent of powers
(16)
exercised by the Executive during emmrgencies. But one thing which
(12) Phillips v. Eyre (1870), 6 Q.B.D.l.
(13) Ibid, at p.16.
(14) Per Lord Brougham in the House of Commons debate to consider
the motion "That the House deem it their duty to declare that
they contemplate with serious alarm and deep sorrow the violation 
of law and justice which is manifest in these unexampled 
proceedings." The proceedings took place in Demerara on a 
declaration of martial lav/ in 1823* Clode, Military Forces of 
the Crown, Yol. II, at p.485 (I869).
(15) Chapters 1 and 2.
(16) Chapters 4 and 7-9*
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mainly distinguishes the exercise of discretionary powers in England 
and such exercise elsewhere is that in the latter places military 
tribunals could be set up to try the citizens, and during the 
continuance of martial law the ordinary courts declined jurisdiction
(17)
to entertain suits against the military authority.
Leaving this aside, what has been the object of declaring martial 
law in the colonies? The short answer would be the need to maintain 
law and order. In considering the scope of the Bengal State offences 
Regulation No. X of 1804, which empowered the Governor-General of 
India in Council to proclaim martial law in time of war, or during 
x'ebellion in any part of the territory in possession of the Government 
of the Presidency of Port William in Bengal, Sergeant Spanlcie, the 
Advocate-General of Bengal, stated:
"The object of martial law, and the trial of offenders under it, 
is justly stated, in the Regulation X of I8O4, to be immediate 
punishment Tfor the safety of the British possessions, and for the 
security of the lives and the property of the inhabitants thereof.1 
It is, in fact, the law of social defence, superseding under the 
pressure, and therefore under the justification, of an extreme neces­
sity, the ordinary forms of justice. Courts-martial under martial 
law, or rather during the suspension of law, are invested with the 
power of administering that prompt and speedy justice in cases
(17) D. E. Marais v. The G.Q.C. (1902) A.C.109| Tilonko v. Attorney- 
General (1907) A.C.93.
presumed to be clearly* and indispensibly of the highest species of
guilt. The object is self-preservation by the terror and example of
(18)
speedy justice.’1
In his opinion the alleged necessity for a recourse to martial 
law would cease to exist if the courts-martial, like ordinary courts 
of law, began to pronounce sentences of imprisonment and hard labour.
’’But courts-martial which condemn to imprisonment and hard labour belie 
the necessity under which alone the jurisdiction of courts-martial can
(19)
lawfully exist in civil society.”
The continuance of martial law beyond a period when it is no
longer required is illegal. For, as was observed by Sir James Mackintosh,
1 the only principle on which the law of England tolerates what is called
Martial Lav/, is necessity; its introduction can be justified only by
necessity; its continuance requires precisely the same justification
of necessity on which alone it rests for a single minute, it becomes
(20)
instantly a mere exercise of lawless violence.” Martial law would 
be justified when there is foreign invasion or civil war Yjhich rendered 
it impossible for courts of law to sit, or to enforce the execution of 
their judgments. It would then become necessary to find some rude 
substitute for them, and to employ for that purpose the Military, which 
was the only remaining Force in the community. Sir James conceded that
(18) Hough, Military Law, at p.548 (1855)-
(19) Ibid.
(20) Olode, Military Forces of the Crown, Vol. II, at p.486 (I869).
"while the laws are silenced by the noise of arms, the rulers of the
Armed Forces must punish, as equitably as they can, those crimes Y/hich
threaten their own safety and that of society, M but he maintained that
(21)
"every moment beyond is usurpation.” He further said that ”as soon
as the laws can act, every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is
(22)
itself an enormous crime.” The same opinion was expressed by Lord 
Broughams
"On the pressure of a great emergency, such an invasion or 
rebellion, when there is no time for the slow and cumbrous proceedings 
of the civil lav/, a Proclamation may justifiably issue for excluding 
the ordinary tribunals, and directing that offences should be tried 
by a Military Court; such a proceeding might be justified by necessity, 
but it could rest on that alone. Created by necessity, necessity must
(23)
limit its continuance.”
The views expressed by the highest law officers of the Crown 
also shoi?r the same reasons for the promulgation of martial law, its 
continuance and application. "The right of resorting to such an 
extremity is a right arising from and limited by the necessity of the 
case - quod necessitas cogit, defendit. For this reason we are of 
opinion that the prerogative does not extend beyond the case of 
persons taken in open resistance, and with whom, by reason of suspen­
sion of the ordinary tribunals, it is impossible to deal according to
(21) Ibid, at p.486.
(22) Ibid, at p.486.
(23) Ibid, at p.484*
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(24)
the regular course of justice." If the regular courts are open, 
the criminals must be delivered to them to be tried according to lav;, 
because "there is not, as we conceive, any right in the Crown to
(25)
adopt any other course of proceeding." The question whether martial
law, when in force, supersedes the ordinary tribunals, did not arise
as it "cannot be said in strictness to supersede the ordinary tribunals,
inasmuch as it only exists by reason of those tribunals having been
(26)
practically superseded." Even if martial law is justly declared 
persons guilty of ordinary offences must not be tried by the military 
tribunals. "Martial law can never be enforced for the ordinary purposes 
of civil or even criminal justice, except, in the latter, so far as the
(27)
necessity arising from actual resistance compel its adoption."
In a case (27 ) arising in India, J. Beaumont/of the Bombay 
High Court stated the position emanating from the declaration of martial 
law. "Firstly, a state of war and armed rebellion or insurrection must 
exist and not merely a state of riot which could be put down with the 
aid of the military and other citizens. Secondly, neither the military 
nor the citizens can refuse or impose conditions on such aid. Thirdly, 
the necessity must be proved, not merely of recourse to the military, but 
also of the impossibility of functioning of the ordinary civil laws and 
the necessity of their abolition for the time being, and the courts 
have power to go into the question vdiether sxxch necessity existed.
(24) Joint Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, Sir John 
Campbell and Sir R. M. Rolfe as to the power of the Governor of 
Lower Canada to declare martial law, 1838. Keir and Lawson, 
Cases in Constitutional Law (1954) a'k P»445*
(25) Ibid) (26) Ibid. (27) Ibid.
(27a) Chanappa v. Emperor. A.I.E. 1931> Bombay 57*
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Fourthly, it is only when the existence of war, whether against 
foreigners or rebels, and necessity are established, that the juris­
diction of the court ceases* Fifthly, the powers exercised by the 
military commonly but incorrectly known as "martial law" in fact are 
no law at all and would be, if the fact of necessity for a war is not
established, illegal and therefore need Acts of Indemnity, if they
(27b)
are not questioned."
In the same case JSS, Beaumont/said that it was convenient to 
arm the executive in time of emergency "with a weapon more easy to 
control and more certain in its operation," but where the Arms Act v/as 
in force and the mob had no arms but only sticks and stones "the 
attack on the police post and the court house must from the nature 
of things have been the work of the scum and not of persons with a 
stake in the tovm." The single allegation that an order of the Magis­
trate under Section 144 of the Code Criminal Procedure was not obeyed 
did not, therefore, suffice to establish the necessity which the law
(27°)
demands before martial law could be applied.
27b) Ibid, at p.63.
27c) Section 144 of the Code Criminal Procedure provides as follows;
"(l) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a 
Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or of any 
other Magistrate (not being a Magistrate of the Third Class) ... 
there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and 
immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable,
Such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material 
facts of the case and served in manner provided by Section 134? 
direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain 
order with certain property that such direction is likely to prevent, 
or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of 
obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, 
or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the 
public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray."
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4. The Guiding Principles in exercising Powers under Martial Law
Every exercise of exceptional powers, not regulated by well-
defined statutes, involves the danger of the powers being exceeded.
Moreover, the discretion of a commander during a state of war in no
way resembles judicial discretion. He is in this dilemma. nTo act
under such circumstances within the precise limits of the law of
ordinary peace is a difficult and may be an impossible task and to
(28)
hesitate or temporize may entail disastrous consequences.” When 
rebellion or insurrection has broken out, should the Executive or the 
military commander wait for the legislature to entrust him with powers 
to deal with the emergency? As has been observed, ”there may not be
(29)
time to appeal to the legislature.”
Should he "take the law into his own hands, and make a law for 
the occasion, rather than submit to anarchy?” In answering Sir Robert 
Peel, the Judge Advocate General said;
”1 think that a wise and courageous man would, if it were 
necessary, make a law to his own hands, but he would much rather take 
a law which is already made: and, I believe the law of England is that 
a Governor, like the Grown, has inherent in him the right, when the 
necessity arises, of judging of it, and, being responsible for his 
work afterwards, so to deal with the laws as to supersede them all,
(28) Phillips v. Eyre (lp$0) 6 Q.B.D.l.
(29) Ibid.
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(30)
and to proclaim martial law for the safety of the colony."
Once martial lav/ has been proclaimed, which serves as a notice
that extraordinary powers have been assumed to restore tranquillity,
the paramount duty of the Executive or the Armed Forces is to take
prompt and speedy action. In describing the course of action open
to the Executive in such circumstances, /. Willes£saidi
"The Governor may have, upon his own responsibility, acting upon
the best advice and information he can procure at the moment, to arm
loyal subjects, to seize or secure arms, to intercept munitions of
war, to cut off communication between the disaffected, to detain
suspected persons, and even to meet armed force by armed force in the
open field. If he hesitates, the opportunity may be lost of checking
the first outbreak of insurrection, whilst by vigorous action the
consequences of allowing the insurgents to take the field in force
may be averted. In resorting to strong measures he may have saved
life and property out of all proportion to the mistakes he may honestly
commit unifEer information which turns out to have been erroneous or
treacherous. The very efficiency of his measures may diminish the
(51)
estimate of the danger with which he had to cope ... ".
In his charge to the jury in Governor Eyre's case, Lord Blackburn 
spoke at length on the manner a Governor should exercise his powers at 
common law in suppressing a rebellion. According to him no officer
(50) Sir David Dundas's evidence before the Geylon Committee of Inquiry, 
1849? quoted by Clode in Military Forces of the Grown, Yol. II, 
at p.160 (I869)*
(31) (1870) 6 Q.B.D.l at p,l6.
should under any circumstances act beyond the power conferred upon 
him by lav/, "even if the doing of that illegal act was the saltation 
of the country." If he, therefore, does something clearly beyond his 
power, an Act of Indemnity passsd subsequently "would be no bar in law 
to a criminal prosecution." Honesty of intention is important where 
it is his duty to act and is authorised to take all necessary measures 
in such circumstances, but "if it would be shown that the officer, 
under colour of exercising his office, was really moved by any other 
motive than an honest desire to do his duty," he would be guilty of 
a misdemeanour. Lord Blackburn said that if the circumstances were 
such that the officer would "be criminally punished for failure of 
duty in not doing it," the officer is bound to "bring to the exercise
(52)
of his duty ordinary firmness, judgment, and discretion."
Every officer must remember that "the danger once paat, every 
measure he has adopted may be challenged as violent and oppressive, 
and he and every one who advised him, or acted under his authority, 
may be called upon, in actions at the suit of individuals dissatisfied 
with his conduct, to establish the necessity or regularity of every 
act in detail by evidence which it may be against public policy to
(55)
disclose." There is, however, no cogent reason why he should shrink 
from discharging the paramount duty, "to exercise de facto powers
(32) R. v. Eyre (1868) Special Report 53
(33) Tl870) 6 Q.B.D.l at p.17.
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which the legislature would assuredly have confided to him if the
(34)
emergency could have been foreseen.” In such a case if the officer 
has subsequently to face a trial, the jury, as Lord Blackburn said, 
should determine whether ’’the circumstances were in fact such that 
what was done really was in excess of the duty of the officer and, 
secondly, whether a person placed in the position of that officer, 
having the information that he had, believing what he did believe, and 
knowing what he did know, if exercising ordinary firmness, judgment
(35)
and moderation, would have perceived it was an excess.” In the
matter of suppressing an insurrection or a rebellion one should recall
what Sir John Copley, the Attorney-General of England, said when in
1824 the Governor of Barbados requested the opinion upon the question
whether the common lav/ of England sanctioned the talcing the life of the
rioters. In Sir John's opinion ’’temper and coolness upon such occasions,
and forbearance as far as it can be exercised consistently with the
(36)
public safety, cannot be too strongly recommanded.” As to the powers 
of the Armed Forces to suppress riots, he said that ”by the common law
the military may effectively act under the direction of the civil
power.”
Comparatively recently the duties of a military commander in 
dealing with insurrection or rebellion were clearly laid down in the
(34) Ibid, at p.l6.
(35) 2' v* ffiv~re (1868) Special Report 53
(36) William Forsyth (I869) Opinions and Cases on Constitutional 
Law at p.194*
Departmental Instructions to Military Authorities in 1942 by the 
Indian Government:
MIn case of open rebellion, where the Military force available 
may, unless the Military Commander assumes exceptional powers, prove 
inadequate to meet the emergency, he should enforce Martial Law ... 
supplementing the ordinary law as may be necessary, but no more than 
is necessary, by military tribunals. In general, he should confine 
the exercise of his exceptional powers to talcing such measures as can, 
on the restoration of order, be shown to have been necessary for 
ensuring the safety of his troops and suppressing the rebellion.
Any exceptional measure taken must not only be clearly directed to 
the attainment of these objects, but be reasonably likely to achieve 
them.
Martial law means the suppression of ordinary lav/ in any part 
of the country by military authority, whose sole duty is to restore 
such condition of things as will enable the civil authority to resume 
charge. In order to attain that object, the military officer may 
issue such orders, and enforce them in such manner as may be necessary 
for that purpose only. His authority is, for the time being, supreme, 
but in practice the amount of his interference with the civil adminis­
tration and the ordinary courts is measured by military necessity.
He shotild not interfere beyond what is necessary for the restoration 
of order, and should, whenever possible, act in consultation with the
local civil authorities. Offenders should "be handed over to the 
ordinary courts for trial whenever this is possible 5 hut persons 
charged with offences which are not offences against the civil law 
cannot he so handed over. The military officer has power to try 
an offender and punish him under Martial Law, hut he should not 
exercise the power except where it is necessary for him to do so 
for the purpose of restoring order or where it is not possible to 
keep an accused person in arrest until he can he handed over for 
trial by the ordinaiy courts. Such occasion may arise if communica- 
tions are interrupted during a considerable period, but even then the 
military officer can generally arrange for the attendance of a civil 
magistrate to whom prisoners can be handed over for trial, and this 
should be done when possible. If the military officer has to try an 
offender, though this should only be necessary in very exceptional 
circumstances, the trial should follow the forms of military law; and 
a record must be kept of every trial so held, and of every punishment 
inflicted under Martial Law. Any punishment so inflicted must not
(37)
be excessive.'1
To dispel all doubts as to whether the military authorities
should be willing to come to the aid of the civil authority unless
cy.
the ordinary laws and tribunals were abolished, Beaumont/of the
(37) Issued from Simla, India, quoted in Muhammad Umar Khan v. The 
Crown, P.L.R. 1953 Lahore 828.
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Bombay High Court clearly expressed the position in the following
words; "Ho section of the Army Act or any other Act has been cited
to us to show that the military in India occupy in this respect a
position different from that of His Majesty’s military forces in any
other part of the dominions, and if so, it is the right of the civil
authorities to demand, and the duty of the military to furnish, all
the armed aid that may be necessary in the suppression of disorders
(58)
and breaches of peace."
On the other hand the civil authority should remember that they
must not resort to extreme action to deal with small breaches of peace.
"When Parliament itself has limited the power of the Governor-General
in Council, any executive officer, even the lowest, if his orders are
questioned or riots occur, has the right, because of a certain number
of evil-doers who break the peace, to declare war against every other
person in a large area as rebel, abolish at one stroke the ordinary
laws and tribunals, and place the military in possession free to deal
and to punish as they will and restore tranquillity so caused through 
(39)
terror.M
5* Origins of Martial Law in British India and its Applications
(a) The Historical Background
We are not concerned with the history of the establishment of
(^8) Chanappa v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1951 Bombay at p.65.
(59) Ibid.
British rule in India, hut shall briefly trace its origin in so far 
as it is relevant for our purpose. Since the sixteenth century 
European merchants were trading with India and on 51 December 1600 
Queen Elizabeth I granted a Charter of Incorporation to the Company of 
English merchants which conferred upon it limited powers of legislative
(40)
character.
The Company could hold court for itself and its affairs and 
"make, ordain, and constitute such and so many reasonable laws, 
constitutions, orders and ordinances, as to them or the greater part 
of them being then and there present shall seem necessary and convenient 
for the good government of the said Company, and of all factors, 
masters, mariners, and other officers, employed in any of their 
voyages, and for the better advancement and continuance of the said 
trade and trafficlc." Further, the Company could impose such pains, 
punishments, and penalties by imprisonment of body or by fines and 
amerciaments as might seem necessary or convenient for the observation 
of such laws and ordinances. Though the Company was given power of 
minor legislation, it was forbidden to enact regulation contrary or 
repugnant to the principles of English law. Both laws and the 
punishments for their contraventions must be reasonable.
Gradually it became evident that such powers were unequal to 
the occasions created by the voyages to, and establishment of trading
(40) A. Berridale Keith, The Constitutional History of India (1955) 
at p.52*
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settlements on* the Indian coasts. Though the Crown's right to 
authorise martial law was uncertain, authority was granted to the 
ship's captain to impose death sentences for such capital offences 
as murder and mutiny and to put in execution martial law. By the 
royal grant of December 1615 the Company was authorised to issue 
commissions to their captains, but in capital cases a verdict must 
be found by a jury.
In 1623 James I empowered the Company to grant commissions 
to its officers and provide for the due government of its officers.
The Charter of Charles II in 1661 accorded powers to the Company to 
build fortresses and was authorised to exercise power and command 
over all employees and punish them for misdemeanour. The Governor 
and Council of each factory was empowered "to judge all persons 
belonging to the said Governor and Company or that shall live under 
them, in all causes, whether civil or criminal, according to the 
laws of this kingdom, and to execute judgment accordingly." The 
cession of Bombay by Portugal in 1661 made further extension of its 
authority necessary. In order to repel any force directed against 
the Company's authority and command over the island of Bombay, the 
nucleus of the first English regiment or Bombay Fusiliers was formed.
The Governor of the island was empowered "to use and exercise all such 
powers and authorities in cases of rebellion, mutiny, or sedition, or 
refusing to serve in wars, flying to the enemy, forsaking colours or 
ensigns, or other offences against law, custom, and discipline military,
95*
in as large and ample manner? to all intents and purposes whatsoever, 
as any captain-general of our army by virtue of his office has used
and accustomed, and may or might lawfully do.M
By the Charter of 1685 the Company were authorised to declare 
war and make peace against any nation of Asia and Africa and to raise? 
arm, train, and muster such military forces as seemed requisite and 
necessary and to execute martial law for the defence of their forts, 
places? and plantations against foreign invasion or domestic insuirrec- 
tion or rebellion. In 1686 James XI expressly authorised the Company 
to appoint admirals and other sea officers in their ships. These 
officers were given power to raise naval forces and exercise within 
their ships the law martial for their defence while engaged in open 
hostility with some other nation. The Charter of 1698 confirmed the 
powers given by those of 1685 and 1686 and contemplated the exercise 
of "the sovereign power and dominion over all the said forts, places, 
and plantations? to us? our heirs and successors? being always
and her successors and the Charters granted by them continued the 
right of the Company to appoint generals and other officers for their 
military forces and to exercise martial law in time of war or open 
hostility.
(41)
secured." All these powers were maintained hy William III, Anne
(42)
I)
41) Ibid, at p.10,
42) Ibid, at p.17.
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The expansion and development of the Company1 s army in India 
demanded greater controlling powers than Yfere given by the Charters, 
but, as the Crown in England was denied the prerogative power to 
govern troops in time of peace, Parliament passed an Act in 1754 
which contained provisions similar to those of the English Mutiny Acts. 
The Act provided punishment for mutiny, desertion and other military 
offences and authorised the setting up of courts-martial for the 
trial of military offences. At the same time the Act made oppression 
and other offences committed by the presidents or councils in India 
cognisable and punishable in England. Before the passing of this 
Act the officers of the Company claimed that the laws and ordinances of 
war enacted by it entitled them to administer martial law for mutinous 
conduct. Sir Geoi’ge Oxended, President of Surat, when he visited the 
island of Bombay in 1669» expressed grave doubts about the legality of 
the aforesaid ordinances. In observing that his doubts were natural 
and justified, Professor Keith has said:
uKo state of war proper could be held then to exist, and the 
extent of the right of the Crown to authorise punishment of such 
offences as mutiny and desertion bjr courts-martial in time of peace 
was wholly doubtful. James II had in 1685 asserted the right to 
punish drastically by courts-martial so long as the insurrection of 
Monmouth was raging, but he had instructed recourse to the civil courts 
the moment warfare had ceased, and this was in accord with the spirit 
of the Petition of Right of 1628 and the contemporary debates in the
97.
House of Commons, which showed that it was held in legal circles 
under Charles I that even soldiers under the common law could not in 
time of peace be dealt with by martial law, a system essentially
(43)
intended for the government of armed forces when war was raging."
The Company's claim to govern under martial law was therefore
invalid. When the ICing had no power to authorise the use of martial
law in civil matters and the Company were required to make laws not
contrary or repugnant to English lav/, it was not within its powers to
govern by martial law. As has been rightly said, "the whole episode
is suggestive of the period of prerogative run mad which precluded the
(44)
Revolution of 1688." The Act of 1754 passed by Parliament removed 
all doubts as to the power of the Company to punish by courts-martial
(45)
any of its officers for offences committed in time of peace.
(b) Occasions for Declarations of Martial Law during British Rule 
in India and the Measures adopted by the Authority
Soon after the First World War the British Government showed
willingness to consider the grant of greater measure of freedom to the
Indians but, before the Act of 1919 oould be enacted, the political
atmosphere in India was becoming disturbed. The general discontent
(45) Ibid, at p.55*
(44) Ibid, at p.39*
(45) "It w&s not until 1754 that the position of martial law in 
India was brought into accord with that in England by the 
passing of an Act of Parliament, based on the analogy of the 
English Mutiny Act." Ibid, at p.34*
was due in part to the effects of war, but also to certain legislative 
measures of the Government. Bills were introduced in the Indian 
Legislature to control the Press, try political offenders without a 
jury, and intern persons suspected of subversive political activities.
Thf, response to Gandhi’s call for satyagraha or passive resistance, 
hartal or abstention from business was observed throughout India. Riots 
broke out in the Punjab on 10th April, 1919j a M  when, in defiance of 
General Dyer’s orders forbidding meetings, people assembled at Jallianwala 
Bagh on 13 th April, he opened fire on the mob, with the result that 
379 were killed and 1,208 wounded. General Dyer, who should have 
realised that the place was so enclosed that quick dispersal was 
impossible, put up the defence that "the firing was carried out to
(46)
produce such a moral effect as would secure order in the Punjab.”
However, a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Hunter was sub­
sequently appointed to investigate into the causes of the firing. In 
its opinion General Dyer’s action was unjustified in so far as it 
aimed to strike terror into the rest of the province. The military 
commander, instead of being moved by such ulterior motives, should 
confine himself to the immediate task of talcing such action as was 
absolutely necessary for the prevention of loss and life and destruction 
of property. His action was also disapproved by the Secretary of State 
and the Army Council.
(46) Ibid, at p.275*
Being "satisfied that a state of open rebellion against the 
authority of the Government exists in certain parts of the Province 
of Punjab" the Governor-General in Council, in exercise of the powers 
conferred by Section 2 of the Bengal State Offences Regulation, 1804, 
suspended the functions of the ordinary courts, established martial 
law and directed the immediate trial by courts-martial persons charged 
with offences described in the said Regulation. Next, the Governor- 
General, in exercise of the power conferred by section 72 of the 
Government of India Act, 1915, promulgated the Martial Law Ordinance
(47)
No. 1 of 1919* Section 72 provided that "the Governor-General may, 
in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace 
and good government of British India or any part thereof, and any 
ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months 
from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by 
the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this 
section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian 
Legislature to make lav/s; and any ordinance made under this section is 
subject to the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legis­
lature, and may be controlled or superseded by any such Act." By 
Martial Law Ordinance No. 1 of 1919? trial by commissioners, two of 
whom must be Sessions Judges, was substituted for trial by courts- 
martial, but the Commission was to follow the procedure regulating 
trials by courts-martial prescribed under the Indian A m y  Act, 1911.
(47) Appendix I.
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(48)
In Bugga v. The King-Emperor, as will he presently seen, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the Ordinance which 
deprived a subject of trial by the ordinary courts was perfectly legal.
By Martial Law Ordinance No. II the martial law area was extended to 
two other districts, Gujranwala and Gujrat. The death penalty
/,! trt '.o'— f>-
by the Bengal Regulation of I8O4 was modified by Ordinance No. Ill 
which permitted any lesser punishment. By (Ordinance No. IV, offences 
committed before the promulgation of Ordinance No, I were made punishable. 
Martial Law (Trials Continuance) Ordinance No. VI of 1919 provided 
that "when an order under Section 2 of the Bengal State Offences 
Regulation, 1804, suspending the functions of the ordinary criminal 
courts in any district has been cancelled and martial law has ceased 
to operate, every trial which may at the time of such cancellation be 
pending before any Commission appointed, as a result of such order, 
under Martial Law Ordinance No. I of 1919? shall be continued by 
such Commission, and any person accused in any such trial may be con­
victed and sentenced and any such sentence shall be carried into 
execution, as if such order had not been cancelled."
Section 3 of Ordinance No. VI provided for continuation of 
trials pending before Summary Courts after- the withdrawal of martial 
law. It declared that "notwithstanding that the function s of the
(48) (1920) 36 5.L.R. 540.
ordinary criminal courts have been suspended in any district and that 
a trial has commenced before a summary court other than an ordinary 
criminal court, such trial shall, when the summary court ceases, by 
reason of the cessation of martial law, to exercise jurisdiction 
therein, be continued before any competent criminal court which would 
have had jurisdiction save for the existence of martial law, and such 
court may act 011 the evidence recorded by the summary court or partly 
recorded by the such court and partly recorded by itself, or it may 
re-summon the witnesses and re-commence the trial." The accused 
could, at the commencement of the proceedings before the second 
court, demand that the witnesses or any of them be re-summoned and 
re-heard.
The Indemnity Act No. XXVII of 1919 was passed to indemnify 
officers of Government and other persons in respect of certain acts 
done under martial law which was declared end enforced in some districts 
in the Punjab. Provisions were made for allowing reasonable compen­
sation for property taken or used by any officer of Government, whether 
civil or military. It was to be assessed "upon failure of agreement 
by a person holding judicial office not inferior to that of a District
(49)
Judge to be appointed by the Government in this behalf." It must be 
admitted that such provision for payment of compensation in respect 
of loss attributable to acts of the military or civil officers was 
remarkable. It might not have entirely satisfied the sense of
(49) Appendix II.
injustice caused by the application of force, but it goes a long way 
to prove a foreign government’s regard for the citizen’s rights.
In 1921 martial law was proclaimed in Malabar in Madras and an 
Ordinance empowered military authorities to make regulations for 
administering martial law and issuing orders to provide for the public 
safety, the maintenance and restoration of order and to authorise the 
trial of certain offences by Special Courts constituted under the
(50)
Ordinance. Provisions similar to those contained in the Bengal State
(51)
Offences Regulation, I8O4, existed in Madras. In 1930 an Ordinance
provided for the proclamation of martial law in the town of Sholapur
in the province of Bombay.
(c) The Judicial Determinations as to the various Aspects of 
Martial Law
(52)
In Chanappa v. Emperor questions were raised as to the meaning of 
martial law, its applicability in India, the extent of military 
aurhobity, the Governor-General’s power to declare emergency, the 
courts’ jurisdiction to decide whether sufficient evidence existed as 
to the necessity for such a declaration.
The question whether the determination as to the existence of 
an emergency is an administrative act to be decided by the Governor- 
General alone or whether it, being a question of fact, can be inquired
(50) Appendix III.
(51) Regulation VII of 1808 and Act XI of 1857-
(52) A.I.R. 1931 Bombay 57? martial law ordinance No. IV of 1930 was 
promulgated, Appendix IV.
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into by the courts was fully considered by Beamon t £.j' He thought
that the court had such powei’ and where martial law had been declared 
it was competent for the court - and was ’’indeed the duty of the 
courts if called upon, after the restoration of normal conditions to
(53)
decide whether and to what extent martial law was justified*” But 
as the consideration whether the facts proved constituted a state of 
necessity and if so how long that necessity existed, involved difficulty, 
the court would hesitate to reject the assertion of the Executive as to 
its existence. Moreover, ’’inasmuch as the Governor-General is the 
loerson who must, in the first instance, decide whether or not there is 
an emergency upon which he ought to act, and inasmuch as he may 
frequently have information which in the public interest he may be 
unwilling to disclose, and which no court can compel him to disclose, I 
think all that the courts can do is to inquire whether there is 
evidence upon which the Governor-General may reasonably conclude that 
an emergency exists. If that question be answered in the affirmative,
(54)
there is an end of the matter.” 
to
As/the contention on behalf of the Grom that so long as the 
Executive and the military authority acted bona fide, their actions 
were not subject to the ordinary laws of the land and needed no
(53) Ibid, at p.58.
(54) Ibid, at p.58.
104.
^ .j,
validating ordinance, #. ,J. Beaumont/said that' it was wholly* untenable. 
Not only* must the military authority prove its bona fides, but it 
should also establish the existence of necessity to justify their 
acts. "The justification for the acts of the military lies not merely 
in their bona fides but in the existence of necessity, i.e. in the 
proof of siich a state of war, insurrection or armed resistance as to 
justify the cessation of the ordinary law and its replacement by
(55)
military force pure and simple."
. c-T-
JS. J. Beaumont/equally rejected the contention that the ordinary
court had no jurisdiction to review the sentences passed by the
military courts even if an Act of Indemnity had not been enacted.
He said that "it is for the Crown to prove the necessity and the
legality of any sentences, civil or military, if not under the ordinary
(56)
law, then under any Act of Indemnity."
(57)
In Bugga v. The King-Emperor, an appeal from a judgment of the 
Martial Law Commissioners, sitting at Lahore 011 2 June, 1919? involved 
the decision whether the setting up of tribunals under the provisions 
of a Martial Law Ordinance was allowed by the Constitution. The facts 
were that the appellants, who had committed several offences under the 
Indian Penal Code, such a„s waging of war against the king, murder, 
arson and riot, were convicted and sentenced to death; one of them
(55) Ibid, at p.65.
(56) Ibid.
(57) (1920) 56 Times Law Reports
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only was convicted of possession of looted property and sentenced to 
seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The offences were committed during 
a serious riot at Amritsar, Punjab.
Three days after the riots, the Governor-General of India
proclaimed martial law in the districts of Lahore and Amritsar and
suspended the functions of the ordinary courts of law. Similar orders
were subsequently made in respect of Gujranwala and Gujrat. He purported
to act under the Bengal State Offences Regulation Ho. X of 1804 which
was extended to the Punjab by the Punjab Lav/s Act, 1872. The day
after he had made the above proclamation stating the existence of open
rebellion against the authority of the Government, the Governor-General,
acting under Section J2 of the Government of India Act, 1919* made and
(58)
promulgated the Martial Law Ordinance Ho. 1 of 1919* It provided 
that every trial in the districts of Lahore and Amritsar held under 
the Bengal State Offences Regulation, I8O4, should, instead of being 
held by a Court-martial, be held by a Commission consisting of three 
persons appointed in this behalf by the Local Government, of whom two 
should be Sessions Judges or persons having legal qualifications as 
therein mentioned. It was also provided that a Commission should have 
the powers of a general Court-martial under the Indian Army Act, 1911, 
and should follow so fax’ as might be the procedure prescribed by that 
Act. The Local Government could direct that the Commission should
(*58) Appendix I.
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follow the procedure of a summary general Court-martial. The finding 
and sentence of a Commission was not subject to confirmation by the 
military authorities. By subsequent Ordinances power v/as given to 
impose a minor punishment in lieu of the death sentence. Pursuant 
to the Ordinance Bo. 1 of 1919 the Punjab Government duly appointed 
the Commission. The Martial Law (Further Extension) Ordinance No. IY 
of 1919 provided that ’’notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Martial Law Ordinance, 1919? the Local Government may, by general or 
special order, direct that any commission appointed under the said 
Ordinance shall try any person charged with any offence committed on 
or after 30th March, 1919» and thereupon the provisions of the said 
Ordinance shall apply to such trials accordingly, and a commission 
may pass in respect of an3>- such offence any sentence authorised by
/ I? P' P 0 W B  X* 0
law.” The offences committed by the appellants ¥£>£§ on 10th
April and Section 7 of the Ordinance No. 1 had declared that the 
provisions contained therein ’’shall apply to all persons referred to 
in the said Regulation who are charged with any of the offences therein 
described, committed 011 or after 13th April, 1919.” Under the aforesaid 
piece of retroactive legislation the trial of the appellants took 
place. Special leave was obtained from the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council to present this appeal.
The argument for the appellants mainly rested on the contention 
that, if Ordinance No. IY of 1919 applied (subject to the direction of 
the Local Government) to any person and to any offence known to the
law, it was invalid by reason of the provisions of Section 65, 
sub-sections (2) and (3), of the Government of India Act, 1915*
Section 65, sub-section (2), read with Section 72, prevented the 
Governor-General from making "any law affecting the authority of 
Parliament, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland whereon may depend in any 
degree the allegiance of any person to the Crown of the United 
Kingdom, or affecting the sovereignty or dominion of the Crown over 
any part of British India.”
It was contended that the Ordinance under consideration, by 
depriving British subjects in India of the right to be tried in the 
ordinary course by the established Coutts of Lav/, affected the 
unwritten lav/s or constitution whereon the allegiance of His Majesty's 
subjects in India depends and was accordingly invalid under Section®' 
65 mentioned above. In rejecting the appellants' argument, Lord 
Cave, in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, said:
"It is not easy to understand how the substitution for the 
ordinary Indian Courts - which are themselves of statutory origin - of 
another tribunal of a judicial character, can be said to affect in any 
way the unwritten lav/s or constitution of the country? but, apart from 
this observation, the argument appears to rest upon a misconception 
as to the meaning and effect of the sub-section. The sub-section does 
not prevent the Indian Government from passing a lav/ which may modify 
or affect a rule of the constitution or of the common law upon the 
observance of which some person may conceive or allege that his
allegiance depends. It refers only to laws which directly affect 
the allegiance of the subject to the Crown., as by a transfer or 
qualification of the allegiance or a modification of the obligations
(59)
thereby imposed.1
(60)
In Re ICochunni El ay a hair an application for the issue of a 
writ of habeas corpus was made for the release of the prisoner who 
was alleged to have been illegally detained. It was contended on his 
behalf that the accused could not be legally arrested for an offence 
committed inside the Martial Law Area when he was at the time of his 
arrest outside the Area. Secondly, the magistrate before whom he was 
brought and who refused to release him on bail had no jurisdiction to 
exercise his powers, since Clause (6) of the Martial Law Ordinance 
Lb. II of 1921 provided for the constitution of summary courts of 
criminal jurisdiction in any administration area that may be preclaimed 
as Martial Law Area.
On the question whether a police officer can arrest a person 
outside the Martial Law Area for an offence committed inside it,
/, SpencerT-held that, under the provisions of Section 177 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, the rule as to jurisdiction was that it was the 
area within which the offence was committed and not the place where the
(59) Ibid, at p.543*
(60) A.I.R. 1922 Madras 215.
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offender was found which determined the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Section 54 of the same Code authorises any police officer to arrest 
without a warrant and without an order from a Magistrate a person 
concerned in any cognisable offence. Section 50 authorises a police 
officer for the purpose of arresting without warrant any person whom 
he is authorised to arrest to pursue such person i&to any place in 
British India. Section 60 directs a police officer making an arrest 
without a warrant to take the person arrested v/ithout unnecessary 
delay before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case. ^  Spencer I. 
said that there was no alteration of the law in this respect in 
consequence of the constitution of the Martial Law courts and the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not abrogated or 
suspended by the introduction of Martial Law. On the contrary, Clause 
(12) and the other clauses of the Ordinance Bo. II for 1921 indicated 
that the courts constituted under it were to follow, as far as 
possible, the procedure laid down in the Code. The police should, as 
early as possible, take the prisoner into the Martial Lav/ Area and 
obtain orders of a Court constituted under the Ordinance. This could 
be done without any order of the nature of an extradition order, 
inasmuch as the whole of the Malabar district was under the adminis­
tration of the British Indian Government. As the petitioner's counsel 
failed to show that the police acted without jurisdiction, the first 
contention failed.
(6l) Appendix III.
The next ground was that, when the petitioner was brought 
before the Magistrate outside the Martial Law Area, an application 
for bail was summarily rejected without even hearing the counsel.
Under the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
the nearest Magistrate to whom an offender may be brought has authority 
to order his detention in such custody as he may think fit for a term 
not exceeding fifteen days or, if he has no jurisdiction to try the 
case, he may order the offender to be forwarded to a Magistrate who 
has jurisdiction. According to /. Spencer J./there was nothing illegal 
in the procedure adopted by the Magistrate in this case in summarily 
rejecting the application for bail. This was the only course open to 
a Magistrate who lacked the jurisdiction to try the offence.
To deal with terrorist movements mainly confined to Bengal the 
Executive was armed with extraordinary powers of arrest, detention 
and trial by several special enactments. Prom 1950 onwards it became 
necessary for a fairly long period to have recourse to the measures 
prescribed by them, but in almost all cases the special tribunals set 
up under those Acts were presided over by judges.
The Meaning of the "State of Siege"
So far we have discussed the purely English conceptions of the 
expression "martial law." We may now refer to a similar doctrine 
known as "etat de siege," or "the state of siege" available in 
European countries, especially Prance, "although neither in French
111.
(62)
nor in English is it confined to places under siege." According to 
Professor Max Radin the state of siege means "the situation of 
places, large or small, invested or overrun or threatened by armed
(63)
enemies or endangered hy insurrection."
Admitting the truth in Dieey’s remarks we may examine "briefly 
the French law in this respect. Three conditions are postulated when 
a "state of siege" declared in France. Fii’st, there must "be domestic 
insurrection or presence of foreign enemy in some parts or districts 
of the country. It can lawfully be declared only "en cas de peril 
imminent, resultant d rune guerre etrangere ou d'une insurrection a 
main armee.1 Secondly, the civil authority must either act in concert 
v/ith or in subordination to the military. Finally the civil law is 
suspended and the people are made subservient to military authority, 
that is to say, the ordinary civil courts are superseded by military 
tribunals.
We quote below the statement of a French writer as to the terms 
of the law which will perhaps "give but a faint conception of the real 
condition of affairs when, in consequence of tumult or insurrection,
(64)
Paris, or some other part of France, is declared in a state of sigge;"
jj62) Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege (1942) 30 CALIFORNIA 
LAW REVIEW 634 at p.636.
(63) Ibid.
(64) "The legal aspect of this condition of affairs in states which 
recognise the existence of this kind of martial law (i.e. the 
state of siege) can hardly be better given than by citing some 
of the provisions of the law which at the present day regulates 
the state of siege in France." - A, V. Livy, The Law of the 
Constitution (1959) Tenth edition, at p.292.
it will help to understand the meaning and nature of the expression 
"I1etat de siege"s
L*etat de Siege
Notion
1028 - L fetat de siege est un regime exoeptionnel de police justifie
par 1'idee de peril national. II est reglemente en France par 
la loi du 9 aout 1849 modifies par les lois du 3 avril 1878 et 
du 27 avril 1916.
Ij'etat de siege, qui peut etre declare pour tout le pays 
ou certaines parties seulement du territoire, est encore appele 
etat de siege politique ou fictif pour distingues de l’etat de 
si^ge reel, lequel peut etre declare par le commandant d'une 
place assiegee ou menacee.
1029 - .Declaration de l1etat de siege - Id etat de siege politique ne
7peut etre declare que par une loi; exceptiormellement, en cas 
d ’ajournement du Parlement, il peut £tre declare par un decret 
en conseil des Ministres mais le Parlement doit se reunire deux 
jours apres.
En 1939? lTetat de siege a ete declare pour la XArance et 
lTAlgerie par le decret-loi du ler Septembre 1930; il a ete leve 
par les decrets des 12 octobre et 12 decembre 1945*
1030 ~ Effets lfetat de siege - 1. Transferr de competences - le premier
effet de lretat de siege est la substitution des autorites militaires, 
s,ux autorites administratives civiles pour I’exercice des 
pouvoirs de police.
115.
Cependent ce transfert n'est pas absolu et automatique. 
D ’apres la loi de 1849? Art, 7? il ne se produit qui dans la 
mesure ou l fautorite militaire le juge utile, c’est-a-dire que 
celle-ci a seulement la faculte de dessaisir 1'autorite civil. 
lOJI - 2. Pouvoirs exoeptionnels - L’etat de siege a en second lieu pour 
effet d*elargir les pouvoirs ordinaires de police en rendent 
legitimes des mesures exoeptionnelles qui ne le sont pas en 
temps normal. C’est 1 ’article 9 de la loi de 1849 qui enumere 
ces pouvoirs exorbitants, ils consistent dans le droit: 1. de 
perquisitionner de jour et de nuit au domicile des citoyens;
2, d'eloigner les repris de justice et les individus non 
domiciles dans la zone d'etat de siege5 5? d'ordonner la remise 
des armes et munitions et de proceder a leur recherche et 
enlevement| 4? d'interdire les publications et reunions jugees 
de nature a exciter ou a entretenir le desordre,
IO52 - 3- Competence des tribunaux militaires - Enfin l1etat de siege 
a pour effet d'elargir la competence des tribunaux militaires 
(L. 27 avril 1916 et 23 dec. 19^2)5 ceux-ci deviennent competents 
pour connaitre d1infractions conmiises par des civil. V, a cet 
egard les ouvrages de droit penal.
(65) Andre de Laubadere - TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMIHISTRATIF
(1957) s-'t p.529. The passages quoted above may be transalted
as follov/s: 11 The State of Siege
1028 - Conception - It is an exceptional police regime which is justified
by the idea of national danger. The legal enactments which are 
applicable now are of Jth August 1849 modified by two other laws 
of April 1878 and 27 April 1916.
L'etat de siege which can be applied to the whole country 
or only parts of the country is also called etat de siege politique
114.
A declaration of a state of siege was first provided by the
(66)
Constituent Assembly set up after the French Revolution. This was 
the "real1 state of siege which was applicable only in time of war. 
In practice this was applied in places where disturbances occurred.
or fictif, so as to distinguish it from l'etat de siege reel 
which the commanding officer of the city which will be besieged 
declares.
1029 ~ Declaration of the State of Siege - IDetat de siege can only 
be declared by an Act of Parliament, exceptionally when the 
Parliament had been adjourned it can be declared by a decree 
taken in a meeting of the cabinet. But then Parliament must 
assemble two days after the decree.
lOJO - Effects of the State of Siege - 1. Transfer of power from the 
public authority to the military authority so far as the police 
powers are concerned. But this transfer is not automatic. 
According to the law of 1849? Article 7 5 the military authority 
can but does not have to take over the powers of the public 
authority.
10pl - 2. The etat de siege results in an increase of ordinary police 
powers and justifies certain exceptional measures which are 
illegal in the ordinary course of things. These exceptional 
powers are stated by Article 9 of the 1849 Act:
(1) The right of searching private houses by day and 
by nightj
(2) To send away convicted persons and individuals who 
are not resident in the area where the state of siege 
has been declared?
(3) The right to order the surrendering of arms and
ammunitions and to search for them and to take them
away;
(4) The right to prohibit publications and meetings of
any nature that may excite or keep up disorder.
1032 - 3* rfhe powers of the military tribunals - The state of siege
enlarges the jurisdiction of the military tribunals (according
to two laws of 27 April 1916 and 23 December 1952); the
military tribunals have jurisdiction over all sorts of
offences and crimes.'1
(66) Law of 10 July 1791> tit. I? Art, 11.
115.
In 184-8 the Constitutional Assembly of the Second Republic provided 
for a declaration of "etat de siege fictif," or the "constructive 
state of siege." Article 100 of the Constitution of 1848 enacted 
"A la,w will set forth the situations in which a state of siege may 
be declared. This law will regulate the procedure and effects of 
such a measure." The first law dealing with a declaration of a state 
of siege was the law of 9'^ h August, 1849? modified by two other laws 
of 5 April 1878 and 27 April 1916.
Though from the terms of the constitutional provision it appeared 
that a constructive state of siege could be declared only by the legis­
lature, it was frequently done by decree. The Constitution of 1852 
empowered the head of the State to declare a state of siege. But such
(67)
a declaration required confirmation by the Senate. The law of April 
1878 provided that only the legislature could declare it, if in session, 
and only for a specified period, after which it would cease to operate.
The Law of 27 April 1916 limited the powers granted by the law 
of 1849* It laid down that the authority of military tribunals over 
civilians would end when peace was restored, no matter whether the 
state of siege was formally withdrawn or not. If the state of siege 
was declared on a threatened insurrection, the military tribunals could 
exercise powers over civilians only in respect of the offences specified 
in the Code of Military Justice or in other statutes.
(67) Article 18.
It is, however, important to remember the distinction between
the etat de siege reel and the etat de siege fictif. In the case of
an "actual" (reel) state of siege, the situation demands the suspension
of law, for no military commander can, in time of actual war, afford
to exercise the same caution and circumspection as are proper and
necessary in peace.
The position under a constructive state of siege is altogether
different, "But the constructive state of siege, although in the
French case it implies war and invasion, also implied that the
immediate and total disruption of civil life had not t*aken place
although there was a distinct danger that it might. For that reason,
this reorganisation of the system of law gives an eminently satisfactory
solution-. It displaces civil pro<tes$(s only so fa^as they need be
displaced. It expedites and simplifies procedure but it assumes the
obligation to maintain law and the constitutional guarantees substantially
(68)
intact."
From the fact that in a state of siege military tribunals are 
substituted for civil tribunals and seen to exercise powers over the
(69)
entire population, both soldiers and civilians, it has been assumed 
that "during this suspension of ordinary lav/, any man whatever is
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or execution at the will of a
(68) (1942) 30 CALIFOBHIA LAV/ BEVIW 634 Ho. 64O.
(69) It is, however, true that this kind of martial law is in England
utterly unknown to the constitution." - A. Y. Divy, The Law of 
the Constitution (1959) Tenth edition, at p.295*
military tribunal consisting of a few officers who are excited by
(70)
the passions natural to civil wwr."
But, as has been observed, "the state of siege is not a condition
in which the law is temporarily abrogated, and the arbitrary fiat of a
commander takes its place. It is emphatically a legal institution,
expressly authorized by the constitutions and the various bills of
rights that succeeded each other in France, and organised under this
(71)
authority by a specific statute."
Thus, in France a proclamation of a state of siege is regulated
by law and subject to known limitations, whereas in the commonwealth coun-
tries as the United States of America there is no law on the subject.
2 "In France the declaration of a state of siege, and particularly
the legal results consequent thereto, are regulated by statute. The
state of siege is a definite legal status. Quite different is the
situation in the United States (and for that matter, in Anglo-Saxon
countries generally), where the law governing an exercise of martial
(72)
rule is largely customary and judge-made."
(70) Ibid, at pp.292-293»
(71) (1942) 30 CALIFOKMA LAW REVIEW 634 at p.637*
(72) Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection 
(1929) 23 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 766 at 776.
CHAPTER 4
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
1. Frequent Applications of Martial Law by State Authority
\
Prom a study of the many applications of martial lav/ in America, 
it appears that the meaning attributed to it comes nearer to its modern 
definition in English lav/. Before considering the scope of martial law 
in that country, we may pause to consider why, in England, there has 
never been a formal proclamation of martial law since 1628, whereas in 
the United States there has been "a perfect epidemic of declarations of 
martial lav/ in some ill-defined sense of the term, by the Governors of
a)
States."
The reason can only be found in the constitutional histories of 
(2)
the two countries. While the English people gradually asserted their 
sovereignty against the Crown's prerogative to rule arbitrarily, leading 
to the abolition of martial law in 1628 f in America in spite of the 
Declaration of Independence, which articulated grievances against the 
King's attempt to render the armed forces superior to the civil power, 
both the State and the Federal Executive began to assume greater and
(1) Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today (1958) 
twelfth edition, at p.123*
(2) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of the Military Authority 
(1915) 24 Yale Law Journal 202. "The whole history of English 
constitutional development shows a dramatic and successful struggle 
for the complete subordination of executive power to law. In 
American constitutional law, a tendency appears to restrict the 
sphere of law, both in favour of property rights and contracts as 
against legislative power and also in favour of the independence
of executive power as against liberty."
119.
(3)
more comprehensive powers. Still, as it was the fear of subordination 
of executive, legislative and judicial authorities to arbitrary military 
rule which led the founding fathers to make constitutional declarations 
against such eventualities, "the executive and military officials who 
later found it necessary to utilize the armed forces to keep order in
a young and turbulent nation, did not lose sight of the philosophy
/
embodied in the Petition of Right and the Declaration of Independence, 
that existing civilian government and especially the courts were not
(4)
to be interfered with by the exercise of military power."
For a proper discussion of the scope and extent of the exercise 
of powers on a declaration of martial law, it is to be remembered that 
the courts had to judge its propriety in the light of the constitutional 
provisions. Moreover, the federal system of government created diffi-
(5)
culties unknown in a unitary system of government.
Another important aspect of the applications of martial law in 
America is that, as martial law involves delegation of power, it Is
(3) "When later the American colonies declared their independence 
one of the grievances listed by Jefferson was that the King had 
endeavoured to render the military superior to the civil power," - 
per J’. Black Jin Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1945) 327 U.S. at p. 230.
(4) Ibid, at p.320.
(5) Charles Fairman, The Lav/ of Martial Rule and the National 
Emergency (1942) Harvard Law Review, 1253 at p.1264-
" s'hticiilpr provisions of national and state constitutions and 
legislation and certain features of federal jurisdiction 
introduce com which should be kept firmly in mind in
examining the law of martial rule in America."
essential that its exercise does not amount to ail abdication of power
either by the executive or the legislature. "The Federal Constitution
and State Constitutions of this country divide the governmental power
into three branches ... in carrying out that constitutional division ...
it is a breach of the national fundamental law if Congress give up its
(6)
legislative power and transfers it to the President ... "
The various attempts of American lawyers and judges to define 
martial law create the same confusion as the opinions of the English
(7)
jurists. We may, however, without confining ourselves to a discussion 
of this common mistaken notion, proceed to consider the confirmed 
American viewpoints in relation to martial law. Unanimity cannot be 
expected here as elsewhere lawyers and judges differ as to the permis­
sible limits within which the executive and the armed forces should 
confine their activities and also as to the scope of the power of 
judicial control. Moreover, the courts had to consider the whole 
matter with inference to written constitutions, both Federal and State.
To discover the proper meaning and scope of martial law they did not, 
of course, have to seek assistance from its past history, as there 
was none.
The essence of all these definitions it that martial lav/ is "hardly 
anything more than a general term for the operation in situations of
(6) Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today,
Twelfth edition (1958)> at p.5*
(7) "The common law authorities and commentators afford no clue to
what martial law as understood in England really is ... In this 
country it is still worse." - 8 Opinions of Attorney-General,
367 (1859).
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(8)
public emergency of certain well-known principles of the common law.'1
(9)
In EX. part e Milligan it was said that "martial lav/ cannot arise 
from a threatened invasion. The necessity must he actual and present; 
the invasion real." Again, "the term martial lav/ refers to the 
exceptional measures adopted, whether by the military or the civil 
authorities, in times of war or of domestic disturbance, for the
(10)
preservation of order and the maintenance of the public authority.
It may be mentioned that nowhere in the constitution is there any 
mention of "martial law." "The Constitution does not refer to 'martial
(ii)
law' at all and no Act of Congress has defined the term."
2. The Suspension of Habeas Corpus
The American Constitution contains the following provisions.
(8) Edward S. Corwin, The President (1948) edition, at p.175*
(9) 4 Wall 2 (1866). In referring to the Milligan decision that 
martial law cannot arise from threatened invasion Corwin saids 
"The meaning intended is that martial law is not judicially 
cognizable as an act of human authority, but only as an occasional 
ugly supervening fact. If, therefore, never supplants the civil 
powers in consequence of anybody's exercising any judgment in the 
matter; it springs into existence automatically when the civil 
power has ceased to exist for the time being. The idea has a 
mystical tinge. The suggestion that martial law has been confined 
in the past to situations which totally deprived persons in 
authority of discretion again flouts the verdict of history and - 
for recent years at least - that of opinion. Total War and the 
Constitution (1947) p.102.
(10) Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. II, 186.
(11) Duncan v. ICahanamoku, 327 U.S. 315 (1945)*
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
(12)
require it." The Article relates to the powers of Congress and 
therefore the prohibition is directed to the federal government.
The conditions precedent to the suspension of the writ are two, 
namely, (i) the existence of rebellion or invasion, and (ii) grounds 
of public safety. These two things must co-exist before the writ can 
be suspended.
It is needless to say that on the suspension of the writ the 
executive agents may arrest any person without giving grounds, and 
such arrests go without a judicial remedy. The presumption that the 
suspension of the writ legalises all arrests and detention is without 
substance. The persons who are responsible for the arrests and 
detention may be held liable, both civilly and criminally, for 
illegality. The courts are not precluded, by the suspension of the 
writ, from issuing it, but the suspension furnishes "a legal ground
(13)
for a refusal to obey it."
The stispension of the writ is not equivalent to the declaration 
of martial law, but the necessity for both must be the same. "The 
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus falls short 
of the establishment of martial law, but to justify it there is required 
the same public necessity as that required for the enforcement of
(14)
martial law."
0-2) Article I, Section 9? Clause 2.
(13; Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (1910)
(14) Ibid, at p,1255. Vol. XI, p.1254.
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As the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus is contained in an Article of the Constitution which relates 
to the powers exercisable by Congress, in some cases it has been held
(15) (16)
that Congress alone has the power to suspend it. In Bn parte Bollman
the Supreme court of the United States assumed that the power of
c.j.
suspension belonged to Congress. J3, Marshall/said: "If at any time 
the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested 
by this Act (granting jurisdiction) in the courts of the United States, 
it is for the legislature to say so. The question depends on political 
considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the 
.legislature will be expressed, this court can only see its duty and 
must obey the laws."
According to Taney/of the American Supreme Court, the
President has, in so far as the life, liberty or property of citizens 
are concerned, the power and duty as prescribed in Article II, Section 5? 
which provides "that we shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully
(17)
executed." He said:
"I can see no ground whatever for supposing that the President, 
in any emergency or in any state of things, can authorise the suspension
(15) Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1891) 
Fifth edition, Vol. II, at p.215. "It would seem, as the power is 
given to Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of 
rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge whether the exigency 
had arisen must exclusively belong to that body."
(16) 4 Cr. 75-
(17) Ex Parte Merryman (1861) 106 Fed. Case 144-
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the judicial power
also by arresting and imprisoning a person without due process of
(18)
law."
Against such views two equally plausible arguments have been 
advanced. First, "rebellion or invasion" may occur when Congress is 
not in session. Secondly, the rebellion may be against the State and
(19)
not Federal authority.
However, the legal basis of the Presidential Proclamations
suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil War was
supposed to rest on Article X, Section 9? Clause 2. "These proclamations
and orders were all based upon the theory that under Article I, Section
9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, or otherwise, the President alone, in
the absence of any authority from Congress, was empowered to suspend
(20)
the privilege of the writ."
(18) Ibid.
(19) Halleck, International Law (I878) Vol. I, at p.499*
(20) Win t hr op, A Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate-General of 
the Army, 1436 (l90l)T~
By Proclamation of 10 May, 1861, the President authorised the 
commander of the United States forces on the Florida Coast "to 
suspend there the writ of habeas corpus" if he found it necessary. 
The President's Proclamation of 24 September, 1862, subjected to 
martial law and trial by military courts certain classes of 
persons named, and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus as to persons who v/ere imprisoned tinder military sentence 
during the rebellion.
An Act of Congress of 3 March, 1863? C.81,S.l. provided; "that 
during the present rebellion the President of the United States, 
whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is 
authorised to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof."
In pursuance of this Act the President issued a Proclamation 
suspending the privilege of the writ generally and throughout the
125.
As early as 1861 President Lincoln referred the legal question 
to the Attorney-General of U.S.A. who rendered the following opinion 
as to the pov/ers of the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
in view of the specific provision of Article I, Section 9> Clause 2.
He said;
"If by the phrase fthe suspension of the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus1 we must understand a repeal of all powers to issue 
the writ, then I fully admit that none but Congress can do it. But 
if vre are at liberty to understand the phrase to mean that in case of 
a great and dangerous rebellion like the present the public safety 
requires the arrest and confinement of persons implicated in that 
rebellion, I as freely declare the opinion that the President has 
lawful power to suspend the privilege of persons under such circum­
stances; for he is especially charged by the constitution with the 
*public safety*, and he is the sole judge of the emergency which 
requires his prompt action.
"This power in the President is no part of his ordinary duty in
time of peace; it is temporary and exceptional, and was intended only
to meet a pressing emergency when the judiciary is found too weak to
(21)
insure the public safety,"
United States, in all cases "where, by the authority of the 
President of the United States, military, naval and civil 
officers of the United States or any of them, hold persons under 
their command or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, 
spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy ... "
(21) Ten Opinions of the Attorney-General 74 (l86l).
Thus, according to Attorney General Bates the President had the 
power to arrest and imprison persons guilty of aiding or abetting the 
insurrection and the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was a 
necessary ingredient of this power. Several views were also advanced 
in support of the President's right to suspend the writ. One ingenious 
argument was that the constitutional clause (Article I, Section 9>
Clause 2) itself stood in the place of an Act of Parliament, with the 
result that the President did not need congressional authorisation.
Others held that the President's power was an emergency power, and 
action under it was subject to congressional review. A third view was 
that "in case of invasion from abroad or rebellion at home, the President 
may declare, or exercise, or authorize martial law at his discretion, and
(22)
in so doing suspend the writ."
How far a Presidential suspension ox the writ of habeas corpus 
would meet with the approval of present-day lawyers and judges if the 
President were to-day to suspend the writ, it is very difficult to say. 
"In a future crisis the Presidential power to suspend would probably 
be just as much an open question as during the Civil War. As to the 
actual precedent of that wa^ r, the outstanding fact is that the chief 
executive 1 suspended the writ1, and that so far as legal consequences 
were concerned, he was not restrained in so doing by Congress nor by
(23)
the courts."
(22) Edward S. Corwin, The President, at pp,179“QO (1948)•
(25) Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln (Hew York, 1926),
pp.lp6-7.
5* Jurisdiction of the Federal Authority
The judicial history of martial law under the constitution of
(24)
the United States begins with the case of Luther v. Borden. During 
Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, the legislature had enacted 
that martial law should be exercised and under colour of authority 
thus created some militiamen entered the house of the plaintiff and 
arrested him as an adherent of the rebels. Chief Justice Taney held 
that as the government of the Island was the best judge of the 
situation arising oxit of the armed opposition, the questions raised
(25)
in this case were not within the court's jurisdiction to decide.
(24) (1849) 7 How. 1.
(25) "Unquestionably a state may use its military powers to put
down an anned insurrection too strong to be controlled by the 
civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of 
every government, essential to the preservation of order and 
free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this 
Union as to any other government. The State itself must 
determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if 
the government of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition 
so formidable and so ramified through the state as to require 
the use of its military force and the declaration of martial 
law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its 
authority. It was a state of war; and the established 
government resorted to the rights and usages of war to 
maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition.
And in that state of things the officers engaged in its 
military service might lawfully arrest anyone, who from 
the information before them they had reasonable grounds to 
believe was engaged in the insurrection; and order a house 
to be forcibly entered and searched, when there were 
reasonable grounds for supposing he might be there concealed. 
Without the power to do this martial law and the militaiy 
array of the government would be mere parade and rather 
encourage attack than repel it." - per Chief Justice Taney.
Justice Woodbury, in a dissenting opinion, said that the Rhode
Island legislature had no power to declare martial law. He would not
concede to the legislature the power to suspend or abolish all
constitutional restrictions as martial law does, even in time of
legitimate war. By martial lav/ he meant that "every citizen, instead
of reposing under the shield of lcnown and fixed laws as to liberty,
property and life, exists with a rope round his neck subject to be
hung up by a military despot at the next lamp-post under the sentence
of some drum-head court-martial." According to him such a regime
could come into existence only during war. But war could be declared
only by Congress and states could not engage in war without the
(26)
permission of Congress.
The majority, however, held that if the military government 
was unnecessarily prolonged, the republican form of government 
visualised by the constitution would n6 longer exist. They also 
agreed that "no more force ... can be used than is necessary to 
accomplish the object. And if power is exercised for purposes of 
oppression, or any injury wilfully done to person or property,
(26) Ibid. "Congj ?ess alone can declare war, and ... all other 
conditions of violence are regarded by the Constitution 
as but ordinary cases of private outrage to be punished 
by prosecutions in the courts, or as insurrections, 
rebellions or domestic violence-, to be put down by the 
civil authorities, aided by the militia, or when these 
prove incompetent, by the general government, when appealed 
to by the state for aid, and matters appear to the general 
government toxhave reached the extreme stage requiring more 
force to sustain the civil tribunals of a state, as requiring 
a declaration of \mp9 and the exercise of all its extraordinary 
rights." - per Justice Y/oodbury.
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the party by whom, orr by whose order, it is committed would undoubtedly 
be answerable.M
Two thing's must be remembered about this decision. It is not 
the judgment of the United States Supreme Court 011 the law of the 
federal constitution. Chief Justice Taney while sitting in a federal 
circuit court was construing a Rhode Island statute. Secondly, Chief 
Justice Taney, it seems, revised his view on martial law powers in 
Ex parte Merryman.
(27)
The facts in Ex parte Merryman involved the arrest of the plaintiff 
by the military authorities. A petition of habeas corpus was made to 
Chief Justice Taney when on cii’cuit in Baltimore, and the writ was 
issued. In response General Cadwalader sent an officer with' a letter 
informing the court that he had been authorised by the President to 
suspend the writ and, therefore, further action should be postponed till 
he received instructions from the President. On the failure of a token 
attempt to attach the General for contempt, if. Taney/'delivered the 
opinion that under the Constitution only Congress had powers to suspend 
the privilege of the writ and the detention of the prisoner could not 
be sustained. Such a conclusion would seem strange not only on account 
of his pronouncements in Luther1s Case, but also for his refusal to 
recognise that a commander, when war is raging, must have the power to 
hold persons in active opposition apart from the suspension of the writ
(27) ^W§£3c3cx2$|:x^ ;Sx^ x^ S^ |^ ;x 17 Feci. Cas. 144? No. 9487 (l86l).
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of habeas corpus.
(28)
In Bx parte. Yallandigham counsel for tlie petitioner, who was 
tried by a military commission for uttering disloyal sentiments and 
sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the civil war, moved the 
Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari and direct the 
Judge Advocate General to send up the record of the military commission. 
In refusing to grant the prayer, the Supreme Court held that a military 
commission did not form part of the judicial system of the United States 
and that the petition was not within the appellate jurisdiction of the 
court as defined by Article III of the Constitution.
(29)
^ ie Prize Cases illustrate for the first time the President's 
power in relation to the exercise of martial law. President Lincoln 
did not wait for any congressional recognition of a state of war before 
he ordered the blockade of the seceding states. This was undoubtedly 
an act of state which stripped all the citizens of the affected states 
of their constitutional rights. As chief executive and commander-in- 
chief the President had power to suppress insurrection and could 
employ martial law to achieve this purpose. Justice Gd“Aer for a 
majority of the court said:
"The President was bound to meet it (the civil war) in the shape 
it presented itself, without waiting for congress to baptize it with a
(28) 1 Wall 245 (U.S. 1865).
(29) 2 Black 635 (U.S. 1862).
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name; and no name given to it by him at' them could change the fact ...
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties ... has met with such
armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions
as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerants, is
a question to he decided by him, and this court must be governed by the
decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to
(30)
which this power is entrusted,M
This decision prescribing the limits of the President’s powers
was, however, soon qualified by the judgment of the United States Supreme
(31)
Court in Ex parte Milligan in which the conception of martial law as 
resting on the v/ar power and as measured by its rights wan superseded 
by the British conception of it as a law of necessity to be determined 
ultimately by the ordinary courts. Here, Milligan, an American citizen 
and a resident in Indiana for twenty years, asked for his release from 
an alleged unlawful imprisonment. His contentions were that he was 
not, and never had been, in the military service of the United States 
and therefore could not be legally tried by a military tribunal. The 
military tribunal convened at Indianapolis by order of the General 
commanding the military districts of Indiana had sentenced him to 
death.
(30) Ibid, at pp.669-70,
(31) (1866) 4 Wall 2.
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He claimed that as a citizen of the United Staten of America
he had the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution.
The question was whether the military tribunal had the legal power
and authority to try and punish him. As every trial involved the
exercise of the judicial power, it had to be decided from what source
did the military tribunal derive authority to try a civilian.
The American Constitution confers the judicial power "in one
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time order and establish." Neither could it be said that Congress
established the military tribunal, nor such a tribunal could be
justified on the mandate of the President, "because he is controlled by
law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not
(52)
to make, the laws." Nor was there any "unwritten criminal code to
(53)
which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction." Justice 
Davies, in delivering the opinion of the majority, made the historic 
utterance s
"The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and 
people, equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its 
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circxunstances. 
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented 
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
(34)
during the great exigencies of government."
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid.
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If the claim be accepted that in time of war the commander of 
an armed force has the power ,!to suspend all civil rights and their
will," it would destro5'- every guarantee of the Constitution, and 
effectually renders the military independent of and superior to
In a dissenting opinion O'* if. Chase enunciated the classic 
definition of martial law. He visualised three kinds of military 
jurisdiction under the American constitution: "One to be exercised
both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war 
without the boundaries of the United States as districts occupied by 
rebels treated as belligerantsf and a third to be exercised in time 
of invasion or insurrection within the limits of states maintaining 
adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires 
its exercise." The first of these three jurisdictions is administered 
under military law of the United States and the second is known as 
military government. The third jurisdiction comes under martial law 
proper and "is called into action by Congress, as temporarily, when 
the action of congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying 
or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or 
invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts localities 
where ordinary law 110 longer adequately secures public safety and
remedies and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his
(55)
civil power."
(36)
private rights•"
Ibid.
Ibid.
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(37)
In one of the early cases ^  Storylof the United States Supreme 
Court had to consider the extent of the President1s power in calling 
the militia into service in case of invasion or insurrection. The 
facts in this case were that a militiaman failed to respond to a call 
made under the Act of 1795 io serve during the war of 1815* He was 
convicted and his property was taken to satisfy the judgment. Under 
the Act the President was empowered by Congress to call up the militia 
in certain cases. Though this power to call the militia to active 
service was undoubtedly of "a very high and delicate nature," it was, 
in fact, a limited power exercisable during actual invasion or 
threatened invasion. It could not, therefore, be exercised vdthout 
corresponding responsibility. If it was a limited power, the question 
arose, who was to judge the exigency? Was it the President or any 
officers to whom the President had delegated his power? Story 
in holding that the authority to decide whether the exigency had 
arisen belonged exclusively to the President and that his decision 
was conclusive upon all other persons, said:
"He (the President) is necessarily constituted the judge of the 
existence of the emergency, in the first Instance and is bound to act 
according to his belief of the facts ... whenever a statute gives a 
discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his 
own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that
(37) Martin v. Mott (1827) 25 U.S. 19.
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the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive jixdge existence
of these facts."
The principle enunciated here that the judiciary will not review 
an executive decision and substitute its own opinion where the legis­
lature has lav/fully empowered him to take any action on a designated
occasion was recently applied in a case before the United States 
(38)
Supreme Court involving the interpretation of tariff law. In this 
case it was contended that the judiciary had the power to review an error 
in the exercise of Presidential discretion under that law. In rejecting 
this argument Justice Douglas said:
"It has long been held that where Congress has authorised a 
public officer to take some specified legislative action, when in his 
judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
policy of the Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence
(39)
of the facts calling for that action is not subject to review*"
5- Martial Law Authorised by State Constitutions
Apart from the proclamations of martial law by the federal
authorities during the civil war, martial law has often been resorted
(40)
to by the state authorities. Thus, martial law was declared on an
38) U.S. v. George S. Bush and Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 371-
39) Ibid, at" 380.
(40) The Proclamation ran as follows: "The Federal troops, the members 
of the police force, and all special police force officers have 
been authorised to kill any and all persons found engaged in 
looking, or in the commission of any other crime." Professor 
Ballantine discussed the validity of the measures adopted by 
the authority and found them unconstitutional.
outbreak of fire at San Francisco in 1906. The most interesting thing 
about the whole affair is that it was not the Governor of California 
nor any other appropriate executive or military authority, but the 
Mayor of the City of San Francisco who declared martial law. The record 
showed that at least ten persons were killed by soldiers when they 
violated the picket line in order to save their property.
Similarly, during the flood in Ohio, a company of the Ohio 
National Guard established a picket line surrounding a portion of the 
affected district with a view to preventing persons from going there 
without a military pass. One Smith, in defiance of the order, passed 
thi’ough the line to take some pictures and was arrested. On a petition 
for habeas coitus, the court of the Common Pleas held that the 
commanding officer could issue regulations for the protection of life 
and property and arrest any person trying to violate such orders.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century industrial disorders 
resulted in the armed forces being ordered to support the civil
(41)
authority. In these instances of martial law was proclaimed by the 
Governors of the States concerned and the armed forces claimed that
(41) Charles Fairman gives a fair picture of the clumsy modus operandi 
of the state executives used to keep the conflict between labour 
and capital within limits: "With exceptions and variations, the 
story tends to repeat itself. Labour organisers find themselves 
pitted against detectives and guards, and a grim struggle ensues; 
local magistrates prove lacking in power or zeal; presently the 
Governor declares that a state of insurrection exists, and perhaps 
adds that martial law shall prevail, and summons the militia.
Then follows an anomalous regime - regulations are promulgated, 
saloons closed, weapons seized, newspapers suppressed or wrecked; 
agitators are arrested and detained, deported or perhaps tried by 
military commission." - Martial Rule and the Suppression of 
Insurrection (1929) 25 ILLINOIS LAW R E V H W " ^  at p.7<a£h
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the proclamation of martial law involved the suspension of all the 
provisions of the constitutions, both state and federal.
(42)
The constitutions of four states expressly recognise the power 
to declare martial law. Besides, the Organic Acts governing Hawaii, 
the Phillipines and Puerto Pico contain express grant of power to the
(43)
executive to declare martial law. The constitutions of nearly twenty 
states provide that laws can be suspended only by the legislature.
Some of the states expressly declare in their constitutions that no 
person can be subjected to martial law or be punished except those in
(44)
the army, navy or militia in actual service.
Though there are provisions in the constitutions of several 
states recognising the exercise of martial law if necessity requires, 
it must not be supposed that they constitute grants of poorer; they are
(45)
rather intended as limitations. The state constitutions as v/ell as
(42) Namely; Massachusetts, Hew Hampshire, Rhode Island and South 
Carolina. The Rhode Island Declaration of Rights provides? "The 
military shall be held in strict subordination to the civil 
authorities. And the law-martial shall be used and exercised, in 
such cases only, as occasion shall necessarily require.”
(43) Carner Anthony, Martial haw in Hawaii (1942) 30 CALIFORNIA LAV/ 
REVIEW 371.
(44) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority (1915) 
24 Yale L.J. at p.199.
(45) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of the Military Authority 
(1915) 24, Yale L.J. 202.
the various Declarations of Rights are subject to the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution. The exercise of martial law by the state 
authorities is, therefore, liable to be challenged before a Federal 
court and if it finds the exercise of power under a declaration of 
martial lav; contrary to any.provision of the constitution of the 
United States it will declare such martial rule illegal and uncon­
stitutional. On the supposition that a condition of v/ar exists, a state 
government may declare martial law, but this raises the question whether
a state can wage war on its citizens in the face of Article I, Section
(46)
10, Clause 3 of the Federal Constitution. The state may, however, 
invoke Article IV, Section 4? under which the United States guarantees 
to every state a republican form of government and protection against 
invasion and rebellion. Still, the state authorities have to consider 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
(47)
Constitution.
(46) ”No State shall, without the consent of Congress, engage in 
war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as 
will not admit of delay.”
Charles Fairman, The Lav; of Martial Rule and the National 
Emergency (1942) 55 Har.L.R. 1253 at 1267. "But however loose 
the local law may have been found to be, the military acts of 
a state government, like all its other measures, are subject 
to the independent federal test of reasonable appropriateness 
imposed by the due process clause,”
(47) "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of lav;; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
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5. Extent of Authority under Express Lav/s
Some mention should "be made of the powers conferred on the
executive by special statutes enacted by the federal or state legislature.
As has been evident from the foregoing discussions, the executive can,
even in the absence of any express provision in the constitution or
statute, act to maintain peace and order as it is charged generally to
(46)
ensure public safety. In ex parte Milligan it was held that "it is 
within the power of Congress to determine in whadS states or districts 
such great and imminent public danger exists as justified the authori­
sation of military tribunals for the trial of crimes against the public 
safety." In the commonwealth, Jamaica and Ireland had such especial 
statutes. Moreover, during the two world wars the British Parliament 
conferred extraordinary powers on the executive. "Such a statute would 
give additional security beside what might be derived from inherent
(49)
executive power." The aim of such legislation is to empower the
executive to act, "not with an arbitrary discretion, but without
applying mere technical ruless so as to do the substance of justice in
(50)
a summary way."
(48) (1866) 3 Wall (U.S.) 2.
(49) Charles Fairman, The La?/ of Martial Rule and the National 
Emergency (1942) 55 Harvard Law Review, 1253? at p. 1264*
(50) Per yj. BlackburnJdn R. v. Eyre (1868) Special Report, at
p . 81.
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If there is a statute conferring specific powers, the Executive 
should restrict its action to the confines of the authority delegated 
for it will he within the power of the courts to nullify the excesses 
committed hy the Executive- This general principle of judicial control 
of administrative agencies is equally applicable to the exercise of
(51)
powers by the armed forces within the state. In a recent case the 
American Supreme Court saids
"When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies 
to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is 
circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to 
participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only 
to the extent necessary to protect justifiable individual rights against 
administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers. The responsi­
bility of determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in 
such instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts by 
Congress by the statutes establishing courts and malting their
(52)
jurisdiction -,f
6* Executive Discretion and its Abuse
In a number of decisions on the constitutional position of the
(51) Stark -v. ftLokard (1944) 321 U.S. 288.
(52) Ibid, at p.509.
state governor dealing- with a breakdown of public order, the ruling
(53)
in the Prize Cases that the Presidential proclamation of martial law 
is conclusive of the itexistence of war and also of the legality of 
the measures adopted was invoked to uphold the Governor's action.
The courts do not seem to have considered the prohibition in the 
Federal Constitution against a State waging war without the consent 
of Congress, nor the duty of the Federal Government to make good the
(54)
guarantee in Article XV, Section 4*
It has, hov/ever, been held that a power to do an act implies a 
power to select the means of doing it. Chief Justice Marshall in the
(55)
famous case of Maryland v. McCullock said: "The Government which has
a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing
that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to
select the means .,, that any means adopted to the end, any means which
tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the
(56)
government, were in themselves constitutional,"
(57)
Ela v. Smith is the leading case which recognised the freedom
(53) 2 Black 635 (U.S. I863).
(54) Article XV, Section 4> lays dovm - "The United States ... shall
protect each of them against invasion, and on application of 
the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature 
cannot be convened), against domestic violence,"
(55) 4 Wheat U.S. 316 (1819).
(56) The general principle discussed here was applied in relation to 
the President's power regarding martial law in the Prize Cases
and his power to call militia in Martin v. Mott (1827T~"25 U.S. 19.
(57) 71 Mass. 121 (1855).
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of the executive to choose the method to attain a particular object 
with which it is commissioned, here, the Mayor of Boston, in the 
exercise of his discretion, called the militia to prevent a riot over 
the return of a fiigitive slave. When one of the crowd attempted to 
break through a cordon of soldiers, he was injured $ he brought suit 
to recover damages. It was there helds
"Whenever the lav/ vests in an officer as magistrate a right of 
judgment, and gives him a discretion to detennine the facts on which 
such judgment is to be based, he necessarily exercises within the 
limits of his jurisdiction a judicial authority. So long as he acts 
within the fair scope of this authority, he is clothed with all the 
rights and immunities which appertain to judicial tribunals in the 
discharge of their appropriate functions. Of these none is better 
settled than the wise and salutory rule of law by which all magistrates 
and officers, even when exercising a special or limited jurisdiction, 
are exempted from liability for their judgments, or acts done in 
pursuance of them, if they did not exceed their authority, although
the concluBions to which they arrive are false and erroneous."
(58)
In Re Boyle the Supreme Court of Idaho, in refusing to issue a
In iibi ■■iiihiihibwmiTiiiium i m r <w
writ of habeas corpus, held that the governor’s declaration was 
conclusive of the state of war and that the measures adopted by him 
were necessary to accomplish the object of suppressing the insurrection.
(58) (1899) 6 Idaho 609.
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The court was of the opinion "that whenever, for the purpose of 
patting down insurrection or rebellion, the exigencies of the case 
demanded for the successful accomplishment of this end in view, it 
is entirely competent for the executive as far as the military officer 
in command, if there be such, either to suspend the writ or disregard 
it, if issued." The court denied jurisdiction to review such decision 
or interfere with the executive process. "It would be an absurdity to 
say that the action of the executive, in such circumstances, may be 
negatived and set at naught by the judiciary, or that the action of
(59)
the executive may be interfered with or impeded by the judiciary."
Industrial unrest and the need to control and regulate the
relationship between labour and capital led the Governor to declare
a part of Colorado to be under martial lav;. Press censorship was
imposed; persons were deported and detained; persons considered to
be responsible for the insurrection were arrested. The plaintiff,
a Union leader, was arrested and detained for 76 days. On an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of the
state held that the detention was not illegal. The court did not
(60)
consider that the Governor had the power to suspend the writ.
Subsequently, on his release when the insurrection was over, 
the plaintiff brought an action for damages against the Governor.
(59) Ibid.
(60) In re Moyer (1904) 35 Calo. 159
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The federal circuit court held that the Governor's action did not 
show any abuse of power; there had been no violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
On an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court, conceded that at the time of the declaration
the courts were open, but he concluded that the Governor's declaration
(61)
was conclusive of the existence of an insurrection.
As the constitution and statutes of the state empowered the
Governor to employ the National Guard to suppress insurrection, he
could "make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end, kill persons
who resist" and "use the milder measures of seizing the bodies of those
(62)
whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace."
Further, though the arrest may have been without reasonable 
ground it will be justified if the measure was necessary and made "in 
good faith." "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in 
the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection 
off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an 
action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not
(65)
reasonable ground for his belief."
The law allows the subsequent challenge before the court of the 
conduct of men responsible for such extraordinary rule but in that
(61) Moyer v. Peabody (1909) 212 U.S. JQ,
(62) Ibid.
(63) Ibid.
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case the court should duly weigh the executive discretion and judge 
the matter on the facts existing at the moment and not in the manner
(64)
of the cool and calm atmosphere of a court-room. "When it comes to a 
decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life, 
the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the 
necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution
(65)
of executive,process for judicial process.u
(66)
In the leading case of Sterling v. Constantine the United States 
Supreme Court considered the legality of the military action taken by the 
Governor of Texas in taking over the properties of the respondent. The 
Texas legislature authorised the railroad commission to limit the 
production of oil. On a petition for an injunction the federal district 
judge raised a temporary restraining order and constituted a three- 
judge court. In order to overcome the difficulties caused by the 
judicial proceedings, Governor Sterling declared a state of insurrection 
and appointed General Wolfcers to suppress it by martial law. There was 
actually no disturbance, no uprising, or interference with the civil
(67")
authorities or the courts. In the absence of any such violence or
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) (1952) 287 U.S. 578
(67) Constantine v. Smith, 57 227 at 251; "It was conceded that at
no time has there been any actual uprising in the territory. At 
no time has any military force been exerted to put riots or mobs 
down.. At no time, except in the refusal of defendant Wolters to 
observe the injunction in this case, have the civil authorities 
or courts been interfered with or their processes made impotent'.
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attempted violence, could the executive “good faith" as advocated and
approved in the Moyer1s case be proved? Martial rule would in such a
case be clearly illegal. And so it was, as quite emphatically declared
by the three-judge court.
Expressing the inability to accept the contention of the
appellant that the court was powerless to intervene since the Governor's
order had the quality of a supreme and unchallengeable edict, /. HughesC<J.
of the American Supreme Court said; "If this extreme position could be
deemed to be well taken, it is manifest that the fiat of a State
Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the
(68)
supreme lav; of the land."
If the Governor would exercise such uncontrolled power upon his
assertion of necessity, the restrictions imposed by the Federal
■ iW.
Constittition would be but impotent phrases. Hughes/said;
"Under our system of government, such a conclusion is obviously 
untenable. There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount
(69)
authority of the Federal Constitution."
If there is a challenge to such arbitrary exercise of powers, 
the court will always interfere. "When there is a substantial showing 
that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured
(68) Sterling v. Constantine (1932) 287 U.S. 373 at p.397«
(69) Ibid, at p.398.
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by that constitution;, the subject is necessarily one for judicial
inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals
(70)
charged with the transgression."
In applying these principles the court must not disregard the 
distinctive authority of the state. "In the performance of its 
essential function, in promoting the security and well-being of its 
people, the State must, of necessity, enjoy a broad discretion. The
(71)
range of that discretion accords with the subject of its exercise."
Since the Governor has the duty to maintain law and order, it is
incumbent that he should be allowed the freedom to act and take all
necessary measures to that end. So long as the Governor's act cannot
be challenged on the ground of lack of good faith and bears a reasonable
relation to the emergency in question, it cannot be declared unjustified
and illegal. Thus, 01 Hughes‘said:
MrJ?he nature of the power also necessarily implies that there is a
permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken in
meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order,
for without such liberty to make immediate decisions, the power itself
(72)
would be useless."
Then, he goes on to say that "such measures conceived in good 
faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling
(70) Ibid, at p.398.
(71) Ibid, at p.399.
(72) Ibid, at p.399-400.
of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the 
discretion of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain
(73)
peace."
The reasons stated above led to the conclusion that there was 
no emergency which compelled the Governor to resort to martial law and 
nullify the order of the District Judge. On the contrary it was the 
Governor's duty to uphold the majesty of law.
"If it be assumed that the Governor was entitled to declare a 
state of insurrection and bring military force to the add of civil 
authority, the proper use of that power in this instance was to 
maintain the Federal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not 
to attempt to override it3 to aid in making its process effective and 
not to nullify it, to remove and not to create obstructions to the
(74)
exercise by the complainants of their rights as judicially declared."
The decision goes to establish that though the executive will be 
allowed discretion in exercising martial law powers "upon sudden emer­
gencies, upon great occasions of state," it has to be proved that 
such discretion was exercised in good faith.
(75) Ibid, at p.400. 
(74) Ibid, at p.404.
CHAPTER 5
GEEBRAL PROBLEMS OF LAW AMD ORDER
1. Duty of Citizens and Soldiers in Restoring Order
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Our discussion on the Crown's prerogative or the common law 
power to suppress disorder has rendered it essential to deal with 
another matter of equal constitutional importance. In relation to a 
riot In time of peace and during a state of rebellion, the duty of the 
citizens, as we shall presently see, remains the same, but our immediate 
purpose is to discover the difference in the duty of the soldier 
towards the civil population in the two different situations.
Whether it is peacetime or wartime, so far as the suppression of 
disorder Is concerned, the common lav/ makes no distinction in this 
respect between the duties of citizens and soldiers. In a charge to the 
Bristol Grand Jury on the occasion of riots in that city, 0. J. Tindal C-J. 
said;
"By the common law every private individual may lawfully endeavour, 
of his own authority and without any warrant or sanction of the magis­
trate, to suppress a riot by every means ... It is his bounden duty, as 
a good subject of the King, to perform this to the utmost of his
(i)
ability."
He was not, however, unconscious of the proper implications of 
the situation. For all practical purposes the citizens, if they do
(l) Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury, quoted in Rex, v. Finney 5 Car
and Payne at p.262.
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anything at all, will merely help the officers of the King in
re-establishing peace and order. 5,It would be more discreet for
everyone in such a case to attend and be assistant to the justices,
(2)
sheriffs or other ministers of the King.11 But where no opportunity
was given for acting on the advice or sanction of the magistrate and
immediate action was necessary, every subject could act on his own
responsibility in suppressing a tumultuous assembly. 1’Whatever is
honestly done by him in the execution of that object will be supported
(3)
and justified by the common law.”
When the paramount consideration for a magistrate is the res­
toration of order, he "may call on all the King’s subjects to a,ssist
him and 8,11 the King’s subjects are bound to do so, upon reasonable
(4)
warning.”
It is thus only in degree and not in kind that the powers of
(5)
the armed forces are different from those of the ordinary citizens.
(2) ibid.
(3) Ibid, quoted in Rex v. Pinney.
(4) Ibid.
(5) "When called to the aid of civil power, soldiers in no
way differ in the eyes of the law from other citizens, 
although, by reason of their organisation and equipment, 
there is always a danger that their employment in aid of 
the civil power may in itself constitute more force than is 
necessary." British Manual of Military Law (1955) Part II, 
Section V, p.l.
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Under the ordinary law of the land the citizens and the soldiers are
alike hound to help in maintaining peace and normal conditions in time
of v/ar as well as in peace.
In cases of ordinary breaches of peace, such as an affray or a
riot or any more or less peaceful demonstration or strike, the civil
authorities generally retain full control over the situation. It is
only in time of rebellion or invasion that the military forces are
entrusted with full powers to direct the whole energy of the State in
repelling the invasion or subduing the rebellion. Only when
war conditions exist will the soldiers be considered the best judges
of the steps taken to deal with them. Ihey can then give all necessary
orders to the civilians and impose restrictions on them to discharge the
(6)
supreme obligation. But, when the armed forces are called in aid of 
the civil power, they are normally expected to act when so ordered by 
the civil authority. "The task of dispersing riotous assemblies in 
time of peace is best directed by the local authorities who have 
knowledge of local conditions. Normally an officer in command of
(7)
troops will act only if called upon to do so by a magistrate.1'
It goes without saying that though the instructions of the magistrates
will greatly influence his judgment, it is also incumbent that "he
must exercise his own judgment whether to use force and, if so, how
(8)
much force to use."
((6) Chapter VI.
(7) Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law (1955) at p.421.
(8) Ibid.
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To stun up, the common law imposes the same obligations 011 the 
soldiers and the citizens. These obligations are, firstly, to come 
to the aid of the civil power when the latter requires their assistance 
to maintain law and order, and, secondly, not to use greater force 
than is necessary. The obligations are equally applicable in every 
type of disturbance.
2. The Principles Governing the Exercise of Powers by the Public Authorities 
Where, in a case of a riot not amounting to rebellion, the extent 
of the powers of the public authorities ai’e not defined by the statute, 
the choice before them being more limited than those of the armed forces 
engaged in suppressing a rebellion, interesting questions regarding 
neglect of duty and excess of jurisdiction arise. If the magistrate or 
other person responsible fails to take proper precautions to preserve the 
peace or uses more force than necessary to restore order, he is both 
civilly and criminally liable. As, during a rebellion which practically 
amounts to a state of war, the necessity is greater, the position of the 
armed forces employed to restore order is also different. Their discre- 
tion will be more free. "A proclamation of martial law during a 
rebellion, or shortly before it has been entirely quelled, practically 
gives to those in authority full powers to dsb all that is necessary to
(9)
restore order. Yet, it must not be supposed that the armed forces can,
(9) Sir William Holdsworth, Martial Lav; Historically Considered, 18 
Law Quarterly Review at p.126.
during a proclamation of martial law, exercise powers not justified
by the exigency. Unless subsequently protected by indemnifying
legislation, the members of the armed forces may also be liable,
both civilly and criminally. Even an Act of Indemnity, as we shall
see, cannot relieve them for acts not done in good faith.
The dilemma facing a magistrate who has the duty to suppress
any disturbance of peace is two-fold. If his order causes death, he
is liable to be indicted for murder or manslaughter but if, due to
his omission to act, the mob causes injury to.other persons or their
property, he may be charged with neglect. The consideration that must
guide his conduct in such cases is, as Bd Littledalefsaid, "to hit
(10)
the precise line of his duty." But to do that is, however, very 
difficult. When law requires of him such a high standard of judgment, 
it will be no defence that what he did was inspired by the best of motives. 
The honesty of intention will, no doubt, be good evidence to show that 
"he has fulfilled his legal duty by doing or abstaining from doing all 
that can reasonably be expected from a man of honesty and ordinary
(11)
prudence."
Neither good feeling and upright intention nor his having acted 
under the advice of others will be an answer to a neglect of duty on 
the magistrate's part. "The question is, whether he did all that he
(10) The Trial of Charles Pirmey (1832) 3 State Trials (New Series) 
at p.510.
(11) 18 Law Quar. Review at p*130.
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knew was in his power, and whioh could be expected from a man of
(12)
ordinary prudence, firmness and activity." Fear of his own personal 
safety would not be a good defence, unless such fear was rational. "If 
on a riot talcing place, a magistrate neither reads the proclamation 
from the Riot Act, nor restrains nor apprehends the rioters, nor gives 
any order to fire on them, nor makes any use of a military force under 
his command, this is prima facie evidence of a criminal neglect of duty 
in him: and it is no answer to the charge for him to say that he was 
afraid, unless his fear arose from such danger as would affect a firm 
man? and if, rather .than apprehend the rioters, his sole care was for
(13)
himself, this is also his neglect.1'
Once a decision to take action has been made on whom lies the 
responsibility if troops are employed to suppress the disturbances?
It is true that the primary duty to maintain order rests with the 
magistrate and the commander of the troops must act under his direction, 
but the magistrate may not know the nature of the weapons at the 
disposal of the troops. In such circumstances "a magistrate, there­
fore, if he acts with discretion, will necessarily defer to the 
opinion of the commander on military matters, particularly as to the
(14)
degree of the force to be used." When, however, the commander is
(12) Rex v. Finney, 5 Gar and Payne 254s 172 English Reports 962
JITbi).
(13) Rex v. Kennet 5 Car and Payne 282: 172 English Report 976
fl78l).
(14) British Manual of Military Law (1955) Part II, Section V,
page 2.
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requested "by the magistrate to take action, it is for him to decide 
the amount of force required in the circumstances. The commander 
"would incur considerable responsibility if he were to fire without a 
request to take action from the magistrate or if he were to refuse to 
fire when requested to do so, but circumstances which he sees before 
him might justify a commander in firing, or not firing, notwithstanding
(15)
the request which he receives from the magistrate," It is, therefore, 
for him to decide whether it is necessary to fire or not, because he 
will be responsible for his action.
5- The Role of the Soldiers during Disturbances
(a) Soldiers do not cease to be citizens
It is a mistake to suppose that the citizens, by enlisting
themselves in the army, cease to be citizens. The soldiers cannot
shake off any of the rights and duties of the citizens. "A soldier
for the purpose of establishing civil order is only a citizen armed
(16)
in a particular manner." As such they are as much bound to help in- 
maintaining peace and order as the other citizens. The mistaken 
notion "that because men are soldiers they cease to be citizens" in 
1780 produced the alarming result that "soldiers with arms in their
(15) Ibid.
(16) Report of the Commission on the Featherstone Biota (1895)
Appendix.
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hands stood "by and saw felonies committed, houses burnt and pulled 
down before their eyes, by persons whom they might lawfully have put (17)
to death, if they could not otherwise prevent them without interfering."
The reasons for their inaction were that there was no officer, civil
or military, to give them the command. To choose to remain silent
spectators when such outrages were being perpetrated cannot be the duty
c.y.
of soldiers for, as Lord 0. Mansfield, the great expounder of common
law, said, "if it is necessary for the purpose of preventing mischief,
or for the execution of the law, it is not only the right of soldiers
but it is their duty to exert themselves in assisting the execution of
(18)
a legal process, or to prevent any crime or mischief being committed."
C‘T.
0. Tindal made observations to the same effect when he said that 
"the soldier is still a citizen, lying under the same obligation, and 
invested with the same authority to preserve the peace of the King as
(19)
any other subject."
On comparing the rights and duties of the soldiers and citizens
e.j.
in relation to maintenance of order 0. J. Tindal reached the 
following conclusions
"If the one is bound to attend the call of the civil magistrate, 
so also is the other; if the one may interfere for that purpose when
(•**?) Burdett v. Abbot (1812) 4 Taunt 401s 128 English Reports 584*
(18) Ibid, at 45O.
(19) Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury (18^2) quoted in 5 Car and 
Payne 262.
the occasion demands it, without the requisition of the magistrate, so
may the other too; if the one may employ arms for that purpose, when
arms are necessary, the soldier may do the same. Undoubtedly the same
exercise of discretion which requires the private subject to act in
subordination to and in aid of the magistrate, rather than upon his
own authority, before recourse is had to arms, ought to operate in a
(20)
still stronger degree with a military force."
(b) Soldiers can interfere without a proclamation of Martial Law
Uo proclamation of martial law or the exercise of the royal
prerogative is needed to justify the use of the armed forces to suppress
riots and other similar disturbances. The sort of military interference
which one may experience when the armed forces are called in aid of the
civil power does not necessarily usher a regime of martial law. They
may, however, be invested with additional powers by the legislature,
without establishing military rule in the disturbed area. "The powers
of the military, coming to the aid of the civil authorities, would seem
in general to be limited to what peace officers may do, unless valid
(21)
statutes give them additional powers."
When soldiers come to the assistance of the civil authority they
(20) Ibid. In Granfe v. Gould (1792) 2 H.BL.98, Lord Loughborough saidi 
"In this country all the delinquencies of soldiers are not triable 
as in most countries in Europe, by martial law, but where they are 
ordinary offences against the civil peace, they are tried by the 
common lav/ courts." By "martial law" Lord Loughborough meant the 
military law of today.
(21) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority, 24 Xale 
Law Jotirnal 189 at 212^(1915)»
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are bound by the ordinary lav/ of the land. In his speech before
Parliament on the employment of the army to suppress the Gordon Riots
e.j.
of 1780, Lord 0. J. Mansfield said:
"My Lords, we have not been living under martial law, but under 
that law which it has long been my sacred function to administer ... 
supposing a soldier, or any other military person who acted in the 
course of the late riots, had exceeded the powers with which he was 
invested, I have not a single doubt that he may be punished, not by
(22)
court-martial but upon an indictment."
It is therefore essential to remember that to suppress ordinary 
disturbances soldiers come to help the civil power, not as soldiers but 
as citizens. "They were employed (no matter whether their coats were 
red or brown) not to subvert, but to preserve the laws of the Constitu-
(25)
tion which we all prize so highly," Lord Mansfield, therefore, dismissed 
as groundless the idea that since the army was employed to quell the 
Gordon Riots the citizens were "living under a military Government, 
or that since the commencement of the riots, any part of the laws of
(24)
the Constitution" had been suspended or dispensed with."
(0)Lxercise of powers by the Army is more for preventive than 
punitive purposes
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The obligation to preserve order and suppress disturbances may 
at times seem so high that one may tend to forget the distinction
(22) 5 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices 415? quoted in 24 Yale 
Lav/ Journal at p.211.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
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"between the power of a policeman to arrest and the power of a policeman 
to constitute himself a court or legislature and try and convict, 
sentence and execute offenders for violations of law or of his own
(25)
orders." The assumption of such power by the executive or the military
authority is not tenable for the simple reason that the power of
adjudication and pimishment is a judicial and not an executive power.
The assertion of the poorer to arrest and detain persons committing
riot and violence has been conceded in cases of necessity though, as we
shall see, the problem whether a military tribunal can try civilians,
if presented for judicial inquiry, raises difficulties. The v/hole
question has to be then resolved with reference to the conditions
prevailing in the area. Some acts may be justified; others may not be
supported upon any accepted standard of justification.
Broadly speaking, however, when martial law has not been proclaimed,
the poY/er of the military authority remains pi'eventive. Their powers,
as an American writer has observed, "would seem to be preventive,
defensive and ministerial, with no authority to issue orders to citizens
(26)
generally, or to pimis^ r those who disobey commands or commit offences."
It is here worth mentioning that the common law would also justify the 
destruction of property, for example, to prevent public danger. The 
maxim Salus populi suprema lex would give ample scope to such common law
(25) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority, 24 Yale 
Law Journal s?T"^T^(T915T7
(26) Ibid, at p.213.
justification of necessity. Even then while the common law doctrine 
of necessity admits that extraordinary measures may he adopted during 
abnormal circumstances, it also equally insists that they must be 
limited by the reasonable necessities of the occasion•
Though the law is clear that, when called by the civil authority, 
soldiers must come to their assistance, they cannot commit any excess, 
not even if they are asked to do so. "Ho excess of force or display 
must be used, and a soldier is guilty of an offence if he uses that 
excess, even under the direction of the civil authority, unless the 
circumstances are such that he has no opportunity of ascertaining and 
judging the facts of the case for himself and is therefore compelled 
to accept the opinion and appraisal of the situation of the civil
(27)
authority concerned."
(d) Principles governing the use of firearms against citizens
’  *------ ------1 1 —1|— 11 ■ 11 1 • 1 t~t T1 ■ ~ ^  ' 1 ri 1 r~~r r 1 n 11 m r - 11 1 ■ 11 mil Mi rr m  1 1 111111 ■ 11 i im n .  ■■ ■ r ~ it 1 11 11 1 -hi■- -■ "    n j n  . j.i m  i i t J u w  irmufij_Lm_j -iTnM.i —frrnm_._i
The question whether in a particular situation a recourse to 
firearms is actually necessary presents some obvious difficulty. If 
it can be proved that the situation was really menacing and slipping 
out of control, the firing would have to be justified by necessity.
This can, of course, be determined by applying an objective standard.
But it is the subjective opinion of the officer commanding the armed 
forces which almost always is advanced as proving the dangerous and 
violent nature of the disturbances. ITo-one will quarrel with the
(27) British Manual of Military haw, Part II, Section V, at p.l (1955)•
proposition that the officer put in charge of restoring order must 
have all the necessary freedom to deal with the situation and his 
subjective apprehension must be given due weight and consideration 
but it is only the objective basis of his fear which should justify a 
recourse to arms.
(26)
hynch v. Fitzgerald, an Irish case, HannaXconsidered at 
length the principles governing the use of firearms against an assembly 
of civilians causing a breach of the peace. The plaintiff claimed 
damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, for the death of his son, 
who was killed by a bullet fired by one of a group of detectives of the 
Special Branch of the Civic Guards. For the protection of certain 
prospective buyers against a threatened demonstration at a sale of 
cattle seized under a warrant from the Irish Land Commission, a force 
of 200 guards including 12 armed detectives were placed around the scene. 
A crowd of nearly 1500 men gathered some time before the hour fixed for 
sale. The three defendants opened fire when a lorry carrying men with 
sticks came through the crowd and crashed into the gate of the yard and 
succeeded in breaking through it. In the course of the firing the 
plaintiff1s son was killed.
Without concerning himself with the cases "where there was, in the 
old legal phraseology, la cry made for weapons to keep the peace’, and ... 
where the soldiers of the regular army have fired upon civilians with or
(28) (1938) Irish Reports 382,
without orders," di Hannalproceeded to state clearly the law on the
subject of involving the loss of civilian life at the hands of the armed
forces of the State. According to him, the defendants must be regarded
as part of the Armed Forces of the State, though their recruiting,
control, discipline and training were very different from those of the
members of the regular Forces. As such they "fall, just like the members
of the regular Amy, under all the duties and liabilities of an ordinary
citizen in the use of arms, nor are they exempt from the ordinary
(29)
process of law." He referred to some authorities dealing with the
(30)
limitations upon the right to fire upon an unlawful assembly and came
(29) Ibid, at p.401.
(30) J', Hannafquoted the following relevant portions from the Report
of the Special Commission (consisting of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, 
Lord Chief Justice Molony and Mr. Andrews, formerly the Right 
Honourable Mr. Justice Andrews) upon the Bachelor’s Walk Shooting: 
"Para 35** The military should only, and legally can only, be 
convened to interfere with, quell, or disperse an unlawful assembly 
if that assembly is unlawful in the sense that it has committed,
or threatens to commit, serious and violent crime: as, for instance, 
setting fire to, or destruction of, buildings or property, killing 
or maiming or seriously injuring persons ... In such cases the 
public peace may demand that such conduct should be stopped or such 
depredations or violence be prevented.
Para 37: The military cannot be brought in whenever it can be said 
that there is a gathering of persons whose object is illicit.
The unlawfulness must be something akin to riot, violent distur­
bance, or crime, or resistance to the execution of the law, to 
avert which military aid is sought as a last and imperative resort. 
It is to such an unlawful assembly that the law applies.
Para 38: Even in the extreme class of cases there is still room 
for the exercise of a wise, scrupulously careful, and a forbearing 
exercise of discretion. The use of firearms, instead of composing 
a crowd, does much to inflame the passions of the crowd and, instead 
of quelling the riot, may do much to disturb the King’s peace. And 
unfortunately the passions are not confined to one side, and the 
armed forces may yield to impulses, and commit indiscretions which 
lead to lamentable results."
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to the conclusion that the armed forces could fire upon a riotous 
assembly only where such a course was necessary as a last resofct to 
preserve life. He traced the principle of repplling force by force to 
the common law which established the proposition that 1 it is lawful to 
use only a reasonable degree of force for the protection of oneself or 
any other person against the unlawful use of force, and that such 
repelling force is not reasonable if it is either greater than is requisite 
for the purpose or disproportionate to the evil to be prevented."
Hannal(did not stop by merely determining the civil liability
of the defendants and awarding a damages of £300, but directed for a
jury trial in which their criminal liability may be determined. In
drawing the attention of the Attorney-General to the necessity of such
an investigation ,1. HarmaXsaid; "This investigation of the criminal
liability is all the more necessary as the three defendants belonged to
the Armed Forces of the State and there cannot be one rule for them,
when their acts result in the death of a citizen, and another in the
case of a motor driver who causes a death and has to stand his trial
(31)
before a jury."
On an appeal by the defendants to the Supreme Court of Ireland, 
Meredithldefined the character of the situation which justified 
recourse to arms, According to him the matter was "merely one of for­
bearance and restraint and the preservation of a due proportion between 
the means adopted and the end to be attained." If calm judgment was
(31) Ibid, at pp.407-6.
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impossible due to the excitement created by the emergency and the need 
to frustrate at all costs the pursuit of an object which sought to 
overpower the forces of the State was apparently most urgent, allowances 
must be made for the quality of the decision of the officer entrusted 
with the life and property of the citizens. As it is only a matter of 
opinion whether immediate action was necessary, such opinion must be 
based on the proper assessment of the situation. Thus J'. HeredithTsaid:
"If the opinion that led to action was occasioned by an actual 
development in the situation, if it was reasonable under all the circum­
stances and afforded a sufficient ground, then the action was justified 
as a practical necessity, even though a Court of law, calmly deliberating 
on the development of the entire situation as disclosed by the evidence
of witnesses from all quarters of the scene, might feel bound to hold
(32)
that objectively the use of firearms was unnecessary and premature."
(e) Conflict between the duties: the Protection of subordinates 
acting by orders of superiors
The dilemma which confronts a soldier in suppressing riot or disorder
in time of peace is a peculiar one. As Dicey observed, "he may be liable
to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, and to be hanged
(33)
by a judge and jury if he obeys it." This is an awkward position.
(32) Ibid, at p.422.
(33) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, Tenth ed., at p.303 
(1959)- Similarly Stephen said: "By the ordinary principles of 
the common law they are, speaking generally, justified only in 
using such force as is reasonably necessary for the suppression 
of a riot. By the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War they are 
bound to execute any lawful order which they may receive from 
their military superior, and an order to fire upon a mob is lawful
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(34)
There has been as yet no clear-cut decision on this important problem*
In cases of doubt “probably upon such an argument it would be found 
that the order of a military superior would justify his inferiors in 
executing any orders for giving which they might fairly suppose their
(35)
superior officer to have good reasons."
if such an act is reasonably necessary. An order* to do more than 
might be reasonably necessary for the dispersion of rioters would 
not be a lawful order* The hardship upon soldiers is, that if a 
soldier kills a man in obedience to his officer's orders, the 
question whether what was done was more than was reasonably 
necessary has to be decided by a jury, probably upon a trial for 
murder; whereas, if he disobeys his officer's orders to fire 
because he regards them as unlawful, the question whether they 
were unlawful as having commanded something not reasonably necessary 
would have to be decided by a court-martial upon the trial of the 
soldier for disobeying orders, and for obvious reasons the jury 
and the court-martial are likely to take different views as to the 
reasonable necessity and therefore as to the lawfulness of such an 
order*" Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, Hjstoiy of Criminal haw in 
England♦ Vol. I, p.204 (1883). Also recently, the same views were 
expressed; "The defence of obedience to the orders of a superior 
is not accepted by the civil courts. On the other hand, if a 
soldier disobeys an order on the ground that it is unlawful, a 
court martial may hold that it was lawful." Wade and Phillips, 
Constitutional Law. Fifth ed., at p.420-21 (1955)-
(34) ,rI do not think, however, that the question how far superior
orders would justify soldiers or sailors in making an attack upon 
civilians has ever been brought before the courts of law in such 
a manner as to be fully considered and determined." Sir James 
Fits-James Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England. Vol. I, 
at p.205 (1883).
(35) Ibid, at p*205.
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Forsyth has attempted to answer some of the questions as to the 
duty of soldiers in such cases as we have considered as follows:
(1) What is the law with regard to a soldier firing upon a crowd 
and causing death?
"There can be no doubt that if the occasion justifies the command
to fire, he is bound to obey it, and is not liable for the consequences.
To disobey it would subject him to severe punishment, perhaps death, by 
(36)
court-martial.u
(2) What is the course open for a soldier when the occasion does 
not justify the command - in other words, the order to fire is improperly 
given?
"A soldier is here placed in a most difficult dilemma. On the 
one hand, it is his military duty to obey the orders of his commanding 
officer; on the other, he has by becoming a soldier not ceased to be a 
citizen, and is subject to the duties of a civilian. It is clear that 
he would not be justified in obeying every command of his superior; as 
for instance - to put an extreme case - supposing he were ordered to fire 
upon the Sovereign, or to desert to the eneny, or to commit a rape.
There he must instantly recognise the form of a paramount obligation,
(37)
and see that disobedience is a duty."
(3) What is his position when the command, though illegal injbhe 
eye of law, is not obviously so?
(36) William Forsyth, Gases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, at 
p.215 (1669).
(37) Ibid, at p.215.
"In such a case he surely ought to be held harmless for obeying 
(36)
it."
(4) What is his duty when he conscientiously believes the order to 
be illegal, but in fact it is not so?
"If he disobeys it, he would be tried and punished by a court-
martial, and properly so; for it would be dangerous to allow a soldier
to shelter himself against the charge of disobedience on the plea that
he mistakenly believed the order of his commanding officer to be
(39)
contraiy to law."
(5) Will he be liable if he disobeys an order which is illegal
but not obviously so, as in the case of a command to fire where there is
a riot, but not such violence as to justify the use of military weapons?
"Here he would only have done that which as a citizen he was bound
(40)
to do, namely to abstain from murder."
(6) Would he have committed an offence against the Articles of 
War which provide that any officer or soldier who shall disobey the 
lawful command of his superior officer, suffer death, or such other 
punishment as by a general court-martial shall be awarded; and if a 
soldier, shall suffer death, transportation (now penal servitude) or 
such other punishment as by a general court-martial shall be awarded?
(36) Ibid, at p.215. 
(39) Ibid, at p.21$.
(40) Ibid, at p.213.
168.
"A court-martial could not find him guilty of disobedience if the 
command was not lawful. Perhaps, upon the whole, the right conclusion 
is this: a soldier may disobey an unlawful command, but he is justified 
in obeying all orders of his commanding officer, unless they are 
obviously, and in a manner patent to common sense illegal. The habit 
of discipline and obedience in a soldier is, I believe, more essential 
to thw well-being of the State, than the possibility of his now and then
(41)
executing an illegal order is injurious to it."
How do the soldiers know xdiether the orders of their officer are
legal or not? One could only suppose that this was possible by applying 
ordinary common sense. As Justice Stephen has said: "Soldiers might 
reasonably think that their officer had good grounds for ordering them 
to fire into a disorderly crowd which to them might not appear to be 
at that moment engaged in acts of dangerous violence, but soldiers 
could hardly suppose that their off! cer could have any good grounds
for ordering them to fire down a crowded street when no disturbance of
(42)
any kind was either in progress or apprehended." Even from the 
standpoint of aniy discipline, obedience to the orders of the superior 
officer should not in eveiy circumstance be considered essential.
"The doctrine that a soldier is bound under all circumstances whatever 
to obey his superior officer would be fatal to military discipline 
itself, for it would justify the private in shooting the colonel by
(ill) Ibid, at p.215.
(42) Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, History of the 
Vol. I, p.205 (1883)*
169.
the orders of the captain, or in deserting to the eneny on the field of
(43)
battle on the order of his immediate superior.” Further, in the opinion
of Justice Stephen, "it is not less monstrous to suppose that superior
orders ■would justify a soldier in the massacre of unoffending civilians
in time of peace, or in the exercise of inhuman cruelties, such as the
(44)
slaughter of women and children during a rebellion.” In all cases of 
conflict, reasonableness would seem to be the best standard in deter­
mining a soldier’s course of action. "The only line that presents 
itself to iry mind is that a soldier should be protected by orders for
(45)
which he might reasonably believe his officer to have good grounds."
Some English judges experienced the same difficulty in determining
how far the orders of a superior officer were a justification. Thus, in
(46)
Keighley v. Bell, which held that, if the order was not apparently 
illegal, the soldier who obeyed it was not criminally liable, /. Willes J. 
said:
"Were I compelled to determine that question, I should probably 
hold that the orders are an absolute justification in time of actual
(43) Ibid, at p.205.
(44) Ibid, at pp.205~6.
(45) Ibid, at p,206. "Although a soldier remains subject to the
common law duties of the ordinary citizen, the fact that he is a 
soldier influences the attitude of the courts towards certain 
acts of his which bring him within the civil jurisdiction. They 
take account of his duties as a soldier to this extent, that 
they will not hold him liable for an act done in obedience to an 
order given by his militaiy superior and not manifestly illegal 
at the time it was given. It would not, however, necessarily 
relieve him of civil responsibility." Iveir and Lawson, Cases in 
Constitutional Law, at p.3&9 (1954)*
(46) (1B665 4F. 8F. 763: 176 English Reports 7&L
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war - at all events as regards enemies or foreigners - and, I should
think, even with regard to English-born subjects of the Grown, unless
the orders were such as could not legally be given. I believe that the
better opinion is that an officer or soldier, acting under the orders
of his superior, not being necessarily illegal, would be justified by
(47) 
his orders."
But where such orders were manifestly illegal the judges did not
hesitate to declare that the soldiers were liable.
(40)
In R. v. Thomas the prisoner, a sentinel on board H.M.S. AcboJle,
had been told to keep off all boats unless they carried officers in
uniform or were allowed by the officer on deck to approach. One of the
boats which did not come within the above description came close to
the ship. The man inside the boat was warned but, on his persistent
advance, was fired at and killed. The jury found the prisoner not
guilty, as he fired under the mistaken impression that it was his duty,
but the judges were unanimous that it was murder. The act was not
necessary for the preservation of the ship.
(49)
R. v. Maxwelll, a case decided by the High Court of Justice in 
Scotland, lays down that a mistaken impression of duty will, not excuse 
an officer if he, without being justified by other circumstances, orders 
his men to fire, and someone is thereby killed. A French prisoner of war
(47) Ibid. According to Professor Hood Phillips "if modified to the
extent that the soldier1 s belief in the lawfulness of the order must
be reasonable, Z* Willesls opinion would probably be accepted by 
the legal Profession." The Constitutional Law of Great Britain and 
the Commonwealth. 2nd ed., at p.302 (1957)*
(43) Russell on Crimes, 3th ed., p.774 (1315).
(49) (1309) Buch., Part II, p.3*
was killed when the accused improperly ordered a sentinel to fire into 
the room where he and other prisoners were confined. At the time of 
firing there was no symptom of disorder in the prison. The general 
instructions which regulated the conduct of troops guarding the prison 
did not contain ary such order as empowered the accused Maxwell to act 
in this manner. The Lord Justice Clerk held that Ensign Maxwell "could 
only defend himself by proving specific orders, which he was bound to 
obey without discretion, and which called upon him to do what he did."
The jury found him guilty of the minor offence of culpable homicide 
with a recommendation to mercy. He was sentenced to nine months' 
imprisonment.
(50)
In B. v. Smith, a case arising in South Africa, J'l SolomonTrefused
to adopt as a rule either of the two following propositions:
"A soldier is responsible by military and civil law, and it is
monstrous to suppose that a soldier would be protected where the order
is grossly illegal. The Court cannot therefore decide that a soldier
is bound to obey any order that may be given him. Then there is the
second proposition: that a soldier is only bound to obey lawful orders
and is responsible if he obeys an order not strictly legal. That is an
(51)
extreme proposition which the Court cannot accept for its guidance."
War broke out in November 1399 and the enemy entered Cape Colony. 
Martial law was proclaimed in the district of Colesburg where the
(50) (1900) 17 Cape of Good Hope Report 5&1. This case was heard before 
the Special Court established by Act 6 of 1900. The constitution of 
the Court was Mr. Justice Solomon, (President) Mr. Justice Lange and 
Mir. A. F. S. Maasdrop. There was no jury.
(51) Ibid, at p.567.
alleged murder took place. A patrol consisting of thirteen men proceeded 
on a dangerous expedition and on reaching a farm, they stopped for a 
short rest. When it appeared that one bridle was missing, the deceased 
was asked by the Captain to fetch the bridle. As he delayed in getting 
it, the prisoner shot and killed him on the orders of the Captain.
The Court did not find whether the Captain's order was in fact 
legal but held that the prisoner was bound to obey it "as long as the 
orders of the superior are not obviously and decidedly in opposition to
the law of the land, or to the well-known established customs of the
(52)
aimy."
The difficulty in which the soldier is placed is inherent. Justice 
Stephen said; "The inconvenience of being subject to two jurisdictions, 
the sympathies of which are not unlikely to be opposed to each other, is 
an inevitable consequence of the double necessity of preserving on the
one hand the supremacy of the law and on the other the discipline of the
(53)
army,"
4. Legislative Indemnity
On the determination of a period of disturbance such as rebellion 
or invasion, it is usual for Parliament to pass Acts of Indemnity for
(52) Ibid, at p,567*
(53) Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of 
England, Vol. I, at p .206 (1883). "It is probably better to 
leave the soldier in a position of difficulty than to place him 
outside the ordinary law." Wade and Phillips, Constitutional 
Law, Fifth ed,, at p.421 (1955)* .
the protection of officials for their acts during the disturbance. "It 
is customary for Parliament to pass Acts of Indemnity after the occasion 
is over, perhaps because the existence of the prerogative is doubtful, 
and certainly because it is necessary to protect persons who have acted 
bona fide in a time of war or insurrection. Such Acts usually substitute 
a right to compensation from the public funds. They are not generally so 
drawn as to protect persons who have acted mala fide and without due
(54)
regard to humanity.'1 They are "the best-known examples of ex post facto
(55)
legislation."
(56)
In Phillips v. Eyre WillesJ.enumerated the occasions when from 
the fourteenth century onwards the British Parliament passed Acts 
"indemnifying those who took arms to maintain the authority of the 
Crown, and of putting an end to occasions of discord, even by way of 
general Act of oblivion, prohibiting civil suits and criminal prosecutions 
in respect of acts done in the course of a rebellion." He then cited 
various instances when the Dominion and colonial legislatures passed 
such enactments. The gist of the matter in the English Acts seemed to 
be that it was "reasonable that acts done for the public service, though 
not justifiable by the strict forms of law, should be justified by
(57)
Act of Parliament."
Enunciating the principle of Acts of Indemnity <?. WillesT.said
(54) Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. Ill, 3rd ed., at p.261-2.
(55) Sir C. K. Allen, Law and Orders, at p.46 (1956).
(56) (1870) 6 Q.B.l,
(57) Ibid, at p.17.
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that its aim was to provide "indemnity for what was done in zeal for
(58)
the public service, and a politic oblivion of the past." Earlier, he 
narrated the difficulty a Governor might have to face in stamping out a 
rebellion, if the moment all trouble was over he and those who acted 
under his orders were exposed to harassing and ruinous litigation.
In the opinion of WillesJ.it seems that, under these and like circum­
stances, the legislature is competent to authorise "by antecedent 
legislation the acts done as necessary or proper for preserving the 
public peace, upon a due consideration of the circumstances, to adopt 
and ratify like acts when done, or in the language of the law under
consideration to enact that they shall be !made and declared lawful 
(59)
and confirmed1.1
Acts of Indemnity are, therefore, ex post facto ratification or
recognition of acts as lawful which, but for such Acts, would have been
unlawful. Thus, Dicey defines them as "retrospective statutes which free
persons who have broken the law from responsibility for its breach, and
(60)
thus make lawful acts which when they were committed were unlawful."
One might ask whether Acts which attempt to legalise unlawful acts 
can be within the competence of the legislature and whether their legality 
can be assailed in a court of law. So fax* as English law is concerned, 
according to both practice and principle, they are certainly legal and 
no court of law would pronounce them as illegal or unconstitutional.
(58) Ibid, at p.18.
(59) Ibid, at p.17*
(60) A. ¥. Dicey, The haw of the Constitution, Tenth ed., at p.233 
(1959).
Being enacted by Parliament, which can make or unmake any law, they
(61)
exist as "the supreme instance of Parliamentary sovereignty." The
Indian constitution specifically states that, notwithstanding the
constitutional ban 011 legislation infringing fundamental rights,
Parliament may indemnify any person in respect of any act done in
connection with maintenance or restoration of order in a martial law
(62)
area and validate any penalty inflicted under martial law.
(b) Distinction between an Act of Indemnity and the Proclamation of 
Martial Law
There is a distinction between an Act of Indemnity and the proclama­
tion of martial law, the establishment of a state of siege, or any other 
proceeding "by which the executive government at its own will suspends
(63)
the law of the land," For, as has been asserted by Dicey, an Act of 
Indemnity, "though it is the legalisation of illegality, is itself a
(64)
law." An Act of Indemnity would certainly be an exercise of arbitrary
sovereign power, except where the legal sovereign was a representative
assembly, because, in such a case "even acts of State assume the form
of regular legislation, and this fact of itself maintains in no small
(65)
degree the real no less than the apparent supremacy of law."
While the declaration of martial law is an executive act, an Act 
of Indemnity is a legislative measure following upon the aftermath of
(61) Ibid, at p.232.
(62) Art. 34, Indian Constitution.
(63) Ibid, at p.237.
(64) Ibid, at p.237*
(65) Ibid, at p.237*
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the rebellion and rule by martial law. The fact that an Act of Indemnity
legalises illegal acts may be advanced in support of the view that the
c* y.
exercise of martial law is illegal in itself. As 0. Z. Cockburn said: 
’These instances of the application of martial law were, therefore, 
either under statutory powers, with which no man has, judicially 
speaking, a right to quarrel, or when exercised by virtue of the pre­
rogative of the Grown, were followed by Acts of Indemnity which, to say
the least of it, sufficiently implies a doubt of the legality of the
(66)
exercise of the power.” A different view of the nature of such Acts
ms, however, taken by Sir Frederick Pollock. He described an Act of
(67)
Indemnity as ”a measure of prudence and grace.” According to him, its
purpose was not to justify unlawful acts ex post facto, ’’but to quiet
doubts, to prevent vexatious and fruitless litigation, and quite possibly,
to provide compensation for innocent persons in respect of damage
inevitably caused by justifiable acts which would not have supported a 
(68)
legal claim.” Further, as some extraordinary measures were justifiable
at common law in time of grave disturbance or war and ”it has never been
decided exactly how far the justification extends and there is in fact
great difference of opinion, it is obviously proper for an Act of
(69)
Indemnity to be framed in language of abundant caution.”
(66) R. v. Nelson and Brand. Special Report, at p .%  (1867).
(67) Sir F. Pollock, What is Martial Law? 18 L.Q.R. at lf>7-
(68) Ibid.
(69) Sir F. Pollock, 19 L.Q.R. at p.231.
(c) The Desirability of Acts of Indemnity
Generally laws mast be prospective and not retrospective but, as
«3f. WillesJ.said, there may be circumstances when retrospective laws, such
as Acts of Indemnity 1 cannot be pronounced naturally or necessarily
(70)
unjust.” He further said:
"There may be occasions and circumstances involving the safety of
the State, or even the conduct of individual subjects, the justice of
which prospective laws made for ordinary occasions and the usual
exigencies of society for want of provision fail to meet, and in which the
execution of the law as it stood at the time may involve practical public
(71)
inconvenience and wrong, summum jus summa injuria.1 The question whether
the circumstances of the particular case would call for a special and
exceptional remedy must, as it involves matters of policy and discretion,
in each case be decided by Parliament "which would have had jurisdiction
to deal with the subject-matter by preliminary legislation, and as to
which a Court of ordinary municipal law is not commissioned to inquire
(72)
or adjudicate.1
As to the desirability of having an Act of Indemnity passed for the 
protection of those who acted under some stress of urgency and necessity, 
Sir David Dundas expressed the following opinion before the Ceylon 
Committee:
"5430. The Governor of a colony, representing the Crown, can 
exercise the self-same power as the Crown itself, if the urgency and
(70) Phillips v. gyre (1870) 6 Q.B.l. at p.27.
(71) Ibid, at p.27.
(72) Ibid, at p.27-
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necessity of the case justify it? ~ I think so.
"5461. And I presume parties so acting would, in the event of 
their having to defend their conduct, have entirely to rely upon the 
necessity and urgency of the occasion which called for the proclamation 
of Martial Law? - I do not admit the word ‘proclamation. ’ They would 
have to justify themselves by the law under which they acted being 
Martial Lawn lA/hether the authorities who set it going had a right to 
do so, is another question.
"5462. Miich question the Constitution provides a power of by 
settling an Act of Indemnity? - An Act of Indemnity is, of course, a 
prudent measure at all times. Whenever you overstep the law, I recommend 
you to obtain an Act of Indemnity, if you can get one; but I am not sure 
that an Act of Indemnity is necessary. I think it would be wise fora 
Governor who has proclaimed and executed Martial Law, to have the sanction 
of his Sovereign for his act, and it would be prudent for all persons who 
have acted under such a law to have an Act of Indemnity. It is a short 
answer to any person who asks you questions about your conduct during the
(73)
time Martial Law existed."
(d) The Aim and Purpose of an Act of Indemnity
The military authorities and the officers acting under a proclamation 
of martial law must not take it for granted that they can seek shelter
(73) Quoted by Clode in his Military Forces of the Crown, Vol. II, at 
pp.176-9 (1669).
under an Act of Indemnity, subsequently passed, fox' every unlawful act
committed by them during the rebellion or disturbance. They must not
suppose that Parliament will afterwards afford them statutory indemnity
in all cases and as a mattes' of course. As (3. Z . Cockburn said*.
"To my mind, the exercise of martial law cannot be put on a worse
or more objectionable footing. No man ought to be placed in the position
of being called upon knowingly and intentionally to violate the law, more
especially where the lives of his fellow-subjects are concei'ned nor on
any sound principle ought he to be protected if he does so. The only
legitimate purpose of an Indemnity Act is to protect a man who, placed
in trying circumstances and called upon to exercise a doubtful and ill-
defined power, has gone, as is very likely to happen in such a case, in
ignorance or haste, but not intentionally, beyond the limits of the
(74)
law."
Whatever may be the scope of an Act of Indemnity, its chief aim
and purpose is to limit the liability of the officers who took action to
restore peace and order. During a state of rebellion, when nartial law
has been proclaimed, the court will, stay its hands in restraining the
military arm but, as has been said, "when an emergency is over, however,
the courts tend to resume their normal strict interpretation of statutes
(75)
in favour of the individual." It follows, therefore, that, unless the
(74) H. v. Nelson and Brand. Special Report, at p.74*
(75) 0. Hood Phillips, The Principles of ISnglish Law and the Constitution, 
at p.340 (1939).
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defendant can justify his action as far as it is allowable by the 
subsequent Act of Indemnity, he will incur liability for the excesses 
beyond the scope of the Act. As General (afterwards Lord) Hutchinson 
remarked: "The principle of a Bill of indemnity he conceived to be an 
exception of certain cases, from the operation of the general law, and 
as such it became necessary for every person claiming the benefit of
(76(
the indemnity to show that he came within the meaning of the exception."
(77)
In Phillips v. Eyre, an action brought by the plaintiff for assault 
and fa3.se imprisonment in the island of Jamaica, Cockburn C, J. made 
some concession to the vehement argument of the plaintiff's counsel 
against the Acts of Indemnity which were passed after every insurrection#
He said:
"There can be no doubt that every so-called Indemnity Act involves
a manifest violation of justice, inasmuch as it deprives those who have
suffered wrongs of their vested right to the redress which the law would
otherwise afford them, and gives immunity to those who have inflicted
those wrongs, not at the expense of the community for whose alleged
advantage the wrongful acts were done, but at the expense of individuals
who, innocent possibly of all offence, have been subjected to injury and
(78)
outrage often of the most aggravated character.''
(76) His remarks during a debate in the Irish House of Commons on the 
petition of Mr# Fitzgerald praying indemnity for certain acts done 
by him in siippressing the Irish Rebellion of 1798, Wright v. 
Fitzgerald (1798) 27 St# Trials, at p#806#
(77) TT869TOhA Q.B.225.
(78) Ibid, at p.242.
C.j.
0. Cockburn fully agreed that "such legislation may be used
to cover acts of the most tyrannical, arbitrary, and merciless character -
acts not capable of being justified or palliated even by the plea of
(79)
necessity, but prompted by local passions, prejudices or fears."
He, however, maintained that no such enactment would receive the royal 
assent unless it were confined to acts honestly done in the suppression 
of existing rebellion, and under the pressure of the most urgent 
necessity.
Martial Law undoubtedly gives immense powers in the hands of 
persons in authority during a grave and serious disturbance and the 
object of a retrospective Indemnity Act to protect them for any inter­
ference with the personal liberty or property of the subject which was 
reasonably necessaxy and done in good faith. Nevertheless, the fact 
that persons exercising such unlimited powers have to look to Parliament 
for approval of, and exemption from, all liability for their acts, shows 
the existence of the Rule of Law.
5, A Few Instances of Acts of Indemnity: Their Contents
In England an early instance of an Act of Indemnity is provided by
one passed after Wat pier's Rebellion, entitled "The King’s Pardon to
(SO)
those that repressed or took revenge of his rebels." After reciting 
how the lords and gentlemen of the realm of England "made divers
(79) Ibid, at p.243.
(SO) 5 Ric. Z,c.3* The first Act of Indemnity was passed as early as 
1 Edw. 3.C.I.
punishments upon the said villains and other traitors without due process
of the law, and otherwise than the laws and usages of the realm required,
although they did it of no malice prepense, but only to appease and cease
the apparent mischief," it enacted that "they shall never be impeached nor
grieved in body, goods, nor their heritages and possessions, by any way
by Our Sovereign Lord the King, his heirs or ministers, nor none other in
time to come, but utterly shall be thereof quit for ever by this grant
(81)
and statute without having thereof other special charter or pardon."
Of the many Acts passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, it is 
only proposed to refer to one and, before doing so, the circumstances 
under which it was passed must be explained. In England, during the two
(32)
World Wars, martial law was not declared, but Parliament invested the 
executive with wide statutory powers to deal at discretion with a person !s 
property or liberty, if the conduct and prosecution of the war demanded 
such interference. We shall in due course examine some of the provisions 
of these Acts, but here it will be sufficient to say that these enactments, 
especially the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, excluded any form of 
judicial review of the acts of the executive.
But as the possibility of the executive exceeding the statutory 
powers so granted could not be excluded, an Indemnity Act was passed in
(81) Ibid.
(82) According to Professor Hood Phillips England was put under martial 
law during the First 'World. War. The Constitutional Law of Great 
Britain and the Commonwealth. Fifth ed., at p.550(T^7).
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1920 which relieved servants of the Crown, from being sued for damages 
for illegal acts committed by them. For acts done in good faith and in 
the public interest, Section X (1) of the Indemnity Act, 1920, provided 
as follows:
"No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever whether civil or
criminal shall be instituted in any court of law for or on account of or
in respect of any act, matter or thing done, whether within or without
His Majesty's dominions, during the war before the passing of this Act,
if done in good faith, and done or purported to be done in the execution
of his duty or for the defence of the realm or the public safety, or for
the enforcement of discipline, or otherwise in the public interest, by
a person holding office under or employed in the service of the Crown in
any capacity, whether naval, military, air force or civil, or by any
other person acting under the authority of a person so holding office or
so employed; and if any such proceeding has been instituted whether before
or after the passing of this Act, it shall be discharged and made void.1'
It is necessary to remember the distinction between acts done in
good faith and acts actually necessary to suppress rebellion or repel
invasion. Thus, when, on the passing of an Act of Indemnity in 1836 by
the Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope, it was submitted to
(©)
the Colonial Office for confirmation, certain amendments were suggested
(83) The provisions of the Act were as fo3-lows: "The said Governor, and 
also all persons acting under his order, direction, and authority, 
shall be, and they are jointly and severally hereby indemnified, 
freed, and discharged from and against all actions, suits, prosecu­
tions, and penalties whatsoever, for or on account or in respect of 
all or any acts, matters, and things whatsoever done, ordered, 
directed or authorised by the said Governor, or by any person or
184.
by Lord. Glenelg. According to him the concluding words of the Act did 
not properly express the meaning intended by the local Legislature. He
said: "Those words indemnify all persons for all acts done by them bona
fide, in furtherance or in execution of the objects for which Martial 
Law was proclaimed; but many acts of wanton and unnecessary rigour, or 
even of injustice and cruelty, may possibly have been done bona fide, in
(34)
furtherance of those objects." He, therefore, suggested that the 
appropriate phrase was "all acts necessarily or properly done."
If we regard the sanctity of the fundamental rights of the 
citizens, the above proposition lays down a sound principle. Otherwise, 
there would be no limit to the extent of the repressive measures of the 
military to which they count on being indemnified. The acts must be 
reasonably necessary and proper for the purpose of the suppression of 
the rebellion. This aspect of the matter was stressed in a despatch of 
19th June, 1866, whose object was to exonerate the Governor of Jamaica
persons acting under his order, direction, and authority, and 
within the said places or any of them, during the existence 
therein of such Martial Law as aforesaid: So only, and provided, 
that such acts, matters, and things shall have been done, ordered, 
directed, or authorised bona fide, in furtherance and in the 
execution of the objects for which Martial Law was proclaimed as 
aforesaid." Glode, Military Forces of the Crown, Vol. II, at 
p.504 (1869). Lord Glenelg was not satisfied of the propriety 
of enacting such an Act in favour of the Governor himself, as this 
would necessarily imply that His Majesty's representative was 
amenable to the civil and military tribunals of the Colony.
(84) Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, Vol. II, at 505 (1869) ♦
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and all other officers for any act done reasonably and in good faith.
After the rebellion there in 1865 was suppressed a local Act of Indemnity
(35)
was passed. However, the despatch proceeded as follows:
"Her Majesty's Government have been advised by the Law Officers of 
the Crown that the effect of the Indemnity Act will not be to cover acts 
done either by the Governor or by subordinate officers, unless they are 
such as (in the case of the Governor) he may have reasonably and in good 
faith considered to be proper for the purpose of putting an end to the 
insurrection, or such as (in the case of subordinates) have been done under 
and in such conformity with the orders of superior authority or (if done 
without such orders) have been done in good faith and under a belief, 
reasonably entertained, that they were proper for the suppression of the
(86)
insur recti on, and for the preservation of the public peace in the island."
(85) Some of the provisions of the Act relevant for our purpose were:
"That all personal actions, indictments, and proceedings present 
or future, whatsoever, against such authorities, or officers, civil, 
military or naval, or other persons acting ... for or by reason of 
any matter or thing commanded, ordered, directed, or done since the 
promulgation of Martial Law aforesaid, whether done in any district 
in which Martial Law was proclaimed, or in any district in which 
Martial Law was not proclaimed, in furtherance of Martial Law ... 
and during the continuance of such martial law, in order to suppress 
the said insurrection and rebellion, and for the preservation of the 
public peace throughout the island, shall be discharged and made 
void; and that every person by whom such act, matter, or thing, shall 
have been advised, commanded, ordered, directed, or done for the 
purposes aforesaid ... shall be freed, acquitted, discharged and 
Indemnified as well against the Queen's most Gracious Majesty, her 
heirs and successors etc.
"That his Excellency Edward John Eyre, Esq. ... and all officers and 
other persons who have acted under his authority, or have acted 
bona fide for the purposes and during the time aforesaid, whether --1--- — J_ X. M  r
such acts were done in any district in which Martial Law was proclaimed, 
or in any district in which Martial Law was not proclaimed, are hereby 
indemnified in respect of all acts, matters and things done in order to 
put an end to the said rebellion; and all such acts so done are hereby 
made and declared to be lawful and are confirmed," Clode, Military 
Forces of the Crpwn. Vol. II, at p.494 (1869). (86)lbid, at p.496.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
1. Judicial Sanction behind the Use of Foroe
It is assumed that peace and order are normal features of a 
well-governed State, hut occasionally situations may develop when 
normal conditions no longer exist. Those to whom the preservation of 
the peace is of the highest consequence are confronted with la special 
and extreme aspect of administrative action.1 What can they do?
Short of abdicating the role assigned to them, they can resort to the
only alternative still remaining open to them, to repel force by
force. Our object will be to record judicial opinions as to when and 
how much force can legally be applied when there is such extraordinary 
commotion as to render every attempt to maintain peace a failure and
the civil authority powerless. Besides "proclamation of martial law"
with which Commonwealth lawyers are acquainted in this context, there
is another expression, "declaration of a state of war," very much used
in America, both meaning much the same thing. Irish judges have also 
used the latter expression. To avoid confusion, it will be useful to
(i)
treat them as synonyms. On the existence of the condition of affairs
(l) In the words of Mr. Stuart Wortley in the House of Commons 
Committee on the Ceylon revolt in 1849 uthe proclamation of
martial law is the declaration of a state of war." - G. G.
Phillimore, Martial law in Rebellion, J.S.C.L., April 1900, 
at p.129.
which require recourse to the military forces of the State, the 
practice in the Commonwealth has been to proclaim martial law in the 
affected area but in America it has not been uniform. Confronted with 
such a necessity, the government has sometimes declared "a state of 
war" and on other occasions proclaimed martial law, the effect being 
the same.
The popular inference, based no doubt on past experience, that
any extraordinary regime must be preceded by a declaration of martial
law or a state of war has no legal support, though "the intention to
exercise such exceptional power and to take such exceptional measures
(2)
is generally announced by a 'proclamation of martial law.’" When the 
government has to suppress a rebellion or repel a foreign invasion, it 
is quite immaterial whether martial law or a state of war has been 
declared. "The right to administer force against force in actual war 
does not depend upon the proclamation of martial law. It depends upon 
the question whether there is war or not. If there is war, there is
(3)
the right to repel force by force." The right in law to resort to 
force arises from the existence of conditions of war or similar con­
ditions. The assumption of arbitrary powers and their application 
in cases of necessity do not derive sanction from a proclamation of
(2) British Manual of Military Law (1956) Part I, Section 1, at p.6.
(3) Per Lord Halsbury in Tilohko v. Attorney-General of Hatal (1907) 
(1907) A.C. 93 at p.94.
martial law. "The notion that martial law exists by reason of the 
proclamation - an expression which the learned Counsel has more than
(4)
once used - is an entire delusion." It must not also be supposed that
such proclamation confers any new powers on the authorities which they
did not possess before. "The proclamation in no way adds to the powers
(5)
inherent in the government of using force to suppress disorder."
The proclamation of martial law is merely an indication of the mind of
the executive and the views they have taken of certain occurrences and
condition of affairs prevailing in the part or whole of the country.
As Sir Frederick Pollock said: "Proclamation of martial law does show
that the responsible executive officers of the king thought a state of
war existed, and may be strong evidence, though subject to be rebutted,
(6)
that a state of war did exist." It only serves as a notice to the
inhabitants of the disturbed area that some extraordinary measures are
(7)
to be enforced in relation to certain activities. The proclamation
does not create the fact of war in the locality or the country. "The
proclamation must be regarded as the statement of an existing fact
(8)
rather than the legal creation of that fact."
(4) Ibid.
(5) Sir William Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered 
(1902) 18 Law Quar. Rev. at p.129*
(6) Sir Frederick Pollock, What is Martial Law? (1902) 18 L.Q.R. at
p.153.
(7) Joint Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals Sir John 
Campbell and Sir R. M. Rolfe on the power of the Governor of the 
Lower Canada to proclaim martial law (1838).
(8) Caleb Cushing, Attorney-General of the U.S.A., VIII Opinions of
the Attomey-Generals at p.374 (1857)-
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That the right to recourse to the military forces arises from
necessity has "been admitted on all hands, hut what kind of necessity
invests the military authority with such unregulated discretion has
of&en been the subject of inquiry before the courts. The review of
cases will show that the ”hands-off” order to the judiciary, whether
it is express or implied, will only be justified by overriding necessity,
a pressing and imminent danger, which threatens the very existence of
lawful authority. If this is not so, martial law cannot be applied.
”It is the emergency that ■ ito gives the right, and the emergency
(io)
must be shown before the taking can be justified*1’ It is true that 
every case must be determined according to its own circumstances, but 
in order that the armed forces can exercise any extraordinary powers 
not granted them by the constitution and the ordinary law ’’the danger 
must be present or impending, and the necessity such as does not admit
(11)
of delay.”
Mere subjective apprehensions as to the existence of such
necessity would not, however, justify the exercise of arbitrary powers.
It will subsequently be judged with reference to an objective standard,
for "necessity is an objective standard by which executive action can
(12)
be measured.” To determine its presence the court will take into
(9) Joint Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor G-enerals Sir John 
Campbell and Sir R. M. Rolfe. ’’The right of resorting to such an 
extremity is a right arising from a limited by necessity of the case 
guod necessitas cogit, defendit.” Ibid.
(10) Mitchell v* Harmony, 1 5(Wall)(u.S.)115 at 134 (1851)*
(11) Ibid.
(12) Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, 1949> at p.543*
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consideration the state of facts as they were at the time of talcing the 
action. There must be a reasonable relation between the steps taken and
(13)
the emergency. If such relationship does not exist, the action will
(14)
be wholly arbitrary, and could be restrained.
Can the court restrain the Executive from declaring martial law 
when such necessity would seem to be apparently non-existent? In Luther 
Borden, Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme Court said 
that the Court would not intervene as to the question whether "the 
public safety" required a declaration of martial law, such question
(15)
being political in nature. Until the emergency is declared over the
Court will not even hold that the disorders did not amount to rebellion
(16)
so as to justify the suspension of ordinary laws.
Though both judges and jurists have conceded full powers to the 
armed forces engaged in suppressing a rebellion or repelling an invasion, 
they have also recognised that any use of force is limited as well as 
justified by the nature of the emergency. Accordingly, the armed forces 
whose duty is merely to restore order or repel an enemy cannot act 
wantonly. The common belief that a declaration of martial law has a
(17)
transcending quality has to be discounted. "The idea seems to be growing
(13) Ibid.
(14) Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
(15) 5 How. 1 (1849).
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of the Military Authority 
(1915) 24 Yale Law Journal 189.
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that it is the prerogative and function of the military to substitute
itself for all civil authority, and that, while it is in control, the
(18)
constitutions, courts and laws may he suspended and set aside.” It 
must he understood hy all concerned whose aim is the public welfare 
that ”martial law, while it dispenses with the forms and delays which 
appertain to ordinary criminal jurisdiction, does not, therefore, autho­
rise or sanction every deed assumed to be done in its name. It stops far
(19)
short of that,” The exercise of powers when martial law has been 
proclaimed does not enable members of the armed forces to commit 
excesses under colour and pretence of authority. Though martial law 
allows every act necessary for maintenance and restoration of order, 
at the same time it requires that it must be honest and bona fide. On 
his failure to prove executive good faith in administering martial law, 
Governor Wall was not only prosecuted but was hanged for the crime of 
committing murder. The legislature, however, usually passes an Act of 
Indemnity which provides a good defence to those responsible for acts 
done in good faith. This kind of legislation, as already seen, does 
not cover any act motivated by malice or ill-will. In the absence, 
however, of an Act of Indemnity, persons guilty of violating civil 
rights may be civilly and criminally liable. ’’Excess and wantonness, 
cruelty and unscrupulous contempt of human life, meet with no sanction
(18) Pinlason, Repression of Riot and Rebellion, at p.168.
(19) Ibid.
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(20)
from martial law any more than from ordinary law." If it is argued
that every act, however 'unnecessary or malicious it may he, is justified
hy a proclamation of martial law, one may easily foresee the institution
of martial law degenerate into an engine of tyranny, private malice and 
(21)
revenge.
(22)
In a case arising in South Africa which involved a consideration 
of the extent of military authority, J". BristoweT.stated the position of 
the courts if the armed forces use the emergency or the declaration of 
martial law as a cloak for acts of private vengeance, personal enrich­
ment or wanton or capricious oppression thus: - " ... in such a case as
this, if it arose, so long as the military power is not used to close 
the Courts and to drive the Judges from their seats, they must exercise
(23)
their constitutional authority." Masonlconcurred with this opinion
when he said that "Courts of Justice so long as they are not closed by 
force, would be bound to entertain a prayer for protection against
(24)
patent violations of right and justice of this nature."
Accordingly, it may be assumed that if the plaintiff can 
establish that the powers were not used bona fide and for recognised 
purposes, he will be entitled to damages, at least when martial law has
(20) Per Colonial Judge in a case arising after Jamaica Insurrection 
in I865, quoted by Finlason. Ibid.
(21) Ibid.
(22) ‘Dedlow v. Minister of Defence, 1915 T.P.D. 543-
(25) Ibid, at 562.
(24) Ibid, at 557-558.
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(25)
been withdrawn. The injured person’s immediate right of action would
only be suspended because the lav/ gives him an ultimate right to redress
in such cases. "If no such ultimate right exists, the existence of
actual war would convert the military authorities into absolute and
^responsible despots, because no immediate relief could be given if
there were no legal liability which would support the ultimate right 
(26) 
to redress."
It is needless to say that, as martial law is applied in different
(27)
circumstances, the degree of force admissible must also vary with them.
On less dangerous occasions the armed forces should not only use the
sledge-hammer of martial law with due moderation, but should so long as
they are not dealing with open resistance, operate as far as possible
(28)
through the civil power.
(25) Wright v. Fitzgerald (1799)*
(26) 1915 T.P.D. at 557.
(27) "It may operate to the total suppression or overthrow of the 
civil authority, or its touch may be light, scarcely felt or 
not felt at all by the mass of the people, while the courts 
go on in their ordinary course, and the business of the 
community flows in its accustomed channels."
Bishop’s Criminal haw, quoted by J. SolomonXin Regina v.
Naude (19QI) 10 Cape Times Report at p.488.
(28) "When the regular courts are open, so that criminals might
be delivered over to them to be dealt with according to law,
there is not, as we conceive, any right in the Grown to adopt
any other course of proceeding." Supra, note. 9 ■
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2. Circumstances Justifying the Use of Force: Existence of "State of War1 
As already seen, the government's right to use force against force
(29)
"depends upon the question whether there is war or not." It therefore 
becomes necessary to consider what a "state of war" is and when it arises.
A state of war when it exists as a domestic fact generally implies 
the presence of warring groups or of overt hostilities either between 
two groups of citizens or between a group of individuals and the lawful 
government, and is to be distinguished from a state of war as a fact in 
International Law.
In considering the extent of powers assumed by the authority on a 
declaration of martial law, both judges and lawyers have used the 
expression "a state of war" in its sense In Municipal Law, meaning any 
formidable disturbance which required the intervention of the armed 
forces.
A state of war as a domestic fact may be created as much by 
invasion by an external power as by rebellion or insurrection from 
within the country. Though the conditions arising from any of them
may be in some respects similar, yet differences exist between insur-
(30)
rection or rebellion and war in the international sense. Kor the 
exercise of powers under martial law it is necessary to bear in mind 
the distinction between them.
29) Tilonko v. Attorney-General (1907) A.C. 93 at p.94*
30) "War is a contention between two or more states through their 
armed forces." Oppenheim's International Law (1951) Vol. II,
p.202,
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(31)
In an American case an insurrection has heen defined as consisting 
of the open and active opposition of a group of individuals to the 
execution of the laws; it must be of formidable character and must defy, 
though temporarily, the authority of the government. It need not be 
accompanied by bloodshed. Again, in drawing the distinction between 
war and insurrection, Justice Sanner of the Supreme Court of Montana 
said;
"War is an act of sovereignty, real or assumed; insurrection is 
not. War makes enemies of the inhabitants of the contending States; 
but insurrection does not put beyond the pale of friendship the 
innocent in the affected district. War creates the rights and duties
(32)
of belligerancy which to mere insurrection are unknown."
Confusion must again be avoided so that the expression a "state 
of war" has not to be used as a synonym for "war." For the presence 
of war, as understood in International Law, makes the exercise of war 
powers under the constitution an obvious necessity. Whereas a state of 
war created by insurrection or rebellion has never been considered as 
such an emergency as to confer on the executive such supreme powers, 
though in some cases of martial rule similar powers have virtually been 
exercised as, for example, In the American Vlvll War.
(31) In re Charge to Grand Jury (1894) 62 Eed* 828.
(32) Ex parte Macdonald (l914) 49 Montana 454*
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(33) u.T.
In an Irish case #. /. O'Conno^ in refuting the argument that
the Irish Rebellion of 1921-22 did not amount to war, expressed the 
opinion that it was undotibtedly war. "I suppose there are many people 
who would say it was not - hesitating to dignify by the title 'war' a 
state of circumstances in which there is little or no open clash of 
arms, and in which the attempt to coerce the will of others is carried 
on, not in the field, not in battle, but mainly, at any rate, in a 
surreptitious way by the commission of multiplied crimes. But we have 
to consider the question from its legal aspects; and from that point 
of view it Is undoubtedly war - guerrila war, a sort of war perhaps,
(34)
but war."
What are the conditions obtaining during a state of war will be 
evident from the following passage:
"On the other hand we have a body of persons, small, no doubt, 
but making up in recklessness what they lack in numbers, determined 
by any and every method in their power to bring this country to a state 
of anarchy rather than submit to the will of the lav/fully constituted 
and freely chosen Government of the country. These men are equipped 
with revolvers, rifles and machine guns, and have the necessary imple­
ments, material, and skill for the manufacture of high explosives; they 
have no uniform. They are unevently distributed over Ireland; they are
(33) Johnstone v. 0 1 Sullivan (1923) 2 I.R. 13-
(34) Ibid, at p.14.
here today, and away tomorrow; now and again they concentrate in 
certain localities in such force as temporarily to dominate the situation 
hut flee to the woods and hills upon the approach of the organised 
Government troops; mostly they carry on their operations as a sort of 
invisible army, posing as harmless citizens by day, and only venturing 
from their lurking places by night to work destruction and take life.
They stop at nothing in their design; they attack the Government troops 
with bombs or gun fire; they shoot the unarmed civil police; they 
attack and destroy by mine, fire or otherwise property both public and 
private; they explode roads, bridges, railway stations, signal cabins; 
they set trains at full speed along railways; here in our capital city 
the lives of nervous people are made intolerable by the din of their 
nightly performances; they inflict immeasurable loss and injury upon a 
peaceable community, in the supposed interest, be it observed, of that
(35)
community."
Yvhere actual rebellion is raging some such conditions or worse 
than them may come to happen, but even on occasions less dangerous 
than rebellion or insurrection, martial law has been proclaimed and 
applied. In some of the American States, a declaration of a state of 
war has been made in normal peacetime, just to overcome some constitu­
tional difficulty in getting things done. These instances are no doubt
(35) Ibid, at p.24.
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abuses of the power to declare martial law, and as we have seen, the 
courts did not lose, at least in some cases, the opportunity to call
(56)
such action illegal and unconstitutional. So far as the practice in 
the Commonwealth goes, it is generally in times of violence or threatened 
violence that martial law has been declared. It may be questioned whether 
on all such occasions a declaration of martial law was really necessary, 
but in fairness to the governments concerned it may be said that 
circumstances were such that mere police precautions would prove 
inadequate. To govern colonial peoples was, however, not an easy task. 
What would stiffice in a country like England in a similar situation 
were considered insignificant by the government admidst a hostile 
population. Moreover, there would always remain the chance of wrong 
assessment of the actual situation, which, if it did not amount to a 
state of war, was still so considered.
3. Test to Determine the Existence of War; the "Open Court" Theory
Use of excessive force can never be justified except by statute 
yet, when martial law is declared, challenges are often made in a 
court of law against the application of force by the military authority.
It has been consistently held that the court will not intervene with
(36) Chapter 4*
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(37)
military action, if war exists and so long as it exists. Before so
deciding, it therefore becomes necessary to determine whether a state
of war existed when force was used. What, then, is the test to determine
whether a state of war exists?
Though English jurists have speculated on the circumstances in
which the armed forces would be justified in exercising all necessary
powers to put an end to a state of war, English history does not provide
us with any instance of the normal exercise of this power, the ordinary
(38)
administration of justice being suspended by reason of civil war.
Yet before 1629 occasions arose when Commissions were issued under the 
Great Seal "to proceed within the land, according to the justice of 
Martial Law, against such soldiers and marines, or other dissolute 
persons joining with them, as should commit any murder, robberies, 
felony, mutiny or other outrage or misdemeanour whatsoever." This 
was recited in and condemned by the Petition of Right.
Be that as it may, in England both judges and legislators have 
generally tried to apply some objective test to determine whether a 
state of war exists in order to pronounce upon the legality of the 
acts of the military forces. At the time of the Petition of Right 
the Members of Parliament were less concerned with the Crown1 s power
(37) Ex parte Marais (1902) A.C. 109.
(38) Thus 0, 0. Cockburn said; "It certainly was not, according to 
Coke, in the wars of Henry III, or during the wars of the Roses, 
or during the Great Civil Wax." R. v. HeIson and Brand (I867) 
Special Report at p.70.
to apply martial law than with the objects for and the occasions on
(39)
which it could he declared. Thus, the discussion that ensued on the
just occasions when martial law could he enforced gave rise to what
later on became known as the uopen court” theory.
Thus, during the debate on the Petition of Eight Mr. Rolle said:
"In this disputation I will not trench on Power, but the abuse of it.
The Law of the Marshall is the King’s law, and the common law takes
notice of it5 we acknowledge it so to be, but now the question is,
(40)
when it is to be used."
He then proceeded to say that "martial law is merely for
necessity, where the common law cannot take place." As the necessity
cannot arise in peace time but only in time of war, it is essential
that both should be considered and defined. He saids
"If the Chancery and Courts of Westminster be shut up that are
officina justitiae, it is time of war but, if the courts be open, it
is otherwise; yet if war be in any part of the kingdom, that the
(41)
sheriff cannot execute the king’s writ, there is tempus belli."
He considered that martial law could only be executed where
common law could not be enforced owing to the presence of the enemy
in any part of the kingdom. He said, however, that if a subject was
taken but not slain in the battle field during the time of rebellion,
it is not the military but the common law under which he should be
(42)
tried.
(39) Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (I869) Vol.II, p.157*
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
Similarly, it seems that Coke detested the idea of the existence 
of concurrent jurisdiction of the martial and the ordinary law of the 
land. He thus said:
"But God send me never to live under the law of conveniency or 
discretion. Shall the soldier and justice sit on one bench? The 
trumpet will not let the crier speak in Westminster Hall. Hon bene
(43)
conveniunt."
In his opinion the time of peace was when the courts were open.
The reasons were, he said, "for when they are open, then you may have
a commission of oyer and terminer; and where the common law can (fefcermine
(44)
a thing, the Martial law ought not."
Comparatively recently, in 1838, in their joint opinion on the 
power of the Governor of the Lower Canada to proclaim martial law during
(43) Ibid at p.158. Also in his Commentary on Littleton, Coke 
elaborated the same idea when he said: "When the courts of 
justice lie open, and the judges and ministers of the same may 
by law protect men from wrong and violence, and distribute 
justice to all, it is said to be time of peace. So when by 
invasion, insurrection, rebellion or such like, the peaceable 
course of justice is disturbed and stopped, so as the courts of 
justice be as it were shut up, et silent leges inter arma, then 
it is said to be time of war." Co. Litt. 249 b.
Hale was expressing the same opinion by saying that "the exercise 
of martial law, whereby any person shall lose his life, or 
members, or liberty, may not be permitted in time of peace when 
the King*s courts are open."
Blackstone referred to the fact of the existence of civil war as 
"when the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, 
rebellion or insurrection, so that the courts of justice cannot 
be kept open." 2 Comm, at 667*
(44) Ibid.
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(45)
rebellion, Sir John Campbell and Sir R. M* Rolfe, the Attorney and 
Solicitor Generals, said that the right to do so arises from the 
necessity of the case. But in so far as they could see ’’when the 
regular courts are open so that criminals might be delivered over to 
them to be dealt with according to law, there is not, as we conceive,
(46)
any right in the Crown to adopt any other course of proceeding,”
It is often the experience that the courts are sitting and their 
doors are open, that is to say, in a physical sense, but for all practical 
purposes they are unable to enforce their judgments. Would it still be 
argued that a state of war was not prevailing as the courts remained 
open? Is it necessary that judges be actually pulled from their seats; 
or does it suffice that the public disorder renders the administration 
of justice precarious, fitful, uncertain, thus defeating the purpose 
for which courts are organised? We shall consider the answers to these 
questions in discussing the relevancy of the ’’open court” theory in 
determining today whether a state of war exists in a particular area.
Reference to American law on this point would show that in 
defining when a state of war prevails the judges1 minds were coloured
(47)
by what had already been said about it in England. Thus, in 1866 in
(45) 7t may he recalled that proclamation of martial law is equivalent 
to a declaration of a state of war.
(46) Quoted by William Forsyth in Opinions and Cases on the 
Constitutional haws (I8O9) at p.198.
(47) "What Justice Davies said in the Milligan opinion was a page 
tom from the constitutional history of England.” Charles 
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule (1942) 55 H.L.R. at p.1254-
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(48)
the famous decision of Ex parte Milligan Justice Davies of the United 
States Supreme Court said that the proper occasions for the application 
of martial law would arise "if in foreign invasion or civil war the 
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal 
justice according to law then, on the theatre of active military 
operations where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish 
a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the 
safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the 
military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can 
have their free course,” But, quite emphatically, he denied the possi­
bility of applying martial law when the courts are normally functioning! 
"Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the
(49)
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction,”
Applying the test enunciated or reaffirmed by him, Justice Davies
held that the laws of war "can never be applied to citizens in States
which have upheld the authority of the Government, and where the courts
are open and their process unobstructed.” So far as Indiana, where
Milligan was tried by a military tribunal, was concerned, he said:
"This Court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal
authority was always unopposed and its courts always open to hear
criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war could
sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever of a citizen in
(50)
civil life, in nowise connected with the military service.”
(48) (1866) 4 Wall 2.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
204.
4- Criticism of the Milligan Test
Objections to acceptance of the test laid dawn, by Justice Davies 
were raised by the minority in the Milligan case itself. They pointed 
out in clearest language that it might happen that courts, though open 
and undisturbed in the discharge of their functions, were in fact unable 
to avert threatened danger, or to punish with adequate promptitude 
guilty conspirators. When the administration of justice becomes a 
delusion and a reproach, it matters little, so far as the ends of 
government are concerned, that the judges had been driven off by 
physical force or their efforts paralysed by widespread disaffection
(51)
to the laws. In reviewing the Milligan case, Professor Willoughby 
said that in so far as the majority was of the opinion that the 
necessity justifying martial law could not be created by a mere legis­
lative fiat, they were not wrong. But their declaration that martial 
law could not arise from a threatened invasion and the fact that the 
courts were open would be a conclusive test in deciding the necessity 
of martial law, went a little too far. He said:
"The better doctrine is not for the courts to attempt to determine 
in advance with respect to any one element what does, v;hat does not 
create a necessity for martial law but, as in all other cases of the
exercise of official authority, to test the legality of an act by its
(52)
special circumstances."
(51) Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law, at p.455*
(52) Willoughby, The Constitutional Laws of the United States (19IO) 
Vol. II, at p.1251.
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How far the Milligan test is, in the light of later developments
in the technique of warfare, acceptable as offering a reliable criterion
to determine the necessity for the application of martial law, has
recently been considered in a few American cases. Times have changed
and the resultant contrast is also great. "In the Civil War, when
Milligan was tried by military commission, no invasion could have been
expected into Indiana except after much prior notice and weary weeks of
slow and tedious gains by a slowly advancing army. They then never
imagined the possibility of flying lethal engines hurtling through the
air several hundred miles within an hour. They never visioned the
possibility of far distant forces dispatching an air armada that would
rain destroying parachutists from the sky and capture far distant
(53)
territory overnight."
The inadequacy of the "open court" theory advocated in the
(54)
Milligan case was pointed out in ICorematsu v. U.S. The reasoning of
the Milligan case which implicitly contained the hypothesis that "in
the absence of actual invasion, the slower and more deliberate procedures
of the civil courts are a sufficient protection from disloyal citizens
lending aid to the enemy" is only proof of the background from which it
issued, "the possibility of air invasion covering the state of Indiana
in less than two hours was not even 'lurking* in the minds of the Justices."
(53) Ex Parte Ventura (1942) 44 F* Supp. 520 at 522.
(54) 140 F.(2d) 289.
The Court, however, recognised that if, in view of modem 
technical developments in warfare, the actual theatre of war must he 
supposed to embrace the whole country, the Milligan test would still 
be applicable. "Since necessity creates the rule (martial), it is 
not inconsistent with the principle established in the Milligan case 
that a threatened air invasion, directed by saboteur signals, which in 
an hour's time could destroy every federal court-house in California, 
presents the necessity for the substitute of military action against
(55)
such sabotage for that of civil courts."
Too literal an application of the test should thus be avoided. 
This is possible only if the concept of the locality of actual war is 
expanded. Commenting quite recently on the Milligan case, an American 
writer found it difficult to see why the "open court" rule should be 
criticised or declared incompatible with total war. "It is true," he 
said, "that modern war is technologically different from the earlier 
wars ... The question under the Milligan case is whether the courts are 
open, not whether the enemy's speediest method of transportation is an 
airplane or a horse. The open court rule is no mere mechanical test,
(56)
nor was it intended to be."
Apart from the arguments based on the needs of a total war, some 
other cogent reasons have been advanced in favour of entrusting the 
military authority with the administration of law and justice without
(55) Ibid, at p.296.
(56) John P. Frank, Martial Law in Hawaii (1944) 44 Col. L. Rev. 639*
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any interference by the civil courts, which may remain open. One of 
such reasons is, according to the opinion of the minority in the Milligan 
case, that "in times of rebellion and civil war, it may often happen, 
indeed, that judges and marshals will be in active sympathy with the 
rebels and courts their most efficient allies." This is certainly a 
strange remark, but it must not be forgotten that the case was heard 
immediately after the .American Civil War and that the majority did not 
subscribe to it. Judges are but human, and share the feelings of other 
people, but, unless a state of civil war prevails, it is unlikely that 
they will sympathise with those who are responsible for violation of 
law and order. This is not intended to imply that, during a civil war, 
judges would invariably be infused with any partisan spirit, but the 
circumstances of the American Civil War were such that this result was 
not unlikely, so that the mere fact that the courts remained open 
would not of itself be sufficient to indicate that a proclamation of 
martial law was uncalled for.
Some other suggestions, such as lack of manpower necessary to 
permit a jury to function, requirement of greater secrecy than is 
possible in a trial before a civil court and attempt by a jury perversely 
to acquit the guilty and impossibility of changing the venue, have also 
been urged. But, it is submitted, the main reasons why the military 
courts should administer law and order are that they are the best 
judges of how men involved in breaches of martial law regulations, which
are not recognised as law by the ordinary courts, should he dealt
(57)
with.
As a matter of fact all these arguments were advanced in a
(58)
recent American case and it was contended that however adequate the 
'‘open court11 theory might have been in 1628 and 1864 it was definitely 
unsuited to modern warfare conditions where the whole country would be 
involved in all sorts of attack through the courts were operation.
ft
j7. Blacl^ '4 in delivering the opinion of the Court, expressed his 
unwillingness to accept the contention that a military commander, on 
the basis of his conception of war necessity, could require all civilians 
accused of crime to be tried summarily by military tribunals, on the 
plain ground that such trials were unnecessary so long as the civil 
courts were fully able to perform their functions. He said:
"The argument thus advanced is as untenable today as it was when 
cast in the language of the Plantagenets, the Tudors and the Stuarts.
It is a rank appeal to abandon the fate of all our liberties to the 
reasonableness of the judgment of those who ax^ e trained primarily for 
war. It seeks to justify military usurpation of civilian authority to
(59)
punish crime without regard to the potency of the Bill of Rights."
Accordingly, it could justly be said that the rejection of the 
sound Milligan rule would open the door to "rampant militarism" and it
(57) H. Erie Richards, Martial Law (1902) 18 L. QuartR. 133*
(58) Duncan v. Kahanamoku & White v. Steeer (1945) 327 U.S. 314*
(59) Ibid, at p.329.
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is the duty of the Court to guard "against an excessive use of any power
military or otherwise, that results in the needless destruction of our
(60)
rights and liberties."
Of course, it must be admitted that it is difficult to strike a 
balance between the conflicting interests » one which demands every 
military precaution against possible rebel or enemy action and con­
sequently to a resort to necessary military measures, and the other 
which would prefer to safeguard the fundamental rights as long as 
practicable, that is to say, until the courts were closed.
The doctrine that a state of war is demonstrated by the closure 
of courts has been renounced in some cases in British dominions outside
England and the prevalent judicial opinion in the Commonwealth is not
(61)
in favour of unqualified acceptance of the "Open Court" theory.
(62)
Elphinstone v. Bedreechand, a case arising in Bombay where the East 
India Company was gradually extending its territorial frontiers is an 
early instance indicating the judicial mood.
The facts involved in this case were as follows: On 16 November,
1817? after the battle of Kirkee, the British forces occupied Poona,
(&) Ibid, at p.334-
(61) "The test of the modem British cases is more elastic. The fact 
that the ordinary courts are in operation is not, of itself, 
conclusive in determining the legality of martial law action: it 
is merely one of the factors to be considered in determining 
whether there was in fact an emergency justifying such action." 
Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, at p.310.
(62) 1 Knapp 316: 12 English Reports (1830). * "
Peshwa Baji RaoTs capital. On 15 December of the same year the Governor- 
General of India appointed the appellant Elphinstone the sole Commissioner 
for the settlement of the conquered territory and conferred on him 
authority over the entire civil and military administration. Elphinstone 
appointed the other appellant Captain Robertson the provisional Collector 
and Magistrate of the city of Poona. Suspecting that Narroba, the 
Peshwa1s treasurer, possessed large quantities of treasure belonging to
the Peshwa, Captain Robertson after the capitulation of the fortress at
Raighur, caused Narroba's property to be searched and seized a few 
boxes of gold coins and jewels. On Narroba's death, his executor
Bedreechand brought this action in the Supreme Court at Bombay for
recovery of damages for the above seizure. The Supreme Court dismissed 
the action as against the East India Company but gave judgment and 
verdict against the appellant.
On an appeal against the decision of the Bombay Supreme Court, 
lengthy arguments were advanced before the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council as to the extent of the power of the military authority 
to interfere with person and property as long as the state of war 
existed and whether actually such condition existed at the time of the 
seizure. On behalf of the respondent it was vehemently contended 
that, when the appellant seized Narroba’s treasure, the courts at 
Poona were open and normally functioning. It therefore followed that 
a state of peace and not war prevailed there, especially when there 
was no actual conflict at the relevant time.
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The appellant conceded that though commissioners were appointed 
to preserve order and tranquillity and the ordinary courts were allowed 
to administer justice, the military character of the government of the 
conquered territory was thereby not lost. For this reason and the 
proper administration of the occupied territory, the military authority 
had power to arrest any person and seize any property. The courts of 
justice must in such cases he denied jurisdiction to, entertain any 
suit against them.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that, under the 
circumstances in which the seizure was made, it must he regarded as a 
hostile seizure and that a Municipal Court had no jurisdiction. In 
delivering a very short judgment, Lord Tenterden said:
”We think the proper character of the transaction was that of 
hostile seizure made, if not flagrante, yet nondum cessante hello, 
regard heing had both to the time, the place, and the person, and 
consequently that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to adjudge 
upon the subjecti that if anything was done amiss, recourse could only
(65)
he had to the Government for redress.”
The fact that the courts were under the authority of the 
Provisional Government administering justice did not alter the nature 
of the transaction. Accordingly, their Lordships recommended His 
Majesty to reverse the judgment of the Court below.
(65) Ibid, at p.361.
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(64)
In Ex parte Marais, Lord Halsbury cited and reaffirmed the 
principle laid down in Elphinstone1 s case by saying that "where war 
actually prevails the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over the 
action of the military authorities.” The petitioner had asked for 
leave to appeal against a decision of jf. BuchananUpf the Supreme 
Court of Cape Colony, stating that he was arrested under the order 
of the military authority without warrant in violation of the funda­
mental liberties of the subject and was shown no cause of such arrest.
BuchananJs refusal to release the petitioner was based on the ground 
that the Court would not go into the necessity of the Martial Law 
Proclamation then in force.
The appellant urged that as there was no disturbance in the 
district in which he was arrested and the civil courts were exercising 
uninterrupted jurisdiction, the existence of a state of war could not 
be presumed. The Crown had, therefore, no power to try an offender 
under martial law. Even if a state of war existed, the application 
of martial law was limited by the necessity of preserving peace and 
order and the jurisdiction of the civil courts were not ousted. The
petitioner was, therefore, entitled to be tried by a civil tribunal.
Id.
In refusing leave to appeal, Lord X* J2T. Hals bury/said;
”The only ground susceptible of argument urged by the learned counsel 
was that, whereas some of the courts were open, it was impossible to
(64) (1902) A.C. 109.
apply the ordinary rule that where actual war is raging the civil 
courts have no jurisdiction to deal with military action, hut, where 
acts of war are in question, the military tribunals alone are competent 
to deal with such questions.
"They are of opinion that, where actual war is raging, acts done 
by the military authorities are not justiciable by the ordinary 
tribunals, and that war in this case was actually raging, even if their 
Lordships did not take judicial notice of it, is sufficiently evidenced 
by the facts disclosed by the petitioners own petition and affidavit.
"Martial law had been proclaimed over the district in which the 
petitioner was arrested and the district to which he was removed. The 
fact that for some purposes some tribunals had been permitted to pursue 
their ordinary course is not conclusive that war was not raging.
"The truth is that no doubt has ever existed that, where war 
actually prevails, the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over the 
military authorities1 action.
"Doubtless cases of difficulty arise when the fact of a state of 
rebellion or insurrection is not clearly established.
"It may often be a question whether a mere riot, or disturbance, 
neither so serious nor so extensive as really to amount to a war at 
all, has not been treated with an excessive severity, and whether the 
intervention of the military force was necessary; but once let the 
fact of actual war be established, and there is an universal consensus 
of opinion that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to call in
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(65)
question the propriety of military authorities."
5* Is the Marais Rule a Correct Approach?
What the Marais case decides is (i) that where actual war is
raging acts done hy the military authorities are not justiciable by
the ordinary tribunals; (ii) that the fact that for some purposes some
tribunals had been permitted to pursue their ordinary course is not
conclusive that war was not raging.
We shall consider the second rule first. Quite obviously it
rejects the much advocated f,sopen court" theory. In the words of Cyril
(66)
Dodd, the Marais case "distinctly puts an end to the ancient rule that, 
because for some purposes the courts are open at a place, that place 
must be held to be one where peace exists, no matter what the actual 
fact may be." Similarly Er#le Richards has said: "The necessity for 
talcing action which infringes on rights of property or liberty cannot 
depend on the fact that the courts continue or do not continue to sit: 
it depends on the necessity created by the presence of an enemy in the
(67)
country." Pollock said that the prevalent opinion in the seventeenth 
century that it was time of peace when and where the courts wexe open 
and the King*s writ could be executed might have laid down a fair test
(65) Ibid, at pp.114-115.
(66) Cyril Dodd, The Case of Marais, 18 L.Q.R.143 at 147 (1902).
(67) H. Erie Richards, Martial Law, 18 L.Q.R.133 at 141 (1902).
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for themselves. "The presence of the King’s enemies at York might
well seem no cause whatever for holding that there was a state of war
(68)
at Plymouth or even at Westminster.”
Further, according to him, the consideration whether a state of 
war exists must not he based on piecemeal facts but on the total 
presence or absence of the phenomenon of rebellion in any part or whole 
of the country. "In many places there may outwardly be peace and yet 
modern means of communication may admit of important aid being conveyed 
to the enemy in the shape of information, supplies and personal adherents. 
In this manner the effective radius of a state of war has been multiplied 
tenfold or more. By recognising this fact we do not alter the law,
m
but apply it to the facts as they exist." Thus, war will be said to 
exist at any place irrespective of the fact whether the courts are 
there open or not, if aid and comfort can be effectively given to the 
enemy, having regard to the modern conditions of warfare.
We shall now turn to some of the Irish cases which deal with 
the nature and effect of a state of war. In R. (Childers) v. Adjutant-
(70
General arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the 
alleged state of war was negatived by the fact that the common law 
courts were sitting and were able to adjudicate on the matter for 
decision by the judges of the Irish Supreme Court, In refuting the
(68) Sir Frederick Pollock, What is Martial Law? 18 L.Q.R. 152 (1902).
(69) Ibid, at p.156.
(70) (1925) 1 Irish Report 5.
contentions raised and presented so attractively, M* O'Connor N-R.. 
conceded that the courts were, no doubt, open but that was not sufficient 
to establish their jurisdiction. Had they been freely functioning as 
in time of peace, the absence of a state of war would have been largely 
proved. The courts had been working "only under difficulties, which 
were it not for the courage and devotion to duty of its officers, 
would have been insurmountable." According to him it was absurd to say 
or hold that the courts were freely discharging their work when the 
judges required the constant protection of a military guard and the 
circuits of the judges were regularly interfered with and some of the 
County Court judges dared not enter their district. This condition of 
affairs, being the cumulative effect of the presence of a state of 
war, would undoubtedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
The truth was that, though the courts were outwardly open and seen to 
be functioning, they had ceased to operate effectively and, when they 
were themselves struggling for their own existence, it was surely 
futile to invoke their help in a matter decided by the military 
authority.
( 7 * 0  V l . R ,
ft* Johnstone v. 0 * Sullivan M. ic. O'Connor/seems to have suggested 
that when a state of war is alleged to exist, it is not very important 
whether the courts were open but it becomes necessary to inquire 
whether the civil authorities have failed to secure to the citizens
(71) (1923) 2 Irish Report 24.
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the rights of life, liberty or property to protect which government 
is organised. "Is the forcible resistance to authority so widespread, 
so continuous, so formidable, of such duration that the help of an army 
must be invoked, not merely in one or two instances, but habitually or
(72)
constantly, lest the State shall perish?"
(73)
In R. (O'Brien) v. Military Governor the military authorities
contended that they had, so long as the state of war continued, the 
power of detention if it was expedient in the public interest and, 
consequently, the court would have no jurisdiction to inquire into or 
pass judgment upon the conduct of the Commander of the Forces. The 
issue was whether there was or was not "that deliberate, organised 
resistance by force and arms to the laws and operations of the lawful 
government, amounting to war or armed rebellion." Once the court 
decides that such resistance does exist "it has no power to prohibit, 
control, or interfere with any act of the military forces, whether it 
is a matter of detention, as in the present case, or the execution of 
a capital sentence by a so-called military court."
It is not, however, clear whether the army's immunity durante 
bello was part of the Crown's prerogative. In Rex (Rona^ne and
(74)
Muloahy) v. Strickland the King's Bench Division in Ireland held that
it was not dependent on the prerogative, but could be treated as an
(72) Ibid, at p.25.
C73) (1924) 1 Irish Report 32.
(74) (1921) 2 I.R. 533.
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independent rule of law. $. Molony/observed:
"It is quite unnecessary for us to entangle ourselves in an 
academic inquiry as to the use of the word 'prerogative.' It is 
used sometimes in one sense, sometimes in another. The King is head 
of a standing army with the consent of Parliament. He cannot, it is 
conceded, merely by proclamation, declare war inside his dominions.
It Is also conceded that, without such proclamation, a state of things
may exist when the military forces of the Crown may be employed "in 
executing martial law." We hold that when a state of things does 
exist which justifies the 'execution of martial law', and such is
(75)
proved to our satisfaction, our hands are tied."
It has now been reasonably clear that the presence of military 
exigency may lead to the suspension of constitutional guarantees and 
that the Court will decline to interfere with military decisions so 
long as the exigency exists. The question may still be agitated as 
to what happens if the constitutional rights are suspended in districts 
far away from the scene of active hostilities. In case of foreign 
invasion, specially in these days of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles, arguments against the "open court" theory may be applied to
justify any executive proclamation or legislative act leading to 
suspension of these rights over the entire country. It has, however, 
been doubted whether the exercise of martial law will be justifiable 
except in districts where a state of war exists, due not to any such
(75) Ibid, at p.334.
foreign, war, but to domestic rebellion or insurrection, Opinions have
been expressed that even in case of a rebellion "If there were such a
degree of danger in the district, by reason of its contiguity to the
scene of actual rebellion, and imminent danger of its spreading, that
might be enough to excuse an honest exercise of it under supreme
(76)
authority, or even to justify it legally."
(77)
-^n Johnstone v. Q1 Sullivan it was argued that martial law cannot
operate in a district where rebellion was not raging. In refusing to
kj.
accept such contentions #. O'Connor saids
"Apart from that, (in his opinion a state of war existed in the
district in question) where a state of war exists in a political unit
of a territory, I cannot discriminate between one portion of that
territory and another; to do so would enable a rebel to claim Immunity,
in effect, the moment he escaped from more or less disturbed county
(78)
to a more or less peaceful one."
(79)
In Ex parte Milligan the question was whether martial law could 
be applied outside the immediate theatre of war. The opinion of the 
majority of the judges of the Supreme Court was that Congress had no 
authority under the Constitution to suspend or authorize the suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus, thus allowing military tribunals to try
(76) Einlason, Commentaries on Martial Law, 129.
(77) (1923) 2 I.R. 13.
(78) Ibid, at p.25.
(79) (1866) 4 Wall 2 (U.S.).
citizens of the States not within the sphere of active military 
operations. Their arguments were, as already noticed, that as in 
those States civil courts were open and transacting judicial business 
without any interruption, its replacement by military courts were not 
necessary.
The dissenting opinion of the minority which asserted that 
Congress had the constitutional authority to do so was based on the 
following arguments:
"Congress has the power not only to raise and support and 
govern armies, but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to 
provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends 
to all power essential to the prosecution of war with vigour and 
success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and 
the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President 
as Commander-in-^hief ... We by no means assert that Congress can 
establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared or 
exists. Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we 
do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in war, and some 
portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, 
it is within the power of Congress to determine to what States or 
districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies 
the authorisation of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and 
offences against the discipline or security of the army or against the 
public safety ... It was for Congress to determine the question of 
expediency."
In this connection it would seem relevant to inquire whether the
existence of a state of war in some districts operates to destroy or
suspend the civil rights of loyal citizens of other districts. The
greater the necessity, the more extensive will executive and military
action he. But, as Professor Willoughby has said, "the populace being
loyal, and the territory domestic, private rights of person and
property still persist, though subject, as in all other cases, to the
(80)
exercise of the police powers of the State." According to him, 
therefore, the military authority will be liable for abuse of their 
authority. When the civil courts are not closed, rights of action 
against any interference with personal liberty or property cannot be 
restrained, except on the grounds of maintaining the efficiency of 
public services.
The Courts1 Power to Determine the Existence of War
When the jurisdiction of a court is challenged, it has the 
inherent right to determine its own jurisdiction. When, therefore, 
any particular fact is pleaded in bar of such jurisdiction, the court 
can inquire whether that fact actually exists, and further whether its
existence ousts the court's jurisdiction.
<81> C.I.In an Irish case /. Molony/was not prepared to accept the
contentions of counsel for the military authorities that it was not
(80) Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (1910) 
Vol. II, at p.1242.
(81) R. (Garde) v. Strickland (1921) 2 Irish Report 317-
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competent for the court to decide whether a state of war existed or
not and that the statement of the officer commanding as to the
existence of war was binding on it. Dispensing with these startling
propositions, he said;
"This contention is absolutely opposed to our judgment in 
(82)
Allen's case and is destitute of authority, and we desire to state, in
the clearest possible language, that this court has the power and the
duty to decide whether a state of war exists which justifies the
(83)
application of martial law."
To prevent abuse of the power to declare martial law, it is 
necessary for the court to decide for itself whether conditions existed 
which justified the aot. Further, it is only Parliament which can 
take away the jurisdiction of a particular court. In stating the 
reasons why the mere declaration of martial law was not sufficient 
to oust the court's jurisdiction, #. SolomonJ.said: " ... nor can I 
find sufficient authority for the argument that, in a case where 
personal liberty is infringed, a proclamation of martial law has 
even greater effect than an Act of Parliament suspending habeas
(84)
corpus."
Whether opposition to the established government amounts to a 
state of war is a question of fact and as such cognisable by the
(82) R. v. Allen (l92l) 2 Irish Report 241.
(83) Ibid, at p.329.
(84) Regina v. Haude and Bekker (1901) Sheil : Gape Times Law Report 
443 at p.449*
223.
court. Thus, in a case arising in Natal, the Supreme Gourt of that 
province said;
"Whether the ordinary eivil authority was absent or powerless 
is a question of fact, upon which the court must ultimately decide, 
and whether any measure was of such a kind as might be reasonably 
necessary in a state of rebellion or war, was also a like question of
(85)
fact, and in the same way within the jurisdiction of the court."
The court has not only the power to decide whether it has
jurisdiction, but is bound to do so, as was held -in an Irish case;
"The court is bound, when its jurisdiction is invoked, to decide
(86)
whether or not there exists a state of war or armed rebellion,"
What is the position of the courts during the existence or
continuance of war will be considered later, but it may be mentioned
that the "question whether war existed or not may, of course, from
time to time be a question of doubt" and in that case "doubtless
cases of difficulty arise when the fact of a state of rebellion or
(87)
insurrection is not clearly established." The court would not know 
whether to restrain its hands or the military measures. To decide on 
this or the other side would, however, require the court to take all 
the circumstances into consideration and in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary it will presume the existence of war from
(85) Umbilini and others v. G.Q.C. (190G) Natal (D.R. 86 at p.90.
(86) |F! (0 TBrien) v. Military Governor (1924) 1 I.R. 32 at 38*
(87) P. F. Marais v. G.Q.C. (1902) A.C. 109,
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the declaration of martial law itself. MAt any rate until the contrary
is shown, the fact of the proclamation will he sufficient prima facie
(88)
evidence of necessity.1
But this is not to say that the court is hound hy the declaration 
of martial law. Such a declaration is treated as a strong evidence of 
the existence of abnormal conditions. Before it would decline to 
interfere with the executive or military action,."the court must decide 
on its own judgment whether there was such an emergency as would
(89)
justify the application of martial law."
Connected with the courtTs power to determine the existence of
(90)
war is its power to take judicial notice of a state of war. The 
court may take judicial notice of a state of war from the evidence
(91)
adduced hy the parties to the dispute.
In R. (02Brien) v. Military Governor R. O’ connor/said that 
the court could .treat as judicial notice common knowledge that a state
(88) Re Fourie (1900) Cape of Good Hope Supreme Court Reports 173*
89) Bernard Schwartz, haw and the Executive in Britain, 312.
90) "But perhaps the existence of a state of war within the
jurisdiction is, as suggested in the Marais case, a public
fact of which the Gourt may take judicial notice." Sir 
Frederick Pollock, Mhat is Martial Law? - 18 Law Q.R. at p.153*
(91) "Even if their lordships did not take jiidicial notice of it, 
it is sufficiently evidenced hy the facts disclosed hy the 
petitioner’s own petition and affidavit." - D. F. Marais v. 
G.Q.C. (1902) A.C. 109 at 114.
(92) (I924) 1 I.R. 32.
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of war existed. "It is common knowledge - and what is common knowledge
I can take judicial notice of." When it becomes a public fact that
the court needs bayonets to protect itself and the general atmosphere
occasioned by frequent movements of troops create stir and tension in
the city life, the existence.of a state of war will be judicially
recognised. Such condition of affairs can hardly escape the notice
M-R.
of a judge. Thus, JT- R* O'Connor/saids "What do I see on my way down 
to court every morning? Armoured cars, military lorries full of armed 
troops, military patrols in our chief thoroughfares, even the approaches 
to the courts guarded by soldiers with fixed bayonets. When 1 see all
(93)
this, surely I cannot say that we have arrived at a state of peace."
The court may also presume the existence of necessity from the 
declaration of martial law itself. The onus, then, will lie on the 
petitioner to prove that no such necessity exists. Something more 
than averment in the petition will be needed to rebut the presumption.
(94)
Queen v. Gildenhuys where the petitioner came before the Supreme 
Court of Cape Colony for an order to admit him to bail and furnish 
him with a copy of the evidence taken at the military inquiry, the
(93) Ibid, at pp.36-37* Similarly, in R. (Childers) v. Adjutant 
General (1923) 1 I.R. at 15, the same learned judge applied his 
own knowledge to determine the existence of a state of war -
"I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a court of 
justice. Why? Because one of the noblest buildings in this 
country, which was erected for the accommodation of the King's 
courts and was the home of justice for more than a hundred 
years, is now a mass of crumbling ruins ... "
(94) (1900) 17 Cape of Good Hope S.C. Reports at p.266.
effect of proclamation of martial law was considered. /. SolomonX, 
expressed the opinion that there was a necessity of presuming a state 
of war when martial law had been proclaimed. The mere affidavits of 
the petitioner’s attorney to the effect that peace prevailed in the 
area was not sufficient to rebut that presumption. The court would 
not, in the absence of some stronger and more convincing proof, go 
behind the proclamation of martial law and conclude that the necessity 
for such law did no longer exist,
(95)
In Standen v. Godfrey J. Wylde/was of the opinion that when 
martial law was proclaimed by "the Governor upon his own responsibility 
and consideration deeming the public emergency such as to warrant his 
recourse to martial measures," such proclamation conclusively deter­
mines the presence of a necessity for introducing such law. The 
court will not take upon itself to question that emergency, but will 
presume it to justify the Governor's act of authority."
From another point of view also it is necessary that the court
should, instead of trying independently to determine the existence of
war, give due weight to the executive decision on this matter, for
Government is in possession of all the relevant information. Moreover,
it may not be safe to hand it to the court for its inspection. Thus, 
(96)
in Ex parte Kotze BristoweXwas in favour of allowing full freedom 
to the executive in deciding upon the necessity. Assuming that the
(95) (1851) 1 Searle 65.
(96) 1914 t.p.d. 564.
courts were still sitting and asked to consider the necessity of
martial law, they should, he said, he guided hy the opinion of the
executive officers responsible for the conduct of military operations.
"I do not for a moment suppose that a court of law, or any judge,
where the most important interests of the nation are at stake, would
interpose his own individual opinion as against those responsible for
(98)
the conduct of military operations.n However, to credit executive 
declaration of necessity with proper value and importance is one thing, 
and the courtTs power to determine it is another.
Judicial Control Revives When Emergency Geases
If a state of war does not exist, it is the manifest duty of
the court to ensure that no person shall he deprived of his or her
(98)
liberty except in accordance with law. Also, when the state of war 
ceases to exist the right of action against the authority will
(99)
revive. In Higgins v. Willis an action was brought against an 
officer of the Crown for damage to the plaintiff’s property. In 
staying the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction 
durante bello, J. Molony/'^aid that nso long as that state of war 
exists, this action cannot be tried; while the plaintiff has a right
(97) Ibid, at p.567.
(98) R. (01Brien) v. Military Governor (1924) 1 I.R. at 38.
(99) (1921) 2 I.R. 386.
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to have his case tried so soon as a state of war no longer prevails.1'
It has been asserted over again that martial law is called
forth hy necessity and necessity alone justifies its existence. From
this it naturally follows that martial law cannot operate when the
necessity for it ceases. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme
Court, in sustaining two primary housing cases, has admirably enunciated
the guiding principles "A law depending upon the existence of an emergency
or certain other state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if
the emergency ceases or the facts change, even though valid when 
(101)
passed."
(102)
-^ex Allen the principle was recognised that, when peace is
restored, courts will assert their jurisdiction to try any person
guilty of committing an act which was not necessary, if in the meantime
an Act of Indemnity has not been passed. "After the war is over,
persons may be made liable, civilly and criminally, for any acts
which they are proved to have done in excess of what was reasonably
required by the necessities of the case - unless these acts have in
(103)
the meantime been covered by an Act of Indemnity,"
fl00) Ibid, at p.387.
(101) Chasleton Corp. v. Sinclair (l924)rl>£U;J. at
(102) (1921) 2 I.E.241.
(103) Ibid., at p.264. Similar opinion was expressed in Kegina v. Uaude 
(1901) Sheil 446 - "!%en the proper time does arrive, as has
consistently been laid down by this court, the persons who have 
committed wrongful acts, whether they be military officials or 
others may be made amenable to the law."
On a proclamation of martial law the usual practice is to issue
(104)
regulations and notices. In a case arising in South Africa it was 
contended that such regulations and notices still had the force of 
law, though martial law was discontinued. The ground urged in support 
of such contention was that these had not yet “been repealed by a formal 
statute. In expressing disagreement with such views /, CurlewisTsaid:
(105)
"If we look at Government Notice No. 40 of 1915 it is clear that
it was issued for the purpose of Martial Law. It is headed "Martial
Law Regulations." Therefore it appears to me that the Government
Notice only has the force of law as long as Martial Law exists, and
that when the object and reason for the regulation has ceased the
regulation itself will cease to have the force of law. It seems to me
quite unlikely that the legislature intended all these Government
Notices to have the force of law until they were repealed by a formal 
(106)
statute."
(104) Haider v. Minister of Defence (1915) Trans, Prov. Div. 622.
(105) "Whereas it is deemed necessary and expedient to make special 
provision for dealing with British subjects of enemy extraction, 
who by word and action show themselves inimical to the 
Gpvernment and Parliament of the Union and to the welfare of 
the State, it is hereby notified that the regulations set
out in the annexture to this notice will be enforced 
throughoxit the Union with effect from date hereof."
(106) Ibid, at p.630.
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Some misunderstanding arose in the past out of the language 
used hy Lord Halshury in the Marais case and it was thought, though 
only for a short time, that martial-law action was beyond any judicial 
control even when the emergency was over. But it has rightly been 
remarked that "if it (the decision in the Marais case) is intended 
thereby to affirm that military authorities cannot, in any case when 
the war is ended, be sued for acts of violence inflicted upon citizens 
during war, or done to their property whilst hostilities are raging, 
then it is a proposition at variance with what has long been, and what
(107)
is still believed to be, the law."
In most cases, however, the executive or the military authority
are, as soon as the proclamation of martial law is withdrawn, "protected
(108)
from legal vindication by legislative indemnity," so that even though 
the courts are willing to assume jurisdiction, they will be debarred 
from doing so. And there Is nothing illegal in passing such Acts of 
Indemnity, permitting a short and effective defence by the authority 
administering martial law.
The reason for the covxrt!s interference when apparently there 
is no interruption in the course of justice is that trial by martial
(109)
law is illegal in such circumstances. Wolfe Tone’s case will ever 
remain a splendid instance of the judicial assertion of supremacy of
(107) Cyril Dodd, The Case of Marais, 18 L.Q.Bev. at 148 (1902).
(108) Standen v. Godfrey (1851) 1 Searle 6l.
(109) The Trial of Theobold Wolfe Tone (1798) 27 State Trials 6lA.
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(no)
the law*
The facts of this case were that in 1798, Wolfe Tone, an Irish 
rebel, was captured during a French Invasion of Ireland and was tried 
by a court-martial and sentenced to be hanged. In moving an applica­
tion for a writ of habeas corpus before the Irish King’s Bench his 
counsel urged;
"I do not pretend to say that Mr. Tone is not guilty of the 
charges of which he was accused; I presume the officers were honourable 
men; but it is stated in the affidavit, as a solemn fact, that Mr.
Tone had no commission under His Majesty, and therefore no court- 
martial could have cognisance of any crime imputed to him, while the 
Court of King’s Bench sat in the capacity of the great criminal court 
of the land* In times when war was raging, when man was opposed to man 
in the field, courts-martial might be endured, but every law authority 
is with me, while I stand upon this sacred and immutable principle of 
the Constitution - that martial law and civil law are incompatible; 
and that the former must cease with the existence of the latter.
This is not the time for arguing this momentous question. My client 
must appear in this Court. He is cast for death this day. He may be 
ordered for execution while I address you. I call on the Court to 
support the law. I move for a habeas corpus to be directed to the
(llO) About this case Bicey said; "Nothing better illustrates the 
noble energy with which judges have maintained the rule of 
regular law, even at periods of revolutionary violence than 
Wolfe Tone’s case The Law of the Constitution (1959) Tenth 
edition, at p.293*
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provost-marshal of the "barracks of Dublin and Major Sandys to "bring 
up the body of Mr. Tone.
Lord Chief Justice (Kilwarden) - Have a writ instantly prepared.
Mr. Curran - My client may die while this writ is preparing.
L.C.J. - Mr. Sheriff, proceed to the barracks, and acquaint the 
provost-marshal that a writ is preparing to suspend Mr. Tone's 
execution and see that he be not executed.
(The Court awaited, in a state of the utmost agitation, the 
return of the sheriff.)
Mr. Sheriff - My Lords, I have been at the barracks, in 
pursuance of your order. The provost-marshal says he must obey Lord 
Cornwallis.
Mr. Curran - Mr. Tone's father, my Lords, returns, after serving 
the habeas corpus, he says General Craig will not obey it.
L.C.J. - Mr. Sheriff, take the body of Mr. Tone into your 
custody. Take the provost-marshal and Major Sandys into custody and 
show the order of this Court to General Craig,
Mr. Sheriff (who was understood to have been refused admittance 
at the barracks) returns - I have been at the barracks. Mr. Tone, 
having cut his throat last night, is not in a condition to be 
removed. As to the second part of your order, I could not meet the 
parties.
L.C.J. - Let a rule be made for suspending the execution of 
Theobold Wolfe Tone; and let it be served on the proper persons."
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Again, one more instance, as illustrating the assertion of 
judicial authority when martial law is over, is provided hy the 
following incident:
When in 1814 New Orleans was being invaded by the British 
Forces, General Jackson, commanding the American Army, declared martial 
lav/. A civilian published a libellous article containing criticisms 
of the General1 s acts. He was arrested by the order of General 
Jackson, but, on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, Federal 
Judge Hall ordered his release. The judge himself was arrested and 
sent beyond the military lines. When, however, civil jurisdiction 
was restored, the judge fined General Jackson one thousand dollars for 
contempt, which the latter quite promptly paid. Later, however, 
Gongress returned him this money with interest.
The seemingly high-handed step taken against Judge Hall was no 
doubt an unusual one, but so also was the judicial indiscretion in 
issuing the writ at a time which demanded the subordination of all 
other activities to military control. The recital of events set out 
above points to these conclusions, the supremacy of the military 
authorities and, when necessary for the success of their operations, 
the entire suspension of all ordinary laws when actual war is raging; 
the re-emergence of the normal administration by the civil government 
when the necessity for martial law ceases.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EXTENT OF ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF POWERS DURING MARTIAL RULE
1. Judicial Problems on Assumption of Powers in an Emergency
The Courts, as already seen, would, during the continuance of 
a state of war, ordinarily decline jurisdiction to entertain proceedings 
against any officer or member of the armed forces acting in the exercise 
of his duties. It has also been noticed how long they should refrain 
from calling a halt to the unchecked exercise of such powers. When 
there has been a declaration of martial law, the military authority has 
usually claimed power to supersede all civil laws, leading to a virtual 
paralysis of the normal functions of the civil government, especially
(i)
the courts. For two reasons it would seem difficult to concede such 
an exorbitant claim. First, doubt still exists in the minds of the 
English jurists as to whether martial law can be declared at all in 
the absence of a state of war throughout the country. Secondly, one 
cannot lose sight of the fact that the courts in England, the Common­
wealth countries and the U.S.A. sat as usual during the two major wars 
of this century, though, of course, express legislative measures were 
enacted to meet emergencies arising or likely to arise in consequence 
of hostilities.
(l) "The idea seems to be growing that it is the prerogative and 
function of the military to substitute itself for all civil 
authority, and that, while it is in control, the constitutions, 
courts and laws may be suspended and set aside." Ballantine, 
Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority (1915) 24 Yale Law 
Journal 189*
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Yet it has been abundantly recognised by the courts that the
exigencies of the situation caused by a formidable rebellion or an
internecine civil war may legally justify the abandonment of all
constitutional forms* But there have been occasions for judges, even
while martial law was in force, to protect the citizen's right to his
life, liberty or property against interference not warranted by the
(2)
laws of the land,
Some confusion is bound to arise from the seemingly irrecon­
cilable facts inherent in the situation. On the one hand the military 
authority, as already noted, has the right not to be interfered with
durante bello; on the other hand the citizen should not be made to
suffer unnecessarily from the unrestrained acts of the armed forces.
The officer commanding the armed forces may reasonably require the 
judiciary to concede full independence without any check. He may 
validly argues "You must judge my plan of campaign as a whole, and 
not take single acts out of their context. You have already, by 
refusing to interfere with me, admitted that an occasion for exceptional 
measures has arisen. I have succeeded in suppressing the rebellion; 
can you, as laymen, say that, by the exercise of this or that much
(3)
less violence, I could have done as well.” Such a claim, based on the
plea of expert knov/ledge and judgment is difficult to resist.
(2) Trial of Theobold Wolfe Tone (1798) 27 Howell's St, Trial 614;
Sterling v. Constantine (1932) 287 H.S. 378; Duncan v. Kahanamoku
(1945)"327 U.S. 314; Higgins v. Willis (1921) 2 Irish Report 386.
(3) ICeir and Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law (1954) 3rd ed., p.436.
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As a matter of faot judicial practice is now firmly settled? 
it will never interfere so long as the state of war or similar circum­
stances exist. But, while admitting the necessity of recognising 
exceptional cases, the court might reply that, if on occasions when no 
great danger to the public safety was manifest and in cases of manifest 
injustice, it refused to protect the citizen, nit would leave too large
(4)
a loophole for tyrannjr and reckless violence.1 In spite of judicial 
pronouncements that there can be no interference with the military 
action, the courts have not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction to 
rectify gross irregularities. On occasions when the military authority 
took an exceedingly high view of the prerogative to suppress disorder 
or defend the country, judicial disapprobation has followed.
Of course, Parliament or the Legislature is wont by retro-active 
legislation to render all acts valid when done in good faith. By 
passing an Act of Indemnity it can provide the authorities with a 
short and convenient defence to all awkward charges; it may also 
provide for compensation for those who have been harshly treated during 
the emergency. But whether indemnifying legislation has been passed 
or not, if the authority did not act bona fide, the rule enunciated
(5)
in Wright v. Fitzgerald will he applicable.
(4) Ibid, at p.438.
(5) (1799) 27 Howell's State Trial 759.
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Here, an action was brought by Wright, a teacher of the French
language at a school in Clonmell in Ireland, against Fitzgerald, high
sheriff of the county of Tipperary, for causing bodily injury by
assault and battery. The damages were laid at £1000. Commenting on
Fitzgerald1s mode of behaviour one of the members in the Iri&h House
of Commons said that "his mode was first to sentence, then punish and
(6)
aftewards investigate."
The following charge to the jury clearly brings out the 
considerations which should move the judicial mind in judging an 
executive act;
"The jury were not to imagine that the legislature, by enabling 
magistrates to justify under the Indemnity Bill, had released them from 
the feelings of humanity, or permitted them wantonly to exercise power, 
even though it v/ere to put down rebellion. No, it expected that in 
all cases there should be a grave and serious examination into the 
conduct of the supposed criminal; and every act should show a mind 
intent to discover guilt, not-t© inflict torture. By examination or 
trial he did not mean that sort of examination and trial which they 
were engaged in, but such examination and trial, the best the nature 
of the case and the existing circumstances would allow of. That this 
must have been the intention of the legislature waw manifest from 
the expression - "magistrates and all other persons" - which proved
(6) Ibid, at p.770«
that as every man, whether magistrate or not, was authorised to 
suppress rebellion, and was to be justified by that law for his acts, 
it is required, that he should not exceed the necessity which gave 
him the power; and that he should show in his justification, that 
he had every possible means to ascertain the guilt which he had 
punished; and above, no deviation from the common principles of
(7)
humanity should appear in his conduct.”
^  (S-IT.Higgins v. Willis 0. Molony/of the Iri&h Supreme Court
went as far as to hold that "when the war was over the acts of the
military during the war, unless protected by an Act of Indemnity,
could be challenged before a jury, and that in that event even the
King’s command would not be answer, if the jury were satisfied that
the acts complained of were not justified by the circumstances then
(9)
existing, and the necessities of the case."
(10)
Governor Wall's case will ever remain the best example of the 
consequences of a malicious abuse of powers entrusted to the executive 
and the refusal of Parliament to cover such acts by passing an Act of 
Indemnity. The crime committed by Governor Wall was the murder of 
Sergeant Armstrong, in 1782, by inflicting on him eight hundred lashes 
with a special species of rope. The charge against the deceased was
(7) Ibid, at p.765*
(8) (1921) 2 I.R. 386.
(9) Ibid, at p.388.
(lO) (1802) Howell’s State Trials 51*
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that of insubordination and raising a mutiny among the soldiers. As 
B matter of fact he, along with others, went to press the pay-master, 
who was about to leave the island with the Governor, for arrears of 
pay.
In the trial the whole question turned on the decision whether 
there was mutiny or "tumultuous disobedience by a military man to his 
military superior." As the Attorney-General contended "if there did 
exist, in point of fact, a mutiny within his majestyfs garrison, which 
it required the strong arm of power to suppress, if it was a mutiny 
so enormous in its siae, so dangerous in its probable and immediate 
consequences, as to supersede the ordinary forms of trial for that or 
such like offences," the jury must not conceive "this or any other man 
similarly circumstanced, as being other than not only an innocent but 
even a meritorious man, who uses the effective powers with which his 
situation arms him or which he has it within his reach to command and 
use, for the discharge of the trust, and the protection of the interests
(n)
committed to him." But he conceded that if the mutiny was brought 
forward "as a pretence, and in order to serve as a cover and cloak for 
abused power, and the malicious perversion of legitimate authority" 
and only to enable the Governor to inflict unauthorised punishment on 
the object of his vengeance, then he was certainly guilty of committing 
the highest crime. Accordingly he must stand condemned of "having
(11) Ibid, at p.55.
abused the great trusts and authority of his situation, for the
oppression of one of his majesty1s subjects, for whose protection,
(12)
among other persons, that authority was originally given."
As, however, the jury could not come to the finding that there 
was a mutiny, or such a court-martial as could be had, or that there 
was any reasonable notice to the deceased that he was charged for 
such and such crime or was called upon to say how he joined one of 
those mutineers, the verdict of guilty was given and the Governor was 
hanged.
2• The Heed to Control Exercise of Arbitrary Powers
Paramount necessities of the moment not only furnish the occasion 
for and justify the exercise of arbitrary powers, but also may lead to 
conferment of wider powers than are actually necessary. In spite of 
harsh criticism against assumption of such powers or their sanction by 
previous legislative prescription, they have been considered imperative,
bot&: by the Courts and the legislature. But as "power is of an
^  c,r.encroaching nature" 0, 0. Cockburn/expressed the feeling that to guard
against its immoderate and unrestrained use it should be defined.
Thus, while referring to current notions that the extent of military
(12) Ibid, at p.55.
(15) Madison, The Federalist, quoted by Sir G. K. Allen, Law and
Order (l956) 2nd ed., at p.11.
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powers knew no limit on a declaration of martial law, he said that "if
such as the system of law under which British subjects can be tried
for their lives or their liberties, it is time that Parliament should
interpose and put some check upon a jurisdiction so purely arbitrary,
(H)
despotic and capricious."
Though in England martial law has not been proclaimed since it 
was condemned by the Petition of Right in 1628 and common law powers are 
deemed sufficient to cope with the few outbreaks of popular frenzy 
which have occurred since that date, yet during the Pirst World War
(15)
the whole of England in effect was put under "martial law." All 
wartime legislation has been based on the principle that, if there 
is no need to resort to exceptional powers, prior legislative action 
to define them is necessary. The wartime statutes illustrate how, 
without curtailing the freedom of the military forces in effectively
dealing with the menacing emergencies, it is possible to retain
normal legislative control. To recognise the need to arm the
executive with the widest possible powers to meet any emergency is
not to concede that Parliament and the Courts should cease to function. 
The whole position has been admirably stated by the Committee on 
Ministers1 Powers;
(14) R- v. Nelson and Brand (I867) Special Report, p.23-
(15) 0. Hood Phillips, Constitutional Law, 2nd edition, p.550 (1957)* 
"Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1914> the whole of the 
United Kingdom was placed under martial law by the Defence of 
the Realm Act, 1914* and British subjects and aliens remained 
under martial law in connection with certain offences for
some months."
"In a modem State there are many occasions when there is a 
sudden need of legislative action. For many such needs delegated 
legislation is the only convenient or even possible remedy. No doubt, 
where there is time, on legislative issues of great magnitude, it is 
right that Parliament itself should either decide what the broad 
outline of the legislation shall be.
But emergency and urgency are matters of degree? and the type 
of need may be of greater or less national importance. It may be not 
only prudent but vital for Parliament to arm the executive Government 
in advance with almost plenary power to meet occasions of emergency, 
which affect the whole nation - as in the extreme case of the Defence 
of the Realm Acts in the Great War, where the exigency had arisen; 
or in the less extreme case of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, where 
the exigency had not arisen but power was conferred to meet emergencies 
that might arise in the future ...
But the measure of the need should be the measure alike of the
power and of its limitation. It is of the essence of constitutional
Government that the normal control of Parliament should not be suspended
either to a greater degree, or for a longer time than the exigency
(16)
demands."
In the Commonwealth countries whenever disturbances of a serious 
nature have occurred or were apprehended, statutes were passed conferring 
necessary power on the Executive. Besides, during the two World Wars
(16) Report of the Committee on Ministers1 Powers, 1932, p.52.
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all these countries provided the respective governments with 
sufficient powers to ward off the dangers of a totalitarian war.
Though to declare martial law is an executive act, it really 
involves a delegation of power, one could almost say abdication by 
the other two organs of the government. The declaration of martial 
la?/ brings out two processes. First, by empowering the Executive to 
declare martial la?/ Parliament enables it to legislate. For, as has 
been said, the declaration "is neither more nor less than to enact 
that the law of the land shall be for the time suspended, and a different
(17)
law substituted for it. Secondly, on a proclamation of martial law, 
the military authorities indulge in what is known as subordinate 
legislation. Martial law regulations and notices are a regular feature 
of such a regime.
The delegation need not be considered as complete abdication 
by the legislature of its functions. There is, as we have seen, need 
of legislative action in defining the extent and powers of the 
executive.
The question will also arise whether such delegation or 
subordinate legislation thereunder could be judicially controlled.
The practice of the English Courts in this respect has been different 
from that in America. The doctrine of supremacy of Parliament debars 
the judiciary in England from reviewing delegation of pov/er to the
(17) Per g. Cockburn/in R. v. Nelson and Brand (1^67) Special
Report, p*70#
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Executive. "The established supremacy of Parliament enables it to
take any measures it deems necessary to cope with the emergency. The
constitutional problem of delegations to the Executive cannot, of
course, arise in the American sense, for whatever powers Parliament
(18)
itself possesses it may confer upon others.” What, then, can the 
Court do? As the only question when nan Act of Parliament, or a 
statutory regulation ... is alleged to limit or curtail the liberty 
of the subject or vest in the executive extraordinary powers of
(19)
detaining a subject,” is what is the precise extent of the powers
given, the duty of the courts is to interpret. "The function of the
judiciary under the English system is reduced to one of interpretation.
The courts cannot control the delegation, they can only see to it that
(20)
the Executive remains within the bounds of the powers conferred.”
As a matter of fact, therefore, courts in England cannot apply
the doctrine of ultra vires to emergency legislation, though protests
(21)
were voiced against conferring great powers on the Executive. The 
same doctrine was, however, sometimes quite successfully invoked to 
invalidate regulations made thereunder. But in a majority of cases when 
such legislations were impugned before the courts as in excess of the 
powers conferred by the relevant statutes, the judges were manifestly 
reluctant to declare them to be so, for obviously they were guided
(18) Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain? 1949? p-314*
(19) Per Lord Wright inTiversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. p.261.
(20) Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, p.314*
(21) Ibid, p.26l.
by the all too important principle that "if extraordinary powers are
here given, they are given because the emergency is extraordinary and
(22)
are limited to the period of the necessity."
Before any discussion as to whether there is any need of judicial 
review of executive action during emergency, it must be mentioned that 
the courts1 refusal to intervene where emergency actually prevails and 
while it prevails was inspired by judicial considerations and sense of 
the need of the hour, though sometimes the statute itself may have
(23)
contained a prohibition against any interference by the court.
It would be a mistake to suppose that the need for judicial control 
of arbitrary exercise of power exists only in cases of emergencies 
involving threats to personal liberty. Bearing in mind the limitations 
on the courtsr power to review the delegation of power to the Executive 
and in certain circumstances even the subordinate legislation, the 
principle should be recognised that "there is danger of arbitrariness 
in all exercises of power, and only through constant control can
(24)
illegality be minimised." Judicial utterances are not lacking as 
to the need of trusting the Executive or of relying on the executive 
good faith, because the nation is "merely lending its liberty for 
extraordinary purposes" and for a limited period; "the good faith of 
the Executive - the administrative desire, in fact, to conform to the
(25)
legislative mandate - is irrelevant in this connection." For, "legal
(23) Ibid, at p.I67.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid.
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rules, unlike those in the physical sciences, do not have fixed areas
of strains and stresses. There is a tendency to stretch legal rules to
the hrealcing point permitted by expediency - to carry out the desired
(26)
action even at the risk of illegality." Every sort of executive 
action not permitted by the ordinary law of the land needs judicial 
control.
If the pressing necessities during any emergency prompt the 
Executive in some matters to ask for "greater powers than were really
(27)
necessary, it is only a captious critic who would blame it harshly."
True, everyone would recognise that stern measures are necessary in
stern times and sacrifices and inconveniences are inevitable. But, as
has also been rightly said:
"It is, however, necessary to realise exactly what those sacrifices
and inconveniences were, not for the hardships which they inflicted at
a time when everybody accepted hardships, but for their constitutional
implications if they should come to be regarded as a normal and desirable
(280
form of government."
Totalitarian methods might be imitated to vindicate democracy 
but, that its soul may not be lost in the process, it is essential to 
remember that "it is part of the democratic process, even during war, 
to be vigilant that emergency expedients do not exceed the real
(26) Sir C. K. Allen, Law and Orders, 1956, at p.54-
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
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necessities of the situation as, from their very nature, they always
(29)
tend to do."
(50)
Judging martial law as "the public law of necessity", it may 
fairly he argued that as the necessity would not he the same on all 
occasions, the application o^ fiiartial law would also differ, thus 
creating an area of no-man's land between the courts' power to review 
administrative decisions and the supremacy of the commander's will.
It is an area where both the judges and the genex'als might feel 
reluctant to encroach on the sphere of the other. The courts, while 
remembering that "where actual war is raging acts done by the military
(32)
authorities are not justiciable by the ordinary tribunals," proceed 
not only to review but also to restrain the acts of the military 
authority, if they find them not justified by, though done in the name 
of, necessity. Faced with the alternative of closing the courts in 
the twilight zone between peace and war, military authorities have 
submitted to judicial control. On reviewing the cases in which 
judges have pronounced on military measures, a basic distinction will 
be noticed between two kinds of martial law - the extreme or absolute 
type, and the mild or qualified type. In the former case the civil 
government and the ordinary courts of the country are suspended. The
(29) Ibid.
(50) "Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its existence and 
necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may be 
employed." - Weiner, A Practical Manual of Martial haw, p.l6 (1940).
(31) "Martial law, however, is of all gradations." - 49 Mont. 454 at 
476 (1914)> Fx Parte McDonald.
(32) Fx Parte Marais (l902 j~ A.C. 109 at II4.
question of judicial review is then completely excluded and becomes 
almost irrelevant. In the latter case troops are requisitioned but they 
act more or less in concert with the civil government. They are 
given certain civil powers, such as those of arrest and detention,
which, it is submitted, are not the same as trial and conviction, which
(33)
are judicial functions. As in this case the armed forces are not 
allowed a completely free hand, the civil courts retain the power to 
review their acts. Though countries in the Commonwealth provide but. 
few instances of this type of qualified martial law they are not 
uncommon in America where State Governors have resorted to martial 
rule on occasions that could by ncjstretch of imagination be deemed 
rebellion or insurrection.
(34)
In one such case, Chief Justice Hughes of the United States 
Supreme Court, on the finding that there was no actual uprising and 
no interference with the normal process of administration, nor any 
attempted or threatened violence excepting the obstruction caused by 
the General commanding the armed forces, held that the Court should 
not impose any limitation on the power of the Governor to declare 
martial law, but it could subject any measures resorted to under such 
a declaration to immediate restraint, Where, though circumstances 
justifying a declaration of martial law did not exist, it had been
(33) Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection 
(1929) 23 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 706 at p.783*
(34) Sterling v. Constantine (1932) 287 U.S. 378.
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proclaimed, the military authority could not impede the normal 
functioning of the court. 0. Hughes/’Jaid:
"If it "be assumed that the Governor was entitled to declare a 
state of insurrection and to bring military force to the aid of civil 
authority, the proper use of that power in this instance was to main­
tain the Federal Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not to 
attempt to override it; to aid in making its process effective and not 
to nullify it; to remove, and not to create, obstructions to the exer-
(55)
cise by the complainants of their rights as judicially declared,"
Where there is no apparent need for declaring martial law, the 
court will only uphold such measures taken by the authority as have a
(36)
reasonable relation with the circumstances calling it forth.
Thus the cases where courts refused to endorse exorbitant claims
of the military authority and refused to sustain absolute rule by
military decrees and regulations, go to prove that martial law can be
qualified, though such a concept has been criticised as a "pernicious 
(37)
doctrine," The concept of qualified martial law has juristic support. 
As Schwartz has said:
"The cases of abuse and their restraint by the courts show that 
martial law action is subject to constitutional limitations; they do 
not disprove the thesis that martial law can be qualified under the
(35) Ibid, at p.404.
(36) Ibid.
(37) U.S. v. Minoro Yasui, 48 F.Supp. 40 at 49-
proper circumstances. It is submitted that the better rule and the
one more consonant with modem conditions, especially where the Federal
Government in its exercise of the war power is concerned, is that a
state of martial rule can exist only to the extent which military
necessity may require. It is, indeed, in most cases something less
than the complete talcing over of civil government, and should operate
although the ordinary courts are functioning where the circumstances so 
(38)
require.M
From all the foregoing considerations one would feel induced to
d-X*
agree with the following views expressed by 0. Innes/of the South 
African Supreme Court on the necessity of legislation regulating 
exercise of powers during martial rule:
"In no respect can martial law be regarded as a good thing: it 
is at the best a lamentable necessity. It imposes a great responsibility 
upon the executive Government; it operates with inevitable harshness 
in certain cases, and it saps the political fibre of the people, A 
retrospect of South African history during the last fifteen year^may 
well give rise to inquiry as to whether the legislature would not have 
done well to regularise and at the same time control the operation of 
the system. With the action of a military commander within the area 
of actual hostilities interference would be alike undesirable and 
impossible. But in places where there are no military operations in
(38) Bernard Schwarts, Law and the Executive in Britain (1949) 
p.309.
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progress, and where yet it may he necessary to exercise special powers 
of supervision and control the position is very different. It ought 
to he possible to legislate for such localities in a way that would 
lessen the burden of martial law both for the Government and the
(39)
people,M
Further, he said that such statute should embody the circumstances 
under which martial law could be proclaimed, things that may be done 
and more important still, things that may not be done, provisions for 
indemnifying those acting within the limits of the powers conferred.
If such a statute were passed two results would follow: (i) to relieve 
those in authority from the temptation to retain martial law after the 
necessity for it had disappeared, and (ii) to prevent the institution
of civil actions pending the passage of an Indemnity Bill.
5* Importance of Judicial Review
Apart from controlling the exercise of inherent powers to meet
the emergency, as already seen, there are other considerations which 
may necessitate judicial review and interference. Statutes have 
occasionally been passed to define the limits of executive action 
during war and rebellion, the conspicuous instances being war-time
(59) Krohn v. The Minister for Defence (1915) APP. DIY. 191 at 202.
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legislations, "both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. To interpret
an Act of Parliament is, as is well known, a judicial function. But
it is also the duty of the courts not to allow anybody to exceed the
powers conferred on him.
(40)
Thus, in a case involving the loss of personal liberty, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had to consider whether a 
colonial Governor could abrogate the existing law of the colony and
(41)
proclaim martial law. The Act of annexation of certain African Terri­
tories empowered the Governor of the Cape Colony to add to the existing 
laws, already in force in the annexed territories, such laws as he 
“shall from time to time by proclamation declare to be in force in 
such territories,1 In 1895 the Governor while acting "in virtue of 
powers vested in m£ by law," issued a proclamation which overthrew the 
established law of the territories with respect to trial, arrest, 
conviction and punishment. The respondent was condemned to imprison­
ment without any trial. The place and duration of his imprisonment 
was left to the uncontrolled discretion of the Governor.
So far as the Proclamation went, Lord Watson said:
"It is an edict, dealing with matters administrative, judicial, 
legislative and executive, in terms which are beyond the competency of 
any authority except an irresponsible sovereign, or a supreme and
(40) Sprigg v. Sigcau (189?) A.C. 238.
(41) Pondoland Annexation Act, 1894*
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unfettered legislature, or some person or "body to whom their functions
have been lawfully delegated. If the Governor and High Commissioner
of the Cape Colony could be shewn to have occupied one or other of
these positions, a Court of law would be compelled, however unwillingly,
to respect his proclamation. If he did not, then his dictatorial edict
was simply an invasion of the individual rights and liberty of a
(42)
British subject.”
In his opinion the Proclamation exceeded the authority delegated 
to the Governor in two particulars. First, it was a new and excep­
tional piece of legislation and differed entirely in character from 
any of the laws, statutes and ordinances which he was authorised to 
proclaim. Secondly, it repealed in substance the whole provisions of 
the existing law with respect to criminal proceedings and thus 
adversely affecting the respondent. Upon these grounds the conclusion 
seemed Inevitable that the issue of the Proclamation was an illegal 
and unwarrantable act.
(43)
Egan v. Macready dealt with a very special case arising during 
the Irifeh disturbances at the end of the First World War. The militant 
forces of the Crown Y;ere called in aid, and Parliament, in order to 
legalise the operations of the armed forces and at the same time to
(44) •
safeguard the liberties of the subject, passed an Act conferring special
U2) (1897) A.C. at p.246.
(43) 1921 Irish Report 265.
(44) The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920.
powers on the armed forces, hut imposing conditions. There was 
power to try any person whether military or civilian, rebel or loyalist, 
by court-martial, but in the case of a trial for a capital offence the 
court-martial had to include a member nominated by the Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland and certified to be a person of legal knowledge and 
experience; a person tried and convicted by a court-martial could 
only be awarded the punishment prescribed for such crime by any 
existing statute or common law.
The court, in deciding the question whether the military authority 
could disregard or by-pass these limitations because they felt that 
the special powers were not sufficient to meet the emergency, posed a 
few queries. Could it be contended that a military authority invested 
by Parliament with this special power was entitled to ignore the Act?
Or could they say "Ho doubt the Act was passed to meet an emergency, 
and we are of opinion that we must be absolutely unrestrained, but we 
find the emergency greater than was contemplated, and we shall act as 
we think right, no matter what the Act of Parliament”? Or could they 
say ”A court-martial specially constituted was prescribed for us, but 
we wonft have such a court-martial. Besides, we shall have a court of 
our own, constituted as we think right, perhaps of a lance-corporal and 
two privates. Further, we must fix our own punishments”?
To those who were risking their lives in suppressing a rebellion 
these sentiments would probably seem natural, but a court of law had 
only a short answer to them: ”If the emergency is greater than was
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contemplated, is it not for Parliament to give further powers or to
(45)
remove the limitations imposed?" Could it "be assumed, Jff. O'Connor M-R. 
asked, that Parliament was in a lethargic condition, incapable of 
energetic action? The contention of the military authorities was that 
the prerogative of the Crown to act as necessity demanded when dealing 
with a state of war was in no way curtailed by Parliamentary legislation 
on the subject, a contention which was directly negatived by the decision
(46)
i-11 Attorney-General v. Be Keyser!s Royal Hotel. Moreover, to concede 
the claim of the military authority to override legislation enacted 
to meet the circumstances created by a state of war would seem to call 
for a new Bill of Rights.
Incidentally, the difficulty created by the rule that legislation 
on matters comprised in the prerogative inevitably restricts the pre­
rogative has resulted in a tendency in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent
(45) Ibid, at p.274.
(46) (1920) A.C. 508. In holding that when a statute is passed it
abridges the Royal Prerogative, Lord Atkinson said: " ... in all 
this legislation there is not a trace of a suggestion that the 
Crown was left free to ignore these statutory provisions, and by 
Its unfettered prerogative do the very things the statutes 
empowered the Crown to do, but free from the conditions and 
restrictions imposed by the statutes. It is quite obvious that 
it would be useless and meaningless for the Legislature to 
impose restrictions and limitations upon, and to attach conditions 
to, the exercise by the &rown of the powers conferred by a 
statute, if the Crown were free at its pleasure to disregard 
these provisions, and by virtue of its prerogative do the very 
thing the statutes empowered it to do. One cannot in the 
construction of a statute attributeto the Legislature (in the 
absence of aompelling words) an intention so absurd." Ibid, 
at p.559.
and in Burma, in recent years, to rely on the prerogative, when dealing 
with war and rebellion, rather than have resort to legislation.
(4?)
In R. v. Allen, 0. Molonyyexpressed a different opinion as to
the source of power of the military authority. He felt unable to accept 
the reasoning of the decision in Egan v. Macready. 0. Molony/had
held that in spite of the Restoration of Ireland Act, 1920, and the 
Firearms Act, 1920, the proceedings of a military court derived their 
sole justification and authority from the existence of actual rebellion. 
The military authority could resort to any measures necessary to restore 
peace and order. By the regulations made under the former Act a court- 
martial could impose the maximum penalty for keeping firearms or 
ammunition by sentencing to penal servitude and under the latter Act 
a sentence of three months' imprisonment in England or two years in 
Ireland, The petitioner argued that when a statutory court-martial 
was empowered to cope with the state of disorder then existing in 
Ireland, it would be unfair if at the same time and place a military 
court should be allowed to try for a similar offence and inflict a 
greater punishment, thus depriving the accused of the legal safeguards
available under those Acts. Though the objection had considerable
C.T.
force, 0. J. Molony/felt that it was "one rather for the consideration 
of Parliament than for this court, which cannot, durante bello, control 
the military authorities, or question any sentence imposed in the 
exercise of martial law." He said that when martial law prevailed the
(47) (1921) 2 I.E. 241.
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military discretion could not be controlled by the court and the 
military authorities were at liberty to ”use special military court 
machinery and to impose any sentence, even death, without being 
disabled, in another case, from applying procedure of a more moderate 
and limited character, or vice versa,” It appears that his conclusions 
were based on the fact that when the proclamations were made introducing 
the special court machinery, Parliament was sitting and had notice of 
the divergence between the practices of such court and those of a 
statutory court-martial and still it did not interfere. It seems that 
his reasoning was not correct.
4* Martial Law Proceedings Not Recognised by Ordinary Courts
Assuming, however, that in some cases the Court may feel compelled 
to intervene in the military sphere, it becomes necessary to consider 
two questions, first, whether it will review decisions by military 
courts under martial law regulations; secondly, whether it will issue 
writs to these courts.
It is, of course, needless to mention that before the courts 
would do either of the two things referred to above, they will be 
inclined to exercise caution in interfering with military action.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Cape Colony refused an application asking 
for an order to the military authorities to issue a pass to the 
petitioner which would enable him to proceed from Cape Town to an
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(48)
adjoining district where he had bought a farm. In the opinion of 
Buchanan, Acting C.J., the Court should "show great caution before 
exercising any censorship over the acts of the military in places where 
martial law properly exists” and therefore he was imwilling to inter­
fere with martial lay/ regulations Y/hich controlled the movement of 
individuals from one place to another.
It is settled beyond doubt that the courts do not ordinarily 
review the decisions of the military courts, excepting where their 
constitution or jurisdiction is challenged. But the position is 
altogether different when military tribunals are set up to try 
civilians or ordinary magistrates1 courts are invested by the military 
authorities with the power to administer martial law regulations.
Some of the South African cases would unmistakably show the assertion 
of judicial supremacy in this respect.
In reviewing certain proceedings in a magistrate’s court 
purporting to have been taken under the direction of the military 
authorities, /. Buchanan'fmaintained that, being an inferior court, 
a magistrate’s court was subject to review by the Supreme Court.
A magistrate’s court as such had no right to administer martial lav/.
He, however, expressed the opinion that the case would have been 
different if the petitioners were tried by a court composed of the
(49)
members of the armed forces.
(48) Ex.parte Minaar (1902) Sheil 217*
(49) Rex v. Kalp^IpOl) 12 Cape Times Reports 1008.
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A conviction by the Resident magistrate, specially deputed by 
the military authority, was quashed by the Supreme Court of the Cape 
Colony on the ground that the mere insertion of the expression "Martial 
Law Jurisdiction" on the top of the charge sheet did not invest the 
magistrate with the authority to decide cases of contravention of
e.j,
martial law. 0. J. Le Villiers/said that "the fact that the magistrate 
purported to exercise Martial Law jtirisdiction does not render valid 
what he did in his capacity as magistrate. In that capacity he had 
no martial law jurisdiction whatever, and could not be specially 
deputed by the commandant to decide cases of contravention of martial
(50)
law."
(51)
Similarly, in Rex v. Link and Wenner9 the conviction of the 
petitioners were quashed as there was no civil warrant for their 
detention and the trial was before a civil court at the instance of the 
military authorities. J. BuchananJ-said: "The Court had consistently 
laid down in all cases which had come before them that whiM they 
would not interfere with the military authorities in martial law 
districts, at the same time the military authorities could not expect 
any assistance from the civil courts to enable them to carry out their 
orders. The magistrate, as a civil functionary, had no right to try
(52)
this case ... "
(50) Rex v. Tan Vuuren (1905) 12 Cape Times Report 902.
(51) IT9O5) 12 Cape Times Reports 144*
(52) Ibid.
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(53)
In Rex v. Walters the Supreme Court of Cape Colony quashed the 
proceedings before a magistrate’s court as they were found grossly 
irregular. The applicant was tried for contravention of certain 
martial law regulations. His grievance was that the magistrate did 
not ask him to plead or produce witnesses and further denied him the 
opportunity of cross-examination. He was not allowed to have any 
legal assistance. As the military authority refused to produce the 
records in the court below, the Supreme Court based its decision on 
the facts disclosed in the petitioner's affidavit.
In the cases where the magistrate purported to act, not in his
capacity as magistrate but as Deputy Administrator of Martial Lav/, the
Court, however, showed reluctance to interfere with his judgment. In
(54)
Rex v. Van Reenan two criminal judgments came up for review before the 
Supreme Court of Cape Colony. The reasons for its refusal to interfere 
were "this Court cannot recognise the court of the Deputy Administrator 
of Martial Law without recognising it as a legal court." It was not a 
legal court inasmuch as its constitution was not authorised by the law. 
Moreover, it was administering a system of laws in the shape of martial 
law regulations which had no legal validity whatever.
Prom the foregoing considerations it becomes quite apparent, 
therefore, that though a magistrate's court is an inferior court over 
which the Supreme Court will always have jurisdiction and control, its
(55) Ibid, at p.805.
(54) Ibid, at p.557.
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proceedings when it actually acted as a martial law court will he 
beyond the recognition of the Supreme Court. The so-called martial 
law courts were never recognised as courts at all nor proceedings 
before them considered as legal proceedings.
The question whether the Court has jurisdiction to issue writs 
to the military authorities acting under a proclamation of martial 
law was considered in an Irish case by a proclamation of 10 December, 
1920, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland placed certain counties to be 
under martial law. The military authorities declared the unauthorised 
carrying of arms to be punishable breath and also issued orders for 
the holding of military courts. The appellants, who were civilians, 
were tried by a military court on a charge of improperly carrying 
arms, were convicted and sentenced to death. The appellants, who 
were civilians, were tried by a military court on a charge of improperly 
carrying arms, convicted, and sentenced to death. The appellants 
applied in the Chancery Division for a writ of Prohibition against 
the military court, the Commander-in-Chief and the General Officer 
Commanding to prohibit them fr<m proceeding further with the trial or 
from carrying into execution any judgment against them. Their con­
tention was that the aforesaid court was illegal and had no jurisdiction 
to deal with the matter. /. Powell£refused the application and the 
Court of Appeal in Ireland dismissed an appeal from his order.
(55)
On an appeal to the House of Lords the decision centred round the
(55) In re Clifford v. 0 1 Sullivan (l92l) 2 A.C. 570.
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technical scope of the writ of Prohibition to stay proceedings of a
military tribunal. A writ of Prohibition is, as described by Viscount
Cave, "a judicial writ, issuing out of a Court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court for the purpose of preventing the
inferior court from usurping a jurisdiction with which it was not
legally vested, or in other words, to compel courts entrusted with
(56)
judicial duties to keep within the limits of their jurisdiction.11
He, then, proceeded to consider whether the so-called military 
court whose proceedings were challenged as illegal could be deemed as 
a court or a legal tribunal in any legal sense of those terms. No such 
claim was, however, advanced on behalf of the military authorities.
MIt was not a court-martial, that is to say, a tribunal regularly 
constituted under military law, but a body of military officers 
entrusted by the commanding officer with the duty of inquiring into 
certain alleged breaches of his commands contained in the Proclamation,
(56) Ibid, at p.582. WillesXin London Gorprn. v. Cox, L.R.2 H.L. 
at p.2545 an(^  Lord Blackburn in Mackonochie v. Lord Penzance,
6 App. Gas. at p.443 supported this definition. They expressed 
the opinion that the writ should only issue to a court having 
some jurisdiction which it was attempting to exceed.. In Peg, v. 
Local Govt. Board, 10 Q.B.0. at p.321, 34. J. Brett/expressed 
the opinion that the Court should not be chary of granting 
prohibition, and that whenever the Legislature entrusts to 
any body of persons, other than the superior courts, the power 
of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the Court OLight to 
control those powers if they attempt to go beyond the powers 
given to them by Act of Parliament. In Clifford and 0*Sullivan 
no such powers, as was pointed out by Viscount Gave, had been 
entrusted to the so-called military court either by Parliament 
or by the common law.
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and of advising him as to the manner in which he should deal with the 
offences $ and its "sentences," if confirmed, will derive their force 
not from the decision of the military court hut from the authority of
(57)
the officer commanding His Majestyfs forces in the field."
The House of Lords was, therefore, of the opinion that however 
wide a view might he taken of the power of the courts to grant prohibi­
tion, it would not lie in the present case. Moreover, there was the 
further difficulty caused by the fact that the officers constituting 
the so-called military court had long since completed their investigation 
and nothing remained to he done by them. The issue of a writ or 
prohibition directed to them would, therefore, be of no avail.
Where a prisoner was confined in a civil gaol under a warrant 
received from the military authority it was held that "the gaoler, as 
a civil servant of the law, has no right to hold a prisoner on the 
order of anybody except of a duly constituted civil officer of the
Crown," and as he had no warrant from such officer he was not entitled
(58)
to keep custody of the prisoner.
A letter to the applicant was opened by military press censors 
appointed under the authority of the General Officer commanding in 
Natal. He pressed for an assurance that this should not occur again. 
While /. MasonJ.admitted the general principle that "under the post
(57) IMd., at 581.
(58) Reineclce v. The Attorney-General (1902) 11 Shiel 565*
office and the general law, it was undoubtedly the duty of the 
Postmaster-General to have the letter in question delivered to the 
applicant, and neither he nor the press censors had under those laws, 
any right to deal otherwise with the letter, whatever may have been 
the motives and whoever may have professed to authorise the act, no 
absolute illegality can be defended on the plea of superior orders," 
he concluded that in the present case "the supervision of letters 
likely to contain such information which may reach the enemy seems on 
the fact of it not an unreasonable precaution." Mas 03$  however,
did not think it advisable to decide upon affidavits such a contro­
versial question whether any necessity for supervision existed or
(59)
not.
(60)
Ifa Toit v. Marais certain livestock belonging to the plaintiff 
was seized by the military authority. The plaintiff subsequently 
followed the military column and was told by the officer in command 
that he could take back his stock or, if he were unable to find his 
stock, to take any other animals in charge of the force to make up 
the full number. Later on the plaintiff found some of his own stock 
in the possession of the defendant who also got back his stock from 
the military authority. The defendant had admitted to the plaintiff 
that he had more stock than originally belonged to him. The plaintiff
(59) W. B. Morcom v. The Postmaster General (1900) 21 Natfes&al Law 
Report, 32.
(60) (1964) 15 The Gape Times Report 139*
sued the defendant for the return of his stock or their value. In 
holding that seizure by martial law did not change either the plain­
tiff’s or the defendant’s ownership in their property, /. Hopleyl. 
said:
"This is a system which the civil law cannot possibly recognise,
nor can we hold for one moment that such proceedings changed the
dominion of the stock acquired by the military in this way. Stock
taken from a suspected rebel remains his just the same as the stock
(6l)
taken from a loyalist remains his."
5. The Abrogation of the Constitutional Guarantees
To what extent does a declaration of martial law abrogate the 
civil law and dispense with the restrictions imposed by the Constitu­
tion? Theoretically speaking, the laws are silent when martial law 
is enforced. They are, from their very nature and in essence, 
fundamentally opposed. I^et in almost all cases when martial law is 
in force the common law is not entirely superseded 5 both have 
co-existed - their respective jurisdictions being defined under the 
proclamation. Clashes were inevitable/for discretionary powers will 
inevitably be exceeded. But as the courts have shown an increasing 
awareness and a better understanding of the relation between judicial
(6l) Ibid, 142.
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control and executive or military action, such conflicts have been
few and occasional. But the willingness of the judges to accommodate
the appropriate authority in its onerous and responsible task of
restoring peace and order does not mean that they have rushed to one
extreme of upholding every unlawful order.
Martial lav/ as such cannot be declared in England, but in the
United States, where such declarations have not infrequently been
made, the courts have been obliged to pronounce on the limits of the
(62)
invasion upon the constitutional guarantees. In discussing the 
effect of a declaration of martial law there Professor Willoughby 
has commented:
"There is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in .American 
law as a declaration of martial law whereby military is substituted 
for civil law. So-called declarations of martial law are, indeed, 
often made, but the legal effect of these goes no further than to 
warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon by the 
executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order, and 
that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and 
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more
(65)
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."
(64)
In Ex parte Milligan the American Supreme Court discussed at
(62) Y/e have discussed the American cases in Chapter 4*
(63) Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, Vol.II, 
at p.1234 (1910). “
(64) (1866) 4 Wall 2.
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length the claim of the armed forces to try an American citizen when 
the courts were peacefully transacting their business. To every person 
charged with crime the American Constitution guaranteed ’the inestimable 
privilege of trial by jury.1 "This privilege is a vital principle, 
underlying the whole administration of criminal justice; it is not held 
by sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or
(65)
political necessity." Justice Davies, who delivered the opinion of 
the court, could find no reason why the birthright of every American 
citizen accused of committing a crime to be tried and punished according 
to the law should be so readily interfered with when the courts in 
Indiana "needed no bayonets to protect it, and required no military 
aid to execute its judgments."
The enormity of the crime or the stupendous moral indignation 
against it is no justification for abolishing the normal judicial 
process. When it was conclusively proved that the judges who were 
commissioned during the Rebellion were eminently distinguished for 
patriotism and "were provided with juries, upright, intelligent, and 
selected by a marshal appointed by the President," it could be asserted 
that "the Government had no right to conclude that Milligan, if guilty, 
would not receive in that court merited punishment," specially because 
its records disclosed that it was constantly trying similar offences 
without any interruption. Justice Davies stated admirably the reasons
(65) Ibid.
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why the law and not men should rule when there was no colossal civil 
commotion in the countryi
"The power of punishment is alone through the means which the 
laws have provided for that purpose, and if they are ineffectual, 
there is an immunity from punishment, no matter how great an offender 
the individual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the 
sense of justice of the country, or endangered its safety. By the 
protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protec­
tion, and they are at the mercy of the wicked rulers, or the clamour 
of an excited people. If there was law to justify the military trial,
it is not our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty
(66)
to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings."
6* Interference with Personal Liberty
The propositions that martial law may lawfully be applied when 
overpowering necessity exists, and that the military authority has no 
right to interfere with the personal liberty of the citizens, are 
contradictory. Prom the very nature of the circumstances such inter­
ference may only be normally expected. "Indeed that some rights of 
liberty must be interfered with by military operations is as certain 
as that there must be interference with some rights of property. A
(66) Ibid.
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commander must, for instance, have power to control the movements of 
non-combatants on the actual field of hostilities or on his line of 
communications! he must have power to control them in his camps or in
(67)
the towns which he defends against the enemy." Such interference finds
support from the principle that "commission of an act otherwise
(68)
tortious is justifiable if necessary for the public good." Salus 
populi becomes the supreme law.
The appropriateness of any military measure affecting the 
personal liberty may, therefore, be assailed by questioning whether 
it was necessary, not by challenging the authority to do so.
It is not the power of control, but the power to punish, that 
has evoked so much criticism. "Temporary restraints upon person and 
property may be defended before the courts as necessary measures of 
prevention. Rather different, however, is punishment by military
(69)
authority." It would, then, be more relevant to inquire what measures 
of control will be deemed necessary and, therefore, lawful.
In the first instance the military authority will issue regula­
tions which will generally limit the rights of assembly, movement and 
expression and gradually other restrictions. Exercise of their powers 
will start when violations of these regulations arise. Arrest and 
detention will mark the first steps and finally military courts will
(67) H. Erie Richards, Martial Law, 18 L.Quar.R. 133 at
(68) Fairman, Martial Rale (1929)~~23 Ill.L.K. 766 at 776.
(69) Ibid, at 78J.
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be set up to try and punish offenders for breach of martial la?/ 
regulations.
Cases will now be started in the civil courts either against 
such arrest and detention or trial and punishment. It will be up to 
the court, if still functioning, to decide ?/hether it will interfere 
with the military acts. So far the preponderance of judicial opinion 
has, as already seen, been in favour of the principle of judicial 
non-intervention ?/hen actual war is raging. But when the existence 
of war is not so obvious or if no reasonable regulation between the 
particular measure and the necessity could be established, the court 
has shown a tendency to restrain such exercise of power. The two 
considerations before the Court have been clearly indicated in the 
following words;
"On the one hand lies that consideration for the individual 
that has dictated our bills of rights - fundamental rules to guarantee 
civil liberty and insure fair play in the exercise of governmental 
power ... It is no doubt wise, as it is lawful, that in time of over­
powering necessity executive process should serve as a temporary 
substitute for judicial process. But the executive should be sure 
that it is indeed a crisis, and not merely an hallucination.
"There is a converse principle of policy: the public should not 
be exposed to the hazards of hair-breadth escapes merely to afford 
gratuitous opportunities to insurrectionists. It is not only a power
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but a duty of the Governor to put down violence and enforce the law.
To hit the precise line of conduct which necessity dictates may indeed 
be difficult ... Officers may have to act summarily and cannot be 
required to weigh their measures with that scrupulous nicety which is 
to be expected in a court of law. Situations must be viewed as they
(70)
appeared at the moment, not in the light of the event.1
To maintain the balance between the opposing considerations may 
indeed be difficult, but it is equally important to remember that 
the personal liberty which "consists in the power of locomotion, of 
changing situation, or moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s 
inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by
(71)
due course of law" is a natural right of the subject and without cogent 
reason should never be abridged or trifled with. As Stephen saidi "Of 
great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal 
liberty; for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, 
magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whenever he or his officers thought 
proper as in France was once daily practised by the Crown, there would
(72)
be an end of all other rights and immunities."
(70) Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection 
(1929) 23 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, at pp.787-8.
(71) Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1, at p.143 
(8th edition).
(72) Ibid.
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7• Encroachments on Rights to Property
hoes martial law require the supersession of the ordinary law 
of property? In order to be able to subdue rebellion or offer effec­
tive resistance to an enemy it is absolutely necessary that the armed 
forces should have the power to enter any premises or destroy or acquire 
any property. The reasons are quite obvious, "ho military operations 
can be carried on unless the troops can enter on private property^ can 
throw up entrenchments and construct other military works 5 can destroy 
houses or other structures which interfere with their action or afford
(73)
assistance to that of the enemy."
It appears the maxim salus republicae suprema lex which requires 
the subordination of the rights of the individuals to the necessities 
of the State, would make such trespass lawful. Some of the few English 
precedents which considered the extent of military interference with 
the rights to property have laid down that no action for damage to 
property will lie against the military authority.
The acceptance of the principle that the commission of a tort 
may be justified did not only refer to cases arising in time of war 
when "a man may justify making fortifications on another’s land
(74)
without license", but also to other cases "where it sounds for the
(75)
public good." Thus, houses may be pulled down to stop a fire, or
(73) H. Erie Richards, Martial haw, 18 Law Q.R. at p.134 (1902). 
f74) Per/. KingsmillJ.,1 Dyer 36 b. (1537)
(75) rbid.
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goods may "be cast overboard to save a ship or the lives of those on
(76)
hoard.
In an action for a nuisance arising from the burning of bricks 
on the defendant's own land lying adjacent to the plaintiff's dwelling- 
house, WillesJ.considered the exceptions to the general liability 
for tortious acts:
"The common law right which every proprietor of a dwelling-house 
has to have the air uncontaminated and unpolluted, is subject to this 
qualification, that necessities may arise for an interference with 
that right pro bono publico, to this extent, that such interference be 
in respect of a matter essential to the business of life, and be 
conducted in a reasonable and proper manner, and in a reasonable and
(77)
proper place."
WillesJ.found analogies from two other examples which made 
lawful such acts as were done of necessity to avoid a greater harm: 
"Every man has a right to enjoy his character untainted and 
uncontaminated by the breath of slander: but that right is subject to 
the rule as to privileged communications, which justifies and permits 
a reasonable publication of defamatory matter, even though it should 
amount to a charge of felony. So every man has a right to the
(76) Pollock's haw of Torts, 15th ed., p.121 (l95l)» "The maritime 
lav; of general average assumes, as its very foundation, that 
the destruction of property under such conditions of danger is 
justifiable."
(77) Hole v. Barlow (1858) 4 C.B.N.S. 334 at 345.
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enjoyment of his land: hut, in the event of a foreign invasion the
Queen may take the land for the purpose of setting up defences thereon
for the general good of the nation. In these and such like cases,
(78)
private convenience must yield to public necessity."
That the rights and liberties of the subject could be lawfully 
subordinated to public necessity was also conceded by St. John, leading 
counsel for Hampden. Thus, he said: "My Lords, in these times of war 
I shall admit not only His Majesty but likewise every man that hath 
power in his hands may take the goods of any within the realm, pull 
down their houses or burn their com to cut off victuals from the 
enemy, and do all other things that conduce to the safety of the
(79)
kingdom without respect had to any man's property."
Such property as may be taken for the necessary defence and
safety of the country cannot be converted to any other use excepting
that for the defence purposes. In the Case of the King's Prerogative 
(80)
in Saltpetre the judges were of the opinion that "when enemies come 
against the realm to the sea-coast, it is lawful to come upon my land 
adjoining to the same coast, to make trenches or bulwarks for the 
defence of the realm, for every subject hath benefit by it. And 
therefore by the common law, every man may come upon my land for the 
defence of the realm, as appears 8 Ed. IT. 23. And in such case or
(78) Ibid.
(79) R. v. Hampden (1637) 3 St. Tr. 825.
(80) T16O7) 12 Co. Rep. 12: 77 Eng. Rep. 1294.
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such extremity they may dig for gravel for the making of bulwarks; 
for this is for the public, and every one hath benefit by it ...
And in this case the rule is true Princeps et respublica ex .justa
(8ll
causa possunt rem me am auferre. "
With the recognition of the supreme necessity the judges did
not, however, lose sight of the principle that "after the danger is
over, the trenches and bulwarks ought to be removed, so that the owner
(82<>
shall not have prejudice in his inheritance."
Where law gives no remedy to persons who suffer, they are left
without any choice. "There are many cases in which individuals sustain
an injury for which the law gives no action; for instance, pulling
down houses or raising bulwarks for the preservation and defence of
(83)
the kingdom against the King's enemies." Here, the court was con­
sidering whether the acts of commissioners appointed under a Paving 
Act causing damage to an individual made them liable to action. If 
they did not exceed their jurisdiction and the Act did not provide for
satisfaction to those who might suffer, judicial intervention was
£ * J.
most unlikely. Thus Lord 0. J. Kenyon/said:
"If the Legislature think it necessary, as they do in many
cases, they enable the commissioners to award satisfaction to the 
individuals who happen to suffer; but if there be no such power, the
(81) Ibid, at 1295.
(82) Ibid.
(85) The Governor & Co. of the British Gast Plate Mnfg. (1792)
4 T.R. 794 at 979» Per <?• Bullerl*
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parties are without remedy, provided the commissioners do not exceed 
their jurisdiction: hut it does not seem to me that the commissioners 
acting under this Act have been guilty of any excess of jurisdiction.
Some individuals suffer an inconvenience under all these Acts of 
Parliament; but the interests of individuals must give way to the
(84)
accommodation of the public.u
Common sense also dictates that in time of war the protection of
(85)
private property will in practice be impossible. It is not so much the
difficulty of enforcing the law which is conclusive against the existence
of a remedy? nbut it is an argument of a practical kind in favour of the 
(86)
rule enunciated" in the cases we have so far considered. Such practical 
considerations, therefore, have led the judges to hold that in time of 
war rights of property may lawfully be infringed and no action will 
lie against the authority.
(84) Ibid, at p.796.
(85) "Assume that an owner applied to the High Court for protection
against a threatened trespass on his property by the military 
for the purpose of their operations, On what grounds could 
the Court refuse relief in such a case if the acts complained 
of were without doubt illegal? It is certain that no Court 
could hamper the action of the military in their actual conduct 
of operations, but to refuse an injunction in such a case would 
of itself be an acquiescence in the suspension of the law."
H. Erie Richards, Martial Law, 18 L.Q.R. 133 •
(86) Ibid.
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CHAPTER 8 
THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF WAR POWERS
1. The Scope of the War Power
The relation "between the exercise of governmental powers during 
war and the constitutional guarantees has "been the subject-matter for 
dispute from early times. The true understanding of the relationship 
was nicely brought out in the ’homespun metaphor’ used by President 
Lincolns "By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a 
limb must be amputated to save a life, but a life is never wisely given
(i)
to save a limb.”
War is admittedly a supreme national crisis. As in other crises, 
so also during the unusual circumstances of war men are naturally 
inclined to ignore law and reason and act on first impulses. What 
seemed to them normal and indispensable during peace time now appears 
impracticable. The result may be confusion. The types of criticism 
which are usually made with respect to the exercise of war powers and 
its constitutionality have been referred to by Mr. C. E. Hughes, as he 
then was. "Some altogether misconceive the constitution. Others 
vaguely fear that we are serving temporary exigency at the expense 
of our fundamental lav/, and that we are thus breeding a lawless 
constitution - ignoring its spirit which is a serious menace to our
(l) Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National 
Emergency, 55 HarT Law Review, 1278 (1942)• ~
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future. Others seek to raise doubts of power in order to embarrass
the prosecution of the war. And there seem to be still others who
in their zeal impatiently and without thought put the constitution
(2)
aside as having no relation to these times.” None of them truly 
reflect the real position. Whenever there is a need to consider war 
powers under the constitution, the true interpretation would seem to 
be as stated by Mr. Hughes;
"While we are at war, we are not in revolution. We are making 
war as a Nation organised under the Constitution from which the 
established national authorities derive all their powers either in 
war or in peace. The Constitution is as effective today as it ever 
was and the oath to support it is as binding. But the framers of the
(3)
Constitution did not contrive an imposing spectacle of impotency."
What is actually meant by the war powers of the Government? 
Again, according to Mr. Hughes, the war power of the national govern-
(4)
ment is "the power to wage war successfully," The comprehensive
d. j*>
nature of this power has been stated by 0. J. Stone/'of the United
States Supreme Court in the following words;
"It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as 
substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not
(2) C. E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution (1917)* Report 
of the American Bar Association, Yol. 42, at p.2^2.
(3) Ibid, at p.232.
(4) Ibid, at p.239-
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restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse 
of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national defence, 
including the protection of wax materials and the members of the armed 
forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise, prosecu-
(5)
tion and progress of war.”
In both the U.S.A.. and England the legislature has the power to
enact war laws conferring on the Executive all necessary powers for the
successful prosecution of the conflict. Though the powers of Congress
are defined by the Constitution, the war time experience of the Nation
was sufficient to settle the Court’s practice. It realised that when
a nation is in the grip of a war and fighting for its very existence,
it is futile to proceed to restrain the legislative authority. "The
idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing
for the national defence, is one of those refinements which owe their
(6)
origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened." In England 
though laws enacted by Parliament cannot be declared ultra vires, yet 
the regulations made thereunder were challenged before the courts as 
unconstitutional. In interpreting the scope of these regulations the 
courts of England, as we shall see, adopted a different view during
(7)
the Second World War than that in the First World War. They went even
(5) Hirabayashi v. U.S. (1943) 320 U.S. 81 at p.93*
(6) Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 26.
(7) "The English Courts have gone further in sustaining Executive
action dLiring the Second World War than they did in the earlier
conflict." Bernard Schwartz, haw and the Executive in Britain,
at p.327.
further than the courts in U.S.A. in according judicial approval of
(8)
the exercise of all necessary powers by the Executive.
Another principle which is to be remembered in reconciling
constitutional guarantees with the overriding war powers is that the
(9)
constitution is not self-destruetive. In discussing the proposition 
that the constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring 
powers on the one hand and talcing them away on the other, Mr. Hughes 
saids
" ... The power has been expressly given to Congress to prosecute 
war, and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying that power into execution. That povj-er explicitly conferred 
and absolutely essential to the safety of the Nation is not destroyed 
or impaired by any later provision of the Constitution, or by any one
(8) Bernard Schwartz, haw and the Executive in Britain (1949) srt 
p.349. "The lessons of American history are even more 
significant in disproving the thesis that freedom from all 
judicial control is essential to the effective waging of war. 
Whenever the existence of the nation has been at stake - from 
the struggle for independence to the last conflict - virtually 
unlimited powers to preserve it have been assumed. Yet at no 
time has it been thought necessary to subscribe to a doctrine 
such as that articulated by the House of Lords in Liversidge v. 
Anderson." (1942) A.C. 206.
(9) In Billings y. TJ.S. (1913) 232 U.S. 261 at p.282, Chief 
Justice White of the U.S. Supreme Court, while considering 
whether the taxing power granted expressly by the Constitution 
was taken away by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
said: "It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution 
is not self-destructive. In other words, that the power which 
it confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on 
the other ... ".
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of the amendments. These may all be construed so as to avoid mailing
the Constitution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of
the citizen from "unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all
(10)
hazard the common defence and the perpetuity of our liberties.1
Without taking too extreme a view of the court1 s approach in
solving the seeming conflict between the exercise of executive powers
during war and the claims to fundamental liberties of the citizen, it
may be said that the paramount consideration before the court has
always been that the war measures must be successful. "Defence
measures will not, and often should not, be held within the limits
(ii)
that bind civil authority in peace." For, as J. Douglasfquite aptly
(12)
said, "peacetime procedures do not necessarily fit wartime needs." 
Frankly speaking, some interference with the enjoyment of rights and 
liberties protected by the constitution is inevitable. "However 
precious the liberty of the subject may be, there is something for 
which it may well be, to some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, 
namely national success in the war, or escape from national Blunder
(13)
or enslavement."
But, at the same time, while conceding the supremacy of war 
measures and military judgment, it has also been felt that such 
measures must be "used only in the most extreme circumstances ...
(10) G. E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution (1917)- Report 
of the American Bar Association, Vol. 42, at p.238.
(11) ICorematsu v. UJ3. (1944) 323 U.S. 214 at p.244.
(12) Birabayashi v. U.S. (1942) 320 U.S. at 106.
(13) Rex y. Halliday (1917) A.C. 269 at p.271.
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(1A)
There must he a careful balancing of interests,"
(15)
In Korematsu v. U.S. J. FrankfurterJof the American Supreme Court 
considered at length the relation between war powers and the constitu­
tional limitations. He dismissed as unrealistic the idea which attributed 
illegality to a war measure judging It by peace time standards. "The 
validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly In the
context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because
(l 6)
like action in times of peace would be lawless." One cannot just say 
that when the armed forces are exercising powers allowable by war needs, 
they are resorting to unconstitutional methods. That would "suffuse
(17)
a part of the Constitution with an atmosphere of unoonstitutionality."
Within their respective spheres of action, which are, of course, very
different, both the judges and the military authorities are functioning
within the limits imposed by the Constitution. "Military authorities
are no more outside the bounds of obedience to the Constitution than
(IS)
are judges within theirs." The Constitution is not an instrument for 
"dialectic subtleties", so that one could recognise that reasonable 
military precautions in time of war were absolutely essential and at 
the same time deny them legal validity. "If a military order such as
(M) Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1945) 527 U.S. 514 at p.555, per Justice 
Murphy.
(15) (1944) 323 U.S. 214.
(16) Itdd, at p.224- "The armed services must protect a society,
not merely its Constitution ... Defence measures will not,
and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil 
authority in peace." Per /. Jacksonfat 244*
(17) Ibid, at p.224.
(18) Ibid, at p.224.
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that under review does not transcend the means appropriate for 
conducting war, such action "by the military is as constitutional as 
would he any authorised action hy the Interstate Commerce Commission
(19)
within the limits of the constitutional power to regulate commerce,M
In the same case JacksonLexpressed the opinion that "it would 
he impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each 
specific military command in an area of prohahle operations will conform
(20)
to conventional tests of constitutionality." But he, for that reason, 
found no justification to "distort the Constitution to approve all that
(21)
the military may deem expedient." The armed forces are merely carrying 
out a defence programme. "He Is not making law in the sense the courts 
know the term. He issues orders, and they may have a certain authority 
as military commands, although they may he very had as constitutional
(22)
law."
Like other problems created hy war, the judicial problem is also 
no less baffling, since the task of reconciling the conflicting claims 
made simultaneously on behalf of the authority and the subjects is not 
so simple and easy. The nature of the judicial reasoning can become 
hardly more delicate, because whatever solution they have to offer 
must antagonise neither the one nor the other. With the necessity
(19) Ibid, at p.225.
(20) Ibid, at p.244*
(21) Ibid, at p.244«
(22) Ibid, at p.244'
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to realise and fulfil the natural expectations of both, the Court is 
handicapped hy its own inexperience as to what is actually necessary 
for defence purposes and what is merely redundant and superfluous.
As on the one hand they must he guided hy the eternal wisdom embodied 
in the Latin maxim, Salus populi est suprema lex, so also 011 the other 
hand they cannot afford to forget the classic utterance of Justice 
Davies in the Milligan cases
"Do doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever 
invented hy the wit of man than that any of its (the D.S. Constitution) 
provisions can he suspended during any of the great exigencies of
(23)
Government. Such a doctrine tends directly to anarchy and despotism ... 1 
Though the judges when deciding cases arising in emergency or 
war have always had the consciousness that "if hard cases make had
(24)
law, emergencies may make worse," the present-day concern of the judges 
is to strike a balance between these two extremes. As we shall presently 
see that there have been differences of opinion among the English and 
American judges as to their power to review the executive action during 
war, it can also he fairly said that all of them have shown their 
understanding of the relative values of conceding essential powers to 
the executive and military authority and upholding the liberties of the 
subjects whenever they can. Justice Rutledge of the U.S. Supreme Court
(23) Ex parte Milligan (1866) 4 Wall (U.S.) 120,
(24) Sir Cecil T. Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law(l94l) 
p.65.
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has remarkably summed up the modern judicial attitude:
"War such as we now fight calls into play the full power of 
government in extreme emergency. It compels invention of lega^, as 
of martial tools adequate for the times' necessity. Inevitably 
some will be strange, if also life-saving, instruments for a people 
accustomed to peace and the normal working of constitutional limita­
tions. Citizens must surrender or forego exercising rights which in 
other times could not be impaired. But it does not suspend the 
judicial duty to guard whatever liberties will not imperil the
(25)
paramount national interest."
2. Judicial Review of Action Taken under the War Power
If such be the nature of the war power it becomes obvious that 
all other governmental agencies, including the judiciary, will of 
necessity be subordinated to military demands, at least so long as the 
emergency lasts. For our purposes It is important to know whether the 
courts are actually rendered powerless by war-time legislations or 
whether the limitations on their power to review and control are merely 
self-imposed, their guiding principle being the consciousness of the 
fact of war.
As the legislative authority is supereme in England, Parliament
(25) Yakus v. ILS. (1943) 321 U.S. 414 at p.461.
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can at any time preclude the court's jurisdiction on any matter 
whatsoever. It will, however, he within the jurisdiction of the court 
to decide whether it has done so hy any particular legislation. In 
the United States of America Congress has to reckon with a written 
constitution defining the powers of the three governmental organs and 
declaring the fundamental rights of citizens. If, therefore, any 
Federal legislation disregards any constitutional provisions the Court 
may declare such Act ultra vires. Congress has no power to oust the 
Court's jurisdiction. The limitations upon the reviewing power of the 
courts are in America imposed hy themselves. No outside authority can 
ever order them not to interfere with any executive action or legis­
lative measure. But, as has heen aptly said, "it is the courts in
Britain, no less than in this country (U.S.A.) that are the ultimate
(26)
judges of the extent of their authority on review."
It may he mentioned that the courts in England may declare any 
regulation or executive action as ultra vires as being in excess of 
the powers granted hy a statute or common law.
In interpreting war-time legislations and regulations made 
thereunder, several questions relating to judicial power to review 
and control have heen raised and considered. In the first place it 
has heen asked whether the courts should adopt a different attitude from 
that followed in peacetime in construing such Acts and regulations.
(26) Bernard Schwartz, haw and the Executive in Britain, p.165.
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The very fact that the nation has become involved in war obviously 
creates a bias in the judicial mind. The whole approach is marked by 
the consideration "it is important to have in mind that the regulation
(27)
in question is a war measure."
(28)
Similarly, in Rex v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig, Lord Finlay, L.C., 
in holding that regulation 14 B of the Defence of the Realm Regulations 
was a proper exercise of the power conferred, said:
"The statute was passed at a time of supreme national danger, 
which still exists. The danger of espionage and of damage by secret 
agents to ships, railways, munitions works, bridges, etc., had to be 
guarded against. The restraint imposed may be a necessary measure of 
preaaution, and in the interests of the whole nation it may be regarded
(29)
as expedient that such an order should be made in suitable cases."
Though expediency or practical considerations may weaken the 
presumption in favour of the liberty of the subject, it has been 
emphatically asserted that the fact of war cannot make any difference 
in the judicial approach in interpreting such regulations. "This is 
not to say that the courts ought to adopt in war-time canons of 
constructions different from those which they follow in peacetime. The 
fact that the nation is at war is no justification for any relaxation 
of the vigilance of the courts in seeing that the law is duly observed,
(27) Per Lord Macmillan in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 at 
P • 2 5 1 .
(28) (1917) A.C.269.
(29) Ibid, at p.270.
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especially in a matter so fundamental as the liberty of the subject -
(50)
rather the contrary."
The position may, however, be differently stated. It may be 
that the courts will maintain the same attitude in interpreting the 
disputed regulations issued under war-time legislations, but it is 
possible that words and expressions used in them will assume an alto­
gether new meaning under the stress of ’total war.’ It is within 
common experience that men in their everyday life shift emphasis to 
mark their behaviour in the light of the changing circumstances. When 
a supreme national emergency places the life of a nation in jeopardy 
"it may well be that a regulation for the defence of the realm may 
quite properly have a meaning which, because of its drastic invasion 
of the liberty of the subject, the courts would be slow to attribute
(31)
to a peace time measure." The court should also consider the objects 
for which a particular Act is passed and its interpretation should 
facilitate and not frustrate such objects. Referring to the need to 
interpret regulation 18 B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939?
3°) Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C,206 at 251, per Lord Macmillan.
31) Ibid. So also Lord Romer said; "We are dealing here with an 
Act passed and regulations were made under it in times of a 
great national emergency, and in view of this circumstance and 
of the objects which that Act and those regulations so plainly 
had in view, the courts should, in my opinion, prefer that 
construction which is the least likely to imperil the safety of 
this country ... The context and circumstances in which they are 
used may force one to the conclusion that even the most familiar 
words and expressions are used in other than their ordinary 
meaning, and this is the case here." Pp.280-1.
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without losing sight of the purpose for which it was issued, Lord 
Macmillan said:
"The purpose of the regulation is to ensure public safety, and
it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather
than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. That is in
accordance with a general rule applicable to the interpretation of all
statutes or statutory regulations in peace time as well as in war
(32)
time."
Lord Atkin, in delivering a dissenting judgment, was not prepared 
to concede any latitude in interpreting a statute or regulation by 
reason of the existence of war. "In this country, amid the clash of 
arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak
(33) (34)
the same language in war as in peace." In Rex v. Halliday, Lord Shaw
of Dunfermline, who dissented from the majority opinion, also uttered 
the same warning when he said that if the executive found it convenient 
to seek refuge to the device of orders-in-council and the judiciary 
"approach any such action of the government in a spirit of complaince 
rather than of independent scrutiny" there would lie grave constitutional
(35)
and public danger. Such views are no doubt inspired from the highest 
motives but they are, it may be submitted, too strict and therefore N 
extreme.
(32) Ibid, at p.251.
(33) Ibid, at p.244.
(34) (1917) A.C. 260.
(35) Ibid, at p.286.
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Whether it is hue to imperceptible change in the judicial sense 
of values or in the very meaning of words under the stress of war, it 
is undeniably true that war time legislation will receive favoured 
treatment and no secret was made of this fact. "However precious the 
personal liberty of the subject may be, there is something for which 
it may well be, to some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely
(36)
national success in war, or escape from national plunder or enslavement." 
The same consideration impelled Lord Macmillan to say in Liversidge1s 
case that "at a time when it is the undoubted law of the land that a 
citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled to give up his 
life and all that he possesses for his country’s cause, it may well be 
no matter for surprise that there should be confided to the Secretary 
of State a discretionary power of enforcing the relatively mild
(57)
precaution of detention."
It will, however, be a mistake to suppose that it is only the
courts which have taken this attitude. The people generally had
sufficient common sense to realise the "obvious fact that sacrifices
and inconveniences which would be intolerable in peace are not only
(38)
justifiable but imperative in war" and they were sacrificing their
(36) Ibid, at p.271, per Lord Atkinson.
(37) (1942) A.C. at p.257* Bowles v. Willingham (1943) 321 U.S.
503 at 519-20, Justice Douglas expressed similar sentiments when 
he said: "A nation which can demand the lives of its men and
women in the waging of that war is under no constitutional 
necessity of providing a system of price control on the domestic 
front which will assure each landlord a fair return on his 
property."
(38) C. K. Allen, Law and Orders (1956)? P-54*
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liberty for extraordinary purposes. Such willing submission on the 
part of the civil population must not be supposed to have established 
the legality of all measures adopted in war time. Lord Sumner’s 
vision was clear enough to focus attention on the relation between 
the war psychology of the people and the war measures;
’’Experience in the present war must have taught us all that many 
things are done in the name of the Executive in such times purporting 
to be for the common good, which Englishmen have been too patriotic to 
contest. When the precedents of this war come to be relied on in wars 
to come, it must never be forgotten that much was voluntarily submitted 
to which might have been disputed, and that the absence of contest and
(39)
even of protest is by no means always an admission of the right ... " 
Other questions relating to judicial review and control of war 
legislations and whether it was not unrealistic when the country is in 
the grip of war for the court to be allowed to interfere with executive 
or military measures, and whether the court is in a position to judge 
of the actual necessity of those measures.
During the First World War regulation 14B of the Defence of the 
Realm Regulations, 1914? authorised the Secretary of State to intern 
any person "of hostile origin or associations," if on the recommendation 
of a competent naval or military authority it appeared to him necessary 
for securing the public safety or defence of the realm. In Rex v.
(39) Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel (1920) A.C. at p.563.
292.
(40)
Halliday the petitioner, a naturalised-British subject of German birth, 
was detained by an order made under regulation 14B. In moving an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus his counsel argued that 
Parliament had not conferred the authority to make such an order.
The question before the court was not one of power but of interpreta­
tion. "The power of Parliament to authorise such a proceeding was not 
and could not be disputed. The only question is as to the construction
(41)
of the Act." We already have seen the reasons for a uniform rule of 
construction and Lord Atkinson expressed his inability to appreciate 
why statutes which infringe the liberty of the subject should be 
construed in one manner and statutes not so infringing in a different 
manner. Words must have the same meaning everywhere. He said; "I 
think the tribunal whose duty it is to interpret a statute of the one 
class or the other should endeavour to find out what, according to the 
well-known rules and principles of construction, the statute means, 
and if the meaning be clear to apply it in that sense. Should the 
statute be ambiguous equally susceptible of two meanings, one leading 
to an invasion of the liberty of the subject, and the other not, it 
may well be that the latter should be preferred on the ground of the 
presumed intention of the Legislature not to interfere with it. That
(42)
is wholly a different matter."
(40) (19X7) A.C. 260.
(§1) Ibid, at p.268.
(42) Ibid, at p.274-
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Be that as it may, regulation 14B imposed two limitations.
First, the regulation could subsist only during the war. Secondly, 
it oould be used for the purpose of securing the public safety and 
the defence of the realm. It was contended that if in pursuance of 
the regulation it was thought necessary to impose any restraint on the 
freedom of individuals supposed to help the enemy, previous judicial 
inquiry must be held in order to justify such measure. Lord FinlOy, 
B.C., in rejecting the proposition that executive action could be 
subjected to judicial control, said; "It seems obvious that no 
tribunal for investigating the question whether circumstances of sus­
picion exist warranting some restrain can be imagined less appropriate
(43)
than a court of law."
Referring to the second limitation which, as a legal limitation, 
seemed illusory to Lord Shaw of- Dunfermline, the learned judge asked; 
"But who is to judge of that purpose? As to what acts of state are 
promotive or regardful of that purpose, can a court of law arrest the 
hand of a responsible Executive?" Though he could imagine extreme 
cases in which personal caprice and not public considerations would be 
dominant, he was no less certain that "in everything, from the lighting 
of a room to the devastation of a province, no court of law could dare 
to set up its judgment on the merits of an issue - a public and
(44)
political issue - of safety or defence."
(43) Ibid, at p.269.
(44) Ibid, at p.288.
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In spite of such, expression of noble and democratic sentiments
the judicial attitude would perhaps be fairly balanced betvjeen the
competing claims of the subject and the State when war was raging.
t.*T<As B. d. Scrutton remarked; "It has been said that a war could not be 
conducted on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. It might also 
be said that a war could not be carried on according to the principles
(45)
of Magna Carta."
Before we proceed to consider in detail the facts and decisions 
thereon in cases arising out of emergency legislations and orders made 
during the two World Wars, it may be mentioned that, broadly speaking, 
the constitutional problems to decide upon the limits of authority 
delegated to the Executive are less acute in England than in the United 
States. It need not be emphasised that "the established supremacy of 
Parliament enables it to take any measures it deems necessary to cope 
with the emergency," and "whatever powers Parliament itself possesses
■ (46)
it may confer upon others." The courts in England cannot control 
delegation, they can only ensure that the delegate does not exceed 
the authority conferred on him. But even here "as the powers delegated, 
under the stress of total war, have become more sweeping, with fewer 
restrictions imposed upon Executive discretion, the judicial power to 
declare Executive action ultra vires of the enabling legislation has
(47)
become of less importance."
(45) Ronnfeldt v. Phillips (19IS) 35 Times L.R. 46 at p.47*
(46) B. Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, p.314*
(47) Ibid.
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While in the United States, on the other hand, in the words of 
Justice Burton, "the outer limits of the jurisdiction of our military 
authorities is subject to revieYf by our courts even under such extreme 
circumstances as those of the battle field." But as he was dissenting 
from the view of the majority on the desirability of judicial control 
of the Executive action, he did not fail to pronounce the following 
caution. Referring to the necessity of judicial review of such action, 
Justice Burton saidi
"This, however, requires the courts to put themselves as nearly 
as possible in the place of those who had the constitutional responsi­
bility for immediate executive action. For a court to re-create a 
complete picture of the emergency is impossible. That impossibility 
demonstrates the need for a zone of executive discretion vri.thin .which 
courts must guard themselves with special care against judging past
military action too closely by the inapplicable standards of judicial,
(48)
or even military, hindsight."
5* Limitations on the Exercise of Administrative Powers During First 
World War
As the statutes enacted by Parliament and their judicial inter­
pretation during the Second World War differed from those in the earlier 
conflict, we shall separately consider them. In spite of the differences,
(48) Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1945) 527 U.S. 542-5*
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however? both periods show and record the judicial tendency to support 
the executive action taken bona fide to secure the public safety and 
the defence of the realm.
(49)
What Lord Atkinson said in Rex v. Halliday with respect to the
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914? and the regulations
made thereunder is equally applicable to all war legislations and orders
issued in pursuance thereof. Two conditions must be fulfilled before
any subordinate legislation or orders made during war emergency could
be sustained as legal and intra vires in a court of law. "Hirst, the
regulations can only be issued during the war, and second, whatever
they purport to do must be done for the purpose of securing the public
safety and the defence of the realm. It Is by no means follows,
however, that if on the face of a regulation it enjoined or required
something to be done which could not in any reasonable way aid in
securing the public safety and the defence of the realm it would not
(50)
be ultra vires and void."
Apart from these considerations, the reason why the judges were 
inclined to uphold executive action during the war crisis are discernible 
from the following statement of Lord Parker in the Zamora cases 
"Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole 
judges of what the national security requires. It would be obviously 
undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence
(49) (1917) A.C. 260.
(50) Ibid, at p.272.
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(51)
in a court of law or otherwise discussed in public."
In spite of this clear statement of the principle that if the 
Executive is entrusted with the duty of making regulations for the 
national security, the judges should not proceed to determine the 
question whether such regulations have or have not the tendency to 
promote the public safety and the defence of the realm, the courts, 
during the first World War, generally acted on the assumption that if 
in their opinion "a regulation upon the face of it could not possibly 
aid in securing the public safety or the defence of the realm" they 
had the power to hold such a regulation as exceeding the legislative 
territory assigned by the Act to the Executive.
It is obvious that the action of the military authority will 
range over a variety of subjects when war is on, but it is not always 
clear which action may or may not have any reasonable relation to war 
efforts. Thus, persons suspected of acting, or of having acted, or 
of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety 
may be prohibited from residing in any locality if the military
(52)
authority has an honest suspicion with regard to such persons.
Again, an exercise of powers under 2B of the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations, 1914? ^or the purpose of procuring a substantial quantity 
of a necessary supply (e.g. raspberries) for the iise of troops Is an 
exercise of the powers for securing the public safety and defence of
(51) (1916)2A.C. 77 at p.107.
(52) Rex v. Denison (1916) 32 T.L.R. 528.
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(53) (54)
the realm. In Ronnfeldt y. Phillips and Others the plaintiff claimed 
a declaration that the order directing him to leave the area where he 
was residing was ultra vires and void and asked for an injunction to 
retrain the defendants from preventing him from returning there. The 
order was made on the allegation that he made certain remarks showing 
disloyalty to the British Crown. Such remarks as the plaintiff made 
could not, it was submitted, be prejudicial to the public safety. 
Moreover, the regulation dealt with persons who were suspected of 
acting to the prejudice of the successful prosecution of the war and 
did not apply to persons who had only expressed disloyal sentiments.
i-.pJi, /. Bankes/was unable to accept the argument. He saids "It used a 
general expression which YYould include language as well as acts. The 
present was a case in which language v/as belied on. The language which 
was attributed to the appellant was such that he might reasonably be
(55)
suspected of acting in a maimer prejudicial to the public safety."
(56)
If suspicion was honestly entertained, it need not be reasonable.
It was also held that a regulation which prohibited a person 
who was not a natural-born British subject from using a name other 
than that by which he was ordinarily known at the commencement of the 
war was not ultra vires, although it discriminated between naturalised
(57)
and natural-born British subjects. The urgent national necessity caused
(53) Lipton, Ltd. v. Eord (1917) 2 K.B. 647*
(54) I19I8) 3fT.L.E._46:
(55) Ibid, at p.49*
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ernest v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police (1919) 35 T.L.R. 512.
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(58)
by war also justified the requisition of a ship. A regulation which, 
upon the face of it, does not secure the public safety or the defence 
of the realm is, it was asserted, outside the authority of the enabling 
Act, but it was held that the regulations 39BBB(l) and 39BD made under 
the provisions of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914»
which empowered the Shipping Controller to give directions as to the
use of British ships and to prohibit any ship from going to sea without 
a previous licence from him were not ultra vires. GreerXsaid:
"To give to a Minister of the Crown who is appointed to control 
and regulate shipping, pov/er to direct where a ship is to go, and what 
cargo she is to load, whether it be raw material of industry or food 
for the population, is obviously a measure which may usefully help in 
securing the safety of the public in a time of scarcity caused by war, 
and may assist in the defence of the realm by enabling the country to 
obtain a sufficient stock of food to provide stamina for the treKrpar troops
(59)
and to maintain and hearten the civil population.1
(58) HudsonDs Bay Co. v. Maclay (1920) 36 T.L.R. 4^9-
(59) Ibid, at p.476. Regulation 39BBB(l) provided as follows:
"The Shipping Controller may make orders regulating, 
restricting, or giving directions with respect to the 
nature of the trades in which ships are to be employed, 
the traffic to be carried therein, and the terms and 
conditions on which the traffic is to be carried, the 
ports at which cargo is to be loaded or discharged ... M 
Regulation 39DD(l) provided that "Except under and in 
pursuance of a licence granted by the Shipping Controller 
no British ship registered in the United Kingdom shall 
proceed to sea on any voyage whatsoever ... "
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(60)
But, in China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay, the 
contention of the plaintiffs that the Shipping Controller had no power, 
under regulation 39BBB, to requisition the owner’s services, was 
sustained, though the Court rejected the other contention that the 
Shipping Controller had no power to requisition the ships. The order 
of the Shipping Controller laid down a scheme for working the plaintiff's 
fleet. It had not only requisitioned the ships and the profits hut 
also the owners’ services. On a close scrutiny of the regulations 
J. BailhacheJ.came to the conclusion that it did not contain the power 
to requisition the services of the owners.
(61)
In Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies the Pood Controller 
entered into agreements with the respondents by which the latter were 
permitted to purchase milk within certain defined areas on terms that 
they should pay the sum of two pence per gallon for the privilege.
The action was brought to recover the sums so payable. The respondents 
denied that the Pood Controller had the power to impose such conditions.
The Attorney-General urged the extreme difficulty of the situation 
caused by war, the necessary steps to be taken to ensure the continued 
supply of milk and the importance of allowing freedom to the officials 
to "act under the powers conferred upon them without the fear of 
technical and vexatious objections being taken to the powers which they 
used." There were only tyro sources from which those powers were
(60) (1918) 1 K.B. 53.
(61) (1922) 91 L.J.IC.B. 897.
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derived, one of them was the Act creating the Ministry and the other 
the Regulations under the Defence of the Realm Act. The House of Lords 
held that neither of them directly or by inference enabled the Pood 
Controller to levy the payment of any sums of money from any of the 
subjects.
Lord Buckmaster, in referring to the arguments pressed by the 
Attorney-General, said:
"All that may be readily accepted, but it cannot possibly give 
to any official a right to act outside the law$ nor can the law be 
unreasonably strained in order to legalise that which it might be
(62)
perfectly reasonable should be done if in fact it was unauthorised,"
He said that if in times of great national crisis more powers Y/ere 
required for maintaining both economic and military integrity of the 
country, the Executive could always ask Parliament, which v/as in 
continuous session, to grant the necessary powers.
(63)
Chester v. Bateson furnishes an interesting example of how an 
attempt by the Executive to oust the jurisdiction of the courts was 
frustrated, not only because the regulation exceeded the limits of 
delegated power but also on the ground that there was 110 reasonable 
basis for the Executive’s action. Regulation 2A(2), which empowered 
the Minister of Munitions to declare an area where war production wan
(62) Ibid, at pp.899-900,
(63) (1920) 1 K.B, 829.
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carried on to "be a special area, provided: "Whilst the order remains
in force no person shall, without the consent of the Minister of 
Munitions, take, or cause to be taken, any proceedings for the purpose 
of obtaining an order or decree, for the recovery of possession of, or 
for the ejectment of a tenant of, any dwelling-house or other premises 
situate in the special area ... If any person,acts in contravention of 
this regulation he shall be guilty of a summary offence against these 
regulations." The authority to make this regulation was derived from 
sub-section l(e) of section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) 
Act, 1914*
The appellant contended that the regulation was bad in so far as 
an Executive order taken thereunder deprived a citizen of the right of 
access to the court. It also violated the provisions of Magna Carta 
which provided: "To no one will we sell, to 110 one will we refuse or
delay right of justice." The Divisional Court invalidated the regulation 
on the basis of the judicial conclusion that it was not "a necessary, 
or even reasonable way to aid in securing the Public Safety and the 
defence of the realm." The enabling statute could not have gone so 
far in the present case, though the Court recognised that Parliament
could enact such a law. As /, Darlingisaid:
"This might, of course, legally be done by Act of Parliament;
but I think this extreme disability can be inflicted only by direct
enactment of the Legislature itself, and that so grave an invasion 
of the rights of all subjects was not intended by the Legislature to
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"be accomplished by a departmental order such as this one of the
(64)
Minister of Munitions."
Jh AvoryJ.was, however, ready to recognise that the purpose 
behind the regulation might be reasonable in so far as it aimed to 
prevent the disturbance of munition workers, provided that no order 
for ejectment was made except under the conditions laid down in the 
regulation. But he considered that the objection to the regulation 
was rightly made, because "it deprives the King's subjects of their 
right of access to the Courts of Justice and renders them liable to 
punishment if they have the temerity to ask for justice in any of the
(65)
King’s courts." In his opinion there was nothing in the statute which
authorised a regulation having such a result. "Nothing less than
e;xpress words in the statute taking away the right of the King's
subjects of access to the courts of justice would authorise or 
(06) 
justify it."
(64) Ibid, at p.833* As Allen has pointed out, "We seem here to be 
on the edge of a judicial pronouncement that there are certain 
fundamental rights which legislation cannot diminish - the 
American rather than the British doctrine. The decision has 
been criticised by those who think that a regulation for 
housing munition workers was sufficiently connected with the 
national defence to be within the powers of the enabling 
statute; if so, it did not matter whether the provision was in 
a statute or a regulation; the regulation, if intra vires, 
would have the same strength as the statute, and the order, if 
properly made under the regulation, would be valid."
Law and Orders, 1956, at p. 87-
(65) Ibid, at p.836.
(66) Ibid, at p.836.
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J. DarlingXreferred to the circumstances when Parliament 
restricted the citizen’s right to resort to a court of law for vin-
(67)
dication of a wrong, as under the Vexatious Actions Act, I896, hut
even here it would he seen that Parliament did not completely har
(68)
the institution of suits by persons mentioned therein. In a case 
involving the interpretation of the statute, ScruttonX.said:
"One of the valuable rights of every subject of the King is to 
appeal to the King in his courts if he alleges that a civil wrong has 
been done to him, or has been committed by another subject of the King. 
This right is sometimes abused and it is, of course, quite competent to 
Parliament to deprive any subject of the King of it either absolutely 
or iijjpart. But the language of any such statute should be jealously 
watched by the courts, and should not be extended beyond its least
(69)
onerous meaning irnless clear words are used to justify such extension."
(67) It .provided: "It shall be lawful for the Attorney-General to
apply to the High Court for an order under this Act, and if he
satisfies the High Court that any person has habitually and 
persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings without any 
reasonable ground for instituting such proceedings whether in
the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the
same person or against different persons, the court may, after 
hearing such person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, 
after assigning counsel in case such person is unable on account 
of poverty to retain counsel, order that no legal proceedings 
shall be instituted by that person in the High Court or any other 
court, unless he obtains the leave of the High Court or some 
judge thereof, and satisfies the Court or judge that such legal 
proceeding is not an abuse of the process of the court, and that 
there is prima facie ground for such proceeding."
(68) In re Boaler (1915) 1 K.B. 21.
(69) Ibid, at p.36.
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As the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914? not contemplate 
disallowing a right of action by the subject, or at least the language 
employed therein did not make an explicit reference to such a restric­
tion, the principle enunciated by J. ScruttonJ.was applicable. Jh 
Darlingisaid:
"It is to be observed that this regulation not only deprives the 
subject of his ordinary right to seek justice in the courts of law, 
but provides that merely to resort there without the permission of 
the Minister of Munitions first had and obtained shall of itself be a 
summary offence, and so render the seeker after justice liable to
(70)
imprisonment and fine."
Though he appreciated that in stress of war citizens should not 
only be rightly obliged but also be ready to forgo much of their 
liberty, at the same time he felt that "this elemental right of the
(71)
subjects of the British Crown cannot be thus easily taken from them."
It appears that, in so far as the decision dealt with that 
aspect of the regulation which debarred the subjects of their right 
of access to the court, it was correct, but when the court did not find 
any reasonable relation between the housing of munition workers and 
the war effort it was surely mistaken.
As Bernard Schwartz has put it, "the importance of Chester v.
(70) Chester v. Bateson, at p.834*
(71) Ibid, at p.834.
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Bateson lies not in its immediate Bolding* however* hut in its 
indication of the zealousness of the English courts during the Eirst 
World War to protect the rights of the subject, even during the stress
(72)
of the war emergency."
(73)
In Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King, the appellant, from 
whom a quantity of rum was requisitioned by the Admiralty, purporting 
to act under regulation 2B of the Defence of-the Realm Regulations,
I9I4, claimed the market value of the rum and contended that in the 
absence of any agreement the market value should be determined by a 
court of law. The regulation provided that the price of any article 
requisitioned, if not agreed, should be determined by the Y/ar Losses 
Commission. The price to be fixed by the Commission was based on cost 
and reasonable profit, not on the fair market value. The regulation 
was, in so far as it purported to deprive persons of their right to 
the fair market value and to a judicial determination of the amount, 
held ultra vires. SalterLsaid: "I do not think that a Regulation 
which takes away the subject's right to a judicial decision, or transfers 
the adjudication of his claim, without his consent, from a court of law 
to named arbitrators, could fairly be held to be a Regulation for 
securing the public safety and the defence of the realm, or a Regulation 
designed to prevent the successful prosecution of the war being 
endangered, within the meaning of these words in the Defence of the
(72) Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, 1949> P*p20
(735 (1920) 1 E.B. 854-
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(74)
Realm. (Consolidation) Act, 1914-"
(75)
In Hudson's Bay Co, v. Mac lay, Greerwhile expressing M s
disagreement with the above decision in so far as it involved the
proposition that the King in Council had no power to acquire necessary
stores at less than current market price or at a price to "be fixed by
a board of arbitrators, said that the Regulation did not debar access
to the courtss "Whether the price was fixed by agreement or by the
Losses Commission, the person whose goods have been taken can, in my
(76)
opinion, sue for the price.1
We have so far discussed some of the cases involving interpretation 
of the war legislations during the First World War and also seen the 
assertion of great constitutional principles. Though they will remain 
as "examples of the preservations of the true functions of our courts 
even in time of great emergency," they were hardly followed in the 
Second World War. On the whole, however, the courts took a lenient 
view of executive action both in 1914 1939* "It was not doubted -
nor, indeed, can it be doubted by sensible persons - that if the law 
allows room for a court to 'lean,' in time of national danger it will 
instinctively and properly lean toward public security. The more
(77)
important thing is that it should not lean until it topples over."
(74) Ibid, at p.865.
(75) (1920) 36 T.L.R. 469.
(76) Ibid, at p.478.
(77) Sir C. K. Allen, Law and Orders (1956) p*44*
4* The Exercise of the Royal Prerogative during War
To attempt a discussion on the nature and extent of the royal
prerogative is beyond the scope of our subject. We shall consider
only how far it could be successfully exercised for the purposes of the
(78)
defence of the country. Before that, one may have to confront the 
inquiry what is meant by the prerogative.
Briefly speaking, the prerogative is, as defined by a learned 
constitutional writer, "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary 
authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the
(79)
Crown." The prerogative is no doubt part of the common law of
(80)
England.
Some distinction has been tried to be drawn between the ordinary
and the absolute prerogative. The ordinary prerogative means "those
royal functions which could only be exercised in defined ways and
involved no element of royal discretion" and by the absolute
prerogative is meant "those powers which the King could exercise in
(81)
his discretion." An instance of the former is the appointment of 
judges, for the King could not himself dispense justice. The absolute 
prerogative covers the exercise of extraordinary powers to meet 
emergencies.
(78) Iialsbury's haws of England, YOL.YII, ed. , pp.221. Chitty's 
Prerogative of the Crown and John Allen’s Inquiry into the Rise 
and Fall of the Royal Prerogative, 1849> contain general discussion 
on the extent and limits of the various Royal prerogatives.
(79) A. Y. Dicey, The Lav; of the Constitution (1959) 10th ed., p.424*
(80) Per Cozens-Hardy M.R. In In re a Petition of Right (1915) 3 K.B.
649 at P*659*
(81) Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law (1955) 41h ed. at pp.130-31*
There have been great controversies In the past as to how far
the King's prerogative could be exercised In times of emergency and
though the decisions of the courts went always in favour of the Crown,
the exercise of arbitrary power by the King was eventually declared
(82)
illegal by the Petition of Right, 1628, the Bill of Rights, 1689? and. 
the Act of Settlement, 1700.
As we are not concerned with the history of the prerogative, we 
shall conclude by making a few relevant observations which are necessary 
for its proper understanding in relation to the controversy about 
alleged supremacy over the statute law.
The prerogative is not based on military force or on the consent 
of the people. "Ho one will pretend that any prerogative of the King 
of England is founded either on military force or 011 the express consent 
of the people. Every prerogative of the Crown must, therefore, be 
derived from statute or from prescription, and in either case there must
(83)
be a legal and established mode of exercising it."
So far as the war prerogative of the King is concerned, it has 
been correctly stated in the following statements "What is termed the 
war prerogative of the King is created by the perils and exigencies of 
war for the public safety, and by its perils and exigencies is therefore 
limited. The King may lay on a general embargo, and may do various
(82) In Chapter 2 we discussed some of the cases and the events 
leading to the Petition of Right, 1628.
(83) John Allen, The Royal Prerogative (1849) p.158*
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acts growing out of sudden emergencies 5 but in all these cases the 
emergency is the avowed cause, and the act done is as temporary as 
the occasion. The King cannot change by his prerogative of war, either 
the law of nations or the law of the land, by general and unlimited
(84)
regulations."
Today, the exercise of the prerogative in relation to the 
prosecution of the war is not important as almost all the powers
(85)
necessary for such purposes are conferred on the Executive by statute. 
What should be the considerations for those who exercise the prerogative
powers of the Grown is clearly expressed in the following statement:
"Emergencies may arise, where it is necessary for the safety 
of the state to commit additional powers to the persons intrusted with
its defence. But when such cases occur, we are to be guided by con­
siderations of reason and expediency in the powers we confer, and not
(86)
by vain and empty theories of prerogative."
(84) Chitty, The Prerogative of the Crown, p.50.
0, <?. ReadingHn Crown of Leons oase (1921) 1 K.B. 595 pointed 
out that these words were spoken by Lord Erskine in a speech 
in Parliament with reference to the orders in council. "It 
is to be observed that it is not a judicial pronouncement, 
but it is quoted by the learned author as a correct statement 
of the law.1
(85) "The statutes have been drawn so broadly as to include 
practically all action taken." B. Schwartz, Law and the 
Executive in Britain, p.314*
(86) £3  ^ p , /£*]
An examination of the few cases in which the legal limits of 
the Crown1 s prerogative in relation to the prosecution of the war 
were considerably discussed shows the fallacy of the claim that the 
Executive can exercise powers as part of the common law though it is 
found unable to justify its action under the statute dealing with the
(97)
subject matter. In The Zamora, a prize case, the question was raised 
whether the Swedish steamship stopped by one of His Majesty’s cruisers 
and brought into a British port, could be validly requisitioned by 
the Government before condemnation subject to appraisement in accor­
dance with Order XXIX of the Prize Court Rules. The steamship, which 
was carrying copper, a contraband of war, was ostensibly destined for 
a neutral port. The case involved the determination of the extent of 
the royal prerogative in International Law and of the right to 
requisition vessels or goods in the custody of the Prize Court of a 
belligerent Power.
Order XXIX, rule 1, provided that where it was made to appear 
to the judge ... that it was desired to requisition, on behalf of His 
Majesty, a ship in respect of which no final decree of condemnation 
had been made, he was to order that the ship be appraised and upon an 
undertaking being given the ship was to be released and delivered to the 
Crown. The Prize Court Rules derived their force from Orders of His 
Majesty in Council which were made under the powers vested in His
(87) (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
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Majesty by the Prize Court Act, 1894* Hie Court had to consider 
whether the Crown had, independently of the aforesaid rule, a right 
to requisition the vessel or goods in question. The Attorney-General 
argued that the King in Council had such power by virtue of the royal 
prerogative and the Solicitor-General contended that the neutral*s 
goods could be requisitioned without payment through no enemy destination 
was revealed.
In rejecting the argument that such power was vested in the 
King in Council otherwise than by virtue of the Act of 1894 > Lord 
Parker said:
"The idea that the King in Council, or indeed any branch of the
Executive, has power to prescribe or alter the law to be administrered
by courts of law in this country is out of harmony with the principles
of our Constitution, It is true that, under a number of modern
statutes, having various branches of the Executive have power to make
rules having the force of statutes, but all such rules derive their
validity from the statute which creates the power, and not from the
executive body by which they are made. Ko one would contend that the
prerogative involves any power to prescribe or alter the law administered
( 88 )in courts of common law or Equity."' }
Lord Parker found no difficulty in conceding that "there is no 
doubt that under Gertain circumstances and for certain purposes the
(88) Ibid, at p.90.
Crown may requisition any property within the realm belonging to its
own subjects." He reached the conclusion that the right of a belligerent
Power to requisition vessels or goods in the custody of its Prize Court
pending a decision of the question v/hether they should be condemned or
released was subject to certain limitations. Pirst, the vessels or
goods must be urgently required for the defence of the realm or the
prosecution of the war. Secondly, there is a real question to be tried
and therefore it would be improper to order an immediate release.
Thirdly, the right must be enforced by an application to the Prize
Court which must judicially determine whether the right is exercisable.
(89)
In In re A Petition of Right the suppliants claimed a declaration 
that they were lawfully entitled to proper compensation for and in 
respect of their lands and premises which the military authorities 
took for the purposes of an aviation ground or aerodrome. They 
contended that, by virtue of the Defence Act, 1842, and other Acts 
of a similar nature, they could legally claim compensation which was 
to be ascertained as provided foi* by those Acts. On behalf of the 
Crown the claim was resisted on the ground that the military authorities 
took the premises for use so long as the war continued and as they 
were exercising powers under the prerogative and the Defence of the 
Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914? no claim to compensation could be 
legally enforced against them. They were, however, willing to pay
(89) (1915) 3 K.B. 649.
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ex gratia such sum as might be assessed by the Royal Commissioners 
appointed for the purpose of assessing compensation. It was held that 
the Crown, represented by the competent naval and military authorities, 
had power in time of war, both by virtue of the royal prerogative and 
the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914? ari-d the regulations 
made thereunder to take compulsory possession of any lands or premises 
for defence without compensating the owner.
Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R* said that ’’the prerogative applied to what 
was reasonably necessary for preventing and repelling invasion at the 
present time regard being had to the invention of gunpowder and the
(90)
use of aeroplanes in warfare."
Warrington/refused to accept the argument that the right 
was confined to the doing of what was necessary for the conduct of 
actual military operations against an enemy fighting on the soil of 
this countrys
"So to limit the prerogative would in these days be to render it 
practically uselss for the purpose for which it is entrusted to the 
King ... The only condition which it would appear must be fulfilled is 
that the act in question, having regard to existing circumstances, 
must be necessary for the public safety and the defence of the realm, 
and on this matter the opinion of the competent authorities who alone 
have sufficient knowledge of the facts, provided they act reasonably
(90) Ibid, at p.660.
315-
(91)
and in good faith, should he accepted as conclusive."
He also referred to the undisputed fact that the ICing, as the 
supreme executive authority, had always been by virtue of the 
prerogative entitled to take or use the property of a subject in 
order to meet any national emergency.
(92)
In Attorney-General v. De Keys&r’s Royal Hotel, the owners of 
the hotel, which was taken by the Crown for housing the personnel of 
the Royal Plying Corps, asked for a declaration that they were 
entitled to a rent for the use and occupation of the premises or, 
in the alternative, to compensation under the Defence Act, 1842. The 
Crown, purporting to act under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, 
1914? denied the respondents’ legal right to compensation. Also, the 
Crown’s prerogative to take the property of a subject in an emergency 
without compensation was pleaded in bar of the plaintiffs’ claim.
We have already seen that similar questions were raised in
(93)
In re a Petition of Right. The view that prevailed there, it will be
(91) Ibid, at p.666. Similarly, in Crown of Leon (Owners) v. Admiralty 
Commissioners (1921) 1 K.B. 595? Lord Reading C.J. could not 
accept the argument that the prerogative should only be invoked
in an emergency, "an instant and urgent necessity," or "a then 
existing necessity" - "That does not mean that to justify the use 
of the prerogative you must be able to show that at the precise 
moment there is a state of things existing that unless the 
prerogative is invoked the nation will succumb. What, I think, 
it means is that there must be a national emergency, an urgent 
necessity for taking extreme steps for the protection of the 
Realm."
(92) (1920) A.C. 508.
(93) (1915) 3 K.B. 649.
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recalled, was that the prerogative allowed the right to take property 
for sudden emergencies, but the Defence Acts of 1803 and 1842 prescribed 
a code for the permanent talcing of land both in war-time and peace time 
and the two systems, therefore, could co-exist, especially when no 
express mention of the prerogative was made in the statute. In this 
connection the Court also referred to the general doctrine that the 
Crown was not bound by a statute unless specially mentioned.
In De Keyser’s Royal Hotel the question for the consideration of 
the House of Lords was whether the prerogative to take private property 
when required for defence entitled the Crown to take it without payment 
of compensation and incidentally whether, if an Act dealt with some­
thing which, before the Act, could be effected by the prerogative, the 
prerogative was curtailed,
A research into the past history on the subject of talcing private 
property for defence purposes only revealed that "the King, as suprema 
potestas, endowed with the right and duty of protecting the Realm, is,
for the purpose of the defence of the realm, in times of danger
(94)
entitled to take any man!s property," but it could not be ascertained 
whether "this right to take is accompanied by an obligation to make
(95)
compensation to him whose property is taken.1
During the last three centuries important changes toolc place 
and in the long series of statutes relating to the occupation of land
(94) (1920) A.C. at p.524. In Chapter 7 we discussed the extent of
interference with the subject’s property during an emergency.
(95) Ibid, at p.524.
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for the defence purposes provisions were made for compensating the 
subjects whose lands were taken or used and indeed, as Lord Moulton 
said, "there is clear evidence that for many years, prior to the
(96)
first of these statutes, the Grown acted on this principle."
Pinally, the Defence Act, 1842, gave the Crown the widest possible 
powers to take land and buildings needed for defence. In all cases, 
however, compensation was allowed for the talcing or using the land 
by the Crow and the compensation was to be assessed by a jury who, 
in the words of the Act, have to find "the compensation to be paid, 
either for the absolute purchase of such lands, buildings, or other 
hereditaments, or for the possession or use thereof, as the case 
may be."
The other question was, if the whole ground of something which 
could be done by the prerogative is covered by the statute, is it the 
statute that rules or is it the prerogative on which the Crown would
(97)
rely; this evoked considerable discussion. The House of Lords fully
HR-
agreed with the principle stated by M. K. Swinf en Ead;^ ' in the Court 
of Appeal below;
"Those powers which the executive exercises without Parliamentary 
authority are comprised under the comprehensive term of the prerogative. 
Where, however, Parliament has intervened, and has provided by statute
(96) Ibid, at p.552.
(97) I*1 Chapter 6 we briefly referred to this controversy.
318.
for powers previously within the prerogative heing exercised in a
particular manner, and subject to limitations and provisions contained
(98)
in the statute, they can only be so exercised.M
Otherwise, as he asked, "what use would there be in imposing 
limitations if the Crown could at its pleasure disregard them and fall 
back on prerogative?"
Referring to the history of the Acts culminating in the Defence 
Act, 1842, which "was not limited either in time or place, and with 
small modifications" was still in force, Lord Moulton considered the 
effect of this course of legislation upon the Royal prerogative. He 
did not think that it led to the abrogation of the prerogative in any 
way, but, as he said;
"It has given to the Crown statutory powers which render the 
exercise of that prerogative unnecessary, because the statutory powers 
that have been conferred upon it are wider and more comprehensive than
(99)
those of the prerogative itself."
Moreover, "it has indicated unmistakably that it is the intention
of the nation that the powers of the Crown in these respects should be
exercised in the equitable manner set forth in the statute, so that
the burden shall not fall on the individual, but shall be borne by the
(100)
community. "
(98) Quoted by Lord Atkinson in De ICeyserfs Royal Hotel case at p.538.
(99) Ibid, at p.554.
(lOO) Ibid, at p.554*
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Lord Dmie&in assigned another reason why the statute should
goVem and not the prerogative:
"Inasmuch as the Crown is a party to every Act of Parliament
it is logical enough to consider that when the Act deals with something
which before the Act could be effected by the prerogative, and specially
empowers the Crown to do the same thing, but subject to conditions,
the Crown assents to that, and by that Act, to the prerogative being 
(101)
curtailed."
Judging the question from another viewpoint Lord Sumner arrived
at the same conclusion. He said:
"The Legislature by appropriate enactment can deal with such a
subject-matter as that now in question in such a way as to abate such
portions of the prerogative as apply to it. It seems also to be
obvious that enactments may have this effect, provided they deal
directly with the subject-matter, even though they enact a modus
operandi for securing the desired result, which is not the same as
(102)
that of the prerogative."
The result, in short, is that "when powers covered by this 
statute are exercised by the Crown, it must be presumed that they are 
so exercised under the statute, and therefore subject to the equitable
(103)
provision for compensation which is to be found in it." Such a
(101) Ibid, at p.526.
(102) Ibid, at p.561.
(103) Ibid, at p.554*
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finding which upholds the safeguards provided hy statute would go a 
long way to meet the demands of justice.
The facts established by this case were summed up by Lord Keith 
of Avonholm in his dissenting judgment in Bank voor Handel v.
(104)
Administrator of Hungarian Property where, however, the issue did 
not involve the determination of the extent of the prerogative to 
seize the property of persons residing in England, but questions were 
determined as to the relevant provisions of the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, 1959- It appeared from the decision in the Be Keysets 
Boyal Hotel case that "there was never a prerogative to confiscate the 
property of a subject in time of war; that, when the exigency of war 
had passed, the property would return to the owner; and that,if the 
disposition of property during war v\ras dealt with by the legislature,
(105)
that superseded any necessity of invoking the prerogative." To the 
argument that such power was in the present case reserved by Section 
16 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1959? Lord Keith replied that 
"that can only be quantum vale at, and if the prerogative never covered 
power to confiscate property of a subject during war for war purposes 
the reservation can be disregarded.” He gave two reasons for not 
holding that the Crown had the prerogative to confiscate the subject’s 
property. First, "if the royal prerogative in the days of its full 
vigour did not extend to confiscation of a subject’s property in time 
of war, I am not prepared to assume that the Legislature intended to
(104) (1954) 1 All E.R. 969.
(105) Ibid, at p.995.
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confer a statutory power to confiscate a subject*s property in 1939-n
Secondly, "such a power would require to be very clearly shown by the
(10>6)
language of the statute and never to be presumed."
By Regulations made under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, the 
government was empowered to requisition ships, to prohibit the unloading 
of ships etc., and the regulations further provided for the assessment 
of "the compensation payable in respect of any property which is 
requisitioned or of which possession is taken tinder these Regulations.1 
During a coal strike in 1921 the suppliants vessel arrived in the Thames 
on 2nd April with a cargo of coal and on the same day a Customs Officer 
gave instructions that "in no circumstances is the vessel to discharge 
without permission." Accordingly the vessel lay with the cargo till 
21st April on which date the government requisitoned the coal and the 
discharge was completed on 23rd April* Assuming that 1 the Crown has no 
right at common law to take a subject*s property for reasons of State 
without paying compensation," 1. WrightJ.thought that the rule could 
apply to a case where property was actually taken possession of or 
used by the Government. In stating the reasons why the suppliants' 
claim for the period up to 21st April could not be sustained, but that 
they were only entitled for two days, 22nd and 23rd April, Wright£said:
"A mere negative prohibition, though it involves interference 
with an owner's enjoyment of property, does not, I think, merely because
>*>*— ■■mn> tlf l.n  I I ■! I II H I Jill I W I U jM B W  ■< * Aj S I '!■ ■■■..** . . . ■  i ■ ■ ■■ H l i lH i .h .n i r w  ,,rmrr‘     , n t T t i r i ^  ■
(106) Ibid, at p.995.
it is obeyed, carxy with it at common law any right to compensation.
A subject cannot at common law claim compensation merely because he
(107)
obeys a lawful order."
Under the powers conferred by the Proclamation of 3 August,
(103)
1914, the Admiralty requisitioned a ship and sent her on a voyage from 
Spain to America with a cargo of iron ore for the manufacture of war 
munitions for the British Government. The ship sustained damage in the 
course of the voyage and sued the Admiralty on the ground that it had 
no right to send the ship on the particular voyage. Before a Divisional 
Court where the case came as a special case stated by the arbitrators 
under Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1339, the owners contended 
that, if ordinary interpretation was given to the 3.anguage used in the 
Proclamation, the effect would be far-reaching. Moreover, neither the 
Proclamation nor the prerogative justified the use of the ship on the 
particular voyage. Lord Reading C.J. expressed inability to accept the 
above contentions and felt that by the Proclamation "it was intended 
to give the widest possible powers in view of an imminent emergency and 
in view of the fact that, if war was declared, it was impossible to 
determine beforehand the ships which the Government would have to
(107) France Fenwick & Co. Ltd. v. The King (192?) 1 K.B. 453 at p.467.
(103) It authorised "the Lords'Commissioners of the Admiralty to 
requisition any British ship or British vessel within the 
British Isles or the waters adjacent thereto" and further 
provided that the owners should receive payment for the use and 
services rendered and compensation for loss and damage.
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(109)
requisition from the subjects of the Crown.”
In answering the contention that the prerogative had been exercised
and the sending of the ship could not be justified under the prerogative,
DarlingXsaid that one should seek directions from the common law and
the constitutional law of England under which "the rule undoubtedly is
that the King, acting in regard to what is called prerogative ’regale
et legale ’, has the right on behalf of his subjects to take their
property for the defence of the Realm and to protect the interests of
(110)
the subjects, compensation of course being fairly made.”
(Ill)
ln Hex v. The Suptdt. of Vine St. Police Station, one Alfred 
Leibmann, a German subject who, for business reasons, came to England 
in 1839, had resided there ever since but was interned during the First 
World War. In May, 1&90, he obtained a formal discharge from German 
nationality, but never became naturalised as a British citizen.
The Solicitor-General submitted that the internment of aliens 
and the taking of any steps necessary to make such internment effective 
fell within the prerogative rights of the Crown at common law. On 
behalf of the applicant it was contended that, as there was no 
authority for the internment of the alien enemies under the Defence of 
the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, or under the Aliens Restriction 
Act, 1914, the Crown had no prerogative to do so ’’because if there were
(109) Crown of Leon (Owners) v. Admiralty Commissioners (1921) 1 K.B.595 
at p.603.
(110) Be) Ibid, at p.606-7.
(111) B3-) (1913)32 The Times haw Reports 3.
there would be no need of emergency legislation giving the King power
to restrict the movements of aliens, to compel them to register
(112)
themselves and the like.” He further argued that "if there is this 
inherent power in the Crown to imprison there must be also inherent
the power to do all the lesser acts provided by the emergency
(113)
legislation." Though the Court was impressed by such forceful 
argument, it was not willing to concede it, but at the same time 
BailhacheT,expressed surprise "why express power to intern alien 
enemies was not included in the emergency legislation, or why there 
has been no Order in Council dealing with the subject as it now arises,
but I notice that the emergency legislation reserves all the powers
(114)
of the Crown."
(112) Ibid, at p.5.
(113) Ibid.
(114) Ibid.
THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF WAR POWERS (Continued)
The Test of "Reasonableness1
(i)
In Liversidge v. -Anderson the question of the construction of the 
words used in regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1959> 
was raised. Regulation 18B enacted - MIf the Secretary of State has 
reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or 
associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial 
to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation 
or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary 
to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person 
directing that he be detained." The appellant contended that the 
words "reasonable cause to believe" implied the existence of an 
external fact which must be the basis of the SecretaryTs belief and 
therefore, could be challenged in a court of law. The respondent argued 
that as the words referred to the belief of the Secretary the reasonable 
ness of the belief was only determinable by him.
Excepting Lord Atkin, who dissented, all the other Law Lords were 
of the opinion that if the Secretary of State acts in good faith when 
making an order under the aforesaid regulation, a court of law is not 
competent to inquire whether in fact the Secretary had reasonable 
grounds for his belief.
(l) (1942) A.C. 206.
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To Lord Atkin the conferment of such powers , only liable to he 
questioned on the ground of absence of good faith, was unprecedented. 
The use of the expression "reasonable cause" showed that the rule 
contemplated the existence of an external fact which was capable of 
being ascertained by the court. He said:
"’Reasonable cause* for an action or a belief is just as much a
positive fact capable of determination by a third party as is a broken
ankle or a legal right. If its meaning is the subject of dispute as
to legal rights, then ordinarily the reasonableness of the cause is in
our law to be determined by the judge and not by the tribunal of fact
(2)
if the functions deciding law and fact are divided."
To establish the meaning of the expression he cited innumerable 
legal decisions. "If a man has" could never mean " if a man thinks he 
has." The test to determine the reasonableness was accordingly an 
objective one.
In declining to accept such an interpretation of the regulation 
Lord Macmillan said that "a court of law could not pronounce on the 
reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s cause of belief unless it 
were put in possession of all the knowledge both of facts and of 
policy which he had. But the public interest must, by the nature of 
things, frequently preclude the Secretary of State from disclosing to
(2) Ibid, at p.227-228.
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a court or to anyone else the facts and reasons which have actuated
(3)
him." A decision on the question whether there was any reasonable 
cause to believe that it was necessary to detain a particular person 
could "manifestly be taken only by one who has both knowledge and 
responsibility which no court can share*"
The trend of argument which supported an objective standard to 
judge the reasonableness of the belief would require one to read the 
regulation as "If the Secretary of State has such cause of belief as a 
court of law would hold to be reasonable." It would then no longer be 
effective as an emergency measure. For, as Lord Macmillan said;
"Courts may differ as to what is reasonable. A judge of first 
instance might hold the Secretary of State to have been justified in 
his belief, the Court of Appeal might take another view and this House 
might have its own view. In a matter at once so vital and so urgent 
in the interests of national safety, I am unable to accept a reading 
of the regulation which would prescribe that the Secretary of State 
may not act in accordance with what commends itself to him as a
(3) Ibid, at p.254* Lord Wright said that regulation 18B imposed a 
duty, a duty to act in the national interest, on the Secretary, 
which was a higher duty than the duty to regard the liberty of 
the subject. The performance of that duty could not be subject 
to the decision of a judge who could not possibly have all the 
information at the disposal of the minister or appreciate their 
full importance. He said; "In these cases full legal evidence 
or proof is impossible, even if the Secretary does not claim 
that disclosure is against the public interest, a claim which a 
judge necessarily has to admit." Ibid, at p.266.
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reasonable cause of belief without incurring the risk that a court of
(4)
law would disagree with him.”
In refusing to accept the contention that "reasonable" necessarily
implied an external standard to be applied by someone other than the
Secretary, namely, by a judge, Lord Wright said that this would
"subordinate the whole substance of the enactment to a single word
g
which itself is ambiguous and inconclusive," He then said:
"The word ’reasonable1 does indeed imply instructed and intelligent 
care and deliberation, the choice of the course which reason dictates.
But the choice is not necessarily that of an outsider. If I am right 
in my view of the effect of the regulation, the choice can only be the 
choice of the minister. All the word ’reasonable* then means is that 
the minister must not lightly or arbitrarily invade the liberty of the 
subject. He must be reasonably satisfied before he acts, but it is
(5)
still his decision and not the decision of anyone else."
The test thus evolved to determine the reasonableness of an 
executive measure under regulation 18B is not, according to the 
majority opinion, the standard of an average prudent man. It is quite 
possible that the average prudent would regard as sufficient some of 
the grounds that would lead the Secretary of State to form the opinion 
that a particular person was of hostile origin or associations and the
(4) Ibid, at p.257*
(5) Ibid, at p.268.
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court could also decide upon the reasonableness of those grounds.
MI do not doubt that a court could investigate the question whether
there were grounds for a reasonable man to believe some at least of
(6)
those facts if they could be put before the court.** But who can 
decide whether if those facts exist it would be reasonably necessary 
to exercise control over such a person? It would be absurd to suppose 
that the standard of an average prudent man could be applied to decide 
this issue. Thus, referring to the necessity of forming the belief 
whether it is necessary to exercise control over the person in question, 
his being of hostile origin, Viscount Maugham said:
*'To my mind this is so clearly a matter for executive discretion 
and nothing else that I cannot myself believe that those responsible 
for the Order in Council could have contemplated for a moment the 
possibility of the action of the Secretary of State of being subject 
to the discussion, criticism and control of a judge in a court of
(7)
law."
He was, therefore, of the opinion that the Secretary must have 
the sole discretion as to the grounds on which he could make the 
order for detention and also as to the facts which he must have 
"reasonable cause to believe" before he decided that such person was 
of hostile origin or associations.
(6) Ibid, at p.220.
(7) Ibid, at pp.220-221.
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Lord Wright discussed the reasons why the Executive should have 
the sole discretion in the matter of such nature. First, the legislature 
must vest the emergency discretion in someone, and the Secretary of 
State is the most appropriate person because he alone has the materials 
for exercising the discretion. Secondly, discretions always involve 
some latitude of choice and there is no hard and fast issue of fact, 
such as there is in the trial of a specific charge on indictment.
Thirdly, the Secretary of State is responsible to Parliament which can 
put an end to any abuse.
One of the reasons which went to make up the decision in 
Liversidge Case was the fear that, unless the Executive was given a 
free hand, the Court might substitute its own judgment for that of the 
Executive. But Lord Atkin maintained that such fears were groundless: 
f,It is said that it could never have been intended to substitute 
the decision of judges for the decision of the minister or, as has been 
said, to give an appeal from the minister to the courts. But no one 
proposes either a substitution or an appeal. A judge*s decision is 
not substituted for the constable's on the question of unlawful arrest, 
nor does he sit on appeal from the constable. He has to bear in mind 
that the constable's authority is limited and that he can only arrest 
on reasonable suspicion, and the judge has the duty to say whether the
(8) Ibid, at p.270*
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conditions of the power are fulfilled. If there are reasonable grounds, 
the judge has no further duty of deciding whether he would hare formed 
the same belief any more than, if there is reasonable evidence to go 
to a jury, the judge is concerned with whether he would have come to
(9)
the same verdict."
If, according to the $iews of the majority, the Executive is allowed
complete discretion on the basis of "subjective" reasonable cause, the
result is, as Lord Atkin thought, that "the only implied condition is
(10)
that the Secretary of State acts in good faith." Lord Atkin doubted 
whether such executive good faith could ever be challenged in a court 
of law, or even challenged whether it could be proved that such good
(ii)
faith was absent.
In spite of the vigorous dissent of Lord Atkin and the innumerable
(12)
precedents referred to by him, the House of Lords thus rejected the 
objective standard in determining the reasonableness of an executive 
action and evolved the new doctrine of "subjective" reasonable cause.
(13)
The conclusions reached at by the majority may seem regrettable, but it 
is at the same time undeniable that their decision was primarily based 
on an interpretation of the scope of war powers, though "the judicial
(14)
language is not confined to cases arising out of the war emergency."
(9) Ibid, at p.239.
10) Ibid, at p.226.
11) Ibid, at p.226.
(12) Ibid, at pp.233-236.
(13) Sir C. K. Allen, Regulation I8B and Reasonable Cause, 5$ L.Q.R. 
P«233•
(14) Bernard Schwarts, Law and the Executive in Britain, p.334*
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So fears have "been expressed that the executive may on the authority 
of this case seek to justify its action hy saying that it seemed reason-
(15)
able to him and, therefore, beyond any judicial control.
On another ground also objections have been voiced against the 
subjective theory. It has been argued that if the proposition that 
"the reasonable cause can only be material in so far as it is an element 
present to his (the Secretary of State's) mind which determines his own 
belief, and "the 'cause to believe* is part of the content of his 
mind" be accepted as laying down a sound rule for determining the 
reasonableness of the executive action, why should the same not be 
applied to the reasoning of a constable before he arrests a suspected 
criminal? If the mental exercises of a Secretary of State cannot be 
examined in a court of law why should those of a police officer be 
justiciable? Thus, a distinguished writer found himself unable to 
reject the arguments
"It is difficult to see why all this psycho-analysis should not 
apply just as forcibly to a policeman as to a Cabinet Minister, or why 
the policeman should not says !I am required to have reasonable cause. 
Well, after mature reflection, I came to the conclusion that I had
(15) Sir C. K. Allen, in referring to the doctrine of ’subjective
reasonable cause' elicited from the highest tribunal in England 
and "which is a landmark in the history of executive powers and 
which, though in a calmer atmosphere it has been doubted and 
qualified," said that the doctrine still presented "a danger of 
bringing us near to administrative absolutism," Law and Orders 
(1956) at p.64.
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reasonable cause. That element was present to my mind and determined
my belief and my conduct. I have satisfied the condition' ... The
only answer to him would appear to be that the mind of a policeman is
(16)
a totally different thing from the mind of a Minister.”
(17)
In Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, the House of 
Lords again had to consider the issue raised and decided in the 
Liversidge case. The appellant, who was detained by an order of the 
Secretary of State, pressed the view that the interpretation put on the 
language of the regulation 18B in the Liversidge case was in law 
untenable. Though he conceded that the Secretary of State must make 
up his mind whether he had reasonable cause to believe certain matters 
before issuing an order under the regulation, his decision was not 
conclusive and he must satisfy the court that the causes which led him 
to act would induce an ordinary reasonable man to believe those matters. 
The Secretary of State should accordingly produce before the court the 
information on which he formed the belief.
As could be foreseen, the House of Lords rejected both these 
contentions of the appellant and applied the principle enunciated in 
the Liversidge case. Lord Wright saids "It is enough here to say that 
the regulation gives to the Secretary of State a plenary discretion to
(16) Sir C. K. Allen, Regulation!8B and Reasonable Cause, 58fL*Q.R*? 
p.235.
(17) 1942 A.G* 284°
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make a detention order against the appellant if he has in his own
mind and according to his own judgment reasonable cause to believe
that the appellant is a person of hostile associations and that by
(18)
reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him."
As the Secretary of State was not bound to disclose the grounds 
on which he formed the belief, there was no need of an affidavit such 
as he submitted in the case. But if, as Lord Macmillan pointed out, 
he had to justify the reasonableness of his cause of belief, the 
court would not be in a position to decide the reasonableness from 
such an affidavit as it did not set out the information on which he 
based his belief. "It is only an assurance of the thoroughness of 
the investigation which he made, not a disclosure of what that
(19)
investigation yielded."
(20)
In an appeal from the Supreme Court of Ceylon, the construction 
of regulation 62 of the Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulations,
1945? came up for the consideration of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. The respondent, who was the controller of textiles in 
Ceylon, had cancelled the appellant’s textile licence under the afore­
mentioned regulation which empowered him to do so "where the Controller 
has reasonable grounds to believe" that any dealer was unfit to be 
allowed to continue as a dealer.
(18) Ibid, at p.505.
(19) Ibid, at p.297.
(20) Hakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne (1951)j A.C.66.
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The Judicial Committee held that the words in regulation 62, 
"where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe," imposed a 
condition that reasonable grounds must in fact exist before the 
Controller could validly exercise the power of cancellation.
Lord Radcliffe, who delivered the opinion of the Judicial 
Committee, distinguished the present case from the decision in 
Liversidge v. Anderson which, it will be recalled, laid down that the 
words "has reasonable cause to believe" meant that the Secretary of 
State "had honestly to suppose that he had reasonable cause to 
believe" and that, granted good faith, he was "the only possible judge 
of the conditions of his own jurisdiction." The reasons for the 
refusal to adopt a similar construction of the words in regulation 
62 were that the discussion of Liversidge case was not intended to
(H W M M W W M O M IW n K lM i
lay down "any general rule as to the construction of such phrases
when they appear in statutory enactments, but v/as confined to the
(21)
context and attendant circumstances of Defence Regulation 18B."
As Lord Radcliffe said;
"The elaborate consideration which the majority of the House gave 
to the context and circumstances before adopting that construction 
itself shows that there is no general principle that such words are 
to be understood. ... After all, words such as these are commonly
(21) Ibid, at p.77- Also, in Re Robinson v. Minister of Town and 
Country Planning (1947) I.K.B. 7^2, Somervell, fit L. J. said: 
"Words in a statute of course must be construed in their 
context.1
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found when a legislature as law-making authority confers powers on a 
minister as official. However read, they must he intended to serve
(22)
as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power."
2. The Extent of Discretionary Powers During an Emergency
Apart from the cases where, despite the use of such expressions
as "has reasonable cause to believe," the reasonableness of executive
action was held not to be subject to judicial control, there are other
instances of the court’s refusal to interfere, for instance when
Parliament invested the executive with the sole discretion to take
all necessary measures if necessity arose. Though judicial dicta are
not wanting that the exercise of discretionary powers must not be
(23)
arbitrary, the express language which the ?/artime statutes and regula­
tions employed to confer such powers made it impossible for the court 
to investigate the adequacy of the reasons prompting the executive to 
act.
(24)
In Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd George, the validity of 
an order taking control of a colliery made by the Minister of Fuel and
(25)
Power under the Defence (General) Regulation 55(4) was impugned.
(22) Ibid, at p.77.
(23) M ... when it is said that something is to be done within the 
discretion of the authorities ... that something is to be done 
according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to 
private opinion ... according to law and not humour. If is to 
be not arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular." - Per 
Lord Halsbury in Sharp v. Wakefield (I891) A.C. 173 ■
(24) (1943) 2 All.E.R. 546.
(25) The Defence (General) Regulation 55(4) provides as follows:- 
"If it appears to a competent authority that in the interests
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It was held that unless the bona fide nature of the executive
action could be challenged, the court would not proceed to inquire into
the rapiditjr or the lack of investigation with which the executive
acted. The rule to be followed in these cases was thus stated by-
Lord Greene M.R.:
"If one thing is settled beyond dispute it is that, in construing
regulations of this character, expressed in this particular form of
language, it is for the competent authority, whatever Ministry that
may be, to decide as to whether or not a case for the exercise of
(26)
the powers has arisen."
Not only that, the adequacy or the credibility of the evidence, 
the necessity of making further investigations or taking any immediate 
step or postponing it for further inquiries are to be determined by the 
competent authority. For, as Lord Greene M.R. said, "it is the competent 
authority that is selected by Parliament to come to the decision, and if 
that decision is come to in good faith, this court has no power to 
interfere, provided, of course, that the action is one which is within
(27)
the four corners of the authority delegated to the Minister."
of the public safety, the defence of the realm, or the efficient 
prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to take 
control 011 behalf of His Majesty of the whole or any part of an 
existing undertaking, and that for the purpose of exercising such 
control; it is expedient that the undertaking or part should be 
carried on in pursuance of an order made tinder this paragraph, 
the competent authority may by order authorise any person ... to 
exercise ... such functions of control on behalf of His Magesty 
as may be provided by the order."
(26) Ibid, at p.547*
(27) Ibid, at p*547.
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If the words in a statute or regulation clearly show that the
power to make the decision of what is necessary or expedient has
heen conferred on the Executive and such decision is made by it,
the court will not investigate the grounds as the reasonableness of the
decision if bad faith is not alleged. In Carltons Ltd. v. Commissioners
(28)
of Works the appellants, whose factory manufactured food products, were 
requisitioned by the respondent under regulation 5l(l) of the Defence 
(General) Regulations, 1939* They claimed a declaration that the 
Commissioners were not entitled to take possession on the grounds that
(29)
the notice was invalid.
The only course open to the court in such cases is "to see that 
the power which it is claimed to exercise is one which falls within 
the four corners of the powers given by the legislature and to see 
that those powers are exercised in good faith." Apart from this the 
court will not inquire into "the reasonableness, the policy, the sense 
or any other aspect of the transaction,"
(28) (1943) 2 All.Eng.E.56O.
(29) Regulation 91(l) provides;- "A competent authority, if it
appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to
do in the interests of the public safety, the defence of the
realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may 
take possession of any land, and may give such directions as 
appear to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient 
in connection with the talcing of possession of that land."
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(30)
In Re Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, the Court of 
Appeal had to consider whether the Minister's decision taken under 
the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944? was controllable by the 
court. The Act was designed to meet an unprecedented situation caused 
by war. The relevant provisions of the Act ares "Where the Minister 
of Town and Country Planning ... is satisfied that it is requisite, 
for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily with extensive war damage in 
the area of a local planning authority, that a part or parts of their 
area ... should be laid out afresh and redeveloped as a whole, an order 
declaring all or any of the land in such a part of this area to be land 
subject to compulsory purchase -for dealing with war damage may be 
made by the Minister ... "
The Plymouth City Council applied to the Minister concerned for 
an order under the aforesaid Act, declaring that land in a particular 
demarcated area in Plymouth should be subject to compulsory purchase. 
After holding a public inquiry and receiving his inspector's report, 
the Minister of Town and Country Planning made the order asked for.
The applicants moved to have the order quashed so far as it affected 
their property.
The court made a few observations as to the functions of the 
executive when entrusted by Parliament with the power to make or not
(30) (1947) K.B. 702.
to make an order according to its discretion. First, the competent
executive official is at liberty to base his opinion on whatever
material he thinks fit, whether obtained in the ordinary course of
his functions or derived from a public inquiry. Secondly, in coming
to a decision he is not required to act on quasi-judicial principles,
though he may follow such principles when holding an inquiry. Finally,
an executive act is not to be treated as a judicial decision or even as 
quasi-
a/judicial decision and therefore the evidence or lack of evidence at 
the inquiry v/hich led him to act cannot be questioned before the court. 
The court will not proceed to substitute its own opinion for that of 
the Executive.
But, as Lord Green M.R. said, the position is different when the 
Executive has exceeded the limits within which his powers were to be 
exercised. He said: "Different considerations, of course, apply in a 
case where a Minister can be shown to have overstepped the limits of 
his statutory powers as, for example, where the conditions in which 
they may be exercised are laid down in the statute and he nurports to
(31)
act in a case where those conditions do not exist."
Where the respondents had, acting under regulation 51 (2) of the
(32)
Defence (General) Regulations, 1939? taken possession of the plaintiff's
31) Ibid, at p.717.
32) Regulation 51(2) provided:- "While any land is in the possession 
of a competent authority by virtue of this regulation ... the land 
may ... be used by, or under the authority of, the competent 
authority, for such purpose, and in such manner, as that authority 
thinks expedient in the interests of the public safety, the defence 
of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for main­
taining supplies and services essential to the life of the community..
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heritable properties under a pretended requisition made by the
Secretary of State for Scotland, he moved the court to interdict the
respondents from cutting, mutilating or removing trees from a certain
area of land belonging to him and to declare that the respondents had
(33)
unlawfully cut and removed trees from the said area.
The counsel for the appellant sought to find in the regulation 
the court1s jurisdiction to interfere with the actions of the competent 
authority in relation to the land. He submitted that the court must 
decide whether a particular act was or was not ancillary to the purpose 
of the regulation. As, however, the words of the regulation appeared 
to the court to be well chosen, such jurisdiction was clearly excluded. 
The House of Lords also refused to entertain the question whether the 
competent authority acted with reasonable care and skill. Further, as 
Lord Narmand said, Min the absence of averments of bad faith or 
ulterior motive the jurisdiction of the courts is included and the 
competent authority is the judge of the use which it shohld make of
(34)
the land ... n
It is not only for war purposes or the emergency arising out of
it that powers not subject to judicial control can be conferred on the
executive. Parliament can invest the same unlimited powers for any
(35)
purpose. The exerfise of such discretion by the relevant authority
(33) Lemetriades v. Glasgow Corprn. (l95l) 1 All.E.R. 457*
(34) Ibid, at p.400.
(35) "f'k must, however, be obvious that Parliament can confer the same 
unlimited discretion on Ministers for purposes other than war 
purposes” ~ per Somervell J. in He Robinson v. Minister of Town and 
Country PI aiming (1947) 1 K.B. 702 at p.721.
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can only be challenged on strictly limited grounds. In one of such
(36)
cases the Court of Appeal considered the principles which should govern 
the exercise of discretion of this kind and were of the opinion that 
"within the four corners of those principles the discretion ... is an
(37)
absolute one and cannot be questioned in any court of law." Lord
Greene M.R. enunciated the principles which the court must look to
in considering any question of discretion of this kind:
"The exercise of such a discretion must be a real exercise of
the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there
is to be found edpressly or by implication matters which the authority
exercising the discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising
the discretion it must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if
the nature of the subject-matter and the general interpretation of
the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to the
matter in question, the authority must disregard those irrelevant
(38)
collateral matters."
If the relevant authority fails to remember these principles before 
envisaging such discretion, his action may be challenged on the grounds
(36) Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corprn. (1948)
1 K.B. 223. Under the provisions of the Sunday Entertainments 
Act, 1932? the defendants imposed the following condition in the 
plaintiffs1 licence s "Ho children under the age of fifteen years 
shall be admitted to any entertainment, whether accompanied by 
any adult or not." The plaintiffs sought from the court a 
declaration that such condition was ultra vires.
(37) Ibid, at p.228.
(38) Ibid, at p.228.
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of bad faith and dishonesty, onr unreasonableness or disregard of 
public policy and things like that "as being matters which are 
relevant to the question." Though, as will be seen, the grounds 
cannot be confined under one head, they overlap to a very great 
extent„
Similar principles will also be applied in upholding delegated 
legislation. Thus, in declaring certain regulations of the Pedestrian 
Crossing Places (Traffic) Provisional Regulations, 1935 > not to be 
valid for unreasonableness either because of the requirements exacted 
by them from the drivers of motor vehicles or on the ground that they 
involved a slowing down of motor traffic to an extent which was
(39)
injurious to the commercial community, Scott L.J. approved the state-
(40)
ment of Lord Russell of Killowen in Kruse v Johnson. Here, the 
Divisional Court was considering a by-law passed by the Kent County 
Council for restricting street noises, e.g. singing, in a residential 
area which h,ad been made under the enabling powers of the Local 
Government Act, 1888. Lord Russell saids "I do not mean to say ■ 
that there may not be cases in which it would be the duty of the 
court to condemn by-laws, made/under such authority as these were 
made, as invalid because they are unreasonable. But unreasonable in 
what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and 
unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were
(39) Sparks v. Edward Ash Ltd. (1943) A.C.223.
(40) p 8SS) 2 Q.B. 91.
manifestly unjust; if they disclosed had faith; if they involved such 
oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those 
subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reason­
able men, the court might well say: ’Parliament never intended to give
authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.’ 
But it is in this sense, and in this sense only, as I conceive that
(41)
the question of unreasonableness can properly be regarded." Continuing 
he said that a by-law was not unreasonable merely because particular 
judges might think it went further than was prudent or necessary or
(42)
convenient, or because it was not accompanied by a qualification or 
an exception which some judges might think ought to be there.
Be that as it may, this digression to consider a few cases not 
dealing with a war emergency shows that the courts are guided by the 
same considerations in upholding discretionary measures, whether they 
issue out of war legislations or peace time legislations. Whenever 
such ihnlimited discretion is conferred 011 the executive
or any other authority by an Act of Parliament, the court has refused 
to act as a court of appeal from their decisions. Because "if it were 
not so it woiild mean that the courts would be made responsible for
(43)
carrying on the executive government," which cannot be the intention 
of the legislature.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Scime feelings were expressed in Liversidge v, Anderson (1942)
A.C. 206.
(43) lord Greene M.R. in Carltona, Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works
(1943) 2 All.E.R. at 564.
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3• The Rational Basis for Executive Action During War
Our consideration of the English cases involving the interpretation 
of wartime legislation and measures has revealed the growing reluctance 
of the courts to review or to declare them ultra vires or even to 
pronounce them imreasonable in having no just relation to the objects 
at which they were supposed to be directed. The American practice is in
(44)
this respect quite different. This is due to the differences in the
constitutional laws and principles of the two countries which we
(45)
already briefly noticed. If any particular legislative measure or any 
rules, regulations or orders are impugned as unconstitutional before 
an American court, the judicial task involves a more complex process 
than in Britain. "Not only must the regulation in question be intra 
vires the enabling Act, but both the Act and the regulation must be 
intra vires the Constitution. The courts must therefore first determine 
the constitutionality of the enabling Act; only after that has been 
decided can the question of the vires of the regulation be gone into.
In determining the latter question, moreover, the American courts can 
invalidate administrative rules and regulations not only because they 
are ultra vires the enabling Act In the strict sense, but also because
(44) "It is in this test of necessity and Its application by the 
courts that the American practice diverges sharply from that 
in Britain where, under the doctrine of Liversidge v. Anderson, 
it is for the Executive to determine whether the measures 
taken are necessary to cope with the emergency.n Bernard 
Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain, at p.343*
(45) Chapter 8.
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(46)
they are unreasonable.1
In reviewing cases involving the determination of the extent of 
the executive authority during war or emergency the American courts 
adopted the rational-basis rule; the assertion of necessity is not 
enough; the executive has to prove that the measures taken have a
(47)
reasonable relation to the necessity. Moreover, as Chief Justice
Hughes, in recognising the need to allow the executive wide discretion
in time of crisis, saids
"It does not follow from the fact that the Executive has this
range of discretion, deemed to be a necessary incident of his power to
suppress disorder, that every sort of action the Governor may take, no
matter hovif unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private right
and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively
supported by mere executive fiat. The contrary is well established;
what are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or
not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial 
(48)
questions." Here, as already seen, the American Supreme Court was 
considering whether a State Governor had the power to regulate property 
rights by resort to martial law.
(46) Bernard Schwartz, American Administrative Law (1958) at p.73*
(47) "Such measures conceived in good faith, in the face of the 
emergency and directly related to the quelling of disorder 
or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the 
discretion of the Executive," per Hughes C.J. in Sterling v. 
Constantine (1932) 287 U.S. at 399*
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(49)
In Hirabayashi v« U.S. the appellant, who was a Japanese- 
American, was convicted of violating a Congressional Act of 21 March, 
1942, which authorised curfew orders to he made under the Executive 
Order Uo. J066 declaring that "the successful prosecution of the war 
requires every possible protection against espionage and against 
sabotage to national-defence premises, and national-defence 
utilities ... "
In deciding the question whether the restrictions thus imposed 
were in exercise of the unconstitutional delegation by Congress of 
its legislative power, and whether they unconstitutionally discrimi­
nated against citizens of Japanese ancestry in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court also had to consider the reasonableness of the 
executive action. Inasmuch as the challenged orders were defence 
measures for safeguarding the American West Coast against the threatened 
Japanese invasion, danger of sabotage and espionage, the Court had no 
doubt that "reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of 
our national ’defence had ample ground for concluding that they must 
face the danger of invasion, take measures against It, and In making
(50)
the choice of measures consider our internal situation."
(48) Ibid, at pp.400-401* This was approved by Stone C.J. of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Duncan v. ICahanamoku (1945) 327 U.S. 314 at
p.336. He said, "But executive action is not proof of its own 
necessity, and the military’s judgment here is not conclusive 
that every action taken pursuant to the declaration of martial 
law was justified by the exigency."
(49) (1943) 320 U.S. 81.
(50) Doid, at p. 94*
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Two choices are left to the Executive in a case of threatened 
danger; it has to inflict sometimes obviously needless hardship on 
the many or it may sit passive and unresisting. Stone C.J. said:
"We think that constitutional government in time of war is not 
so powerless and does not compel so hard a choice if those charged 
with the responsibility of our national defence have reasonable
(51)
ground for believing that the threat is real."
If the measures were an appropriate exercise of the war power, 
could its validity be impaired because it discriminated against 
citizens of Japanese ancestry? The appellant insisted that the 
measures taken were unreasonable and inappropriate, as they violated 
the constitutional guarantees of the Eifth Amendment. In refusing to 
accept such contentions, Stone C.J. pointed out that every military 
control of the population of a dangerous area in wartime involved 
some infringement of individual liberty, just as did the police 
establishment of fire lines during a fire or the confinement of 
people to their houses during an air raid alarm. He said:
"The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon 
the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a 
group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than 
others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is
(51) rbid, at p.95.
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not to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances
(52)
racial distinctions are irrelevant.”
'The Court here was not concerned with the problem of defining 
the ultimate boundaries of the war power, but was faced with the task 
to decide whether the curfew order as applied was within the scope of 
the war power. As Stone C.J. said:
”Our investigation here does not go beyond the inquiry whether, 
in the light of all the relevant circumstances preceding and attending 
their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute afforded a
(53)
reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curfew.”
Two circumstances which went to determine the attitude of the 
Court were that, immediately prior to the taking of the aforesaid 
military measures, the Japanese had made a heavy air attack on Pearl 
Harbour and the common e:xperience that ”in time of war residents 
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater 
source of danger than those of a different ancestry.” The Court, 
therefore, sustained the conviction for the violation of the curfew 
order imposed to prevent espionage and sabotage in an area threatened 
by Japanese attack. In the final analysis the Court found that ”it 
is enough that circumstances within the knowledge of those charged 
with the responsibility for maintaining the national defence afforded
(54)
a rational basis for the decision Ytfhich they made.” Miether the Court
(52) Ibid, at p.100.
(55) Ibid, at p.101. 
(54) Ibid, at p.102.
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would have made it was irrelevant.
She military authority, however, did not stop by enforcing the 
curfew orders on the West Coast of America. Under President's 
Executive Order No. 9102 the War Relocation Authority was established 
to "formulate and effectuate a program for the removal from the areas 
designated ... under the authority of Exemitive Order No. 9066 ... 
of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive 
Order" and to "provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate 
places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropria/fce 
and supervise their activities." ^ series of Civilian Exclusion 
grders applicable to "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and 
non-alien" were issued by the military commander of the Western Defence 
Command.
(55)
ln Norematsu v. U.S. the appellant, an American citizen of 
Japanese descent, was convicted of violating the above-mentioned order 
excluding all persons of such descent from the designated areas.
Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court, had to admit that "all legal restrictions which curtail the 
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect," though 
all such restrictions may not be unconstitutional. In other words, 
the courts must "subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." But,
THOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT "exclusion from the area in which one1s home
(55) (1944) 323 U.S. 214.
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is located is a far greater deprivation than constant confinement to 
the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.", he found ample justification in 
upholding the executive or military measures. Justice Black saids 
" ... we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of 
Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from 
the West Coast War area at the time they did ... Nothing short of 
apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent
(56)
danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify either."
As the military authorities who had the primary responsibility of 
defending the country concluded that mere curfew order did not provide 
adequate protection but that exclusion were necessary, the Court also 
arrived at the conclusion that such "exclusion from a threatened area 
no less than curfew, has a definite and close relationship to the
(57)
prevention of espionage and sabotage."
Justice Murphy, who dissented, held different views. He 
considered that, when the judicial test of the validity of a government 
order depriving an individual of any of his constitutional rights on a 
plea of military necessity depends on whether the deprivation was 
reasonably related to a public danger that was so "immediate, imminent 
and impending as not to admit of delay" and not to "permit the inter­
vention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger,"
(56) Ibid, at p.218.
(57) Ibid, at p.218.
the challenged order did not meet that test. The order was an obvious
instance of racial discrimination and denial of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. It not only deprived
individuals of their substantive rights under the Constitution "to live
and work where they will, to establish a home where they choose and to
move about freely" but it also, in excommunicating them without the
benefit of hearing, deprived them of their constitutional rights to
procedural due process. Justice Murphy found no reasonable relation
to an immediate, imminent and impending public danger to "support this
racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete
deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation
(58)
in the absence of martial law."
To Justice Jackson the difficulty to determine the reasonableness
was presented from a different direction. Besides the fact that the
courts can never be in a position to know whether such orders as were
(59)
considered in the instant case have a reasonable basis in necessity, 
the consideration that "a civil court cannot be made to enforce an 
order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a
58) Ibid, at p.254*
59) "In the very nature of things military decisions are not 
susoeptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not 
pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that 
often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could 
not be proved. Information in support of an order could not 
be disclosed to courts without danger that it would reach the 
enemy* Neither can courts act on communications made in 
confidence," per Jackson J., at p.245*
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reasonable exercise of military authority” is no less important*
Justice Jackson thought that "the courts can exercise only the judicial
power, can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or they
(60)
cease to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy.”
To rely on a civil court to review the exercise of military power "so
vagrant, so centralised, so necessarily heedless of the individual"
seemed to him wholly delusive. He then went on to say:
"The military reasonableness of these orders can only be
determined by military superiors. If the people ever let command of
the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the
courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint
upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future
as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments
(61)
of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history."
Judging the issues involved here from the viewpoints mentioned
above the legalistic approach towards their solution was, according to
him, meaningless. Moreover, as he said, "once a judicial opinion
rationalises suoh an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution
or rather rationalises the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions suoh an order," the Court will be seen to validate the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure which under-
(62)
lined the aforesaid military orders.
(60) Ibid, at p.248.
(61) Ibid, at p.248.
(62) Ibid, at p.246.
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(63)
In a habeas corpus proceeding the appellant, a citizen of 
Japanese ancestry who was detained in a war relocation centre, challenged 
the legality of her detention* The military authority was willing to 
release hei? only on condition that she should agree to comply with 
regulations and restrictions regarding leave clearance and other con­
ditions of resettlement in the light of the statute (Act of Congress,
21 March, 1942) and the Executive Orders (nos. 9^06 and 91°2) which 
formed the basis of the Japanese evacuation programme. On her represen­
tation the military authority arrived at the finding that she had been 
a loyal American subject. The question whether there was any reasonable 
basis for the militaiy order in detaining an admittedly loyal citizen 
or in granting him or her a conditional release was a matter for the 
consideration of the Court, Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Gourt 
was of the opinion that no such power could be "implied as a useful or 
convenient step in the evacuation program, whatever authority might be
(64)
implied in case of those whose loyalty was not conoeded or established." 
If it could be assumed that the original evacuation was justified, its 
legality was solely due to its being an espionage or sabotage measure, 
and not because there was community hostility to a particular group of 
American citizens. As Justice Douglas said:
♦The evaouation program rested explicitly on the former ground 
not on the latter as the underlying legislation shows. The authority
(63) Ex parte Mitsuye Endo (1944) 323 283*
(64) Ibid, at p.302.
to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release or protection 
against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty is
(65)
conceded*"
According to him, a citizen who was conceded to be loyal presented
no problem of espionage or sabotage* ftHe who is loyal is by definition
(66)
not a spy or a saboteur*1' If, therefore, the authority to detain is 
exercised over such person, the aforesaid measure against espionage or 
sabotage would be transformed into a different thing* Precisely this 
was not done by Executive Order Ho, 9066 or the Act of 21 March, 1942* 
The court refused to do what the Order or the Act did not do. The 
standard of necessity did not, at least in the case of the appellant 
who was conceded to be a loyal citizen, justify her continued detention. 
"When the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war 
effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no
(07)
relationship to that objective is unauthorized,"
4. The Abuse of Powers
 m —
Two cases which raised the problem of determining the extent 
of the power of the military authority to establish a direct military 
rule and to continue for a period of nearly three years, arose out of
65) Ibid, at p.502.
66) Ibid, at p,302.
67) Ibid, at p.302,
68) Duncan v* Kahanamoku and White v. Steer (1946) 527 U.S. 504*
a regime of martial law in Hawaii. Immediately following the severe 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941 > the Government 
of Hawaii promulgated martial law throughout the territory of Hawaii 
and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The Governors proclamation 
also authorised the commanding general "during the ... emergency and 
until danger of invasion is removed, to exercise all the powers 
normally exercised" by the Governor and by the "judicial officers and 
employees of this territory." The President approved the Governor’s 
action on 9 December, 1941*
In pursuance of this authorisation the commanding general 
proclaimed himself Military Governor and undertook the defence of the 
territory and the maintenance of order. On 8 December, both civil 
and criminal courts were prohibited from summoning jurors and witnesses 
and also trying cases. Military tribunals were established to try 
civilians for violating the laws of the United States and the 
Territory of Hawaii and rules, regulations, orders and the police of 
the Military Government, In inflicting punishment, the military 
tribunals were to be "guided by, but not limited to, the penalties 
authorised by the courts-martial manual, the laws of the United 
States, the Territory of Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and the 
customs of war in like oases." Punishment must be commensurate with 
the offence committed becaUfce the established rule* The death 
penalty could be imposed "in appropriate cases."
The result was that the military authority began to rule by
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simply promulgating orders from time to time and regulated the daily 
activities of the civilians. The sentences imposed by the military 
tribunals could not be reviewed by the appellate court, since they 
were not part of the judicial system of the United States. In short, 
the authority acted on the assumption that its rule was not subject 
to any judicial control.
Some eight months after the declaration of martial law, White, 
a stockbroker in Honolulu, was arrested by the military police. His 
business was in no way connected with the armed services. Syx*
The charge was the embezzlement of stock of another citizen. A military 
tribunal, designated as a Provost Court, tried, convicted and sentenced
(69)
him to four years.
Duncan, a civilian shipfitter employed in the navy yard at
Honolulu, was arrested after two years of martial rule. He was
engaged in a brawl with two armed Marine sentries. He was tried by
(70)
a military tribunal and sentenced to six months* imprisonment.
In proclaiming martial law the Governor presumably relied on
(71)
section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, 1900. The question before the
(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid.
(71) It provides: "That the Governor shall be responsible for the
faithful execution of the laws of the United States and of the 
Territory of Hawaii within the said territory and whenever it 
becomes necessary he may call upon the commanders of the military 
and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii, 
or summon the posse comitatus. or call out the militia of the 
Territory to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, 
insurrection or rebellion in said Territory* and he may, in
American Supreme Court was whether the provisions contained in Section 
67 empowered the armed forces to supplant all civilian laws and 
substitute military for judicial tribunals.
The decision largely depended on the interpretation of the 
language Used in the Organic Act which, it could be plainly seen, 
authorised the Governor of Hawaii to invoke military aid under certain 
circumstances. But it did not define the exact limits to which the 
military authorities must conform. It is, no doubt, certain, as 
Justice Black pointed out, that it "did not explicitly declare that 
the Governor in conjunction with the military could for days, months 
or years, close all the courts and supplant them with military 
tribunals." The use of the term "martial law" in the section did not 
mean that it contained the power to obliterate the judicial system of 
Hawaii.
Referring to the legislative history of the Islands Government 
contended that Congress, by the provisions of Section 67, "intended 
to give the armed forces extraordinarily broad powers to try civilians 
before military tribunals." The facts were that before Congress 
enacted the present Act, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in interpreting 
the language of an identical section in the original constitution of
case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, 
when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any 
part thereof, under martial law until communication can be 
had with the President and his decision thereon made 
known."
Hawaii, held that it empowered the Hawaiian President to authorise
military tribunals to try civilians whenever the public safety needed 
(72)
it. Congress, it was learned, adopted the same language and its inter­
pretation by the Hawaiian Supreme Court,
This could hardly suffice to persuade the Court that "Congress 
was willing to enact a Hawaiian Supreme Court decision permitting"
"a radical departure" from "our political traditions and our institution 
of jury trials in courts of law." Justice Black, who delivered the 
opinion of the court, said:
"Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our 
system of government. They were set up by our founders to protect 
the liberties they valued. Our system of government clearly is the 
antithesis of total military rule and the founders of this country are 
not likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the 
limits of a territory made part of this country and not recently taken 
from an enemy. They were opposed to governments that placed in the 
hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws,
(75)
Their philosophy has been the people's throughout our history."
(72) Re Kalanianaole, 10 Haw. 29. Here, the defendants were rebels
who took part in the uprising which the armed forces were
ordered to suppress. This case not only upheld military trials 
of civilians but also held that the courts would not interfere
unless there had been clear abuse of power resulting in cruel
and inhuman practices or the "establishment of military rule for 
the personal gain of the President and the armed forces." But 
the courts would not go into the question whether the President's 
action was unjustifiable, as being unnecessary for the public 
safety.
(75) Ibid, at p.322.
Another ground upon which extraordinary measures in Hawaii could 
not he supported was that Hawaiian citizens were no "less entitled to 
constitutional protection than others*" While Congress, in enacting 
section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, "intended to authorise the 
military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil 
government and for the defence of the Islands against actual or 
threatened rehellion or invasion, was not intended to authorise the
(74)
supplanting of courts hy military tribunals,"
The principle in all these oases is one enunciated earlier hy 
the United States Supreme Courts
" the military should always he kept in subjection to the 
laws of the country to which it belongs, and that he is no friend to 
the Republic who advocates the contrary. The established principle 
of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it
(75)
the military must always yield,"
Justice Burton, however, dissented from the view taken by the 
majority and speaking for himself and Justice Frankfurter, said:
"Once the islands are visualized as a battle field under actual 
invasion, threatened with further invasion, and invaluable to the enemy 
as a base from which to attack the continental United States, the 
situation is completely changed from that of an ordinary civilian 
community. Under conditions likely to disregard even the laws of
(74) Ibid, at p.324*
(75) 3)ow v. Johnson* 100 U,S, 158 at p*l69*
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civilized warfare, the island population was threatened with immediate
destruction. It thus became necessary to organize and protect that
population against imminent danger from bombing, fire, disruption of
water and food supply, disease and all the other incidents of modern
warfare. The limited area, limited garrison and great isolation of the
Islands put a premium on the efficiency of its civilian defence and on
the integration of it with the military defence. All activity was
subordinated to executive control as the best constitutional safeguard
(76)
of the civilian as well as the military life.*1
In 1951 there was imminent danger of a strike affecting the 
steel mills in the United States which would have resulted in an almost 
complete stoppage of production of this essential commodity. In
(77)
Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the American Supreme Court 
was asked to decide whether the President was acting within his con­
stitutional power when he directed the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of and operate most of the country's steel mills. The mill 
owners' views were that the President's order amounted to law-making 
which the Constitution had expressly confided to the Congress. The 
Government oontended that the President made the order on the findings 
that action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would 
otherwise be caused by a stoppage of steel production. To meet this 
grave emergency the President was merely acting within the aggregate
(76) (1946) 327 U.S. 304 at 357.
(77) (1951) 343 U.S. 579.
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of his constitutional powers as the Chief Executive and the commander- 
in-chief of the TFnited States.
In holding that the order could not properly he sustained as an 
exercise of the President *s military power as Commander-in-chief of the 
Armed Forces, Justice Black refused to accept the authority of the oases 
"upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day 
fighting in a theatre of war." He said:
"Such cases need not concern us here. Even though 1 theatre of 
war* he an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our 
constitutional system hold that the commander-in-chief of the Armed 
Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private 
property, fhis is a job for the nation's law-makers, not for its
He, further, continued to say:
"Hor can the seizure order he sustained because of the several 
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see 
that "the laws he faithfully executed" refutes the idea that he is 
to he a law-maker. The Constitution limits his functions in the law­
making process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the 
vetoing of laws he thinks had. And the constitution is neither silent 
nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
(78)
military authorities." 
B
(79)
execute."
Ibid, at p.587 
Ibid, at p.587
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Justice Jackson was also of the opinion that the widest latitude
of interpretation could he given to sustain the Presidents Exclusive
function to command the instruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world for the seourity of our society,1' hut
when it was turned inward, "not because of rebellion but because of a
(80)
lawful economic struggle between industry and labour," no such indulgence
was possible. A command power of the Chief Executive in a militaristic
system could be implied as being absolute, but in a constitutional
Republic it is subject to limitations. Justice Jackson said*
"The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that
the civilian would control the military, not to enable the military
to subordinate the presidential office. No penance would ever expiate
the sin against free Government of holding that a President can escape
control of executive powers by law through assuming his military
role. What the powers of command may include X do not try to envision,
but I think it is not a military prerogative, without support of law,
to seize persons or property because they are important or even
(81)
essential for the military and the naval establishment."
(80) Ibid, at p.645.
(81) Ibid at p.646.
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CHAPTER 10 
THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE IN PAKISTAN
1. General Considerations
In Pakistan martial law has so far twice been declared. When 
disturbances broke out in the Punjab in 1953 and the civil authority 
in the Province failed to maintain and restore peace and order, martial 
law was proclaimed and continued for about two months and a half.
When the necessity for declaring it and its continuance for this 
long period were challenged before the courts, its nature and function 
were defined and explained with reference to the notions of Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. On considering the relevant facts and circum­
stances, the court found that good grounds existed for such declaration. 
We shall presently consider them in detail. The second occasion when 
martial law was proclaimed (it is still continuing) was by President 
Iskander Mirza's Proclamation of 7th October, 195©> which abrogated 
the Constitution of Pakistan of 1956, dissolved the National and 
Provincial legislatures and vested the supreme authority of the State 
on himself as the President of Pakistan and the Chief Administrator 
of Martial Law.
Some care has been taken to narrate the facts and legal decisions 
of the present regime in Pakistan under martial law because, as will 
be seen, it differs fundamentally from the Commonwealth and American
364.
(1)
conceptions of the subject. The reasons advanced for the promulgation 
of martial law on the second occasion would appear to be, not the 
existence of rebellion or invasion but political and constitutional 
deadlock, so mention must be made of the constitutional developments 
in Pakistan prior to October, 1958* Apart from the Protectorate period 
in England, martial law as a form of government, when no rebellion or 
invasion threatens the existence of the State, has never been 
previously tried in any of the countries of the Commonwealth or IT.S.A. 
Those who have commented on the present system of government under 
martial law in Pakistan compare it to a mild sort of dictatorship or 
seemingly benevolent military government.
An examination of the proclamation of martial law in 1953 and 
the acts done by the military authority reveals some confusion 
regarding the nature and extent of the exercise of discretionary 
powers? the same lack of clarity is evident in the acts of the present 
regime in Pakistan. Unless the limits of authority are succinctly 
defined and the rulers and the ruled are guided by the clearly 
expressed principles, the result is bound to be unhappy. To declare 
martial law is not to assume the negation of laws; in Anglo-American 
legal systems martial law is a branch of Constitutional Law and
(l) "It is not at all common to find Martial Law being introduced 
over a whole country in circumstances of general peace," per 
Cornelius J., as he then was, in The Province of East Pakistan 
v. Mehdi Ali Khan. F.L.D. 1959 8.C. 38? at p*439*
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though there has been a laok of unanimity as to the nature of the 
authority exercisable by the military forces and a resulting vagueness 
as to the content of martial law, still, as has already been seen, 
the various legal decisions of these countries have enunciated some 
common principles from which no violent departure has so far been 
made.
To the vagueness as to the meaning of martial law and the 
misconceptions about it in the minds of lawyers in the Commonwealth 
and elsewhere has been added, so far as Pakistan is concerned, the 
further confusion of its people regarding various modem legal 
institutions and principles and their values in improving their 
economic and social conditions. This would seem to explain the 
prolonged continuation of martial law in Pakistan and its institution 
as a form of government. As our scope is limited we shall briefly 
refer to these uncertainties and misconceptions as occasion arises.
Distinctions will be drawn between martial law as commonly under­
stood by the Commonwealth lawyers today and martial law as administered 
at present in Pakistan, but they will merely reveal that it is a mis­
nomer to call the latter martial law administration. We shall indicate 
the points of departure from the common law system, not only with 
regard to the exercise of martial law powers, but also as to the 
general Gonduct of the ordinary government business.
With these few preliminary remarks as to the nature of martial 
law being at present administered in Pakistan, we shall proceed to
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consider the background which led to the proclamation of martial law 
in the Punjab in 1955* Here the discussion as to whether it was 
necessary to proclaim martial law will engage our attention more than 
the administration of martial law itself.
2. Events leading to the Fun.iab disturbances in 1953 and the 
Proclamation of Martial Law
In March 1953 martial law was declared in Lahore and continued 
till the middle of May. Before the declaration of martial law the 
police had opened fire at several places. As a result of such firing 
two persons were killed on 4th March and ten persons on 5th March; 
sixty-six persons were wounded. When the armed forces were called in 
to quell the disturbances, eleven more persons were killed and forty- 
nine were injured. There were other casualties caused by the police 
or military firing in other towns in the Punjab.
A Court of Inquiry with Muhammad Munir C.J. of the Lahore High 
Court, as he then was, as its Chairman, was set up under the Punjab 
Disturbances (Public Inquiry) Act, 1953* hold an inquiry into the 
disturbances in the Punjab which led to the proclamation of martial 
law. The terms of reference were:-
(i) the circumstances leading to the declaration of Martial Law 
in Lahore on 6th March, 1953;
(ii) the responsibility for the disturbances; and 
(iii) the adequacy or otherwise of the measures taken by the
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Provincial civil authorities to prevent, and subsequently to deal with,
(2)
the disturbances *
The Report of the Court of Inquiry has fully discussed the genesis
of, the responsibility for, and the appropriateness of the measures
adopted by the civil authority to prevent, the disturbances* As some
of the administrative problems and the failure to solve them were due
to extraneous considerations, we propose to discuss the Report briefly
but as a whole*
(a) Cause of the Disturbances
The immediate cause of the disturbances in Lahore was the rejection
by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, of a few
demands made by the Majlis-i-Amal, a sort of Committee of Action
(3)
constituted by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention. The Central 
Government at Karachi had not only refused to accept the demands served 
in the form, of an ultimatum, but also ordered the arrest of the promi­
nent leaders of the movement. This led to demonstrations and processions 
which in the end turned into disorders and outbreaks of violence*
The controversy which led to the demands is popularly known as
(2) Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II 
of 1954 ^0 inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*
(5) The demands were that **if within a month the Qadiani Ahmadis 
were not declared a non-Muslim minority and Choudhury 
Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister who is an Ahmadi, and 
other Ahmadis occupying key posts in the State, are not removed 
from their offices", it would resort to direct action*
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the "Ahrar-Ahmadiya" controversy which has continued for over half a
(4)
century. It relates to sharp doctrinal differences between the 
Ahmadis and the other Muslim sects. Why, it may be asked, did such 
differences of opinion assume such importance as to produce open 
defiance to the authority of the State? though it is understandable 
that, if popularly held beliefs are challenged, especially when they 
are primarily religious, vigorous and vehement protests will be made, 
for a proper understanding of the real motives behind the movement 
some explanation of the ideology of certain sections of the people is 
necessary.
The creation of the State of Pakistan was viewed differently by
different people and the Ulema (the Islamic doctors in theology) had
their own views. Their ideology was that "implicit in the demand for
(5)
Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic State.11 They further claimed 
that their aspirations were met by the passing of the Objectives 
Resolution in 1949 Uy the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, whioh was 
later incorporated as the Preamble to the Pakistan Constitution of 1956.
(4) The Ahmadis are the followers of one Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of 
Qadian who started a new religious movement known as ! Ahmadiyaf, 
after his name, or 'Qadiani1, after the place of his birth. The 
Ahrar was a party of nationalist Muslima, which seceded from the 
Indian National Congress, but at the same time opposed the 
creation of Pakistan. After the Partition, therefore, "no scope 
for activity was left for the Ahrar in India or in Pakistan" and 
in order to “capture a political living space1' began to exploit 
the controversy. As the events subsequently proved their reading
of the psychology of the Muslim masses were correct. They succeeded 
in rallying public opinion in favour of the movement against Ahmadis.
(5) The Report, at p.201.
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If their views were correct, the demands were hut logical conclusions.
If, in pressing their demands on the strength of the Islamic ideology,
the Ulema did not pause to consider the other commitments of the State,
nor did they concern themselves with the assertions made hy such
(6)
eminent persons as Iqbal who conceived the idea of Pakistan, or even 
Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, the fault was not theirs. Things 
should have been explained and discrepancies between unattainable 
ideologies and claims of the State brought to light but, as will be 
seen, both the Central and Provincial governments avoided taking 
unpalatable decisions and incurring unpopularity. The result could 
well be imagined*
(b) The Responsibility for the Disturbances
Apart from the immediate causes the following factors were 
referred to by Mr. Daultana, the former Chief Minister of the Punjab, 
as being responsible for the disturbances:
(i) the general hostile attitude against the Ahmadis,
(ii) the provocative behaviour of the Ahmadis,
(iii) the vague religious basis of the national ideology of
(6) Dr. Iqbal, in his presidential address to the Muslim League in 
19309 said: "Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of
an autonomous Muslim Stated will mean the introduction of a kind 
of religious rule in such States." Mr. M. A. Jinnah, in his 
speech of 11th August, 1947? to the Constitutent Assembly of 
Pakistan said: " ... you will find that in course of time Hindus
would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, 
not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of 
each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the 
State."
Pakistan which gave strength to mull ax sm and plausibility to the 
mullahs1 way of dealing with politioal principles,
(iv) the role of the Ahrars in using the controversies for 
political purposes,
(v) the participation of the general body of the Ulema.
(vi) the failure of the political leaders to give a correct lead 
to the people,
(vii) the activities of the malcontents.
Besides these he mentioned other general grievances against the 
government as aggravating the situation.
A very naive argument urged by the Committee of Action was that 
the disturbances would not have occurred if the Government had acceded 
to its demands and had not ordered the arrest of the leaders of the 
movement. Such a contention is, of course, wholly unacceptable.
<^ n considering the attitudes of both Central and Provincial 
governments the Court of Inquiry felt that though law and order was a 
Provincial subject "something more than a motion of legal and 
administrative mechanism" was necessary to control a population when 
it was seized with such religious frenzy. In its opinion "this 
something did not exist in the Punjab and was not thought of in
(7)
Karachi•"
(c) Reasons for the Failure of the Provincial Civil Authority to 
maintain peace and order
(7) The Report, at p.283.
571.
It may to some extent be true that both the unsophisticated
Ulema in particular and the people in general could be induced to
believe in a certain state of things, but the problem which would seem
to baffle an outside observer is the distressing failure of the
government to tackle with the situation which could not be said to
defeat all human ingenuity* The government could not plead ignorance*
The advisability of taking suitable steps will be evident from the
(8)
recommendation of the high officials of the State. There was also no
need to enact fresh legislative measures} appropriate steps could be
taken against a few persons under the provisions of either the
(9) (10)
Pakistan Penal Code, or the Punjab Public Safety Act.
(8) "I am convinced that if Government continue with its present 
policy of leaving the Ahrar alone, they will sooner or later 
perpetrate such a horrible crime that Government will find it 
difficult to explain its failure to take action upon what the 
C.I.D. has been repeatedly and vehemently reporting to it ...
But some Government somewhere must give the masses a correct
lead. If every party is afraid that the Ahrar will join hands with 
the Opposition, it will be difficult to maintain law and order”, 
per Qurban Ali Khan, Deputy Inspector-General of Polioe, Punjab, 
Ibid, at p.314*
(9) Section 153A of the Pakistan Penal Code provides as follows: 
‘’Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by 
visible representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to 
promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes 
of Her Majesty’s subjects, shall be punished with imprisonment 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.1
(10) The motive for enacting this abnormal piece of legislation was to
provide the executive with sufficient reserve powers to act in an
emergency. Section 3 of the statute empowers Government to 
detain a person, if such course is considered by Government to 
be necessary to prevent the person concerned from acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the public safety or public order. Section 5 
enables the Government to make an order to restrain such a person 
from making public speeches. Section 6 gives to the Government
One of the reasons, apart from whatever political motives there might 
have been, was the arrangement by which the President of a political 
party was at the same time allowed to occupy the position of the 
Chief Minister of the Province. In such cases if there was a conflict 
between the dual personality of the same individual, inaction was as 
likely as domination of one personality by the other. What happened 
in the present case was that Mr. D&ultana, the Chief Minister of the 
Punjab, and who was also the President of the Provincial Muslim League 
Party, declined to take action, because it would make him and his party 
unpopular. "The Punjab Public Safety Act was a hated Act to the 
politician and whenever any recommendation for taking action under 
the Act was made, it was looked upon with political spectacles and, 
in the decisions taken, the politician throughout dominated the
(11)
administrator.11 Under the stress of the emotions of the moment it 
was forgotten that administrative problems remain no less administrative
extensive control on press and newspapers. Section 12 empowers 
a District Magistrate to prohibit the holding of any processions 
or demonstrations in any public place, or any public meeting. 
Section 21 declares it to be a punishable offence for a person 
to make any speech or to publish any statement, rumour or report, 
if such speech, or publication causes or is likely to cause fear 
or alarm to the public, or if it defames or is likely to defame 
any Government in Pakistan or any servant of the Crown or if it 
furthers or is likely to further any activity prejudicial to the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order. Section 25 
punishes the performance of any mock ceremony resembling any 
ceremony associated with or consequent upon death.
(ll) The Report. at p.278.
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though they may originate from or emerge out of the bitterest 
political or religious controversies of the day.
(d) Inadequacy of the Measures adopted by the Provincial Civil 
Authority to restore peace and order
We may now turn to consider briefly the role of the officers who
were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the Province*
The Keport ends by recording its firm conviction that !,if the Ahrar
had been treated as a pure question of law and order without any
political considerations, one District Magistrate and one Superintendent
(12)
of Police could have dealt with them.11
Naturally the question arises why could not the situation have 
been so controlled, even after the Central and Provincial government *s 
inaction had led to the outbreak of the violence? Why was there such 
a spectacular failure of the administrative machinery to maintain law 
and order so that martial law had to be declared? Politics, as has 
already been seen, dominated the scene right from the beginning till 
the outburst of violence. But why did the civil authority fail to 
suppress the disturbances? In discharging their normal duties, they 
should have ignored the causes of the disturbances and the propriety 
or reasonableness of the demands. The governments of the day might 
have gone on arguing endlessly over the question "to be or not to be" 
on this particular issue, but it is difficult to imagine reasons for the
(12) Ibid, at p.337.
failure of the civil authority to suppress the breach of the peace.
The threat was not only imminent; it was actual and real.
The District Magistrate of Lahore was primarily responsible for 
the maintenance of law and order in the metropolitan city. Though 
there has been reference to the presence of "too many cooks", that is 
to say, a number of high officials, such as the Inspector-General of 
Police, the Home Secretary, the Chief Secretary and even the Governor 
of the Province, who ought to have been previously consulted by the 
District Magistrate, it has nowhere been suggested that, once violence 
broke out, he was hampered in his activities by higher authority till 
the decision was made to proclaim martial law. So far as the subject 
of "too many cooks" is concerned, it may be pertinent to observe that, 
if this was the true state of facts as to the machinery for the main­
tenance of law and order in the Provincial capital, it was surely a 
clumsy arrangement. There should not have been any distinction in 
this respect between the functions of the District Magistrate of a 
metropolitan city and his counterpart in a mufassil district* He must 
have as free a hand in controlling disturbers of the peace as an 
officer in charge of a remoter district. And, unless there is an 
indication of a failure on his part, men on the higher rung of the 
official hierarchy must not assume the directive role.
(e) The relationship between the Civil and Military authority before 
martial law was declared
Some comment is necessary on the relationship between the civil 
and military authorities when the latter was called in merely in aid of
the civil power. We have, it may he recalled, discussed this matter
(13)
elsewhere. However, in the present case allegation was made about 
the lack of proper co-operation and co-ordination between the police 
and the members of the regular Armed Forces. Instance was even cited 
when certain sections of the men on the street preferred to garland the 
military officers at a time when their funotion demanded the assump­
tion of a strictly neutral role. Be that as it may, the evidence
disclosed that the military authority were "not anxious to help" unless
(14)
they were given "complete control." On the other hand the Army was 
aggrieved that "the police were not dealing firmly" with those 
responsible for causing the actual disturbances. It was even suggested 
that timely action would have saved the necessity of employing the 
soldiers. As Geneenl Azam said:
"Half-hearted measures and poor leadership resulted in chaos.
The police force were first £lass, and if they had followed a firm 
policy at a oertain stage, they could have dealt with the situation
(15)
without the help of the Array."
Such a state of affairs was regrettable, because this lack of 
co-ordination and understanding between the two forces not defeat made the 
proclamation of martial law neoessary. Muhammad Munir G.J. could not 
help commenting: "It naturally stmtck us as a very unhappy position
that there should be any such formality between the two forces pursuing
(13) Chapter 5*
(14) The Report, at p.373*
(15) Ibid, at p.381.
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(16)
the same end.'* In our considered opinion the Report should have 
submitted their suggestions as to how relationship between the Army 
and the police should be governed in future on similar occasions.
The need for express regulations in this respect will also be 
felt if the matter is considered from another aspect inherent in the 
situation. When two forces under different commands are employed at 
the same time and placed to discharge similar functions, conflict is 
bound to arise* However solicitous both of them may be to assist each 
other, the clash of will would seem inevitable. The present case was 
no exception as would be evident from the following passage:
"The military contingents were also to use force, fif necessary1, 
but they were to act under the orders of their commanders. The 
commanders themselves were to use their own discretion "under the 
general directions given by the G.O.C." The words within commas create 
a difficult position. Who was to decide whether force was "necessary"? 
If the commanders were to use their discretion, then they themselves 
would decide. But suppose the police officer started using force and 
the military commander thought it was unnecessary, or if he thought 
force should be used and the police officer did not use it. How would
the commander be "supporting" the police contingent in that event?
(17)
Ibid, at p.375* 
Ibid, at p.575.
5. The Judicial Attempt to Define Martial Law
Valuable as the findings of the Court of Inquiry were, its
utterances were not judicial. Moreover, the Court did not consider
the meaning of martial law, nor did it determine the extent of powers
exercisable by the Armed Forces when martial law had been declared.
(18)
In a case arising from the acts of the military authority enforcing 
martial law during the Punjab disturbances, the Lahore High Court 
discussed several aspects of their authority. Incidentally, the Court 
referred to the different senses in which mattial law is used and
also considered whether powers conferred on the military authority
, (19)
by the Martial Law (Indemnity; Ordinance, Ho. II, 1955? could be
validated. The main contention before the Court centred upon the
(20)
question whether Section 7 of the Ordinance which provided for the 
continuation of sentences by special military courts even after martial 
law had ceased to exist, was ultra vires the Governor-General1s power 
to promulgate ordinances.
The appellant had moved the application for relief in the nature 
of habeas corpus under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(18) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1955 Lahore 825.
(19) Appendix VI.
(20) It provided: Confirmation and Continuance of Martial Law Sentences 
of Confinement. (I) Every •person confined under and by virtue of
a sentence passed by a Court or other authority constituted or 
appointed under martial law and acting in a judicial capacity shall 
continue liable to confinement until the sentence, reduced by 
remissions,if any, earned under the rules applicable to the serving 
of such sentence, is served, or until he is released by order of 
the Central Government.
on the allegation that the prisoner, a member of the Provincial
Legislative Assembly, was being illegally detained under the aforesaid
provisions of the Ordinance, Further, he challenged the introduction
of martial law, the constitution of the speoial military courts, the
procedure adopted by them which did not conform to the ordinary forms
of criminal trials and the continuation of martial law after the
necessity for it had ceased.
Government contended that the Ordinance indemnifying servants
of the Crown and other persons in respect of acts done in good faith
and validating sentences of special military courts was validly
promulgated under section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1955?
by the Governor'-General.
(a^ The Different Meanings of Martial Law
In attempting to give an indication as to the proper meaning
of martial law Muhammad Munir, C, J. of the Lahore High Court, as he
then was, referred to the different senses in which it is used in
constitutional jurisprudence. Firstly, it relates to the law as to
"discipline in the armed forces of the State which is administered by
(21)
tribunals, called courts-martial." Secondly, martial law means 
"military government in occupied territory and is used to describe the
(21) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P:L.R. 1953 Lahore at p.829. In 
Pakistan, if this sense be accepted, martial law would mean 
"the law administered by courts-martial law constituted under 
the Army Act, the Naval Discipline Act, and the Air Force 
Act."
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(22)
powers of a military commander in times of war in enemy territory.” 
Thirdly, it means "the rights and obligations of the military under 
the common and statute law of the count ay to repel force toy force while 
assisting the civil authorities to suppress riots, insurrections or
(23)
other disorders in the land.” In this sense it is recognised toy the
law of England and "there are several ancient statutes which make it
incumbent not only on the citizens tout also Crown servants, including
(24)
the army, to assist civil authorities in suppressing disorders.” In 
American Constitutional law, martial law in this means a "form of 
police power of the State” and it is applied "when the military arm 
does not supersede civil authority tout is merely called upon to aid
(25)
such authority in the execution of its civil functions." In the opinion
of Munir C.J. it was a "misuse of the term to describe these rights and
duties as martial lawj they are no more than a part of the civil law
(26)
of the land." In Pakistan these rights and duties of citizens and 
servants of the Crown, including the armed forces, are laid down in the 
provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code Criminal Procedure and 
the Police Act.
(22) Ibid, at p.829. The Duke of Wellington understood martial
law in this sense when he saids
"Martial Law is neither more nor less than the will of the 
General who commands the army."
(23) Ibid, at p.829.
(24} Ibid, at p.829.
(2g) Ibid, at p.835-
(2fi) Ibid, at p.830.
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He, however, failed to mention that the Petition of Right, 1628,
(27)
expressly prohibited the declaration of martial law in England. He
also did not consider that, though assumption of powers necessary to
sucress disturbances is allowed under English law, such assumption
would not ordinary result in the suspension of the Constitution. ‘'Martial
law, more often -used as the name for the government of a country or a
district by military tribunals, which more or less supersede the
jurisdiction of the courts ... How this kind of martial law is in
(28)
England utterly unknown to the constitution." The only acts permissible 
during the martial rule are as have been described by Dicey:
"Soldiers may suppress a riot as they may resist an invasion, 
they may fight rebels just as they may fight foreign enemies, but they 
have no right under the law to inflict punishment for riot or rebellion. 
During the effort to restore peace, rebels may be lawfully killed just 
as enemies may be lawfully slaughtered in battle, or prisoners may be 
shot to prevent their escape, but any execution (independently of 
military law)inflicted by a court-martial law is illegal, and technically
(29)
murder*"
Muhammad Munir C.J* also came to the conclusions that the setting 
up of special military courts with a view to punishing people for
(27) We have fully discussed the incidents leading to the declarations 
contained in the Petition of Right in Chapter 1.
(28) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1959) Tenth ed., at 
p.291•
(29) Ibid, at p.293*
contravention of Martial Law Regulations or Orders could only be
justified if the orders passed by such courts were necessary for the
preservation or restoration of order. "If the object in inflicting
sentences of imprisonment was not preventive but punitive in the
sense in which civil courts punish criminals, the sentences can have
no reference to necessity and would, therefore, automatically come to
(30)
an end with the withdrawal of the martial law." But strangely 
enough, as we shall see, he held that the sentences passed by the 
special military courts could be legally enforced on the expiry of 
martial law, because Section 7 of the Martial Law Ordinance Ho. II of 
1953 00 enacted.
Further, though Muhammad Munir C.J. was of the view that, on 
a comparison between the provisions of law in Pakistan with those of 
English law, "it will be apparent that the rights and duties of 
citizens, including servants of the Crown and the military, are
(31)
substantially identical in both systems," he failed to indicate in 
which sense martial could then be applied in Pakistan. Is it in the 
sense in which once the Constable and Marshall Court in England used 
to administer it? Or the sense in which it was understood by the 
Duke of Wellington - the will of the General commanding the army in 
a conquered country? Or does martial law in Pakistan mean the 
"suspension of ordinary law and the temporary Government of a country
(30) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1955 Lahore at p.843*
(31) Ibid, at p.835.
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(32)
or parts of it by military tribunals," in whicb sense it "is unknown to
(33)
the law of Ungland," Nowhere in the judgment have the principles
underlying the assumption of extraordinary powers by the executive or
the amed forces been clearly enunciated* It seems, from the judgment
as a whole, that he had in mind the current English notions of martial
law, that is to say, "the common law right of the Crown and its
servants to repel force by force in the oase of invasion, insurrection,
(34)
riot or generally of any violent resistance to the law." This is evident
from his following assertions
"Every person, whether a Crown servant or not, is justified
under the law of this country to assist others, including Government
servants, in the protection of person and property. This right of a
person to protect the person and property of others from haim is
recognised by those sections of the Penal Code which deal with the
(35)
right of private defence."
The vagueness as to what martial law is appears in other matters 
connected with the subject.
(b) The Extent of Military Authority
Nobody would perhaps quarrel with the proposition that the 
executive or the military authority may assume all necessary powers to
(32) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1959) Tenth ed., at 
p.287*
(35) Ibid.
(34) Ibid, at p.288.
(35) Md. Dinar Khan v. The Crown. P.L.R. 1955 Lahore at p.834*
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suppress breaches of peace, but to say that martial law means “the 
will of the General who commands the army" is, as already seen, subject 
to qualification. So far as the domestic situation is concerned, such 
high views of the authority of the Armed Forces have not been favoured 
by the jurists. The unlimited exercise of authority by the commander 
of the military forces has been recognised as a part of the jus belli, 
and can only be permitted in times of war in enemy territory. Confusion 
should, therefore, have been avoided between the two notions of martial 
law just mentioned.
The failure to remember the distinction between these two 
apparently similar, though by no means identical, views had led to wrong 
conclusions as to the powers exercisable during martial rule. Thus, 
when Muhammad Munir C.J. said that “during such period, all 
constitutional guarantees are suspended and the officer in chief 
command of the forces operating in the troubled area acquires for the
(56)
time being supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority", 
he was inwardly disposed to the views expressed by the Duke of Wellington. 
This becomes more explicit by his utterance which immediately follows 
the aforesaid observations
“In other words, he himself fixes the limits and definition of 
his own authority. He makes his own law, sets up his own courts and 
no civil authority, while he is in command, may call into question what
(56) Ibid, at p.838
he does. In this sense, therefore, martial law is not law at all but
(37)
the will of the officer commanding the army.”
Even assuming that martial law is “the will of the General who
commands the army11, it would be extremely incorrect to say that when “a
commander, who steps in to quell a rebellion, inaugurates a reign of
lawlessness and a civil authority, legislative or executive, which
hands over the civil populace of a locality to the military, places
the life, liberty and property of the people at the feet of the
(38)
General who commands the army.” Hot to speak of the exercise of 
military authority within the country, even in enemy territory the 
military government established by a foreign power cannot introduce a 
“reign of lawlessness”. Theoretically the will of the General 
commanding the army of the occupying power may be supreme, but "the Hague 
Convention of 1907 and the §eneya^ Convention of 1949 have imposed
(39)
certain restrictions on the exercise of his authority*
However regrettable the confusion between the notions of military 
government in a foreign country and martial law may seem to be, it has 
persisted all through the judgment. Thus, Muhammad Munir C.J. seems 
to have taken different views as to the extent of the authority of the
(37) Ibid, at pp.838-9*
(38) Ibid, at p.839* Referring to the declaration of a “state of
siege “ in France which leads to the suspension of fundamental 
rights and consequently to arrest, imprisonment or execution
at the will of a military tribunal Munir C.J. said that this
kind of martial law was “completely foreign to the British or 
American Constitution. “
(39) British Manual of Military law. Part III (1958).
military commander when he considered martial law as the law of neces­
sity. He said: “How because the professed justification for the
military to step in is the disturbance of public tranquillity and the 
object is to restore civil authority to its normal condition, the scope 
of the activities of a military commander extends only to taking such 
action as is necessary for the restoration of law and order, and all 
acts that fall within the scope of that activity will certainly be 
validated for the martial law period by an indemnity bill. A military 
commander, therefore, incurs a serious risk if, beyond doing what iB 
necessary for the restoration of law and order, he takes upon himself
other functions which have nothing to do with the restoration of normal
(40)
conditions.”
This, however, appears to be a reasonable statement of the 
powers of the military authority during the continuance of martial 
law. It shows that his powers are not unlimited, but can and should 
only be exercised if justified by necessity. It is obvious that if 
the authority is guided by the standard of “the will of the General 
who commands the army”, their action is j^bound to be very much different 
from the one taken with reference to the law of necessity. If, short 
of a formidable rebellion or invasion, it becomes necessary to declare 
martial law, the second of the above two views is clearly preferable.
It is needless to emphasise the subtle distinction that exists between 
them.
(48) Md. Umar Khan v. The Grown, P.L.R. 1953 lahore at p*840.
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(°) When can Martial Law be declared?
In any case involving questions as to the meaning of martial law 
it is also important to decide the circumstances justifying its 
declaration. Controversies, as already noticed, exist as to whether 
it can he enforced unless in time of war. When does war exist? It
(41)
prevails when the ordinaiy courts are not open. Ihe "open court" theory
(42)
was, however, partially modified in some of the English cases. In this 
connection it is also necessary to determine the extent of the juris­
diction of the ordinary courts. Excepting brief references to these 
important matters, there is no clear statement about them in the
judgment. Neither is there any conclusion, as is evident from the
following passage:
"Just as the transition from civil tumult to rebellion and from 
rebellion to war is easy and imperceptible, so the common law doctrine
of the right to use force against force can be extended to justify the
use of necessary force where riots have assumed the form of armed 
insurrection or open rebellion amounting to war* There is authority 
for this proposition in the Privy Council case of Tilohko v. Attorney-
(43)
General, which was followed by the House of Lords in Clifford v.
(44) (45)
01 Sullivan and in the Queen's Bench case, Phillips v. Eyre. On such
occasions the civil courts may still function, though a delicate
(41) Chapter 6.
(42) Ibid.
(43) (1907) A.C.93.
(44) (I921) 2 A.C. 570.
(45) (1870) 6 Q.B.D. 1.
position may develop where, while the courts are functioning, the 
military seek to oust their jurisdiction by setting up their parallel
(46)
tribunals and claiming paramountoy for them*"
(47)
Muhammad Munir C.J. then referred to Wolfe Tone!s case and quoted
the judgment at length, but instead of seeing in it the best illustration
of "the noble energy with which judges have maintained the rule of
(48)
regular law, even at periods of revolutionary violence", he saw in it 
an instance of the conflict between the civil and the military 
authorities of the State. He said: "Where any such conflict between
civil law and martial law arises, the antagonism becomes so irrecon­
cilable that in the conflict one or the other must perish, the civil 
courts claiming that they have jurisdiction to judge whether war 
exists to oust their jurisdiction and the military commander asserting
(49)
that there is war and that his will is supreme."
Further, he referred to the observations in the case of Marais
(50)
v. G.Q.C. that where war prevailed the ordinary courts had no juris­
diction over the action of the armed forces but it waw for the civil 
courts to decide whether a state of war existed or not. It appears 
that Muhammad Munir C.J. was expressing his agreement with the views 
mentioned in these cases, but as this was in the earlier part of his 
judgment, when he was expounding the state of law in Pakistan, it 
might have been more clearly indicated.
(46) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1955 Lahore 835*
(47) (1798) 27 Howell’s State Trials 614*
(48) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1959) Tenth ed., at p.293*
(49) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1953 Lahore 835.
(50) (1902) A.C.114.
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(d) The Court's Jurisdiction during Martial Law
So far as judicial control of military action is concerned, 
Muhammad Munir C.J. agreed with the opinion that civil courts could 
not call into question the legality or propriety of its action, 
“Durante hello, therefore, the will of the military commander is as 
supreme in the area as if he were in military occupation of the enemy
territory.” He, however, noted the difference between the exercise of 
power by a military commander in an occupied territory and in his own 
country, “Whereas the subjects of a belligerent country, who reside 
in occupied territory, have no legal right against the military, the 
persons on whom the military commander exercises jurisdiction in his 
own country in times of peace have rights with which he can interfere 
only in the expectation that after the termination of the state of
affairs his actions would be ratified by the legislature.'1 In
answering why "so long as martial law lasts such orders cannot form
justiciable issues before the civil courts," he candidly admitted that 
they would not be so "not because the civil courts have no jurisdiction
but because their jurisdiction can at any time be ended by show or use
of force by the military." But when martial law no longer exists "the 
threat to the existence of the civil courts disappears and they can then 
not only function in a normal way but also call in question the acts of
(51)
(52)
(55)
51) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1955 Lahore at p.841
52) Ibid, at p.841.
55) Ibid, at p.842.
the military, whose only defence then can either he the right of
private defence or the right to dispose unlawful assemblies or some
(54)
indemnity legislation."
(e) The Trial by Military Tribunals and its Legality
One of the strong arguments in passing the Petition of Right, 1628,
was not so much the assumption of powers to suppress disorders as the
(55)
trial of citizens by special and military tribunals. As a matter of
fact such tribunals (courts-martial which try soldiers for breaches of
military rules and regulations governing their conduct must be excepted)
are unknown in England. This was noted by Munir C.J. s "In fact in
pure Anglo-Saxon system of law the setting-up of military tribunals to
exercise what in substance are judicial powers is not recognised at
(56)
all."
(f) Continuation of Sentences by Military Tribunals
In the British dominions and colonies where martial law has been 
declared and enforced, it will be seen that "the moment martial law is 
withdrawn, all orders of the military, including sentences of imprison­
ment, which were intended to continue after the cessation of martial
(57)
law, cease to have force and effect." What was strange in the present 
case was that section 7 of the Martial Law (indemnity) Ordinance Ho. II 
of 1955 not only validated "acts ordered or done in good faith for the
(54) Ibid, at p.842.
(55) Chapter 1.
(56) Md. Umar Khan v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1955 Lahore at p.849*
(57) Ibid, at p.841 - "And in our Constitution there is nothing enabling 
the military to step in and take over to the exclusion of civil 
power", at p.859*
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purpose of maintaining or restoring order11 "but also kept alive "all 
sentences executed and orders of seizure or destruction of property
(58)
made during the martial law period" even on the expiry of such period*
In discussing whether "this confirmatory provision conflicts with the 
principle that when martial law is withdrawn and civil power fully 
restored, all orders passed by the military must expire on such with­
drawal" Muhammad Munir C.J. observed that there was no suoh confirmatory 
provision in England since the days of Edward III and also none such in 
Ireland or the colonies. On an interpretation of Section 7 of the 
Ordinance II of 1953 he concluded that as it referred to sentences of 
the kind in the present case, they would, therefore, remain effective 
unless the section was shown to be ultra vires.
(g) Suspension of the Constitution during Martial Rule 
Refuting the arguments that the declaration of martial law and 
the passing of the Ordinance II of 1953 led to the suspension of the 
Constitution, Muhammad Munir C.J. said that the authority of the Govern­
ment or the legislature had not ceased in the area under martial law. 
"[Eheir authority to act, except to the extent that it is controlled by 
the martial law administrator, does not cease and it cannot at all be 
said that the sovereignty of the State is temporarily deposed from
(59)
such area." According to him suspension of constitutional guarantees 
was a different matter. Moreover, under the Government of India Act,
(58) Ibid, at p.849-
(59) Ibid, at p.857.
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1955» still in force, "there are very few constitutional restrictions
(60)
on the legislature^ power*11 But when he made such a wide statement
that f,in an emergency the rights of the legislature to legislate as
to person and property of its citizens are supreme and any legislation
passed by it touching the freedom of person or possession or enjoyment
(6l)
of property, cannot be objected to on the ground of unconstitutionality11, 
it can hardly be supported. (The advocacy of the supremacy of the 
Constitution and not Parliament would have been appropriate in the 
context of Pakistan where the powers of the Legislature and the 
Executive were defined by a written Constitution.
4* The Constitutional Emergency in Pakistan and Assumption of 
Extraordinary Powers by the Executive
Pakistan came into existence as a result of the British
Governments announcement of 3 June, 1947* Paragraph 4 stated that
"while it was not intended to interrupt the work of the existing
Constituent Assembly (that is, the Constituent Assembly which had
come into being as a result of the Cabinet Mission*s proposals) it was
nevertheless clear that any Constitution framed by that Assembly could
not apply to those parts of the country unwilling to accept it."
Subsequent paragraphs provided methods by which certain provinces oould
join the existing or the new Constituent Assembly.
(60) Ibid, at p.857.
(61) Ibid, at p.858.
The Indian Independence Act, 1947> enacted by the United Kingdom 
Parliament legally transferred power to the two independent dominions. 
By 1950 the Constituent Assembly of India completed its work of framing 
a constitution for the country. But the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan failed to produce any constitution for Pakistan. On this 
ground the Governor-General of Pakistan dissolved it on 24 October,
(62)
1954* The legality of his action was challenged by the President of 
the Constitution Assembly. The Sind Chief Court held that the
(65)
dissolution was invalid. On appeal to the Federal Court of Pakistan, 
the majority of the judges held that Section 223A of the Government of 
India Act, 1935 (which section was added to the Act in 1954)> under
(62) The Proclamation declared as follows: "The Governor-General 
having considered the political crisis with which the country 
is faced has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the 
constitutional machinery has broken down. He has, therefore, 
decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan.
The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost 
the confidence of the people and can no longer function.
The ultimate authority vests in the people who will 
decide all issues including constitutional issues through their 
representatives to be elected afresh. Elections will be held 
as early as possible.
Until such time as elections are held, the administration 
of the country will be carried on by a reconstituted Cabinet.
He has called upon the Prime Minister to reform the Cabinet 
with a view to giving the country a vigorous and stable 
administration. The invitation has been accepted.
The security and stability of the country are of paramount 
importance. All personal, sectional and provincial interests 
must be subordinated to the supreme national interest."
(63) Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, P.L.B. 1955
Sind 96.
which the present proceedings were started, was invalid inasmuch as it
(64)
had not received the assent of the Governor-General.
The main contention raged on the question whether the legal 
sovereignty of the Queen-in-Parliament passed to the Constituent Assembly 
alone or along with the Governor-General. On behalf of the Federation 
it was urged that the sovereignty rested with the Assembly and the 
Governor-General, so that the letter's assent was necessary for the 
validity of all laws, constitutional or otherwise. The view of the 
Constituent Assembly was that it was a sovereign body uncontrolled by 
any external agency and as such the constitutional laws enacted by it 
did not require the Governor-General1s assent. The Federal Court 
expressed unwillingness to accept this contention and, therefore, held 
that his assent was necessary. Cornelius J., as he then was, dissented. 
In his opinion the constitutional practice followed for seven long years 
by the three government organs was clear. In accepting the legality 
of all such laws in force which did not receive the Governor-General' s 
assent all of them had a share. It was too late in the day to deviate 
from the practice. Besides, there were also other indications which 
would undoubtedly show that the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign 
body.
The consequences that followed the decision were that as many as 
forty-four Acts of the Constituent Assembly passed without the
(64) Federation of Pakistan v* Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.D. 1955 
F.C. 240.
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Governor-General1 s assent "became invalid. The Governor-General 
attempted to validate and give retrospective effect to thirty-five 
Constitutional Acts by an Emergency Powers Ordinance, IX, of 1955?
(65)
promulgated under Section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1955*
(66)
In Usif Patel v. The Crown The Federal Court held that Section 42 did 
not enable the Governor-General to make by Ordinance any provision as 
to the constitution.
Muhammad Munir C.J. said; “This Court held in Mr. Tamizuddin 
Khan!s case that the Constituent Assembly was not a sovereign body.
But that did not mean that, if the Assembly was not a sovereign body, 
the Governor-General was. We took pains to explain at length that in 
that case the position of the Governor-General in Pakistan is that of 
a constitutional Head of the State, namely a position very similar 
to that occupied by the $kksk King in the United Kingdom. That 
position, which was supported by Mr. Diplock, is now being repudiated 
by the learned Advocate-General and, on the ground of emergency, every 
kind of power is being claimed for the Head of the State. Let us say 
clearly, if we omitted to say so in the previous case, that under the
(65) Section 42 reads as follows; “(l) The Governor-General may, in
cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the
peace and good government of Pakistan or any part thereof, and 
any ordinance so made shall have the like force of law as an 
Act passed by the Federal Legislature, but the power of making 
ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions 
as the power of the Federal Legislature to make laws, and any 
ordinance made under this section may be controlled or superseded 
by any such Act.1
(66) P.I.D. 1955 P.O. 387.
Constitution Acts the Governor-General is possessed of no more powers
(67)
than those that are given to him by those Acts."
Referring to the extent of powers exercisable by the Governor-
General in times of emergency, he went on to say:
"One of these powers is to promulgate Ordinances in cases of
emergency but the limits within which and the checks subject to which
he can exercise that power are clearly laid down in section 42 itself.
On principle the power of the Governor-General to legislate by
Ordinance is always subject to the control of the Federal Legislature
and he cannot remove these controls merely by asserting that no
Federal Legislature in law or in fact is in existence. No such
position is contemplated by the Indian Independence Act, or the
Government of India Act, 1955* Any legislative provision that relates
to a constitutional matter is solely within the powers of the
Constituent Assembly and the Governor-General is under the
Constitution Acts precluded from exercising those powers. The sooner
(68)
this position is realised the better."
To circumvent the difficulty created by this judgment the
(69)
Governor-General issued a Proclamation and an Order for the summoning
(67) Ibid, at p.596.
(68) Ibid, at p.596.
(69) The operative part of the Proclamation was as follows:
"(l) The Governor-General assumes to himself until other 
provision is made by the Constituent Convention such powers 
as are necessary to validate and enforce laws needed to avoid 
a possible breakdown in the constitutional and administrative 
machinery of the country and to preserve the State and maintain 
the government of the country in its existing condition."
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of a Constituent Convention* Further the Governor-General made a 
reference to the Federal Court for an advisory opinion under Section 
213 of the Government Act.
(70)
On hearing the Special Reference No. I of 1955 the Federal Court 
held that the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was valid and 
further held that the Governor-General could summon a new Constituent 
Assembly with the same powers as the old one and the invalid Acts could 
be revalidated by him as a temporary measure, subject to the approval 
of the new Constituent Assembly. The principle accepted by the 
Federal Courses that "in an emergency of this character the Governor- 
General had special powers under the common law which were not to be
(71)
found in the Acts of 1935 and 1947•” The departure from the decision 
in Usif Patel*a case was made on two grounds. "First, in the Ordinance 
the validation of the invalid Acts was not stated to be a temporary 
measure pending validation by a Constituent Assembly; and, secondly,
(70) P.L.D. 1955 F.C. 435.
(71) Muhammad Munir C.J. saidi "The disaster that stared the Governor- 
General in the face, consequent on the illegal manner in which the 
Constituent Assembly exercised its legislative authority, is apparent 
from the results described in the Reference as having followed from 
this Court *s decision in Mr. Tamizuddin Khan1 s case and the subsequent 
case of Usif Patel. The Governor-General must, therefore, be held
to have acted in order to avert an impending disaster and to prevent 
the State and society from dissolution. His proclamation of 16 April, 
1955 f declaring that the laws mentioned in the Schedule to the Emer­
gency Powers Ordinance, 1955» shall be retrospectively enforceable 
is accordingly valid during the interim period, i.e. until the 
validity of these laws is decided upon by the new Constituent Assembly. 
Needless to say that since the validity of these laws during the 
interim period is founded on necessity, there should be no delay in 
calling the Constituent Assembly." At p.486.
there was no provision in the Ordinance for the summoning of a
(72)
Constituent Assembly."
5* The Law of Necessity
In the Reference made by the Governor-General under Section 213
(73)
of the Government of India Act, 1935? Muhammad Munir C.J. considered
at length whether, in such an emergency as referred to in it, the Head
of the State could "temporarily assume to himself legislative powers
(74)
with a view to preventing the State and society from dissolution."
At that moment no Legislature was functioning and State necessity 
demanded that laws which had become invalid should be immediately 
given retrospective validation. Was the Governor-General obliged to 
wait for a legal remedy or was he entitled "in the interests of the 
State temporarily to act outside the limits of the written constitution"? 
In other words, could he act on the principles contained in such maxims 
as id quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitum facit. or salus 
populi suprema lex, or salus reipublioae est suprema lex.
In the opinion of Muhammad Munir C.J. "the law of civil or 
State necessity is as much a part of the unwritten law as the law of
(72) Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, at p.48
(1957).
(73) Special Reference No. I of 1955? P-L.D. 1935 F*C* 435*
(74) Ibid, at p.478.
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military necessity*11 He found support from Cromwell1 s utterance:
"If nothing should he done hut what is according to law, the throat 
of the nation might he cut while we send for someone to make a law",
(75)
and referred to a few English cases* It must, however, he mentioned
that Cromwell was exercising dictatorial powers. The history of the
long struggle between the King and Parliament is a record of the
final triumph against the arbitrary exercise of powers hy the Executive*
(76)
The case of Attorney-General v * Be Keyserfs Ro.val Hotel was also cited 
in support of the ahove proposition, hut the decision embodied a contrary 
principle. It held that "when powers covered by this statute are 
exercised by the Crown, it must be presumed that they are so exercised
(77)
under the statute", and, therefore, the Crown*s prerogative was accordingly 
curtailed* Even the necessity arising out of a World War could not 
enlarge the powers of the Crown when statutory limitations were imposed 
upon them. Opinions of some jurists were also quoted in support of 
the principle that what would otherwise be unlawful, necessity would 
make them legal.
Muhammad Munir C.J. compared the powers and responsibilities of 
the Head of the State during an extraordinary emergency to those of 
an Army Commander during Martial Law, because "the law of civil 
necessity and that of military necessity are both founded on a common
(75) In re an Arbitration (1915) 5 K.B. 676; Shipmoney Case* R. v.
Hampden (1657) 5 St* Tr. 825; Bates*s Case (1606) 2 St* Tr. 371*
(76) (1920) A.C. 508.
(77) Ibid, at p.554-
599-
(78)
principle." Of course some distinction existed. ’’The duty of an army 
commander arises where there is a revolt, insurrection or disturbance 
of the public order, hut the principle which permits, and occasionally 
demands, the exercise of emergency powers is not limited to those cases 
and equally governs a situation where the Head of the State is required
(79)
to act in a case of necessity when the Legislature is not being." On
the authority of the principle enunciated by Lord Mansfield in the
(80)
proceedings against George Stratton and others* Muhammad Munir C.J. 
expressed the opinion that ’’subject to the condition of absoluteness, 
extremeness and imminence, an act which would otherwise be illegal 
becomes legal if it is done bona fide under the stress of necessity 
being referable to an intention to preserve the constitution, the State
hQ) Special Reference No* I of 1955* P*L.D. 1955 F.C, 436 at p.485*
(79) Ibid, at p*484*
(80) (1778) 21 Howell's St. Tr* IO46. The Proceedings were started
on an information filed by His Majesty's Attorney-General for a 
misdemeanour in arresting, imprisoning and deposing Lord Pigot, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Fort St. George and President 
and Governor of the settlement of Madras. The defendants contended 
that Lord Pigot had violated the constitution of the government
of Madras and that the defendants had acted under necessity in 
order to preserve the constitution* In his address to the jury 
Lord Mansfield said: " ,*• to amount to a justification, there
must appear imminent danger to the government and individuals; 
the mischief must be extreme, and such as would not admit a possi­
bility of waiting for a legal remedy. That the safety of the 
government must well warrant the experiment ,. • The necessity will 
not justify going further than necessity obliges: for though 
compulsion takes away the criminalty of the acts, which would 
otherwise be treason, yet it will not justify a man in acting 
farther than such necessity obliges him or continuing to act after 
the compulsion is removed," at p. 1230.
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(81)
or the Society and to prevent it from dissolution," Further, since
Lord Mansfield*s address to the jury expressly referred to the right
of a private person to act in necessity, "in the case of Head of the
State Justification to act must a fortiori be clearer and more
(82)
imperative."
Cornelius J. dissented from the views taken by the majority and 
was of the opinion that the Governor-General had no more powers in an 
emergency than conferred upon him by the constitution. He found 
himself unable to agree with views which favoured a larger authority 
in a Governor, as would be evident from the following statements
"There is no doubt that a Governor will always held to have had 
all the power necessary for meeting any emergency which may have 
required him to take immediate action for the safety of the Colony.
If he acts in good faith and having regard to the circumstances
(83)
reasonably, he will be held harmless."
Cornelius J. fully approved the criticism of the above dictum 
by Br. Keiths
"This is doubtless unsound doctrine, if it suggests that there 
is any special privilege in the case of a Governor or that mere 
reasonable action in good faith will cover any act. Every member of 
the executive may violate in case of emergency ordinary laws, but the 
Governor, like every other officer, runs the risk of finding that a
(81) Special Reference Ho. I of 1955> P*L.D. 1953 C• 435 ais 485*
(82) Ibid, at p.485*
(83) per Sir H. Jehkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the 
Seas, at p.103
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Court of law may conclude that the emergency was not such as to justify
(84)
his action despite its good faith and apparent reasonableness."
Such opinion was unexceptionable especially when Pakistan was
provided with a most elaborate constitution contained in the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, and the Government of India Act, 1955- These
instruments distributed all the powers of Government in detail among
the several authorities of the Centre and the Provinces. Considering
the history of the working of the Government of India Acts beginning 
(85)
from 1915 Cornelius J thought that what Dr. Keith said generally with 
reference to the Governor of a Dominion was fairly true in relation to
84) A. Berridale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions.
85) Special Reference Ko. I of 1955, F.L.D. 1955 F.C. 455*
"This Constitution, which was well adapted to the requirements 
of a great country with a population of some 350 millions, was 
operated successfully for ten years before the Partition, some 
six of these years being covered by the period of the Second 
World War, in a most successful manner, without resort by the 
Chief Executive to any powers other than those expressly 
provided by the British Parliament in the Government of India 
Act and certain other statutory instruments of a temporary 
nature. Prior to the coming into operation of the Government 
of India Act, 1935, bhe country had been governed for some 
twenty-two years under the previous Constitution Act, viz. the 
Government of India Act, 1915i whose provisions differed from 
those of the 1935 Act in two main respects, viz. that powers 
were mainly concentrated in the hands of the Executive, and 
legislative institutions were as yet embryonic and were provided 
with only limited scope. Yet even in that earlier period, when 
responsibility for the safety and welfare of the State devolved 
so much more heavily upon the Executive heads at the Centre and 
in the Provinces, it was never found necessary to invoke any 
powers in relation to British India except such as were derived 
clearly from express statute", at p.
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the Governor-General of Pakistan. "He possesses no special privilege 
to act in excess of the powers afforded to him by the written constitu­
tion, and by his Commission of appointment, and that he cannot affect
to act as Viceroy or to assume that he possesses general sovereign
(S6) 
power."
The only occasion when the Governor of a Dominion may be justified
in breaking the law in the exercise of extraordinary powers is when it
becomes necessary to declare martial law. He may do so in "certain other
(07)
occasions when the requirement arose in relation to public order."
When such extraordinary powers are assumed, they are "generally confined
(88 )
to matters affecting the property and persons of individual subjects."
He then went on to say;
"The existence of an emergency, say a state of war or a large- 
scale disturbance, may justify the executive in making an order 
commandeering all private motor vehicles. Similar circumstances may 
justify entry by officers of the executive upon privately owned 
premises which are, in the eye of the ordinary law, inviolable. In 
a more stringent emergency, the services of members of the public may 
be requisitioned for the purposes of carrying out works or otherwise 
offering resistance to oheck a calamity or offering resistance to an
(09)
enemy."
(86) Ibid, at p.498*
(87) Ibid, at p.511.
(88) Ibid, at p.511.
(89) Ibid, at p.511.
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According to him this was the state of law in the United Kingdom
and the countries of the Commonwealth* Referring to the United States
of America Cornelius J. said that there also f,the operation of the
maxim 1 necessity knows no law* is recognised hut only in relation to
(90)
matters falling within, the police powers of the State.1
As to the argument that Hon the ground of emergency every kind
of power is being claimed for the Head of the State11, he said that the
(91)
effect of the judgment in Usif Patel fs case was that even u$der the 
situation contemplated by the Proclamation of 16 April 1955 "the 
Governor-General could not invoke any powers except such as were
(92)
available to him under the constitutional instruments in force.1 
Ho arguments showing sufficient justification for varying that finding 
were advanced in the Reference.
But, if the Governor-General were, besides being a mere 
constitutional head, also a political sovereign as the King of England, 
he might have claimed such powers as the latter was advised to 
exercise;
(i) in 17231 in relation to the colony of Hew Jersey in America, 
to determine the electoral right by prescribing the qualifications of
(90) Ibid, at p.511* Blackstone defined police powers as including 
nthe due regulation and domestic order of the Kingdom whereby 
the inhabitants of a State, like members of a well-governed 
family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the 
rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners, and 
to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective 
stations11, quoted by Cornelius J. at p.511.
(91) P.L.D. 1955 P.O. 387*
(92) P.L.D. 1955 P.O. 435 at 515.
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electors, and varying constituencies, in the absence of a local 
electoral law;
(ii) in 1747 9 in relation to the colony of New Hampshire in 
America, to increase the number of constituencies;
(iii) in 1690, by appointment of a Governor for Maryland, in 
America, in respect of which Lord Baltimore had incurred forfeiture 
of the charter held by him, in advance of the forfeiture being 
enforced; or
(iv) in 1752, in relation to the colony of Georgia in America, 
upon surrender of the charter, to authorise magistrates and other 
public officers by proclamation under the Great Seal, in advance of 
the establishment of a new system of administration.
Reference to the opinions of jurists and the facts and decisions 
of few cases all of which belonged nto periods when, and to territories
(9?)
where, the power of the King was, in fact, supreme and undisputed,n 
did not seem relevant. As Cornelius J. said:
n9?he records of these affairs are hardly the kind of scripture 
which one could reasonably expect to be quoted in a proceeding which 
is essentially one in the enforcement and maintenance of representative 
institutions. For they can bring but cold comfort to any protagonist 
of the autocratic principle against the now universal rule that the 
will of the people is sovereign. In the case of North America, the
(93) Iticl, at p.5x5.
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territory was lost eventually to the British Crown through the main­
tenance of just such reactionary opinions as those which Senior Counsel 
for the Federation of Pakistan has been pleased to advance for the 
acceptance by the Court. And in the English case, the fate of the 
King, and the judges who delivered the opinion favouring absolute 
power in the King stands for all time as a warning against absolutism,
and as a landmark in the struggle for the freedom and eventual
(94)
sovereignty of the people.**
Muhammad Sharif J., in agreeing with the above views, said that 
the Governor-General was not competent to legislate and could not by 
his own act make valid laws which he could not otherwise enact, so 
far as constitutional matters were concerned. In the absence of 
authority for a contrary proposition and to circumvent this difficulty, 
recourse was had by Government counsel to such dicta as salus populi suprema 
lex and fnecessity makes lawful what is otherwise unlawful.* It was 
hardly possible to utilise them on the present occasion. As Muhammad 
Sharif J. said:
"These have been sometimes invoked in times of war or other 
national disaster to infringe private rights or commandeer private 
property, but we have not been referred to any authority or reported 
cases where, under the stress of circumstances created by some inter­
pretation of law, these were extended to embrace changes in constitutional
(94) Ibid, at pp.515-516.
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law. It might on occasions lead to dangerous consequences if in any 
real or supposed emergency of which the head of State alone must be 
the judge, the constitutional structure itself could be tampered
(95)
with.1
(95) Ibid, at p.519-
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CHAPTER 11
THE LAW OP MARTIAL RULE Iff PAKISTAN (Continued-)
1. The Proclamation of 7 October 1958; The Abrogation of the Pakistan 
Constitution of 1956 and its reasons
On 7 October, 1958> Major-General Iskender Mirza, the President 
of Pakistan, made ,fa clean sweep” of the country's Constitution, govern­
ment, assemblies and political parties. The abrogation of the two year 
old constitution was simultaneously followed by the handing of supreme 
power to General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
imposition of martial law throughout Pakistan. The President's 
Proclamation ran as follows:
"for the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest 
anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful 
exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, 
the lack of decorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends. 
There have been a few honourable exceptions. But being in a minority 
they have not been able to assert their influence in the affairs of 
the country.
These despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of the 
lowest order. Adventurers and exploiters have flourished to the 
detriment of the masses and are getting richer by their nefarious 
practices•
Despite my repeated endeavours, no serious attempt has been made 
to tackle the food crisis. Pood has been a problem of life and death
for us in a country which should be really surplus. Agriculture and 
land administration have been made a hand maiden of politics so that 
in our present system of government no political party will be able 
to take any positive action to increase production. In Bast Pakistan, 
on the other hand, there is a well organised smuggling of food, medicines 
and other necessities of life. The masses there suffer due to the 
shortage so caused in and the consequent high prices of these commo­
dities. Import of food has been a constant and serious drain on our 
foreign exchange earnings in the last few years, with the result that 
the Government is constrained to curtail the much needed internal 
development projects.
Some of our politicians have lately been talking of bloody 
revolution. Another type of adventurers among them think it fii? to 
go to foreign countries and attempt direct alignment with them which 
canonly be described as high treason.
The disgraceful scene enacted recently in the Bast Pakistan 
Assembly is known to all. I am told that such episodes were common 
occurrences in pre-Partition Bengal. YJhether they were or not, it is 
certainly not a civilised mode of procedure. You do not raise the 
prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, killing the Deputy 
Speaker and desecrating the National Plag.
The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I 
am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the 
present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and
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stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex 
problems facing us today. We cannot get men from the moon. Hie same 
group of people who have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination 
will rig the elections for their own ends. They will come back more 
revengeful, because I am sure that the elections will be contested, 
mainly, on personal, regional and sectarian basis. When they return, 
they will use the same methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy 
and are the main cause of the present widespread frustration in the 
country. However much the administration may try, I am convinced, 
judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and •unscrupulous 
scramble for office, that election will neither be free nor fair. They 
will not solve our difficulties. On the contrary, they are likely to 
create greater unhappiness and disappointments leading ultimately to 
a really bloody revolution. Recently, we had elections for the Karachi 
Municipal Corporation. Twenty per cent of the electorate exercised 
their votes, and out of these, about fifty per cent were bogus votes.
We hear threats and cries of civil disobedience in order to 
retain private volunteer organisations and to break up One Unit. These 
disruptive tendencies are a good indication of their patriotism and 
the length up to which politicians and adventurers are prepared to go 
to achieve their parochial aims.
Our foreign policy is subjected to unintelligent and irresponsible 
criticism, not for patriotic motives, but from selfish points of view, 
often by the very people who were responsible for it. We desire to
have friendly relations with all nations, but political adventurers 
try their best to create bad blood and misunderstanding between us 
and countries like the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R. and the Peoples* Republic 
of China. Against India, of course, they scream for war, knowing 
full well that they will be nowhere near the firing line. In no 
country in the world do political parties treat foreign policy in the 
manner it is done in Pakistan. To dispel the confusion so caused, I 
categorically reiterate that we shall continue to follow a policy 
which our interests and geography demand that we shall feonour all our 
international commitments, which as is well-known we have undertaken 
to safeguard the security of Pakistan and, as a peace-loving nation, 
to play our part in averting the danger of war from this troubled 
world.
For the last three years, I have been doing my utmost to work 
the Constitution in a democratic way. I have laboured to bring about 
coalition after coalition, hoping that it would stabilise the adminis­
tration and that the affairs of the country would be run in the 
interests of the masses. My detractors, in their dishonest ways, 
have on every opportunity called these attempts as Palace intrigues.
It has become fashionable to put all the blame on the President. A 
wit said the other day, **If it rains too much it is the fault of the 
President, and if it does not rain it is the fault of the President.” 
If only I alone was concerned I would go on taking these fulminations 
with the contempt they deserve. But the intention of these traitors
and unpatriotic elements is to destroy the prestige of Pakistan and 
the Government by attacking the Head of the State. They have succeeded 
to a great extent, and if this state of affairs is allowed to go on, 
they will achieve their ultimate purposes.
My appraisal of the internal situation has led me to believe 
that a vast majority of the people no longer have any confidence in 
the present system of Government and are getting more and more 
disillusioned and disappointed and are becoming dangerously resentful 
of the manner in which they are exploited. Their resentment and 
bitterness are justifiable. The leaders have not been able to render 
them the service they deserve and have failed to prove themselves 
worthy of the confidence the masses had reposed in them.
The Constitution which was brought into being on 23rd March,
1956, and after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is full of 
dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon disintegrate internally 
if the inherent malaise is not removed. To rectify them, the 
country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution. Then 
it is my intention to collect a number of patriotic persons to 
examine our problems in the political field and devise a Constitution 
more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people. When it is ready, 
and at the appropriate time, it will be submitted to the referendum 
of the people.
It is said that the Constitution is sacred* But more sacred 
than the Constitution or anything else is the country and the welfare
and happiness of its people. As Head of the State, my foremost duty 
before my God and the people is the integrity of Pakistan. It is 
seriously threatened by the tuthlessness of traitors and political 
adventurers, whose selfishness, thirst for power and unpatriotic 
conduct cannot be restrained by a Government set up under the present 
system. Nor can I any longer remain a spectator of activities designed 
to destroy the country. After deep and anxious thought, I have come 
to the regrettable conclusion that I would be failing in my duty if 
I did not take steps, which in my opinion are inescapable in present 
conditions, to save Pakistan from complete disruption. I have, there­
fore, decided:~
(a) the Constitution will be abrogated,
(b) the Central and Provincial Governments will be dismissed 
with immediate effect,
(c) the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies will be 
dissolved,
(d) all political parties will be abolished,
(e) until alternative arrangements are made, Pakistan 
will come under Martial Law. I hereby appoint General Muhammad Ayub 
Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator and place all the armed forces of Pakistan under his 
command.
To the valiant Armed Forces I have to say that "having been 
closely associated with them since the very inception of Pakistan, I
have learnt to admire their patriotism and loyalty. I am putting a 
great strain on them. X fully realise this but X ask you officers 
and men of the Armed Forces on your services depends the future 
existence of Pakistan as an independent Nation and a bastion in these 
parts of the Free World. Do your job without fear or favour and may 
God help you.1
To the people of Pakistan, I talk as a brother and fellow 
compatriot. Present action has been taken with the utmost regret, 
but I have had to do it in the interests of the country and the masses 
finer men than whom it is difficult to imagine. To the patriots and 
the law-abiding, I promise you will be happier and freer. The 
political adventurers, the smugglers, the black marketeers, the 
hoarders will be unhappy and their activities will be severely 
restricted. As for the traitors, they had better flee the country
(i)
if they can and while the going is good."
2. Its Justification and Effects
It is true that, in announcing this bold and outright condemnation
of "the politicians" and "the system", "no stronger words could be used
(2)
by a head of State". Still, the question might be, and as was, asked 
whether President Miraa was absolved of all responsibility for the
(1) P.L.D. 1958 Central Statutes 577.
(2) The Times. London, 9 October, 1958-
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state of affairs he so loudly and vociferously denounced. It would 
seem natural to inquire what was he doing all the time. Could he 
claim that he did not suffer from the limitations which marred the 
general political behaviour of the popular leaders? "Unfortunately 
General Mraa is not a General de Gaulle 5 he himself must bear part 
of the blame for the political degeneration he deplores. He is far 
from innocent of party politics (the Republican party owed its 
existence largely to him); he played a significant part in the 
dismissal of one of the most stable Governments Pakistan has had - 
that of Mr. Suhrawardy, And he is certainly as ambitious as the
(3)
general run of politicians, though less selfishly.” Excepting his 
own assertions, whose truth or wisdom need not concern us, there is 
no evidence of his difference of opinion with them. On such important 
issues silence can never be a convincing proof of one*s ability, 
neither does it go a long way to establish his sincerity. His 
vehement sentiments against everybody and everything did not contain 
in then^my constructive approach to the solution of the many ills of 
Pakistan. Before resorting to such drastic remedy as was proclaimed 
by him, would it not unmistakably show his faith in and loyalty to the 
Constitution if he first exhausted all the resources provided by it? 
After all, he took a solemn oath to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution*
(3) ffhe (Manchester) Guardian. 9 October, 1958.
Be that as it may, concerned as we are mainly with the legal 
and constitutional significance of the measures adopted we shall 
consider those aspects of the New Rule relevant from that viewpoint. 
The immediate result of the Proclamation abrogating the Constitution 
was the dissolution of the Assemblies, both National and Provincial, 
dismissal of Governments, both at the Centre and the Provinces and 
the assumption of all necessary powers for the governance of the 
country. Obviously, the unchallenged exercise of such powers 
required the imposition of martial law, which here only meant notice 
of a detemination not to be hampered by any sort of opposition or 
criticism against his rule. This was evident from the liquidation 
of all existing political parties.
Gradually it was made clear that the proclamation of martial 
law was made not on traditional grounds (there was no sign of 
disturbance, nor any reasonable apprehension of it, excepting perhaps 
the awareness that these drastic steps might be challenged before 
the court of law), neither was it meant to be a temporary affair.
What was it then? Would it be proper to call such assumption of 
powers by an expression which has altogether different meaning and 
content? Even the instance of martial law in the sense of military 
government for a fairly long period is rare in the Commonwealth and 
America. It will be our endeavour to find the true nature of the 
Rule introduced by President Mirza*s Proclamation of 7 October, 1958, 
and seek its meaning and justification with reference to the study of 
martial rule in different countries, which we have previously made.
4X6.
Having thus briefly considered the outcome of President Mirza's 
Proclamation but before we proceed to examine closely the features of 
the Hew Regime, it would perhaps not be out of place to discuss the 
validity of the argument which was sought to justify the scrapping 
of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. For it was the main contention 
of Iskender Mirza, ever since he came into prominence, that parliamen-
(4)
tary democracy was not suited to Pakistan. Even after he was swom-in 
as the first President of Pakistan under the Constitution of 1956 which 
introduced parliamentary government in the country, he was not recon­
ciled to the idea of having such government.
5- Causes of the Failure of Parliamentary Government in Pakistan
Since both achievements and failure, unique and colossal in their 
nature, mark the history of the people of Pakistan for more than a 
decade, it is fruitful to discuss some of the causes which led to the 
virtual scrapping of the Constitution and the negation of democracy in 
this country. Ho simple explanation would be satisfactory. To discover
(4) He talked of "controlled democracy11. H. Feldman, A Constitution 
for Pakistan, at pp.66-67 (1955)* Also Professor Alan Cledhill’s 
The Constitution of Pakistan at p.77 (1957)* In an interview 
with the Special Correspondent of The Daily Telegraph. London,
15 October, 1958> President Mirza said: "we have got to have
some sort of representative Parliament which at the same time 
can be restricted. When I used the words ’'controlled democracy"
I was cursed from ohe end of the world to the other. But I think we 
should have a democracy with a provision in the constitution to 
right the situation when democracy runs off the rails."
the reasons for such failure one has to probe as much the dominant
national traits as to examine the social, political and economic
conditions prevailing in the country.
Before considering its failure it may be necessary to inquire
what is meant by "parliamentary government." Here some difficulty is
bound to arise, for parliamentary government, as has been said, "is not
a static piece of constitutional machinery but a dynamic process" and
further, any definition would merely "tend to be about the formal
machinery of government than about the informal spirit and customs
(5)
which form the lubricant that enables the machine to operate."
Without attempting to define it, some of the most salient features of 
parliamentary government may therefore be profitably enumerated:
1. The Executive must be responsible to and disraissible by the 
Legislature.
2. Laws are to be enacted by the Legislature which must be 
composed of members elected by the citizens at regular intervals.
5. Judges must be independent.
(5) Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies: A Report 
prepared by the Hansard Society. 1955 > at p.2. Again 
"democracy is not merely a matter of political institutions, 
but of the spirit in which they are worked; democracy must 
arise from within, and cannot be imposed - though it may be 
helped or hindered - from without ... Unless the true 
democratic temper is present, the most beautifully devised 
political or economic machinery will result in nothing but 
slavery." Education for Citizenship in Africa: A Report of
the British Advisory Committee on Education, 1948*
4. The Rule of Law must prevail; no man should he punishable 
without trial in an ordinary* court of law and except for a distinct 
breach of a properly* enacted law; no man should be above the law.
5. The fundamental rights of the citizens must be guaranteed.
6. The elections must be free and impartial.
Apparently some but not all of these incidents characterised the
British Indian Government before the transfer of power to the newly
created dominions of India and Pakistan. We have already briefly
considered the Government of India Act, 19359 and the constitutional
history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958 when parliamentary government
was suspended by the Presidential Proclamation on 7th October. We
have seen that the Constitution of 1956 embodied the principles of
parliamentary government. Most of the members of the Constituent
Assembly who took an active part in framing the Constitution were so
much steeped in the ideas of parliamentary system in the United
Kingdom that they did not pause to consider whether in view of the
geographical distance between the two wings of Pakistan and other
(6)
factors such a system could be reasonably expected to work. But they 
not only assumed that a democratic constitution containing familiar 
features would operate quite successfully, they perhaps thought that 
"a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice" 
would go a long way to satisfy the national aspirations. In spite of
(6) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 1957> &t 
pp.15 and 19.
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their indifference to the possibility of future conflict between 
Islamic principles and democratic concepts, the Preamble to the 
Constitution of 1956 recorded some of the common aspirations of the 
people -
’’Wherein the State should exercise its powers and authority 
through the chosen representatives of the people;
"Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance 
and social justice as enunciated by Islam should be fully observed;
"Wherein the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually 
and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings 
and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
"Vi/herein adequate provision should be made for the minorities 
freely to profess and practise their religion and develop their 
culture;
"Wherein should be guaranteed fundamental righfe including rights 
such as equality of status and of opportunity, equality before law, 
freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, 
and social, economic and political justice, subject to law and public 
morality;
"Wherein adequate provision should be made to safeguard the 
legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;
"Wherein the independence of the Judiciary should be fully secured
"So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their 
rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the world and make
their full contribution towards international peace and the progress 
and happiness of humanity."
Mention must be made of two other facts. First, the Constitution 
of 1956 declared Pakistan to be "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan," 
and also on 2 March, 1956, the Governor-General of Pakistan signed a 
hill to make the country an Islamic Republic. Secondly, almost simul­
taneously, the Constituent Assembly decided that Pakistan would remain 
within the Commonwealth. The resolution for continued membership of 
the Commonwealth which was supported by Mr, Suhrawardy, the leader of 
the Opposition, though members of his party absented themselves from 
the House, was passed by forty-two votes to two. Mr. Muhammad Ali, 
the Prime Minister, saidi "We accept the Queen, not as our Sovereign, 
but as the symbol of the free association of the Commonwealth ... As 
a Republic we are completely free and independent, and we are also
(7)
free to be members of the Commonwealth as long as we wish."
The question therefore necessarily arises why in spite of 
declarations of such seemingly admirable and more or less attainable 
democratic principles and the expressed desire to associate with the 
other democratic countries of the Commonwealth, the Constitution of 
Pakistan had, within two and a half,years of its enactment, to be 
abrogated. Hot only that, it would also be important to inquire why, 
along with the abrogation of the Constitution, the people of Pakistan
(7) The Times. London, 3 March, 1956.
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had to be deprived of Parliamentary democracy which is still functioning 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. In this connection other questions 
would also be raised, such as why martial law had to be introduced 
throughout the country, why the fundamental rights had to be suspended, 
why political parties were dissolved and, most important of all, why 
the jurisdiction of the Courts was curtailed and why the Executive 
has assumed the entire legislative powers and partial judicial powers 
of the State.
Out' attempt shall be directed to find out the answers to these 
questions, but as they are all inter-connected the reasons advanced 
may seem to overlap. One might even con’^inyte the entire discussion to 
a few summary observations such as that democracy, as known in the 
West, is foreign to the genius of the Eastern peoples, or that the 
leaders who were entrusted with the governments of the country since 
its inception did not sincerely believe in democratic ideals. One 
might also contend that the accusations of inefficiency made in 
President Mirza*s Proclamation of 7th October were the real causes of 
the failure. But to stop there, without any attempt at further analysis, 
would be to oversimplify a very complex problem. It may, no doubt, be 
true that all of the above explanations contain some truth, but none 
of them, it is submitted, gives a true diagnosis of the social and 
political evils that required such a drastic remedy. Some of the 
causes are quite common for, in most of the countries in South Asia 
today where Parliamentary democracy has suffered setbacks, they have
also been exhibited. But in Pakistan where the democratic process has,
though temporarily, been discarded, some factors are novel. We shall
now consider these in turn.
As far back as 1924 an utterance which seems to have been
justifiably, though quite cynically, made is still representative of a 
widely
qxxsriy popular belief that Western type of democracy is unworkable in
Asia. "You can no more expect the representative institutions to
flourish in their proper form in India than you can expect hot-house
(8)
flowers to blossom in the icy cold of the North.” Such facile 
expressions do not help to solve the problem; they merely tend to fore­
stall inquiry. They do not explain why democratic ideals are unattain­
able in the East and, if really so, what ideals should be substituted 
and followed, or even consider whether any genuine attempt has been 
so far made to build a democratic society on the Western model.
It is true that the concept of democracy as "government of the
(9)
people, by the people and for the people” is the result of the social 
and philosophical beliefs of the people of Western Europe and that the 
evolution of their social and economic structure contributed greatly 
to the formulation as well as realisation of the democratic principles
(8) The statement was made by A. K. Eazlul Huq, quoted in E. 
Coupland *s The Constitutional Problem in India. 1944*
(9) In his speech at Gettysburg during the American Civil 
War, Abraham Lincoln said that "this nation, under God, 
shall have a new birth of freedom, and government of the 
people, by the people and for the people shall not perish 
from the earth.”
and assumptions. To reach the present state of development they
needed not only a few generations but several centuries* With them
democracy is now not merely a political idea, but something much more
than this* It is a way of life or an instinct or an attitude of mind.
The Christian morality may underlie and nourish the sentiment, but
the institutions and methods gradually built up on the democratic
basis manifest an adherence to the secular ideal.
The expression of the doubt that parliamentary government as
known in the West may not, therefore, be suitable for Pakistan "whose
background, traditions, and social structure may provide infertile
(10)
soil for the growth of such a tender plant" is partially true. 
"Democratic practice as it is followed in the West requires a high 
sense of public responsibility and the acceptance of certain funda­
mental rules and values* These have hardly been as yet developed in 
Pakistan as in other Asian countries where also the new democratic 
institutions have not yet acquired the same content as they have in
(id
the West." Warnings have also been given against the attempt to 
introduce a system of government for a people who is not yet ready to 
accept it. "Institutions and methods in order to command success and 
promote the happiness and welfare of the people, must be deep-rooted
(10) Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies; A Report 
prepared by the Hansard Society, 1955 > a-t P«4*
(11) G. W. Chowdhury, Parliamentary Government in Pakistan in 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. XI, 1957-5^! at p.90.
in their traditions and prejudices ... A slavish adherence to any
particular type (of administration), however successful it may have
proved elsewhere, may, if unadapted to local environment, he as ill-
suited and as foreign to its conceptions as direct British rule 
(12)
would be."
Yet in 1947 the logic of the situation demanded that power 
should he transferred to the people of Pakistan, who were left to 
choose whatever form of government they liked. Though the validity 
of the above criticisms needed recognition, everyone seemed to have 
accepted the ideals of democracy. Not only at the moment of national 
exuberance caused by the grant of independence, which led to forget­
fulness on this ^ tissue, but ever since "democracy as an ideal has not
been seriously challenged in Pakistan either from the extreme right
(13)
or the extreme left," There was, however, some misunderstanding in 
certain circles about the nature and function of a modem State, but 
their demand based on Islamic religious conceptions, was not favoured 
by the leaders of public opinion, though, in deference to the wishes 
of the Ulema, the Constitution of 1956 was sprinkled with some Islamic 
principles.
Beginning with the demand for Pakistan and through the recent 
years after its creation, the political leaders here as elsewhere
(12) Sir P. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. 
1922.
(13) G, W. Chowdhuiy, Failure of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan, 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol. XII, 1958-59 P*66.
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sought "the extension of their political rights through the development
(14)
of institutions based on the British model." While the Constituent 
Assemblies of Pakistan were engaged in drawing a Constitution for the 
country, not only the leaders, who were mostly lawyers, imbued with the 
ideas of British Constitutional law, were thinking "in British terms" 
and asking "for responsible government", but also the "people of 
Pakistan were so familiar with the British Constitution that any
(15)
fundamental departure from it would be regarded with profound suspicion." 
Obviously, as has been suggested by Sir Ivor Jennings, there were "other 
forms of self-government, such as that which operates in the United
(16)
States", and an analysis was also made of the constitutions of various
countries but "in the end, however, what may be called the British
(17)
prejudices of the lawyers proved to be dominant."
Ihus, when neither the people nor the leaders showed any 
aversion (with the solitary exception of Major-General Iskander Mirza 
who advocated what he termed as "controlled democracy" and expressed 
preference for a presidential form of government) for democracy in 
general and parliamentary government in particular, it arouses interest 
as to why both were superseded before a chance was given to work them.
(14) Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies! A Report 
prepared by the Hansard Society, 1953 > at p.5.
(15) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 1956, at 
pp. 15 and 19.
(16) Ibid, at p.13.
(17) Ibid, at p.16.
Some transparent and immediate causes such as have been referred 
to with great vehemence in the Presidential Proclamation of 7*^ October, 
19589 a?® oft-repeated and easily discernible. Besides them, there 
are other important reasons for the failure of parliamentary govern­
ment in Pakistan which require consideration. Among these the first 
and foremost is the lamentable lack of awareness of rights which made 
liberty quite meaningless though independence was a reality. It seemed 
that after they had achieved their object (of course, not shedding much 
"blood, sweat and tears") they felt relieved and avoided taking new 
responsibilities in order to fulfil the conditions necessary for a 
greater success. It appeared, or at least was made to appear, that there 
was no task of importance demanding attention, since the homeland was 
theirs and the government would be run by their own men. Some such 
complacency and self-satisfaction as stressed in the poetic utterance 
"God13 in his heaven; all!s right with the world" marked the general 
behaviour of the people and the leaders alike. Ihe fundamental mistake 
was perhaps the easy assumption which led everyone to believe that
government business would go on as before, if not more efficiently,
(IB)
at least no worse than under British rule in undivided India. The 
politicians failed to realise that great difficulties of every sort 
would dog their steps after the departure of the personnel running the 
previous government. Hone could deny, however, that though the
(18) "Everybody in a nationalist movement assumes that government is 
a simple art which can be learned in a morning." Sir Ivor 
Jennings, Problems of the New Commonwealth, at p.30 (1959)*
government of yesterday was hardly democratic, it was nevertheless 
enlightened and efficient. What the successor government of a newly 
created nation needed most at this hour was a fresh sense of direction 
and an understanding of the steps required to ensure efficiency in the 
most complex machinery necessary in a parliamentary form of government. 
Unfortunately there was no leader, after the passing of the two founding 
fathers, with sufficient ability to meet the new situation.
This indifference to the need to evolve a new sense of purpose 
in the changed circumstances and the failure to acquire more detailed 
knowledge of the technique of parliamentary government, though 
inexcusable, is explained by the rapidity of constitutional develop­
ment in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. While the older members of 
the Commonwealth are still functioning under their respective Constitu­
tion Acts, enacted by the British Parliament, Pakistan, like other 
newer members, got full freedom after a very brief experience of 
parliamentary government under the Government of India Act, 1935; 
gradual development and political esqaerience which bring a mature 
outlook are not characteristic features of political evolution in 
Pakistan, To unite on the slogan for independence was one thing; to 
understand the full implications it involved was, however, completely 
different. Nobody would deny that to acquire a full understanding 
of the democratic process required time. As has been aptly remarked,
"it is impossible to expect that colonial politicians will develop 
overnight the traditions which Britain has accumulated through
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(19)
centuries. "
At the same time, it would seem that the leaders managed to
forget the lessons of history. They assumed and quite wrongly, as
later events proved, that self-government implied good government
(20)
and self-government meant "independence from alien control." They should
have rather recognised that "political independence and democratic
(21)
self-government are not the same thing." For it may he that "a
colony may become independent of imperial authority, only to fall
under the sway of local demagogues or tyrants, or become disturbed
by internal disorder or insurrection which the government cannot 
(22)
control."
It is, therefore, necessary to consider what are the essentials 
for the proper functioning of a democratic parliamentary government 
which went unheeded in Pakistan and resulted in its dismal failure.
Starting with the proposition that "the business of the govern-
(23)
ment is not very different from any other business", the prime 
consideration for those responsible for running a parliamentary 
government is that they must have faith in democratic ideals and show 
their willingness to make necessary sacrifices to attain the object.
Apart from outside attack, the newly-created democracies are subject
(19) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 1956, at p.156.
(20) Problems of Parliamentary Government in Polonies; A Report 
prepared by the Hansard Society, 1955> at p#19*
21) Ibid.
122) Ibid.
23) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, 1956, at p.151.
to insidious pressure from within. Referring to this sort of pheno­
menon, Sir William Slim, the Governor-General of Australia, recently 
said:
"I have watched in several countries, even in one or two of our 
own family, this attack from within. It has sometimes, temporarily 
at least, had success. Where it has, parliamentarians who have been 
so abruptly swept aside have only themselves to blame. They fell into 
two cardinal errors. First, they allowed themselves to become cyhical 
in their hearts, to develop a secret contempt for the people they 
represent. That feeling undermines all proper human relationship and 
is the attitude of the dictator. Secondly by their behaviour, by their 
lack of integrity in public and private life, they have given ammunition 
to those, whether in the Press or elsewhere, who would attack parliamen­
tary government. Like every other human institution, parliament is
(24)
no better and no worse than the men and women who ccompose it,"
It would appear that the political leaders in Pakistan were not 
only ignorant of these principles but unmistakably showed their 
unwillingness to learn from mistakes or pay sufficient attention to
(25)
the warning pronounced.
(24) In his opening address to the conference of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association held at Canberra on 2 November, 1959. 
The Times. London, 3 November, 1959*
(25) Signs of contempt for democratic principles are evident from the 
failure to frame a constitution for the country before nine years 
elapsed, the reluctance to hold general elections, the treatment 
of the political opponents and the disregard of well-known con­
ventions and usages. Also, ironically enough, the man who had no 
faith in parliamentary government and made no secret of the fact
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It would be a mistake to suppose that the members of the ruling
party were alone to blame; the selfish lack of regard for constitutional
(26)
principles was equally exhibited by the parties in opposition. Again,
intrigue among the members of the party in power itself found overt
(27)
expression in their conduct, resulting in the irreparable loss of
was allowed to become the first President of Pakistan under the 
Constitution of 1956 and entrusted with the responsibility to 
work it successfully. K. J. Newman, Pakistani Preventive 
Autocracy and its Causes, Pacific Affairs, at p.28 (1959).
On the dissolution of the First Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan, cases were heard before the Federal Court of Pakistan 
in which severe judicial remarks were made against the political 
behaviour of the members of the previous government. But, as 
subsequent events proved, members of the Second Constituent 
Assembly followed the same pattern of conduct as their predecessors. 
G. W. Choudhury, Failure of Parliamentary Government in Pakistan. 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XII (1958-59).
(26) The absence of any protest by the opposition elements against 
the action of Mr. Ghulam Ahmad, the Governor-General of Pakistan, 
in dismissing Khwaja Naaimuddin, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
in May, 1955> immediately after he passed the National Budget, 
shows party and not parliamentary spirit. Equally unfortunate 
was the welcome accorded to Mr. Ghulam Ahmad when he, in order 
to frustrate the attempt of the First Constituent Assembly to 
control his powers by amending sections 9> 10, 10A and 10B of the 
Government of India Act, 1955» dissolved the Assembly. Again, a 
couple of months before the abrogation of the Pakistan Constitution 
in October, 1958 > the members of the opposition groups in the East 
Pakistan Legislative Assembly, while showing opposition, more 
physical than constitutional, managed to inflict a fatal wound on 
the Speaker of the House.
(27) It would not have been possible for Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, the 
Governor-General of Pakistan, either to dismiss Khwaja Naaimuddin 
when apparently enjoying the confidence of the majority in the 
Constituent Assembly or dissolve the Assembly itself in October,
1954 > if some of the members of the ruling party were not co­
operating with him. As has been said about his action in dissolving 
the Constituent Assembly: MThe Governor-General was able to behave
in this manner because a group in the cabinet was in league with 
him, making it difficult for the Prime Minister to take a strong 
line* The behaviour of this group was as subversive of democratic
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democratic values.
Due to this indifference to and ignorance of the democratic
process "the business of government" also suffered in other respects.
The success of the parliamentary system depends on the existence of
other parties. In Pakistan the Muslim League, which claimed to have
created a separate homeland for the Muslims, continued to dominate
till the election in East Pakistan in 1954 practically wiped it out.
Even then no well-defined parties were organised to replace a single
dominant party, hut the mushroom growth of parties indicated that
Pakistan "would not have two strong parties, as in Britain, nor one
strong party with a variety of opposition groups, as in India, hut a
(28)
handful of competing groups." Moreover, whatever parties emerged to 
fill the vacuum, they showed little enthusiasm in any sound programme
(29)
and consistent political action* This was no less due to their
conventions as the actions of the Governor-General." G, W. 
Choudhury, Parliamentary "Government in Pakistan, Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. XI, at p.86 (1957*58)* When, on the issue of 
one unit in West Pakistan, the Republican Party refused to 
support Mr. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister, the latter advised 
the President Iskander Mirza to summon the National Assembly. 
The President refused and Mr. Surawardy had to resign. "The 
episode constitutes a doubtful chapter in the parliamentary 
system in Pakistan." G. W. Choudhury, Failure of Parliamentary 
Government in Pakistan, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XII, at 
p.64 (1958-59).
(28) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, at p.18 
(1956).
(29) G. W. Choudhury, The East Pakistan Political Scene, 1955-57» 
Pacific Affairs at p.520 (1957)*
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inexperience as political parties, for which, again, the Muslim
League which "by taking credit for the establishment of Pakistan, took
(30)
care that no alternative party arose to challenge their position" was 
to blame. This attmtude on the part of the ruling party, besides 
violating the basis of a parliamentary system, denied the opportunity 
to learn through trial and error. The tendency to get rid of opponents 
and run a single party may have been caused by blind party spirit, but 
it could not generate faith in democratic ideals to which it paid lip- 
service. If the followers of the Muslim League cared to study the 
experience of those people who make a success of a parliamentary 
system (as recorded in the following passage) they would have been 
conscious that some factor was being left out of accounts
"We do not regard the Government, any Government, as actuated 
purely by party spirit. We tacitly assume the existence of a counter­
balancing factor - call it the "parliamentary spirit." "Parliamentary 
spirit" is by no means incompatible with "party spirit" - in our system 
it includes it. For centuries party has been the dynamic, and also the 
organizing agency in Parliament, and without party Parliament would 
fall into impotence and anarchy. But the parliamentary spirit does put 
a limit to the indulgence of party spirit. In a parliamentary system 
no party can be completely self-centred. It instinctively avoids 
doing anything which would destroy the parliamentary system or seriously
(30) Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political Hole of Pakistan's Civil Service, 
Pacific Affairs« at p.135 (1958)*
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impede its working. It must at least tolerate the existence of other
parties, let the electors vote for them if they wish, and leave them
(31)
free to express their views in the country and in Parliament."
It is perhaps too much to expect that the political leadership 
of the Muslim League could offer this* The little experience that the 
politicians had gathered of the process of government was learned "by 
running of a great political party in opposition to British rule" and 
part of their success was due to participation in such a party, but even 
then the democratic process can hardly bg fully understood unless they
(32)
join the deliberations and activities in the Legislature. The short and 
limited nature of such experience made possible under the Government 
of India Act, 1955 > was not at all adequate to meet the new situation 
created by independence. Moreover, by its composition, aims and 
objects, the Muslim League did not resemble any of the political
(33)
parties in Britain or U.S.A. Like the Indian National Congress it 
included members of all shades of opinion and interest who had sunk 
their differences to achieve freedom from foreign control. On realising 
the changed circumstances, the leaders of the Muslim Leage should either 
have dissolved the party or reorganised it on a new basis, leaving scope 
for the growth of responsible opposition parties.
(31) Sir Gilbert Campion, Developments in the Parliamentary System 
Since 1918. British Government Since 1918. at p.18 (1950).
(32) Sir Ivor Jennings, Problems of the New Commonwealth* at p.30
(1959).
(33) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, at p.10 
(1956).
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The successful conduct of the business of government also requires 
that there should be an honest, impartial and highly-skilled public
(54)
service, because without it self-government is quite unthinkable. Min­
isters are supposed to take decisions; it is the public service which 
can implement them. It is hardly neoessary to say that without such
(55)
implementation the system itself may be called into question. Advocating
a strong civil service does not imply complete confidence in it. After
(56)
all the civil servants have their own limitations.
(57)
Though Pakistan suffered from a dearth of able civil servants,
m
Ibid, at p.151.
Sydney D. Bailey, Barliamentary Government in Southern Asia, at
p.85 (1955).
(56) Harold J, Laski, Reflections on the Constitution, at pp.11-12 
(1951)* Referring to ,!the little officials" who "are not 
only greedy for power" but "have a habit of strangling them­
selves in their own red tape", Laski said: "They compose
complicated regulations in a style no one, not even themselves, 
can understand. They do everything with painful slowness, and 
with a relentless search for the routine of uniformity. They 
lack the initiative and the directness of business men. They 
make irritating rules which interfere, as in industry and 
commerce, with practical affairs of which they have no first­
hand experience. They make, only too often, a theoretical* 
approach to a problem laid before them ... They become fixed, 
at an early stage of life, in a traditional way of doing things, 
so that their habits fail to get adjusted to the ever-changing 
pattern of the outside world."
(37) "At the time of partitition the civil service of Pakistan, 
formed from the former Indian Civil Service and Indian 
Political Service, consisted of a little over a hundred 
officers. One of the most serious handicaps that Pakistan 
suffered, as compared with India, was that there were hardly 
any officers or sufficient status and experience to act as 
permanent heads of the new ministries. In the entire Interim 
Government of India on the eve of partition there was not one 
Muslim officer of the rank of Secretary, There were only four
it is surprising to see "how the civil servants have captured the apex
of the pyramid" if the Government of Pakistan may he compared to a
(58)
pyramid* Even before parliamentary government ceased to exist in 
Pakistan the civil servants were playing a "more powerful role than
(59)
that of their imperial predecessors." Conflict between the elected
representatives entrusted with the government of the country and the
permanent officials did not escape the notice of foreign commentators.
Thus, as early as 1955 > it was observed: "The political complexion of
Pakistan in the future will be largely determined by the extent to
which these British-trained senior administrators and army officers
consider that they are the only ones qualified to control the evolution
(40)
of the country!s institutions." Such extent, as is well-known, has been 
finally demonstrated. It may not be inappropriate to say that "to 
some extent Pakistani parliamentary leaders acquiesced in the
(41)
gradual assumption of power by army and bureaucracy," but it may not 
also be disputed that parliamentary crisis in Pakistan was accelerated
officers of the rank of Joint Secretaries. Many of these 
deficiencies were made good by quick promotions of the available 
officers and also by hiring British officers on a contract basis." 
Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political Role of Pakistani Civil Service. 
Pacific Affairs, at p.137 (1958)•
(58) Ibid, at p.157-
(59) Ibid, at p.151.
(40) The Observer, London, 4 September, 1955*
(41) K. J. Newman, Pakistani Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes.
Pacific Affairs, at p.51 (l959)»
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by the impatience and over-ambition of the civil servants who proved
(42)
themselves no less politically minded than the politicians.
Apart from these considerations of the internal working of 
parliamentary government, some other requisites for its success may 
also he mentioned. Foremost among them is the participation of the 
citizens in government and administration of the country. This may 
start "with the simple act of recording a vote in elections, bi^ t it
(43)
does not end there." The citizens must not feel that vast differences 
exist between them and "the political elite or favoured bureaucracy
(44)
who have a monopoly of the business of government". They must have 
access to important impartial information. At the same time the need 
to educate them must be immediately recognised. Without universal 
education, it would be futile to expect from them mature judgment 
when they only vote at widely spaced intervals. Widespread illiteracy 
is a serious impediment to the successful development of parliamentary 
institutions. As has been aptly said, "The fact that a large propor­
tion of men, and a larger proportion of women, in the four countries
(4?-) Sydney D. Bailey, Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia, at
p.86 (1953).
(4?) How precarious the position of the Prime Minister of Pakistan
became some years before the post was abolished is evident from 
the following remark of Mr. H. S. Surawardy in the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan: "So, Sir, to be the Prime Minister of
Pakistan which has been held by certain honourable gentlemen who 
have been turned out, taken by the ears and thrown out, as it 
suited the coterie, is not a matter of very great honour." Quoted 
in The Political Hole of Pakistani Civil Service, Pacific Affairs, 
at p.137 (1958).
(44) Ibid, at p.86,
(India, Pakistan, Burma and Geylon) are illiterate or semi-illiterate
(45)
is a greater handicap than is always acknowledged,n But it does not
follow that, because the majority of the people are still illiterate,
democracy must be denied them, even temporarily. The peoples who
compelled King Jojgn to sign Magna Carta in 1215, ov who caused the
French Revolution on the cry of * Liberty, Equality and Fraternity1, or
even who made the American Congrees enact the Bill of Rights lived
before the age of universal education. It is no wonder they knew
that the democratic process can only be learned in a democratic
(46)
regime,
With the problem of educating the masses is connected the still 
greater problem of improving the education of the new leaders "who
45) Ibid, at p.86.
46) If such assertions that "some undeveloped countries have to 
learn democracy, and until they do so they have to be controlled" 
(made by Major-General Iskander Mirza, Pakistani Minister of 
Interior, as he then, was, The Times, London, $0 October, 1954) 
meant a progressive realisation of democracy, nobody would 
quarrel. But if they hinted at the introduction of dictatorship 
and its continuation till the people are ready for democracy, 
they were certainly wrong. If the centuries of authoritarian 
rule did not teach the people of Pakistan the value of democratic 
ways of life, does it not follow that democratic institutions will 
flourish only where democracy is allowed? In partially agreeing 
with the contention that the people of Pakistan are not politically 
mature enough to conduct a parliamentary system, Mr. Muhammad Ali, 
a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, said that this could not be 
learnt under dictatorship. He said: "The school in which this
experience is gained is free elections, and the instrument for x 
imparting this education is open public debate between political 
parties. Both the school and the instrument may not be perfect, 
indeed far from it, but the modem world has not yet seen a better 
means of educating the people." The Times, London, 12 July, i960.
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spring so quickly to the front at the prospect of self-government."
They must he prepared to assume their new responsibilities. Not only 
the quality of their formal education should be high, but also "ways 
should be sought by which this education could be further adapted as
(47)
a training for democratic leadership." It should he gradually "made
(48)
more widely accessible to the lower ranks of the active politicians."
Those who are already in power must also be conscious of their lack of 
sufficient training in the art of democratic government and seek more 
knowledge of democracy through contact and communication with other
(49)
parts of the world.
To make a success of parliamentary government it is essential to
realise that "the masses are as interested in material benefits as in
(50)
political freedom." Though it is true that "the parliamentary system,
by itself, cannot guarantee a higher standard of living" and that
"parliaments do not grow rice, nor cabinets construct irrigation
works", the political leaders should not forget that "if these things
are not done, the people may lose patience ?ri.th parliamentary institutions
(51)
and demand some alternative method of government." On the other hand 
the citizens must not look to government for satisfying their whole 
needs. In many spheres of activities they must rely on their own
(47) Problem of Parliamentary Government in Colonies; A Report prepared 
by the Hansard Society, at p.51 (1953)•
(48) Ibid.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Sydney P. Bailey, Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia, at
p.90 (1953).
(51) Ibid.
resources, skill and individual efforts. They must understand that 
"the functions of the State are limited and that much of the essen­
tial business of the community should be carried on by unofficial and
(52)
private organisations."
Such factors as black marketing, landlordism, corruption, giving 
"the Jobs to the boys", lack of understanding among the leaders, 
activities of religious minorities, and communist infiltration are 
often mentioned as the causes of the ills of Pakistani politics, but 
they are rather the symptoms, and not the disease itself.
Though our analysis of the conditions necessary for the'success 
of parliamentary government is by no means adequate or exhaustive, it 
gives an indication of the shape of things that moulded the constitutional 
developments in Pakistan. One of the constant factors which is causing 
friction in the smooth working of government is the distance between 
the two wings of Pakistan. Whether one agrees or not "the division of
•r*
the country into two parts, separated by a thousand miles of Indian
territory, together with the composite nature of the people" seems not
only "likely to override the unity of Islam which originally conferred
(53)
a virtual monopoly upon the Muslim League," it stands as an insuperable 
obstacle to building up any kind of democratic movements or institutions. 
Besides, huge administrative problems are also involved which baffle
(52) Ibid,
(53) Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, at p. 10 
(1956).
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all solutions. This would also go to explain why it took nine years 
to produce the country fs Constitution and why it was necessary to 
abrogate it after only another two years. Keferring to this need to 
settle the balance of power between East and West Pakistan and among 
the various groups of people in the latter Province, Sir Ivor Jennings 
said:
"For eight years this was the main issue which held up the enact­
ment of a Constitution, to weight the Bengalis against the people of 
West Pakistan, and to weight the Punjabis against the other people of 
West Pakistan ... If all this could have been settled in 1946,
Pakistan might by now have enjoyed ten years of constitutional govern-
(54)
ment instead of ten years of communal and personal rivalry."
Before we conclude, one or two words are necessary to refer to
(55)
the Islamic provisions in the Constitution of 1956. These were inserted 
in recognition of persistent demand of the Ulema. Serious misgivings 
were raised in the minds of many as to their future effect on the 
positive law of the country. The question was whether if it were 
brought into conformity with Islamic law, the Constitution woul<^remain 
democratic. Judged by the modem notions of Western Democracy it could 
not so remain. Uo attempt, however, has been radde to implement these
(54) Sir Ivor Jennings, Problems of the New Commonwealth, at p.29 
(1959).
(55) These are contained in the Preamble, Chapter IX and sections 
196 to 199.
provisions since their enactment, but they could be a source of 
conflict in the future.
4. The New Regime; The First Phase
Pursuant to the Proclamation of 7 October, 1958, abrogating the 
Constitution and assuming supreme powers, President Mirza promulgated 
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958* It was deemed to take
(56)
effect immediately and extended to the whole of Pakistan.
The Republic of Pakistan (the prefix "Islamic" was dropped) was, 
notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution of 23 March 1956, 
to be governed "as nearly as may be in accordance with the late 
Constitution." Subject to any order or regulation passed by the 
President or the Chief Administrator of Martial Law respectively 
most existing laws were to remain in force; the powers and jurisdiction 
of the existing courts were continued. Judgments of the Pakistan 
Supreme Court would be binding on all courts. The power of the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts to issue the prerogative writs was 
preserved, but they were not to be issued against the Chief Administrator 
of Martial Law, his deputy or any person acting under their orders. 
Notwithstanding that no writ might be issued against an authority 
so mentioned, the Court could, however, send to such authority "its
(56) Presidents Order No. I of 1958, P.L.D, 1958 Central Statutes 
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opinions on a question of law raised" when a writ had been sought against 
any authority succeeded by each authority. All orders and judgments 
of the Supreme Court given between the Proclamation and the Order were 
valid and binding on all courts and authorities, but no writ or order 
for a writ issued after the Proclamation would have effect unless 
provided for in the Order. All other applications and proceedings for 
any writ, not so provided for, abated forthwith. (Section 2)
Section 3 laid down that "no Court or person shall call or permit 
to be called in question - (i) the Proclamation, (ii) any order made 
in pursuance of the Proclamation or any Martial Law Order or Martial 
Law Regulation, (iii) any finding, judgment, or odder of a Special 
Military Court or a Summary Military Court."
Section 4 provided that notwithstanding the abrogation of the 
late Constitution, all laws, other than the late Constitution, all 
ordinances, orders-in-council, orders other than orders made by the 
President under the late Constitution, such orders made by the President 
under the late Constitution as were set out in the Schedule to this 
Order, rules, by-laws, regulations, and other legal instruments in 
force would be continued subject to such necessary adaptations as the 
President may see fit to make or alteration repeal or amendment by 
competent authority. Ro court could call in question any adaptation 
made by the President under this section.
The Governor of a Province could exercise such powers as he 
would have had, if directed by the President under Article 193 of the
late Constitution to assume the functions of government of the Province 
on failure of the constitutional machinery. His power to make ordinances 
remained the same as conferred by Article 106 and clauses (l) and (3) 
of Article 102 of the late Constitution. In exercising these powers, 
the Governor was subject to any directions given him by the President 
or the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. In case of repugnancy between 
a Governorfs Ordinance or order passed by him under this section and 
any Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, the 
latter would prevail.
Section 6 guaranteed the continuance into office of all persons 
who were in the service of Pakistan as defined under clause (l) of 
Article 218 of the late Constitution and the Governors, Judges of the 
Supreme Court and High Courts, Comptroller and Auditor-General, 
Attorney-General and the Advocate-General would remain in office on 
the same terms and conditions and would enjoy the same privileges.
Section 7 declared that no provision of law which provided for 
the reference of a detention order to an Advisory Board would be 
given effect.
As is obvious, the practical effect of the aforesaid provisions 
was the abridgment of the powers and jurisdiction of the Courts.
Besides they envisaged that henceforward the judicial power of 
Pakistan would be simultaneously exercised by parallel courts set up 
by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. \Vhatms particularly 
important was that the proceedings of the military tribunals could
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not be reviewed by the ordinary Courts of law. This was a fundamental 
and unique departure from the Anglo-American traditions of the supremacy 
of the judiciary. It may be mentioned that neither during the American 
Civil War, nor during the prolonged years of struggle between Parliament 
and the King in England were any external limitations put on the 
Courts1 power to review executive or military proceedings or orders 
violating the subjects’ rights.
Bearing in mind the above the distinctions between martial law 
as traditionally understood dn& applied and such rule as introduced in 
Pakistan, we may proceed to consider the nature of Martial Law 
Regulations and Orders issued by the Administration.
On 7 October, 1958? General Muhammad Ayub Khan declared:
"l. Whereas I adjudge it essential for national requirements 
to exercise jurisdiction within the international boundaries of 
Pakistan, I, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, 
do hereby give notice as follows1
2. Martial Law Regulations and Orders will be published in 
such manner as is conveniently possible. Any person contravening 
the said Regulations or Orders shall be liable under Martial Law 
to the penalities stated in the Regulations.
5* The said Regulations may prescribe special penalities for 
offences under the ordinary law.
4. The said Regulations may appoint Special Courts for the 
trial and punishment of contraventions of the said Regulations and
445.
(57)
Orders and of offences under the ordinary law.1
Under Martial Law Regulations issued on the same day the whole
of Pakistan, considered as the Martial Law Area, was divided into
three zones. The "Zone A" comprised the Karachi Federal Area including
Malir, the "Zone B" included the whole of West Pakistan less "Zone AM,
and the "Zone C" covered the whole of East Pakistan. For each of these
zones a military commander was appointed as the Administrator of Martial
Law. It was further notified that Orders under these Regulations and
additional Regulations, known as Martial Law Orders and Martial Law
Regulations, may he issued hy the Chief Administrator of Martial Law,
or any Administrator of Martial Law, or any other officer authorised
(58)
hy the Chief Administrator.
(l) The Administration of Justice under Martial Law
Two classes of Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction were set 
up: (i) Special Military Courts, and (ii) Summary Military Courts.
These courts were invested with the power to "try and punish any 
person for contravention of Martial Law Regulations or orders or for 
the offences under the ordinary law. The criminal courts as hy law 
established would have power "to try and punish any person for offences 
under the ordinary law and for contraventions of Martial Law Regulations." 
It may he noticed that the conferment of power on Special Courts to try
(57) P.L.D. 1958 Central Statutes 499
(58) Ihid.
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and ptuaish for offences under the ordinary law and of power on ordinary 
courts to try and punish for contravention of martial regulations and 
orders is unparallelled.
(a) The Constitution and powers of
(i) Special Military Courts
An Administrator of Martial Law could convene Special Military 
Courts in his area for the trial of any offence to which the Martial 
Law Regulations extended. The ordinary law would include any special 
law in force in the area. These courts were to be constituted in the 
same manner and would exercise the same powers and follow the same 
procedure as a Field General Court Martial convened under the 
Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The provisions of this Act and the rules 
made thereunder would apply and govern the proceedings before the 
Special Military Courts. It was further provided that any person 
exercising the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class or of a 
Sessions Judge might be appointed a member of the Court. The Court 
could pass any sentence authorised by law or by these Regulations.
All sentences of death had to be reserved for confirmation by an 
Administrator of Martial Law.
(ii) Summary Military Courts
An Administrator of Martial Law would, by general or special 
order, empower any Magistrate of the First Class or any Military or 
Naval or Air Force Officer, provided that h& was specially selected 
for this particular duty, to hold a Summary Military Court, for the
trial of any offence committed in the area. A Summary Military Court 
would exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as a 
Summary Court Martial held under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The 
provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder would apply and 
govern the proceedings before such a Court, except that no other 
officer was required to attend. The court was not obliged to record 
more than a memorandum of the evidence nor to frame formal charges.
The court could pass any sentence authorised by law or the Martial 
Law Regulations, except death, transportation or imprisonment 
exceeding one year or whipping exceeding fiftden stripes. All 
proceedings before the Summary Court had to be forwarded without delay 
for review to the Administrator of Martial Law. An Administrator 
could give general or special directions as to the distribution of 
cases to the Summary Military Courts.
A later Regulation provided that in a proceeding before the 
Special Military Courts a regular summary of evidence need not be 
recorded; in its place an abstract of evidence would be sufficient. 
Also, it was not essential that the prosecutor should be a person 
subject to the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Any Army, Naval or Air 
Force officer, a Public Prosecutor, a Police Prosecutor, a Police
(59)
official or a civilian lawyer could be appointed as a prosecutor.
(59) Ibid, Martial Law Regulation No. 57.
448.
(b) Farther Provisions
A few more provisions regarding the administration of justice 
were made under the Martial Law Orders. All proceedings of Special 
Military Courts, after confirmation hy the Administrator, were to he 
sent to the Judge Advocate-General for final review. Criminal courts 
were given powers to award punishments under Martial Law Regulations, 
when they tried offences under the same; they were to follow the 
procedure of a summons case as provided in the Pakistan Code of 
Criminal Procedure. A magistrate invested with special powers under 
Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could try any offence 
punishable by death under the Martial Law Regulations.
All sentences of death under these Regulations passed by either 
criminal courts or special military courts were reserved for confir­
mation by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. All offenders 
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment were treated as ordinaxy criminals. 
Whipping was administered by jail authorities.
Sub-Administrators were empowered to convene special military 
courts and summary military courts. They were also authorised to 
issue necessary orders and delegate powers of issuing orders to any 
officer in their own areas. But the power to issue Regulations could 
be exercised only by the Chief Administrator or an Administrator; the 
sub-administrators were not given this power.
In case of conflict between Martial Law Orders or Regulations 
passed by the Chief Administrator and those passed by an Administrator
449.
(60)
or sub-administrator, the former would prevail.
2. The Nature of Offences Under Martial Law Regulations
Martial law in its ordinarily accepted sense deals with only 
certain specific kinds of offences, such as, creating disturbances or 
disorders, carrying firearms, entering prohibited areas. It leaves to 
the ordinary courts, if they are still open and functioning, administra­
tion of criminal and civil justice according to the law of the land, 
because otherwise there would be confusion and denial of justice. And 
so long as martial law is justified the ordinary courts, as already 
seen, neither interfere with the military, nor render the military 
authority any assistance by trying offences under Martial Law 
Regulations.
The case seems to have been radically different when Pakistan 
was put under "martial law" in October, 1958. With few exceptions, all 
offences created by the Martial Law Regulations could and ought to have 
been dealt under the ordinary law of the land. Many of them were 
already offences under the ordinary law. The only difference was the 
liability to a greater punishment under the Martial Law Regulations.
Examples of new kinds of offences arei- "Ho person shall destroy, 
deface, remove, or in any way tamper with any notice exhibited under
(60) Ibid.
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martial law. Maximum punishment ten years* rigorous imprisonment’1 and
"Every person shall when required to do so give his correct name and
address and produce his permit or pass to any military or civil officer
or any soldier or policemen. Failure to comply shall he punishable.
(61)
Maximum punishment death.1
An example of an offence under the existing law being made more 
severely punishable under the Martial Law Regulations is:- "No person 
shall commit dacoity as defined in the Pakistan Penal Code, Maximum 
punishment death." Section 395 of Code lays down that "whoever 
commits dacoity shall be punished with transportation for life or with 
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and 
shall also be liable to fine.”
Such anti-social acts as hoarding foodgrains, wilful adulteration 
of food, smuggling, child-lifting, abduction of women, using official 
position to bestow patronage or favours, spreading false and alarming 
news and many others dealt with by the Martial Law Regulations were 
offences under the law of the land.
5* The Second Phase
A new turn of events came when on 28 October 1958 General 
Muhammad Ayub Khan assumed the powers of the President of Pakistan,
(6l) P.L.3). 1958 Central Statutes 499-508. The maximum punishment
for the latter offence was subsequently redftCtyfed.
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Twenty-four hours earlier he had been sworn as Prime Minister. In a 
Proclamation he announced:
"Major-General Iskander Mirza, lately President of Pakistan, has 
relinquished his office of President, and has handed over all powers 
to me, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Chief Martial Law Administrator and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
"Now, therefore, I have this same night of 27 October forthwith 
assumed the said office of President and have taken upon myself the
(62)
exercise of the said powers and all other enabling in this behalf,"
The reasons why President Mirza stepped aside and handed over 
all powers to General Muhammad Ayub IChan were stated to be the misap­
prehension in the minds of many as to the real nature of the dual 
control which both of them were exercising. Any semblance of such 
control was likely to "hamper the effective performance of this 
immense task, which was of an urgent nature." President Mirza said:
"An unfortunate impression exists in the minds of a great many 
people both at home and abroad that General Ayub and I may not always 
act in unison. Such an impression, I cannot help feeling, if allowed 
to continue, would be most damaging to our cause. I have therefore
(63)
decided to step aside and hand over all powers to General Ayub Khan."
Though, as will be seen, the new President did not withdraw 
martial law and thought fit to continue it^ General Ayub Khan was not
(62) The Times, London, 28 October, 1958*
(63) Ibid.
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merely content with the military aspects of his Government. He 
immediately proceeded with various social, economic and political 
reforms needed for the progress and well-being of the country and also 
for the future success of democracy. As early as 25th December, 1958, 
General Ayub Khan, in commemorating Muhammad Ali Jinnah*s birthday, 
clearly enunciated the policy of his Government:
,!Our aim is to introduce a representative form of Government, 
such as can be understood and worked by our people. We shall have to 
ensure that such a representative Government is so designed that its 
working is not marred by political instability. As soon as the major 
problems facing the country have been solved, the reforms have been 
put into operation and the administration rehabilitated, the best 
constitutional brains in our country will be asked to apply themselves 
to the question of framing a constitution. When doing so, the wishes
(64)
and desires of the people of Pakistan will be fully respected,”
6. The Judicial Views on the Abrogation of the Constitution
(a) The Legality of the New Regime
Immediately after the abrogation of the Constitution, President 
Mirza declared: "I have no sanction of the law or of the Constitution.
I have only the sanction of my conscience1 and further "my authority is
(64) Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XIII, at p.227 (i960).
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(65)
the revolution,M Without entering a discussion on the relative merits 
of one's conscience and the need to uphold the legal and constitutional 
principles even in trying circumstances, we shall proceed to consider 
the constitutional position of the Hew Regime as viewed hy the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan.
(66)
The State v. Dosso, which involved a determination of the 
validity of the Frontier Crimes Regulation III of 1901, the Supreme 
Court had to take judicial notice of the fait accompli of 'Jth October 
and also interpret some of the provisions of the Presidents Order 
Ho. I of 1958* Incidentally it had to consider the legality of the 
abrogation of the Constitution. The Courtfs pronouncement as to the 
constitutional position created by the President's Proclamation was 
largely shaped by the views of an Austrian writer, Hans Kelsen. 
According to him, the decisive criterion of a revolution was the 
overthrow of the existing order and its replacement by a new one.
The new rulers might "annul only the Constitution and certain laws of 
paramount political significance, putting other norms in their place" 
and a great part of the old legal order might remain valid also under 
the new system. But such validity did not depend on the provisions 
of the old Constitution; if the old laws continued to be valid under 
the new Constitution, the reason was that validity was expressly or 
tacitly conferred on them by it:
(65) In an interview with the representative of The Daily Mail, London, 
10 October, 1958.
§66) P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 555.
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"The laws which, in the ordinary inaccurate parlance, continue 
to be valid are, from a juristic viewpoint, new laws whose import 
coincides with that of the old laws. They are not identical with the 
old laws because the reason for their validity is different. The 
reason for their validity is the new, not the old, Constitution, and 
between the two continuity holds neither from the point of view of the 
one nor from that of the other. Thus it is never the Constitution 
merely but always the entire legal order that is changed by a
(67)
revolution."
As no other alternative seemed open to the Court, the adoption
of the views expressed by Hans Kelsen was clearly inevitable. Of
course, it did not escape the notice of the Court that Kelsen was
discussing the matter from a different aspect, that of International
and not domestic law. Thus, Muhammad Munir C.J* said:
"If the territory and the people remain substantially the same,
there is, under the modem juristic doctrine, no change in the corpus
or international entity of the State and the revolutionary government
and the new Constitution are, according to International Law, the
legitimate government and the valid Constitution of the State. Thus
a victorious revolution or a successful coup d’etat is an internationally
(68)
recognised legal method of changing a Constitution."
(67) Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, translated by 
Anders Wedberg, at p*118, quoted in The State v. Losso, at 
PP.559-540.
(68) P.L.D. 1958 S.C. at 539.
According to him, therefore, the success of a revolution or 
in other words the efficiency of the change would establish its 
legality. The motive for such a revolution is altogether irrelevant.
It "might be prompted by a highly patriotic impulse, or by the most 
sordid of ends", so long as "the revolution is victorious in the 
sense that the persons assuming power under the change can successfully 
require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, 
than the revolution itself is judged not be reference to the annulled
(69)
Constitution." But the failure to effect a change in the Constitution 
by attempting a coup d’etat would be unpardonable. For then those 
"who sponsor or organise it are judged by the existing Constitution
(70)
as guilty of the crime of treason."
(b) The Meaning of "shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance 
with the late Constitution"
In trying to reconcile the abrogation of the Constitution and the 
directions contained in the President’s Order Ho. I of 1958 that hence­
forward the Republic of Pakistan "shall be governed as nearly as may be
(71)
in accordance with the late Constitution", Muhammad Munir C.J. expressed 
the view that as the laws kept alive by subsequent Article 17 of the 
same Order did not include the late Constitution it must be assumed 
that its provisions could no longer be enforced. "The laws that are
(69) Ibid..
(70) Ibid.
(71) Article II, clause 1, P.L.D. 1958 Cen. St. 497.
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in force after that date (7 October, 1958) are enumerated in Article 
XV, but from the 1st of such laws the Constitution of 23rd March, 1956, 
has been expressly excluded. This means that when, under clause 4 of 
Article II of the Order, the Supreme Court or the High Court is moved 
for a writ, the ground for the writ can only be the infraction of any 
of the laws mentioned in Article IV, or any right recognised by that
(72)
Order and not the violation of a right created by the late Constitution.”
As the question before the Court was whether the impugned Frontier 
Crimes Regulation violated the provisions in the late Constitution 
guaranteeing Fundamental Rights, Muhammad Munir C.J., in stating the 
aforesaid opinions, concluded that fundamental rights could no 
longer exist. He said:
"The so-called Fundamental Rights which were described in Part 
II of the late Constitution are therefore no longer a part of the 
national legal order and neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court 
has under the new Order the authority to issue any writ on the ground
(73)
of the violation of any of the fundamental rights.”
In his opinion,^though the very essence of a fundamental right
is that it is more or less permanent and can not be changed like the
ordinary law, under the new legal order any law might at any time be
changed by the President and therefore "there is no such thing as a
Li
fundamental right, there being no restriction on the Presentfs
(72) P.L.D. 1958 S.C. at p.541. 
$73) Ibid, at p.541.
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(74)
law-making power.'1 So far as the Courts were concerned they could not, 
unless the President expressly enacted the provisions relating to 
fundamental rights, issue any writ on the ground that such rights as 
guaranteed hy the late Constitution had been violated. They were no 
longer "a part of the law of the land*1'
In eaqjlaining the apparent conflict between Articles II and IV, 
Muhammad Munir C.J* said that the provisions "shall be governed as 
nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution" contained in 
the former Article referred only to the machinery of the government and 
not to the laws of the late Constitution. "It is true that Article II 
provides that Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as may be in 
accordance with the late Constitution but this provision does not 
have the effect of restoring fundamental rights because the reference 
to Government in this Article is to the structure and outline of 
Government and not to the laws of the late Constitution which have 
been expressly abrogated by Article IV. Article II and Article IV 
can therefore stand together and there is no conflict between them.
But even if some inconsistency be supposed to exist between the two, 
the provisions of Article IV which are more specific and later must
(75)
override those of Article II."
(76)
In an appeal against a judgment of the Dacca High Court, Muhammad 
Munir C.J. repeated the views he had expressed in Dossofs case and said 
that the contention that the Court was under a duty to ascertain from
(74) Ibid, at p.541.
(75) Ibid, at p.541.
(76) The Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, P.L.D.1959 S.C.387.
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the general direction that, with the exception of the parts expressly
abrogated, Pakistan should be governed by the 1956 Constitution,
"qualified by the discretion implied in the expression !as nearly as
may be1 in Article 2(l) the precise part of the law of the Constitution”,
would merely create confusion in the administration of the laws. In his
opinion such interpretation would be inconsistent with the clearly
defined scheme of the short document (which was described by one of
the counsel before him as ”the shortest constitution in the world”).
As the Constitution was abrogated and the entire legislative and
executive authority vested in the President and the powers of the
courts themselves were subject'sit to orders of the President, the
existence of a fundamental right guaranteed by the late Constitution
would seem to be a self-evident contradiction and their further con-
(77)
tinuance a complete impossibility.
Cornelius J. differed from the views expressecjfby the majority of 
the judges of the Supreme Court. In reappraising the provision of 
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, otherwise known as Presidents 
Order No. 1 of 1958, after the lapse of nine months, he felt that 
though the late Constitution was abrogated, still the words ”shall be 
governed as nearly as may be” were ”of high importance as furnishing 
a key to the understanding of the true nature of the Martial Rule
(78)
imposed upon the country by the then President on 7th October, 1958.”
(77) Ibid, at p.405.
(78) Ibid, at p.438.
He did not agree that this expression referred only to the structure 
and outline of Government and not to the laws, including the law of 
the Constitution and that it did not have the effect of preserving the 
fundamental rights. During the period of nine months after the 
Proclamation of October, 1958, was seen that the Constitution 
was "being observed, not as a mere matter of courtesy or of merely 
general guidance, but that in actual practice, where the provisions 
of the late Constitution are applicable in their terms to matters 
for governmental action, they are being applied according to their
(79)
terms." Also, as a matter of practice where the circumstances 
required variation or modification, the present authority was readily 
making the necessary changes. Prom "this degree of adherence to the 
provisions of the late Constitution" Cornelius J. was induced to 
observe that the words "shall be governed as nearly as may be in 
accordance with the late Constitution" had been to some extent" under­
valued on the last occasion when the Supreme Court were deciding the 
case of the State v. Dosso. He candidly admitted that "the full power
and purpose of these words may not have been appreciated at that
(80)
early date•"
It would be wrong to suppose that the provisions of Article 2(l) 
of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, were comparable to a 
mere reference book, or as was suggested by counsel, an Instrument of
(79) Ibid, at p.438.
(80) Ibid, at p.439*
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Instructions of the kind which were issued to the Governor-General of 
India and Governors of Provinces by the British Sovereign under the 
Government of India Act, 1935* According to Cornelius J., "the words 
’shall be governed' are mandatory in expression as well as in effect, 
and by saying that the provisions in question shall be operative subject 
to specified written instruments issued by the highest authorities of 
the new regime, the value and force of the words in which these 
provisions are embodied in the late Constitution is certainly raised,
(81)
in a legal sense much beyond that of words in a mere book of reference."
Further, the apparent conflict between the above expression
securing the continuity of the provisions of the late Constitution and
Article 4(1) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, which
expressly provides that nothing in the late Constitution shall operate
as positive law from 7 ^  October, 1958, seemed to raise great difficulty
and could only be resolved by reference to legal theory and political
philosophy. It appeared that "the directory provisions of the late
Constitution referred to in Article 2(l) have, subject as expressed in
(82)
the Order, been subsumed into the Martial Law." The constitutional 
provisions no longer derive any force from their existence in the 
Constitution "but exists only because of and by reason of the Martial 
Law, and only to the extent that the Martial Law by expression does not
(83)
recall or avoid them."
(81) Ibid, at p.440*
(82) Ibid, at p.440.
(83) Ibid, at p.440.
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(c) A Different Concept of Martial Lav;
In none of the cases as yet decided has the fundamental question
of the meaning of martial law and the conditions in which it may he
applied been agitated or determined. The claim to introduce a new
Constitution and rule under it is one thing; to continue to govern by
martial law for an indefinite period is, however, entirely different.
Be that as it may, it seems that Cornelius J. proceeded to consider the
difference between martial law as applied in Pakistan since 7 October,
(84)
1958, and its ordinary conception. Martial law generally means when 
applied to occupied territory by the commander of a conquering Army, 
or to a part of onefs own country by the civil government, 1 the entrust- 
ment of plenary powers to the armed forces for the purposes of restoring
(85)
law and order.” Within the municipal sphere it could be applied only
when "conditions have reached a point of disturbance beyond the
(86)
capacity of the civil authorities to control.” It did not escape his 
attention that "it is not at all common to find Martial Rule being
(87)
introduced over a whole country in circumstances of general peace.” 
Martial law as was being enforced in Pakistan bore a close resemblance 
to the application of martial law in an occupied territory and was very 
different from "the like application over a disturbed area of municipal 
territory.” But as the suspension of sovereignty or the replacement
(84) Ibid, at p.459*
(85) Ibid, at p.459-
(86) Ibid, at p.459*
(87) Ibid, at p.459-
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of governmental agencies in an occupied territory did not imply that 
such rule was purely arbitrary as to the exercise of power or uncon­
trolled hy principle or unrestricted as to method, so also in Pakistan, 
though the new regime must he established and maintained hy demolishing 
the foundation upon which the previous and superseded sovereignty was 
based, "it is not essential that the provisions of that Constitution 
so far as they operate upon the lives of ordinary citizens, through the
machinery of government at all levels, should he affected beyond the
(88)
absolute necessity."
(d) Did Fundamental Rights Exist after the Declaration of Martial Law?
(89)
?^be State v. Dosso Muhammad Munir C.J. categorically denied
that the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the late Constitution
still existed or that the Court had power to issue a writ on the ground
that any of those rights were infringed. Like the other constitutional
provisions they were swept away by the provisions of Article I? of the
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958* After explaining the
discrepancy between this Article and Article II of the same Order, he
expressed the opinion that the fundamental rights did no longer exist
and the latter Article did not "have the effect of restoring fundamental
(90)
rights."
Cornelius J., though he conceded that the Laws (Continuance in 
Force) Order, 1958? "must prevail over anything appearing in the
(88) Ibid, at p.440.
(89) P.L.D. 1958 S.C. 553. 
(90 Ibid, at p.540.
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Constitution of 195& or anything seeming to have validity only hy 
reference to the provisions of that Constitution”, was not certain 
whether the mere abrogation of the Constitution could take away the 
fundamental human rights. With reference to a number of fundamental 
rights as enumerated in Part II of the late Constitution it could be 
asserted that nthey do not derive their entire validity from the fact
(91)
of having been formulated in words and enacted in that Constitution.”
He said that "a number of these rights are essential human rights
which inherently belong to every citizen of a country governed in a
(92)
civilised mode.” It did not appear that merely because the Constitution 
which embodied them had ceased to exist, these elementary human rights 
should also come to an end.
(93)
In a later case Cornelius J reaffirmed his views about the
enforceability of the fundamental rights, though as a consequence of
the promulgation of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, "ike
compulsive force of the fundamental rights in respect of all laws and
(94)
all executive actions was at one stroke taken away.” It was true that 
in the absence of a saving provision or feature ’'every proceeding 
before a court in which the question of the issue of a writ to enforce 
a Fundamental Eight was pending” would fail. But he asked whether it
(91) Ibid, at p.560.
(92) Ibid, at p.561.
(93) ffhe Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, P.L.D. 1959
S.C. 587.
(94) Ibid, at p.457.
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was necessary for the authorities of the new regime to insist that every 
such proceeding should he abruptly terminated. He saidi
"I can imagine that this harsh procedure might have been deemed 
unavoidable where the pendency of a writ was in itself, in a large way 
or in a small way, a threat to the paramount authority of the new regime. 
But looking through the list of Fundamental Rights, I cannot find any 
one of them (other than that relating to preventive detention, which 
received special treatment in the Order) which might in itself, by 
being put into operation, have prejudiced the success of the new regime 
as it has been observed in operation during the past nine months. It U  
true that the suspension of constitutional guarantees frequently 
accompanies the promulgation of Martial Law, and it is true that even 
the late Constitution by Article 191 empowered the President in a 
state of emergency to issue a proclamation and during the pendency of 
such proclamation, by Article 192 the President was empowered to 'suspend
(95)
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights ... 1,1
But in view of the provisions contained in Article II of the 
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 195$, it could be said that, though 
the Constitution was repudiated, "its provisiosn, so far as applicable 
in the changed conditions resulting from the dissolution of the Legis­
latures and the dismissal of the elected Governments, would continue to
be applied in practice, though subject to the expressed will of the
(96)
new Sovereign authorities."
(95) Ibid, at p.43r7
(96) Ibid, at p. 43$
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Cornelius J., however, admitted that despite the legality of 
the form which the fundamental rights still possessed and the fact 
that they once possessed the highest legal force and effect, they were 
under the changed conditions not supported by any legal sanctions. As 
a result, "no actions at law can be based upon these provisions, and 
the courts possess1 no authority for their enforcement, because they 
are subject only to the same sanctions as are applicable to the Martial
(97)
Law." In his opinion, if this view was correct, it followed that the 
fundamental rights had not become entirely devoid of validity, any 
more than the preamble of the late Constitution or the Directive 
Principles of State Policy. He said:
"The Fundamental Sights have indeed lost the operation which was 
conferred upon them by the provisions in Article 4 of the late 
Constitution, but they nevertheless remain as provisions in the late 
Constitution, and are valid to the extent assured by Article Il(l) of 
the Order."
7* The Traal of Offences under the Martial Law Regulations and the 
Court*s Jurisdiction to interfere
(98)
Elaborate provisions were made by a subsequent Regulation as to 
the procedure governing the review and confirmation of sentences by
£97) Ibid, at p. iim
(98) Martial Law Regulation Ho. 61, P.L.D. 1959> ^en» St. 1-2.
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higher authority. It provided that, subject to any order made by the 
Zonal Martial Law Administrator in consultation with the Provincial 
Governor (or in case of Karachi, the Federal capital, the Chief 
Commissioner) directing that a particular case or class of cases under 
the Martial Law Regulations or Orders should be tried by or transferred 
for trial to a Special Military Court, Magistrates exercising First 
Class powers should try such cases. But offences punishable with 
death were to be tried by a magistrate invested with special powers 
under Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate exercising First Class powers, an Additional District 
Magistrate or a District Magistrate.
No appeal would lie against any sentence passed in accordance
(99)
with the above provisions, and by a subsequent amendment it was further 
provided that no revision would lie from such sentence. Neither any 
appeal or revision would lie from any sentence imposed in any cases 
tried by a criminal court and confirmed by the Martial Law Administrator 
before the 24th December, 1958.
The procedure for revision of sentences passed by a Magistrate 
varied with nature and extent of the punishment. Section 3 provided 
that an application would lie within fifteen days to the Court of Session 
in respect of sentences other than transportation or death, and in 
respect of sentences of imprisonment for a term not exceeding four
(99) Martial Law Regulation No. 63? Ibid, at p.90.
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years, whether or not such sentences were combined with any other 
punishment, and to the High Court in respect of all other sentences.
While hearing an application under the above provisions a Court of 
Session and the High Court should exercise powers conferred by sub- 
section 1 and follow the procedure in sub-sections 2, 4 and 6 of 
cbac section 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but hb± the powers 
in section 426 of the Code were not to be exercused. Clause 1 of 
section 459 empowers the High Court acting in revision to exercise 
the powers of a court of appeal (including the power in section 426 
to s e x e e  release the petitioners on bail). Clause 2 gives the petitioners 
the right to be heard; clause 4 forbids an order of acquittal to be 
converted into one of conviction. Clause 6 provides that the 
petitioners may be called on to show cause against enhancement of 
sentence. Before the abrogation of constitution, a court of session 
could only make recommendations; the power to interfere could only 
be exercised by the High Court. Ho further revision would lie from 
an order so passed by a Court of Session or the High Court and no 
court should call such order in question.
In case of sentence of death passed by a Magistrate the 
proceedings were to be submitted to the High Court within seven days 
for confirmation of the sentence and the said Court should proceed as 
upon a reference under chapter twenty-seven of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which lays down the procedure for confirmation of death 
sentences passed by a Court of Session, and its decision could not be
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called in question in any Court#
Every sentence imposed by a (Special) Military Court according to 
the provisions of section 1 of the Regulation was subject to review and 
confirmation as provided by the Pakistan Array Act, 1952, in the case
(100)
of sentences passed by a General Court Martial. By a later amendment
sentences imposed by magistrates were not required to be sent to the
Zonal Martial Law Administrator for confirmation or to the Judge
Advocate-General for review#
In respect of all sentences imposed under the above provisions,
a petition would lie to the Zonal Martial Law Administrator and, in
case of a sentence for the period of not less than seven years*
rigorous imprisonment being confirmed by him, a further petition could
be made to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as the Deputy Chief
Martial Law Administrator# Short periods of limitation were also
(101)
provided for making these applications.
A Zonal Martial Law Administrator could delegate the power of
confirming the proceedings of any (Special) Military Court to a
(102)
subordinate commander.
(100) Martial Law Regulation No. 63# P.L.D. 1959 C@a. St. $1,
(101) Ibid. By Martial Law Regulation 66-A, paragraph 9> added to 
Regulation 61, provided nothing in the latter Regulation "shall 
prevent a review of sentence » (a) by the Deputy Chief Martial 
Law Administrator where the sentence is not less than seven years' 
rigorous imprisonment; (b) by the Martial Law Administrator con- 
cemed in all other cases - where the Chief Martial Law Adminis­
trator sees fit, by general or special order, to direct such 
review."
(102) Martial Law Regulation No. 65.
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The constitution and jurisdiction of a Military Court, whether 
Special or Summary, and the proceedings, orders or sentences passed 
by such a Court, could not be called in question in any Court, including
(103)
the High Court and the Supreme Court.
On the transfer of a case pending before a Magistrate to a 
Special Military Court the latter was not bound to recall and rehear 
any witness who gave evidence before such transfer but could act on 
the evidence already recorded by the Magistrate.
All the foregoing provisions for the trial of offences under the 
Martial Law Regulations and Orders, simple and well meaning though they 
might be, struck at the very foundations of criminal and civil justice. 
How could the magistrates and judges, who are, by their training and 
habits, accustomed to a different method of arriving at the truth of 
an allegation, be expected to administrer the Regulations which were 
fundamentally incapable of even palm-tree justice? A slight improvement 
is noticeable in the amendment of the above provisions, which provided 
that '‘with effect on and from the 1st day of March, 1959> no case 
relating to an offence under any of the Martial Law Regulations shall 
be tried by any court other than a Military Court, Special or Summary: 
Provided that cases which are pending in courts other than Military 
Courts shall continue to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions 
of Martial Law Regulation 61, as it stood immediately before this
(103) Ibid.
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(104)
Regulation."
(105)
Earlier in a case decided by the West Pakistan High Court it 
was observed that an anomaly would arise "if an offence under the 
Martial Law Regulations and one under the Pakistan Penal Code which, 
as in the present case, happens to be a warrant case, are tried 
together. Xn the opinion of the Court it was desirable "in cases 
where the provisions of the Pakistan P'enal Code or any special law 
and the Martial Law Regulations are alleged to have been contravened 
that there should be separate trials so that the difficulty pointed
(106)
out above is not experienced,"
Though the nature of martial law as applied in Pakistan today 
is entirely different from that as ordinaryly understood, it is
essential to remember that, if confusion is to be avoided, martial
■ . 1
law regulations and orders should be administered by separate courts. 
The ordinary courts should have nothing to totals: do with them*
(104) Martial Law Regulation Ho, 66.
(105) Fateh Muhammad v. The State, P.L.L. 1959 Lahore 171.
(106) Ibid, at p.175.
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Chapter XII 
CONCLUSION
Beginning from the definition of martial law which, according to 
Blacks tone, is 11 in truth and reality no l§w, but something indulged 
rather than allowed as law"(l), we have, in the preceding pages, 
discovered certain positive characteristics inherent in this ’'lawless1 
system. The expression, though it has undergone gradual transformation 
in meaning and content, is not only descriptive of a state of affairs, 
but has also Its Individual norm. Looked at institutionally, the concept 
of martial law has always been identified with the Executive, especially 
the Armed Forces* But neither executive nor military authorities, when 
exercising the widest possible discretion in times of extreme necessity 
have acted on the assumption that no law bound them, even if demands have 
occasionally been made that in times of grave crisis, law must be ignored. 
Such claims have not been judicially approved, though courts in America 
and the Commonwealth have conceded that, during a state of war, military 
acts cannot be interfered with. Common sense as well as reason also 
demand that the assumption of special powers by the Armed Forces should be 
legally justified by the existence of reasonable and probable cause. The 
emphatic assertions that the court has jurisdiction to decide whether a 
state of war exists and will, as soon as it ceases to exist, entertain
(i) Commentaries, I, 414.
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proceedings against any military acts alleged to have been unnecessary or 
done in bad faith or with malice clearly establish that the armed forces 
are not above the law, but subject to judicial supervision and control,
"The reason of the law, as the judges often said, was compressed in the 
maxim Quod enim necessitas cogit defendit. And both the existence of 
the danger and the propriety of what was done to meet it were questions 
for the courts11. (2) An Act of Indemnity will not cover acts which were 
unnecessary or improper. If there has been abuse of power in declaring 
martial law, the court will restrain the acts of the authority. (3)
The concept of martial law, so far as now consistent with the 
constitutional principles, is the result of an evolutionary process*
We have already considered how the Tudor kings at times applied or 
threatened to apply the summary justice of martial law against civilians 
during the time of peace and while the ordinary courts were open. The 
Stuarts "whose method was to claim all debateable ground for the 
prerogative and then to consolidate their position" used to issue commissions 
empowering various persons, civil as well as military to proceed by 
martial law and to punish soldiers and "other dissolute persons" joining 
with them for robberies, felonies, mutinies and other outrages.(4) The 
contention of the parliamentary leaders, accepted by the sovereign and 
embodied in the Petition of Right, 1623, was that not even soldiers, much 
less civilians, might be tried by martial law within the realm, except
(2) Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 
(1942) 55 Harvard Law Report at page 1257.
(3) Chapters I?, VI and VII.
(4) Chapter I.
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when war prevailed and the common law courts did not function*
Whether it is due to the declaration contained in the Petition of 
Right, 1628, or the increased awareness of the relations between law and 
governmental power, or the relative absence of any formidable disturbance, 
martial law has never been formally declared Sn England since that date.
But, as has been asserted, martial law nis assuredly part of the law of 
England11 if it means 1lthe power of the government or of loyal citizens to 
maintain public order, at whatever cost of blood or property may be 
necessary11, but not when it is used r,as the name for the government of 
a country or a district by military tribunals, which more or less supersede 
the jurisdiction of the courts,,.(5) The experience of England shows that 
government by law makes obedience to law instinctive and loyalty the 
prevailing sentiment, thus rendering resort to foree either by the citizens 
or the authority an anachronism. Practice in the colonies points to a 
different conclusion, but, even apart from occasional exercise of powers 
under a proclamation of martial law, the dependent position of colonial 
territories itself made administration more important than law.
This requires some elaboration. In the ttnited Kingdom governmental 
powers, both executive and legislative, are exercised by a sovereign 
Parliament, composed of the King, Lords, and Commons. Though the king 
is the head of the executive government, it is the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet which has virtually monopolised the exercise of the executive power. 
The cabinet and the Prime Minister is dependent on the House of Commons
(5) A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, Tenth edition, at 
pp. 290-1. (19597
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and subject to its criticism and control. Theoretically spesdcing,
Parliament can make or unmake a law, and its decisions will be equally 
binding whether they meet public approval or not. In practice, however,
it rarely transgresses the constitutional limits. To ensure the success
of its policies and measures, the ruling party invariably seeks to 
ascertain the various shades of opinions as reflected in the Houses of 
Parliament. It tries to guage popular feelings by following the 
discussion In the press and the platform. As a result, the proposed 
measures in their final form often embody a compromise between conflicting 
interests, opinions and sentiments. This talent for compromise,
according to a well-known jurist, explains the continued success of a
system so difficult to work* “Without a talent for compromise, no 
government or society, political or other, can enjoy happiness or even 
internal quiet. Whenever sovereign power is lodged in a body of persons, 
(whether it be one and homogeneous, or consist of heterogeneous bodies), 
differences will naturally arise between its constituent members, which, 
without a perpetual compromise, must prevent their acting in concert.
Even an autocrat, if he would reign securely, must perpetually defer to the 
opinion of the subject community, or to that of the section of the 
community with xjhich he controls the rest11. (6)
If, instead of proper weighing and balancing the differences of
opinions on a proposed course of action, the cabinet tries to implement 
a decision, the chances are that it may have to retrace Its steps.
(6) John Austin, A Flea for the Constitution, at p.6 (1&59)
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Recently, the Sues crisis in 1956 has amply demonstrated this fact.
Though Parliament in the United Kingdom constantly endeavours to provide 
the English people with good government, efficiency alone, which may only 
he secured by more control than the legislature or the people will accept, 
has been abandoned as an aim. It has been recognised that government 
must have as its foundation the free consent of the people governed, not 
only generally but also on each individual item of legislation that affects 
its interest.(7)
As is obvious, a similar course of action, though desirable, could 
not be practised In governing colonial peoples. The very relationship of 
the rulers and the governed sometimes unnecessarily generated violent 
feelings and created commotion beyond the power of the civil authority to 
control. Apart from a few instances of unduly harsh measures, (both 
public and legal opinion condemned them in unambiguous terms) mostly 
confined to the West Indies, the enforcement of martial law in the colonies 
did not on the whole impose any excessive hardships. At the same time it must 
not be forgotten that, on every occasion when martial law has been 
declared in the colony, the Governor had to justify his action either 
before the courts or the Imperial Government at Westminster, It is also 
remarkable that the legislators, the judges and the law officers of the 
Crown have been uniform in upholding the views that martial law can only 
be declared in cases of extreme necessity. The declaration of martial law
(7) “Statutes in this country do not have to be promulgated since they
are assumed to be already known11. Marshall and Hoodie, Some
Problems of the Constitution, at p. 15 (1959)
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in the Commonwealth has never been from political motives or to solve 
political disputes. One will, therefore, agree that so far as the 
Commonwealth is concerned 11 on the whole, however, the coarse of 
development has been toward law and away from unrestrained power as the 
dominant influence in government11* (8)
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that though the rule of law, as 
understood by Dicey,(9) was never fully effective in the colonies, two 
processes involved in the method of colonisation prevented the establishment 
of government by decrees or purely arbitrary rule* First, as soon as 
government was established in the colony, laws defining the powers of the 
Executive as well as other laws were enacted by the United Kingdom 
Parliament* Gradually legislatures in the colonies were entrusted with 
powers to legislate on specified subjects* Secondly, ordinary courts 
were empowered to administer the laws of the land11* Excluding those 
occasions when martial law was declared (they were few and far between and 
necessarily brief in duration) no military tribunals were set up to
(8) Bernard Schwartz, Law and the Executive ip Britain* at p.2 (1949)
(9) nWe mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can 
be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts of the land* In this sense the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by
persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers 
of constraint*
We mean in the second place, when we speak of the ,rule of law* 
as a characteristic of our country, not only that with us no man 
is above the law, But (what is a different thing) that here every 
man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary 
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
tribunals11 • A, V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution* Tenth edition, 
at pp. 188-193 (1959)
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administer criminal jusitce. It is important to bear in mind that even 
when such tribunals were created they were not empowered to deal with 
ordinary offences.
The instances of the applications of martial law by the State 
authorities in America unmistakably show that sometimes it was sought to 
be used to adjust social and political relations? the attempts of the 
State governors to exercise their discretionary prerogatives on grounds 
other than recognised by law were foiled by the courts. "Occasionally 
the governor declares 1 martial law1 as a trump card in some contest with 
political rivals. In 1935 Governor Johnson of South Carolina tried to 
get rid of the highway commissioners by declaring them to be insurgents - 
only to be restrained by the State Supreme Court. (10) Governor Quinn of 
Rhode Island, seeking to tap the strength of an opponent who was also 
proprietor of the Narragansett Race Track, established martial law over 
the track. When Senator Huey Long was at war with Mayoi’ Walmsley for 
control of the Hew Orleans police board, Governor Allen, acting from the 
Senator*s hotel suite, obligingly called in the troops and instituted 
an extraordinary regime which he described by the alliterative title 
of "partial martial law". In 1939 Governor Rivers of Georgia proclaimed 
"martial law" around the highway department*s building as a device for 
excluding the chairman, whom he had already been enjoined from removing, 
and later expanded his proclamation to protect his military agents from 
punishment for their contempt - all of which was brought to naught by the
(10) Hearon v. Cains. 178 S.C.381 (1936)
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State Supreme Court and the Federal District Courts"*(11)
The present example of "martial law" in Pakistan is, in many 
respects, novel. To-day it exists there as a system of government.
The country is governed by Presidential decrees? no constitution has yet 
been framed and no legislature has been established? the courts are 
po\^ erless to assert their independence? all political parties are banned 
and the citizens have no right to challenge the Infringement of their 
rights and criticise governmental policies and measures. In brief, 
military government has been established to promote efficiency. Its 
claim seems to be the sacrifice of individual rights for the sake of the 
interests of society.
The most conspicuous feature of the regime is the trial of citizens 
by military commissions. In the absence of any real or threatened 
disturbance endangering the security of the State, the claim to try 
citizens by military tribunals would seem untenable. It is obvious that 
military tribunals which are "merely committees formed for the purpose of 
carrying into execution the discretionary power assumed by the government", 
(12) lack all the attributes of an ordinary court. The need to recognise
(11) Patten v. Miller. 190 Ga. 105? Miller v. Rivers. 31 F. Supp. 540?
referring to these and many other instances of such applications of
martial law Charles Fairman saids- "Episodes of this sort have 
given rise to many misleading cases. For a time it seemed that in 
several jurisdictions there was a short and safe way of getting over 
any difficulty without fuss about legality". He rightly concluded 
that Hughes3 C.J.*s opinion in Sterling v. Constantine. (1932) 287
H.S, 378 "brought order in this wild area". (1942) 55 Harvard Law 
Report 1253.
(12) per Mr. Justice Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, Volume 1 at
p. 216 (1883)? In re Clifford and 0* Sullivan. Yl92lT 2 A.C. 570?
Tilohko v. The Attorney-General(1907)" A."G*93.
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that, in time of peace the exercise of judicial power must not he 
entrusted to them, is Insistent and apparent.
As the basis of the proclamation of martial law in Pakistan in 
October 1958 was entirely different from that on which such a proclamation 
usually rests, It would be futile to expect similar judicial 
pronouncements from the courts In Pakistan. Apart from the questions 
whether the success of the new regime requires that the citizens of Pale is tan 
should be governed by "Martial law", when no state of war apparently 
exists and whether such rule can ever solve the problem of distribution 
of powers among different organs of government and the territorial units 
of the State, the most important criticism of the present regime has 
centred round the necessity of upholding the rule of law. Obviously the 
rule of law cannot exist when martial law is enforced or executive 
absolutism prevails. We need not discuss the values of personal liberty, 
freedom of belief and expression and the supremacy of the law, but may 
refer to the existence of opinion in P aids tan which has openly advocated 
them as a check against the exercise of unrestrained governmental power. 
Thus, Chief Justice Kayani of the West Pakistan High Court, in lamenting 
the sacrifice of fundamental civil liberties to the gods of order and 
progress, made this celebrated remark:
"There are quite a few thousand men who would rather have the 
freedom of speech than a new pair of clothes, and it Is these that form 
a nation". (13)
(13) Tjhe Times. London, 12th July, I960.
ABO
It is true that the Executive may genuinely attempt to act 
"according to law", but unless the judiciary, which can set the proper 
limits to the exercise of power, is independent, the claim that the rule 
of law exists in Pakistan under the present martial law regime would 
merely seem paradoxical.
A permanent system of martial law is equivalent to dictatorial rule# 
Those who uphold the principles of justice cannot give countenance to 
martial law in time of peace, (14) much less to martial law as a system 
of government as it will sooner or later degenerate into petty tyranny.
It may also be mentioned that at present there is no separation of 
governmental powers in Pakistan. All governmental power has been 
concentrated in the hands of the Executive. Montesquieuls theory pushed 
to its logical extreme may produce undesirable results, but "still there 
is the basic lesson against the overconcentration of power in any one 
branch of government". (15) Some division of power is essential in a 
State governed by law. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, 
or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution are subverted".(16)
(14-) "Of course no common law lawyer could feel much respect for so rude
a system of justice". (1942) 55 Harvard Law Report at 1258.
(15) B. Schwarta, Law and the Executive in Britain, at p. 15.
(16) The Federalist, No.4-7 (Madison)
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These references to the values of democracy and the machinery to 
ensure it would have been unnecessary if martial law had not been 
continued for such a long period and the tendency to centralise the 
administration had not been exhibited* Both were sufficient to raise 
misgivings and doubts* The claim of the present regime, that the
measures adopted by it, though radical in many respects, aim at removing 
the persistent obstacles "unfavourable to the working of a democratic 
government, may raise certain hopes and it was, therefore, extremely 
reassuring to hear President Ayub Khan x^ hen, addressing the Bar Association 
of the Karachi Branch of the West Pakistan High Court, he saids
nThe several refoimi commissions and committees which had been set 
up were working with speed to prepare the country for a representative 
form of government. As soon as these basic things looked like getting 
under way, a constitutional commission consisting of the best brains in 
the country would be established and its recommendations put before the 
country* Free and unfettered elections would be held thereafter11* (17)
The extraordinary measures under the regime have been continued on 
the alleged ground that the people were not yet ready to work a 
parliamentary democracy and needed time to prepare themselves for it, 
(critics have pointed out that democratic processes cannot be learnt under 
authoritarian rule) It is with this end in view that President Ayub Khan 
has promulgated the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, under which basic 
village councils have been set up and these will, by indirect election,
(17) The Times * London, 16th January, 1959*
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choose the future representatives to the National and Provincial 
Legislatures. It is also noteworthy that the present regime, though 
mainly deriving its support from the Army, is using civilian organs in 
carrying the country*s administration. Whatever its other failures and 
shortcomings may be, it must be undoubtedly recognised that President 
Ayub Khan*s revolution ”has consisted in carrying forward with military 
despatch what the politicians promised but failed to perform” .(18) The 
vigorous land reforms in West Pakistan, cleaning the civil service of 
corrupt officials, rehabilitation of the refugees, enforcement of laws 
against tax: evasion will always remain as the best examples of ”an honest 
zeal' for the public welfare”.
Whether the martial law regime will produce results justifying its 
imposition is yet to be seen. To provide the country with a genuinely 
democratic constitution is its biggest task. President Ayub Khan has 
expressed his preference ”aquarely and unshakably in favour of a 
presidential system in which a strong executive would be saved from the 
need to haggle for support from members of the Legislature”.(19) At
present the Constitution Commission Is considering various proposals on 
the future constitution. Public opinion has so far been positively in 
favour of a parliamentary system of government with a new set of checks 
and balances and the withdrawal of martial law. (20) In fulfilling,
without abdicating, the responsibility for protecting the best interests 
of the country, all personal inclinations should be subordinated to the
(18) The Dally Telegraph. London, 27th October, 1959*
(19) The Times, London, 12th July, I960.
(2°) The Guardian. London, 29th August, I960.
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necessity of respecting the people*s opinion.
The task of replacing the present ijdlitary government with a 
constitutional government is stupendous and the method of approach to the 
problem is unique. Until it is accomplished most people would agree that 
patient expectation is preferable to barren cynicism, "Judgment must 
wait", yet a few remarks without prejudice may be ventured*
What is happening in Pakistan to-day is, in all probability, a 
temporary phase. The problems raised by such prolonged continuation of 
martial law will undoubtedly attract attention, and unless they find 
immediate solutions, fresh complications are bound to arise. The 
approach to these solutions involves two considerations. First, it is 
a necessity to understand the essential nature of martial law, the 
circumstances in which its application will be consistent with 
constitutional principles, and the limits to executive or military 
discretion when it is being enforced. If the principles governing its 
proclamation and enforcement are lacking, practices indulged in by the 
present regime in Pakistan must be discontinued. Such mild judicial 
astonishment as has been expressed by a dissenting judge of the Supreme 
Court (2l) would be hardly stifficient to deter the executive authority 
from pursuing a course of action which trill find no support In the Anglo- 
American jurisprudence. It is essential that the highest court 111 the
(2l) "It is not at all common to find Martial Law being introdticed over 
a whole country in circumstances of general peace. Such a 
condition approximates more closely to the application of Martial 
Law to an occupied territory than to the like application over a 
disturbed area of municipal territory", per Cornelius J., as he 
then was, in The .Province of East Pakistan v. MehiH Av; TOiqn. 
P.L.D. 1959 S.C. 387 at p.439.-----------------------------
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land should give clear indications as to the proper sense in which martial 
law is applicable in Pakistan in future, the limits to which the executive 
should confine itself, even in times of extreme necessity or national 
emergency and the extent of the citizenfs rights* If it fails the 
supremacy of the law will never be a reality*
Secondly, in devising a future Constitution for Pakistan, the 
present regime should be guided by the principles governing the general 
legal and political pattern of the other members of the Commonwealth*
Such assertions as were made by the Indian Prime Minister immediately after 
President Ayub IChan*s assumption of powers (22) merely indicate the 
preponderant feelings in the other countries of the Commonwealth. Any 
sharp deviation from the common pattern Is liable to arouse suspicion and 
doubts in the minds of the other Commonwealth citizens. The harmonious 
development of relationship between the members of the Commonwealth, the 
growth of common democratic Institutions and the consideration of deriving 
maximum benefits from the membership of the Commonwealth point to the only 
conclusion, namely, Pakistan should retain a democratic constitution.
It is essential to recognise that if a nation is constitutionally 
impoverished, no doctrine or philosophy would be adequate to advance it 
In the field of cultural, economic and scientific progress. If the oft- 
repeated charge that the previous parliamentary government was weak to 
maintain its own existence, is it not legitimate to inquire "must a 
government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of the people"?(23)
(22) "The very basis of the Commonwealth has been democratic institutions 
and the parliamentary form of government" Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru* s 
statement in Parliament, The Times. London, 21st November, 1953.
(23) President Abraham Lincoln, quoted in Martial Law in Hawaii. (1942)
30 California Law Review at p*333.
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It must be recognised that, at least since Cromwell1s time, the 
way in which the present regime in Pakistan has been set up and the way in 
which it has functioned up to the present is unique. That circumstances 
in Pakistan made them necessary may be true and It may be conceded that 
those who now wield power in Pakistan are not pursuing their own ends 
but are bona fide patriots whose aim is to create a. situation in which 
democracy may become a reality but it has created a precedent in the 
Commonwealth to which, in countries where independence has only recently 
been achieved or In which it xdll shortly be achieved, politicians of 
a different type may appeal when setting up a "martial law" regime to 
achieve personal or party objectives* "Whatever form the Pakistan 
Constitution may ultimately take, it would seem essential that it should 
contain a chapter which should clearly set out in what circumstances and 
by whom martial law may be declared and the jurisdiction of the courts 
over the acts of those who exercise powers to declare and administer 
martial law. Such success as the present regime in Pakistan has enjoyed 
has been due to the fact that the politicians were taken by surprise* If 
any individual or body of persons were to contemplate setting up a similar 
regime after the new constitution has been promulgated, he or they would 
not find those against whom such action were aimed unprepared and the 
results of such an attempt might be disastrous. The supremacy of the 
Constitution must be guaranteed and extra constitutional actions prohibited* 
If Pakistan Is to avoid another experience similar to the present, the 
power to deal with emergencies must be declared in the Constitution.
APPENDIX I
14 April, 1919*
AN ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRIAL OF PERSONS CHARGED Y/ITH 
OFFENCES UNDER THE BENGAL STATE OFFENCES REGULATION 1804
Whereas the Governor-General is satisfied, that a state of open 
rebellion against the authority of the Government exists in certain 
parts of the Province of Punjab;
And Y/hereas the Governor-General in Council has, in exercise of 
the powers conferred by Section 2 of the B.S.O. Regulation, 1804, 
suspended, in respect of offences described in the said Regulation 
with which any person of the classes therein referred to may be 
charged, the functions of the ordinary courts of Judicature within 
the districts of Lahore and Amritsar in the aforesaid Province and 
has established martial law in the said district; and has directed 
the immediate trial by courts martial of all such persons charged with 
such offences;
And whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it expedient 
to provide that such trials shall be held in the manner and by the 
tribunals hereinafter provided;
Now, therefore, the Governor General in exercise of the power 
conferred by Section J2 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is pleased 
to make and promulgate the following ordinance
1. Short Title and Commencement.
(l) This Ordinance may be called the Martial Law Ordinance, 1919.
(2) It shall come into operation at midnight between the 15th and 
the 16th April, 1919*
2. Trials under Regulation X of 1804 to be held by Commission
(1) Every trial held under the B.S.O.R., 1804 (hereinafter called the 
said Regulation) shall, instead of being held by a court martial, be 
held by a commission consisting of 3 persons appointed in this behalf 
by the local government.
(2) The local government may appoint as many commissions for this 
purpose as it may deem expedient.
(3) At least two members of every such commission shall be persons 
who have served as Sessions Judges or Additional Sessions Judges for 
a period of not less than three years, or persons qualified £epex2C 
under Section 101 of the Government of India Act, 1915, for appoint­
ment as Judges of a High Court. The local Government shall 
nominate one of the members of the Commission to be President 
thereof.
3. Gohvening authority.
A commission shall be convened by the local government or by 
such officer as the local government may authorise in tbhis behalf.
4* Powers and Procedure of Commissions
A commission shall have all the powers of a general court martial 
iHxitexS under the Indian Army Act, 1911, and shall, subject to the 
provisions of this Ordinance, in all matters follow so far as may be 
the procedure regulating trials by such courts martial prescribed by
or under the said Act:
Provided that where, in the opinion of the convening authority, 
a summary trial is necessary in the interests of the public safety, 
such authority may direct that the commission shall follow the 
procedure prescribed for a summary general court martial by or under 
dksks a±xa the said Act, and the commission shall, so far as may be and 
subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, follow such procedure 
accordingly:
Provided further, that Sections 78, 80 and 82 of the said Act 
shall not apply to any trial under this Ordinance.
5. Stexfiroixng Confirmation of finding and sentence unnecessary
The finding and sentence of a commission shall not be subject to
confirmation by any authority.
6. Saving of Proceedings of Courts Martial already begun
Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect any trial held or begun
to be held by court martial under the said Regulation prior to the 
commencement of this Ordinance,
7. Retrospective Effect
Save as provided by Section 6, the provisions of this Ordinance 
shall apply to all persons referred to in the said Regulation who 
are charged with any of the offences therein described, committed 
on or after 13th April, 1919*
Chemsford,
Viceroy and Governor-General.
Appendix II
ACT NO. XXVII of 1919 25 SEPTEMBER, 1919
An Aot to indemnify officers of Government and other persons in 
respect of certain acts done under martial law, and to provide for 
other matters in connection therewith.
Whereas owing to the recent disorders in certain districts in 
the Punjab and in other parts of India, martial law has been enforced 
And whereas it is expedient to indemnify officers of government 
and other persons in respect of acts, matters and things ordered or 
drone or purporting to have been ordered or done for the purpose of 
maintaining or restoring order, provided that such acts, matters or 
things were ordered or done in good faith and in a reasonable belief 
that they were necessary for the said purposes;
And whereas certain persons have been convicted by courts and
other authorities constituted an appointed under martial law, and it
is expedient to confirm and provide for the continuance of certain 
sentences passed by such courts or authorities 
It is hereby enacted as follows
1. Short title. This Act may be called the Indemnity Act, 1919*
2. Indemnity of Government officers and other persons for certain
acts. No suit or other legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil 
or criminal, shall lie in any court of law against any officers of 
government, whether civil or military, or against any other person
acting under the orders of any such officer for or on account of
or in respect of any act, matter or thing ordered or done or purporting 
to have been ordered or done for the purpose of maintaining or 
restoring order in any part of British India where martial law was 
enforced, on or after the 30th of March, 1919 > a*id before the 26th of 
August, 19199 by any such officer or person; provided that such officer 
or person has acted in good faith and in a reasonable belief that his 
action was necessary for the said purposes;
And if any such proceeding has been instituted before the passing 
of this Act it is hereby discharged.
3* For the purposes of Section 2 a certificate of a Secretary to
Government that any act was done under the orders of an officer of Govern- 
ment shall be conclusive proof thereof, and all action taken for the 
aforesaid purposes shall be deemed to have been taken in good faith 
and in a reasonable belief that it was necessary therefcr unless the 
contrary is proved.
4. Confirmation continuance of martial law sentences
Every person confined under and by virtue of any sentence passed
by a court or other authority constituted or appointed under martial 
law and acting in a judicial capacity shall be deemed to have been 
lawfully confined and shall continue liable to confinement until the 
expiration of such sentence or until released by the Governor-General 
in Council as otherwise discharged by lawful authority.
5. Compensation in respect of loss attributable to certain acts.
When under martial law the property of any person has been taken or used
by any officer of Government, whether civil or military, the Governor- 
General in Council shall pay to such person reasonable compensation 
for any loss immediately attributable to such talcing or using, to be 
assessed upon failure of agreement by a person holding judicial 
office not inferior to that of a District Judge to be appointed by 
the Government in this behalf.
6. Savings. Nothing in the Act shall -
a) apply to any sentence passed or punishment inflicted by or under 
the orders of any commission appointed under the Martial Law Ordinance,
1919
b) be deemed to bar a full and unqualified exercise of His Majesty's 
pleasure in receiving or rejecting appeals to His Majesty in
or to affect any question or matter to be decided therein, or
c) prevent the institution of proceedings by or on behalf of the 
government against any person in respect of any matter whatsoever.
ORDINANCB HOn, II OF 1921 
26th August ? 1921
Ail Ordinance to provide for the proclamation of Martial Lav? to 
empower military authorities to make regulations for administering it? 
and to provide for other matters connected therewith«
Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide 
for the proclamation of Martial Law? to empower military authorities 
to make regulations and issue orders to provide for the public safety 
and the maintenance and restoration of order? to authorise the trial of 
certain offences by Special Courts constituted under this ordinance? 
and to provide for other matters connected with the administration of 
Martial Law<5
How? therefore? the Governor-General? in exercise of the powers 
conferred by Section 72 of the Government of India Act? is pleased to 
make and promulgate the following Ordinances-
In this Ordinance may be called the Martial Law Ordinance? 1921*
2* Martial Lav/ shall be in force and the provisions of this Ordinance 
shall apply in the area which is specified in the schedule and in such 
other areas as the Governor^General^in^Council may? by notification in 
the Gazette of India? direct? and in all such areas Martial Law shall 
be proclaimed by stich means and in such manner as the Local Government 
may direct 5 and shall remain in force in any such area until v;ith drawn 
by the Govemoi^GGneral^in^Couneil by notification in the Gazette of 
India? whereupon the provisions of this Ordinance shall eeas© to 
apply in such areas
Provided that no failure to comply with any directions of the 
Local Gove ranieni as to the manner of proclamation in any area shall 
invalidate anything done in the administration of Martial Law in 
pursuance of this Ordinance in that areas
Provided further that the validity of any sentences passed? or 
of anything already done or suffered? or any liability incurred or 
indemnity granted in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance
shall not be affected by reason only of the fact that this Ordinance
has ceased to be in force*
3« Administration of Martial Lav/s In any area in which Marbial Law
“  .air i . .... . V
if? for the time being in force? the Gommander™in~Ohief in India or an 
Officer not below the rank of Major-General empowered by him in this 
behalf? shall appoint one or more military officers? not being lower 
in rank than a Lieutenance^Colonial? to be Military Commanders to 
administer Martial (any such officer being hereinafter referred to in 
this Ordinance as “the Military Commander”) ? and the Military Commander 
shall exercise his powers in respect of such area or such part thereof 
(hereinafter referred to as an “administration area’1) as the appointing 
authority may direct*
4o Regulationss (1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance?
f -nrr inniii it m m  * *
the Military Commander shall have power to make; regulations to provide 
for the public safety and the maintenance and restoration of order and 
as to the powers end duties of military officers and others in 
furtherance of that purpose*
(2) Such regulations may provide that any contravention thereof? 
or of any order issued thereunder or supplementary thereto? shall be 
punishable with any punishment authorised by any law in force in any
part of British India? and any such contravention shall? for the 
purpose of this Ordinance? he deemed to he an offence against a 
regulation or an order? as the case may he©
(3) The power to make regulations shall be subject to the following 
c ondit i on s ? namely s «
(i) in making any regulation the Military Commander shall interfere 
with the ordinary avocations of life as little as may be consonant with 
the exigencies of the measures which he deems to be required to be 
taken for the purposes of Martial Law5
(ii) before making any regulation the Military Commander shall? if 
possible? consult the Senior Civil Officer in direct charge of the 
administration area in which he exercises power? but shall not bo 
bound to follow his advicef and 
(iii) the penalty? if any? for the contravention of a regulation 
shall be specified theroinft
(4) Tlx© Military Commander shall cause any regulation made by him 
to be published in such manner as he thinks best fitted to bring it to 
the notice of those affected? and shall transmit through the normal 
channel a copy of every regulation so made to the Command er~dn~Chief 
in India©
'5* Martial Law Orders 3 (l) The Military Commander may? by order
^  pi ii'wiim «ii iirT nrnMin iiinm n u i'i i n w rinr  m i) » ] i iiu rii i) * * ** v  r  v
in writing? empower any Magistrate or any military officer of seven 
yoQVSr service not below the rank of a Captain to make Martial Law Orders 
in any part of the administration area for the purpose of supplementing, 
the reguli tions in that area? and the punishment for the contravention 
of day such Order shall be that specified in the regulations for the 
contravention of a Martial Law Orders
Provided that no Order shall be made which is inconsistent with 
the regulations*
(2) ISvery Magistrate or officer making a Martial Law Order under 
sub*-section a) shall cause the same to be published in such manner as 
he thinks best fitted to bring it to the notice of those affected*
(3) A copy of every such Order shall? as soon as may be? be 
submitted to the Military Commander who shall have power to add to? 
modify or rescind any such Order in such way as he thinks fit©
(4) Lhere a Military Commander has under sub-section (3) added to? 
modified or rescinded any such Order? h© dial! forthwith* communicate 
the fact to the Magistrate or officer who made the Order? and such 
Magistrate or officer shall thereupon cause to be published in the manner 
hereinbefore mentioned the Order as so added to or modified? or the 
fact that the Order has been rescinded? as the case may be©
6© Courts under the Ordinances (i) Summary courts of criminal 
jurisdiction may be constituted for the purposes of this Ordinance in 
any administration area in the manner hereinafter provided*
(2) The Military Commander may? by general or special order in 
writing? empower any Magistrate appointed under the provisions of the 
Code of.Criminal Procedure? 1898? to exercise the powers of a 
Summary Court*
7* Limitation of Jurisdiction of Sunmiary Courts* No Summary Court 
shall try any offence imless such offeree mis committed
(a) in the adraini strati on area in which, such Court was constituted? and
(b) after such date (whether before or after the date of the
proclamation of Martial Law in the area) as the Governor-General^in-
Council may? in rospect of such area? by notification in the Gazette 
of M i a ,  diroct in this behalfo
8o Trial of Offences against regulations or Martial Law Orders«
(i) liJvery offence against a regulation or a Martial Law Order which 
is triable by a Summary Court shall be tried by such court? unless the 
Military Commander directs that it be tried by the ordinary Criminal" 
CourbfJo
(S) The ordinary Criminal Courts are hereby empowered to try any 
offence in I'espeet of which a Military Commander has made a direction 
under sub-section (l) and any offence against a regulation or Martial 
Law Order which is not triable by a Summary Court©
(3) Contraventions of any regulation or order made or issued in any 
area? after the date notified in respect of that area by the Governor- 
Genoral^in-Couneil under Clause (b) of Section 7 and prior to the 
enforcement of Martial Law by or under this Ordinance in that urea? by 
any officer acting in the exorcise of military control for the purpose 
of providing for the public safety of the maintenance or restoration 
of order - shall be deemed to bo offences against a, regulation or a 
Martial Law Order in force in that area under this Ordinance? and shall 
be triable and punishable as if any sentence authorised by any such 
aforesaid regulation under this Ordinance*
9*3 Trial of oifencQsconnectod with events necessitating Martial Law© 
(X) Sxtbject to the previsions of Section 7? offences? other than 
offences of the Iciud referred to in Section 8? connected with the 
events which have necessitated the enforcement or continuance of Martial 
Law?. or any class of such offences? may? if the Military Commander 
by general or special order so directs? be tried by Summary Courts,
(3) Xf any question arises whether or not an offence is an offence 
of the nature described in sub-section (1)? the decision of the Summary
Court shall,be conclusive on the point? and such decision thall hot be,, 
questioned in any Court# •'
(3) Tli© Military Commander or any authority empowered by him in
this behalf may? by a general or special order? give directions as to 
the distribution among the Summary Courts of cases io:fbe tried by them 
under Section 8 of this section*
IQ o Trial of Other Of fences * Save as otherwise provided in this 
Ordinance? all :offences shall be dealt with by the ordinary Criminal 
Courts exercising Jurisdiction in the administration area in the 
ordinary cou* so of law#
XIa Jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts* The ordinary Civil 
Courts shall continue to exercise civil Jurisdiction in the areas in 
which .Martial Law is in force by or under this Ordinance? provided that 
no Oivxl'Court shall exorcise ahy1Jurisdiction by way of intorforence 
with any-regulation. or Martial Low Order made under this Ordinance©
12* Procedure of Summary Courts* In the trial of any case a 
Summary;Court"shall? as far as possible? follow the procedure laid 
down in the Code of- Criminal Procedure? 1898? for the trial 'of warraht- 
casec? and shall have all the powers conferred by the said Gode on 
a Mg istrate in regard to the is sup of processes to compel appearance 
and to compel the product! on of documents and other moveable property. : 
Provided that the Court shall not be required to record more than a 
■memorandum of the ovHence or to frame a Toxmial charges
Provided further thaiy; in the trial of my offence punishable 
with, imprisonment'--for a term not exceeding one year? the Court may 
follow the procedure for the summary trial - of cases in which an appeal 
laid down in Chapter XXIX of the said Code® ;
13o Sentences by Summary Courbs® Summary-Courts-may pass any..
fffiinm M ■■mil  in u m u h m t m m  ■•-»-■. ri ■■ i W .i iinimwTbiBMBi^ VaiptgrqUTcfejfJiL-gftmjftl v  v  "»
sentence authorised by law or by regulations under this Ordinance 
provided that such Courts shall not pass a sentence of imprisonment 
for a term exceeding two years? - or- of fine exceeding one thousand5 . - 
rupeesB
14* Jurisdiction of Summary Courts* (1) No person shall be tried
p —1— r*r iTfrtfiTf , u m i ’t n n  i —•^ T-in-n * f  ^ Y1rii-ir<lv-o1iiiTTfrg‘Ttv'TVrmn,B-Ti-TTit*J^ -f/ rtf,.TTl‘rrf*f
-by a Summary Court for an offence which is punishable with imprisonment 
for a term exceeding five years* • . .
C2) If a Summary Court is of opinion that the offence disclosed
is one which it is not empowered to try? it shall send it for trial
to an ordinary Criminal Court having jurisdicti on®
(3) If a Summary Court is of opinion that an offence which it is
empowered to try should be tried by an ordinary Criminal Courts or
that it requires a punishment in excess of that which it is empowered 
to inflict? it shall stay proceedings and report tho case for tho 
orders of the Military Commander? who may direct that the ease shall 
bo tried by a Summary Court? or may send it to an ordinary Criminal 
Cornet having jurisdiction.
15* Legal Practitioners® J£vory per® n accused of an offence before 
a Summary Court shall be entitled to be defended by a legal practitioner* 
Provided that the Court shall not be requor ed to grant an 
adjournment for tho purpose of sopuring the. attendance of a legal 
practitioner if? In the opinion of the Court? such adjournment would 
cause unreasonable delay In the disposal of the case*
16* Nxclus ion of ini orf er enc o of Othor Court s « (1) Notwithsi ending
*1 ■ ■ i-^ r - n  in w ff  i i^ f iH ^ m n n r r r *  rralirYIr  ri‘ -  f -1 -iitmn« -T^m-trtn-t - ir ^ - ii-y mrii 11 m i-»f*-t n —rirtt—m -^nr ^ti— T—f- - — -------- /  w
tho provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 1898? or of any 
other law for the time being in force? or of anything having the 
force of law by whatsoever authority made or done? there shall be no
appeal from any order or sentence of a Summary Court? and no Court 
shall have authority to revise such order or sentence? or to transfer 
any case from a Summary Court? or to make any order under Section* 491 
of tho Cod© of Criminal Procedure? 1898? or have any jurisdiction of 
any kind in respect of any proceedings of a Summary Court®
(2) Hie power of the Governor^Oeneral-in-'Gounoii or the Local 
G-ovemment to make order under Section 401 of Section 402 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure? 1898? shall apply in respect of persons 
sentenced by Summary Courts*
17* Limitation of power of Summary Court to whip« Notmthstanding 
anything contained In sub-section2 of Section 4? no Summary Court 
shall pass a sentonce of whipping? for any offence against a regulation 
or Martial Law. Order except where tho offender has in the commission 
of tho offence used criminal force withintthe meaning of the Indian 
Penal Code*
18o Execution of sentences of whipplngy In the execution of any
impi I I M  ■ - I I |-n- [ irtw  *I|| Hull ■ r If irr~ |I iTrr n |i i>i i iiii n in ilT)i ll1 * * 11 ■ TiftBji . V  -
sentence of whipping passed by a Summary Courtp‘ the provisions of 
sub~saction (2.) of Section 392and the provisions of Sections 393 and 
394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 1898? shall apply? and every 
such sentence shall? us for as possible? be carried out In a place 
to which the public shall not be admitted®
19® Offence defined* Unless thero is anything repugnant in the 
subject or context? the word "offence” shall be doomed, for the purposes 
of this Ordinance and of Soot ions 401 and 402 of the Cod© of Crim5.nal 
Procedure? 1898? to include an dot which is? or which under tho 
provisions of this Ordinance Is doomed tomba? an offence against a, \ 
regulation or a Martial Low Order*
' '20* Saving« Mbihing in; this Ordinance shall b© construed as in 
dorogaiion of m y  powers for tho maintenance of law and order exercisable , 
by the Govemor-General^in^Oouncil or any other authority,
21# Validation of Martial'Law Sentences prior to proelamatL on,: Anv- 
sentence passed in any area? af-fcbr the date notified in respect of that 
area by the Cfover nor™Goneral^in«CounciX under Clause (b) of Section ? 
and prior to the enforcement of Martial Law by or under this Ordinance 
in that area? in, respect of any contravention, of a regulation or order • 
made or issued within the same period by any officer acting in the 
exorcise of military control for the purpose of■ providing ‘-for the public 
safety or the maintenance or. restoration of order shall b©'deemed to be 
as valid as if it were a, sentence passed under this Ordinance in respect 
of ar offence against a regulation- or a Martial'Law Order in fcrcein , 
that aroa under this Ordinance^
22© "ProceedInres not invalidated by certain irregularities© Mo sentences 
finding or order passed by a Summary Gourt shall be invalid by reason ’ 
only of any error? omissi on or Irregula rity has in fact occasioned a 
failure of justice#
23© Protection of bona fido action© Mo suit? prosecution or other 
legal: proceeding-whatsoever shall lio against any person for or on 
eg count of or. in respect of any act? matter or thing ordered, or done? 
or purporting to have been ordered or . done?  ^ /
; (a) under this Ordinance? or
(b) in the exercise of military control in any area for the purpose . 
of providing, for the public safety or the maintenance or restoration of 
order? after the date notified in respect of that area by tho Governor** 
Genoral-in-Gouncil under -Clause (b) of Section 7 and prior to the
enforcement of Martial Law by or under this Ordinance in that area. 
Provided that such per m i  has acted in good faith and: in a reasonable 
belief that his action was necessary for tho said purposes <>
Provided further that nothing in this Section shall prevent the 
institution of proceedings by or on behalf of the Governor against any 
person in respect of say matter whatsoever# .
Reading*
Viceroy and Govamor^Goneral,
Appendix IV 
Ordinance No IV of 1930
15th May, 1930
An Ordinance to provide for the proclamation of martial law in the 
town of Sholapur and its vicinity, to empower military authorities to 
make regulations for administering it, and to provide for other matters 
connected therewith*
Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide 
for the proclamation of martial law in the town of Sholapur and its 
vicinity, to empower military authorities to make regulations and issue 
orders to provide for the public safety and the restoration and maintenance 
of order, and to provide for other matters connected with the administration 
of martial law;
Now therefore, the Governor General, in exercise of the powers conferred 
by section 72 of the Government of India Act, is pleased to make and 
promulgate the following ordinance : - 
1* Short Title and intent*
(1) This Ordinance may be called the Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance, 
1930.
(2) It shall extend to the area comprised in the municipal limits 
of the town of Sholapur in the Bombay Presidency:
Provided that the Governor General in Council may, by 
notification in the Gaaette of India, extend this Ordinance to any 
other area comprised in, or to the whole of, the District of Sholapur*
2* Proclamation of martial law - In any area to which this ordinance
extends martial law shall be in force and shall be proclaimed by such 
means and in such manner as the Local Government may direct; and shall 
remain in force in any such area until withdrawn by the Governor General 
in Council by notification in the Gazette of India, whereupon the 
provisions of this ordinance shall cease to apply In such area;
Provided that no failure to comply with any directions of the Local 
Government as to the manner of proclamation in any area shall invalidate 
anything done in the administration of martial law in pursuance of this 
Ordinance in that area;
Provided further that the validity of any sentences passed, or of 
anything already done or suffered, or any liability incurred or indemnity 
granted in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance, shall not 
be affected by reason only of the fact that this Ordinance has ceased 
to be in fact.
3* Administration of martial law. In any area in which martial law is 
for the time being in force, the Commander-in-Chief of India or the 
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Command, shall appoint one or 
more military officers, not being lower in rank than a Lieutenant-Colonel, 
to be Military Commander to administer martial law (any such officer 
being hereinafter referred to in this Ordinance as "the Military 
Coranander”), and the Military Commander shall exercise his power in respect 
of such area or such part thereof (hereinafter referred to as an 
1 administration area’*) as the appointing authority may direct.
Regttiafcions. (l) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the 
Military Consnander shall have power to make regulations to provide for
the public safety and the restoration and maintenance of order and as to 
the power and duties of military officers and others in furtherance of 
that purpose.
(2) Such regulations may provide that any contravention thereof, or of any 
order issued thereunder or supplementary thereto, shall be punishable with 
any punishment authorised by any law in force in any part of British India, 
and any such contravention shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be 
deemed to be an offence against a regulation or an order as the case may 
be.
(3) The power to make regulations shall be subject to the following 
conditions, namely
(i) in making any regulation the Military Commander shall interfere 
with the ordinary avocations of life as little as may be consonant with 
the exigencies of the measures which he deems to be required to be taken 
for the purposes of martial law.
(ii) before making any regulation the Military Commander shall, if 
possible, consult the senior civil officer in direct charge of the 
administration area in which he, exercises power, but shall not be bound 
to follow his advice; and
(iii) the penalty, if any, for the contravention of a regulation 
shall be specified therein.
(4) The Military Commander shall cause any regulation made by him to be 
published in such manner as he thinks best fitted to bring it to the notice 
of those affected, and shall transmit through the normal channel a copy
of every regulation so made to the Comnander-in-Chief in India.
5- Martial Law order. The Military Commander nay, by order in writing, empower 
any Magistrate or any military officer of seven years* service, not below 
the rank of a captain, to make martial law order in any part of the 
administration area for the purpose of supplementing the regulations iii 
that area, and the punishment for the contravention of any such order shall 
be that specified in the regulations for the contravention of a martial law 
order;
Provided that no order shall be made which is inconsistent with the 
regulations.
(2) Every Magistrate or Officer making a martial law order under 
sub-section (i) shall cause the same to be published in such manner as he 
thinks best fitted to bring it to the notice of those affected.
(3) A copy of ebery such order shall, as soon as may be, be submitted
to the Military Commander, who shall have power to add to, modify or rescind
any such order in such way as he thinks fit.
(4) Where a Military Commander has added to , modified or rescinded any
order under sub-section (3)? he shall forthwith communicate the fact to
the Magistrate or officer who made the order, and such Magistrate or officer 
shall thereupon cause to be published in the manner hereinbefore mentioned 
the order as so added to or modified, or the fact that this order has been 
rescinded, as the case may be.
6. Offences. (1) No person shall -
(a) communicate to the enemy, or
(b) with the intention of communicating it to the enemy, collect 
publish or attempt to elicit, any information with respect to 
the movements, numbers, description, condition or disposition 
of any of His Majesty* s forces or any piLice force engaged in
administering martial law or in restoring or maintaining order, or with 
respect to the plans or conduct or supposed plans or conduct of any 
military operations by any such forces, or with respect to any woiks or 
measures undertaken for, or connected with or intended for, the defense 
of any place.
(2) No person shall commit any act which is calculated to mislead or 
hamper the movements or inperil the success of any operations of His 
Majesty's forces or any police force engaged in administering martial law, 
or in restoring or maintaining order.
(3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subjection (l) or 
sub-section (2) shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 
121 of the Indian Penal Code.
(4) Any person who voluntarily assists or relieves with money, victuals
or ammunition, or knowingly harbours, protects or conceals any enemy, shall 
be punishable with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to ten years, 
or with fine, or with both.
Explanation - for the purposes of this section, the expression **eneny" means 
any mutineers, rebels or rioters against whom operations are being carried 
out by His Majesty* s forces or the police for the purpose of restoring or 
maintaining order in any area in which martial law is in force by or under the 
provisions of this ordinance.
,7; Jurisdiction of ordinary Criminal Courts - All offences punishable under 
this Ordinance shall be dealt with by the ordinary Criminal Courts 
exercising jurisdiction, in the administration area, in the ordinary course 
of law.
• 8' Limitation of power to whip. Nothwithstanding anything contained in
sub-sect!on (2) of section 4? no Court shall pass a sentence of whipping 
for any offences against a regulation or martial law order except where 
the offender has, in the commission of the offence, used criminal force 
within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code
9* Jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. The ordinary civil courts shall 
continue to exercise civil jurisdiction in the areas in which martial law 
is in force by or under this Ordinance:
Provided that no civil courts shall exercise any jurisdiction by way 
of interference with any regulation or martial law order made under this 
Ordinance.
10. Validation of regulations and orders made before proclamation of martial 
law. Contraventions of any regulation or order, made or issued in any 
administration area on or after the 12th day of May 1930, and prior to
the proclamation of martial law in such area under section 2, by any officer 
of military control for the purpose of providing for the public safety or 
the restoration or maintenance of oder, shall be deemed to be offences 
against a regulation or a martial law order in force in that area under 
this ordinance, and shall be triable und punishable as if any sentence 
authorised by any such aforesaid regulation or oder were a sentence 
authorised by a regulation under this Ordinance.
11. Validation of martial law sentences prior to proclamation. Where, on or 
after the 12th day of May, 1930? and prior to the proclamation of martial 
law under section 2, in any administration area, any sentence has been 
passed by any officer acting in the exercise of military control for the 
purpose of pr obi ding for the public safety or the restoration or maintenance 
of order in respect of any contravention of a regulation or od^r made or
issued within this same period by any such officer, such sentence shall be 
deemed to be as valid as if it were a sentence passed under this Ordinance 
in respect of an offence against a regulation or a martial law order in 
force in that area under this Ordinance.
12. Protection of bona fide action. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding whatsoever shall lie against any person for, or on account of, 
or in respect of, any act, matter of thing ordered or done, or purporting 
to have been ordered or done.
(a) under this ordinance, or
(b) in the exercise of military control in any area for the purpose of 
providing for the public safety or the restoration or maintenance of order, 
on or after the 12th day of May, 1930* and prior to the proclamation of 
martial law in such area under section 2 s
Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the institution 
of proceedings by or on behalf of the Government against any person in 
respect of any matter where such person has not acted in good faith and 
a reasonable belief that his action was necessary for the aforementioned 
purposes.
^3* Saving. Nothing in this Ordinance shall be construed as in derogation 
of any powers for the maintenance of law and order exercisable by the 
Governor General in Council or any other authority •
Irwin
Viceroy and Governor General
Appendix V
Report of the Commission on the Featherstone Riots (1893)
Employment of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power
Requisition for Intervention by Troops
4. The primary obligation for the preservation of order and for the 
suppression of disturbances rests with the civil authority. The civil 
authority should only requisition troops when satisfied that it is or 
will be impossible to deal with the situation which has developed, or 
is immediately apprehended, by means of all the resources of the 
civil power, that is to say, the local police, supplemented by any 
additional police that can be procured from elsewhere or by any 
police reserves or special constabulary that may be available.
A military commander who receives a requisition for troops from 
a distance is bound to comply if he is not in full possession of the 
facts. If, on arrival, the magistrate demands immediate intervention 
before the commander has had time to investigate for himself, he must 
intervene and he would be protected by the law. If, on arrival, a 
commander has time to investigate, he must do so, and acquaint himself 
with the facts and judge for himself before he intervenes. A commander 
on the spot, while attaching great weight to the opinion of the 
magistrate, must himself decide whether military intervention is 
necessary to deal with the circumstances in which he has been 
requisitioned.
Responsibility between Civil and Military Authority
5* There remains to be considered on whom, after a decision to take 
action has been made, the responsibility rests in the case of the 
employment of troops in the suppression of disturbances. As stated 
in paragraph 4» the primary duty of preserving public order rests with 
the civil authority. A commander, therefore, in all cases where it is 
practicable, should place himself under the direction of a magistrate.
The duties of a magdstrate do not, however, impose upon him a 
knowledge of the weapons at the disposal of the troops, or of the 
effects of those weapons; he may not be, therefore, the best judge as
to the degree of force to be employed by the soldiers in the particular
circumstances for which he desires and requests their intervention.
A magistrate, therefore, if he acts with discretion, will necessarily 
defer to the opinion of the commander on military matters, particularly 
as to the degree of force to be used. The primary responsibility,
however, remains with the magistrate, and if he is on the spot, it is
his duty to request the commander "to take action" when the civil 
resources at his disposal are insufficient to deal with the circum­
stances which present themselves.
On the other hand, a commander will not be performing his duty 
if, from fear of responsibility, he takes no action and allows out­
rages to be committed which it is in his power to check, merely on 
the ground that there is no magistrate to direct him to take action.
If the magistrate and the commander are acting together, the
obligation lies on the magistrate to request the commander to take 
action, but the action to be taken, i.e. the degree of force required 
in the circumstances, must be judged by the commander; the latter 
would incur considerable responsibility if he were to fire without 
a request to take action from the magistrate or if he were to refuse 
to fire when requested to do so, but circumstances which he sees 
before him might justify a commander in firing, or not firing, 
notwithstanding the request which he receives from the magistrate.
The commander must judge of the degree of force to be employed, and 
it is his duty to fire if he cannot otherwise stop the violence which 
is being committed before him. He must decide whether it is 
necessary to fire or not, and is responsible for his action.
Quoted from the British Manual of Military Law (1951) Bart II, 
Section Y, at pp.2-3*
Appendix VI 
Ordinance II of 1955 
Martial Law (indemnity) Ordinance, 1955
An Ordinance to indemnify servants of the Crown and other persons 
in respect of acts done under martial law and to provide for certain 
other matters in connection with the administration of martial law 
(9th May, 1953).
Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to 
indemnify servants of the Crown and other persons in respect of acts 
done under martial law, and to provide for certain other matters in 
connection with the administration of martial law;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2 
of the Government of India Act, 1935? ^be Governor-General is pleased 
to make and promulgate the following Ordinances-
1. Short title, extent and commencement
(1) This Ordinance may be called the Martial Law (indemnity) 
Ordinance, 1953*
(2) It extends to all the Frovinces and the capital of the 
Federation.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
2. Definition In this Ordinance -
(l) '’Martial law area" means the city of Lahore as defined in 
the City of Lahore Corporation Act, 1941 (Punjab Act XV of 1941) 
the Lahore cantonment.
(2) "Martial law period" means the period beginning on the 
6th day of March, 1953 > an& ending on such day as the Central Govern- 
ment may by notification in the Official Gazette declare.
3* Indemnity of servants of the Crown and other persons for certain 
Qcts.
(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie
in any court against any servant of the Crown for or on account of or 
in respect of any act ordered or done by him or purporting to have been 
ordered or done by him in the martial law area during the martial law 
period for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order or of carrying 
into effect any regulation, order or direction issued by any authority 
responsible for the administration of martial law in the said area to 
which he was subordinate; and no suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie in any court against any other person for and on 
account of or in respect of any act done or purporting to have been 
done by him under any order of a servant of the crown given for 
any such purpose as aforesaid.
Provided that the act was done in good faith and in a reasonable 
belief that it was necessary for the purpose intended to be served 
thereby.
(2) For the purposes of this section it shall be conclusive proof 
that an act was done under an order of a servant of the Crown given
for one of the aforesaid purposes if the Central Government, in the case 
of an officer employed in connection with the affairs of the Central
Government, or the Provincial Government, in the case of an officer 
employed in connection with the affairs of a Provincial Government, so 
certifies; and an act shall he deemed to have been done in good faith 
and in a reasonable belief that it was necessary for the purpose 
intended to be served thereby except with the previous sanction -
a) where the act complained of was ordered or done by a servant
of the Grown employed in connection with the affairs of the Central 
Government, of the Central Government, and
b) where the act complained of was ordered or done by a servant
of the Crown employed in connection with the affairs of Provincial 
Government, of the Provincial Government.
5* Confirmation of order for seizure or destruction of property.
Where in the course of operations conducted in the martial law 
area during the martial law period property whether movable or immovable 
has been seized, confiscated, destroyed or damaged by or under the 
directions of a servant of the Crown acting under martial law, such 
seizure, confiscation, destruction or damage shall be deemed to have 
been lawfully ordered and authorized, and no claim shall be maintained 
in any court in respect of any such property for the restoration 
thereof or for compensation for any loss sustained in consequence 
of the seizure, confiscation, destruction or damage thereof.
6. Validity of sentences passed by martial law courts
All sentences passed during the martial law period by a court 
or other authority constituted or appointed under martial law and
acting' in a judicial capacity shall be deemed to have been lawfully
passed, and all sentences executed according to the terms thereof 
shall he deemed to have "been lawfully executed.
7. Confirmation and continuance of martial law sentences of confinement
(1) Every person confined under and hy virtue of a sentence passed 
by a court or other authority constituted or appointed under martial
law and acting in a judicial capacity shall continue liable to confinement 
until the sentence, reduced by remissions, if any, earned under the 
rules applicable to the serving of such sentence, is served, or until 
he is released by order of the Central Government,
(2) The provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898, shall not apply to any sentence or confinement referred 
to in this section,
8. Application of Sections 6 and 7 to certain trials under martial law 
The provisions of Sections 6 and 7 apply to sentences passed
during the martial law period by a court or other authority constituted 
or appointed under martial law notwithstanding that such court or 
authority may have held the whole of a part of its sittings outside 
the martial law area, or notwithstanding that the offence or a part 
of the offences for which the accused person was tried and convicted 
may have been committed before the beginning of the martial law period,
9. Saving
Kothing in this Ordinance shall prevent the institution of 
proceedings by or on behalf of Government against any person in respect 
of any matter whatsoever.
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